I have received some details from Dave Hanson whose grandfather was with 1 Kings Shropshire Light Infantry, like Neil Hampson’s great grandfather. The KSLI were on the left of 2nd York & Lancs on the 21st March 1918. Most of the information below comes from Dave, who also sent me copies of the battalion War Diary for those days.

From the War Diary Map of the area Details from Appendix to the Diary

This is extracted from Dave’s email to me; “My grandfather Pte William HANSON was with 1st Battalion KSLI for the last 18 months of WW1 having enlisted in 1916 at the age of 36 (with a family of 3 young children).  Grandfather was a Lewis gunner (I don't know which Company) and I distinctly remember him recounting how his small section were in an action and saw men running behind them. They assumed they were their own people pulling back but then realised they were German troops and that they were cut off. They dumped the Lewis gun in a shell hole and hid in nearby woods, eventually making their way back to our lines. I thought I remembered that this took two weeks but I have been told that this was unlikely, more like a few days. What makes me certain that this action took place on 21st March is that my grandmother told me much later that she had received a telegram reporting him missing in action and that at the same time a relative of his had been killed. I had no idea who this would be but in the course of researching my family history I have eventually identified this man as Pte Alfred HANSON of 1/4 KSLI who was a 2nd cousin of grandfather's; part of the family I knew nothing about - I've even found and met up with his niece but that's another story. Alfred died between 21st and 24th March 1918 further north in the line so I think this, together with what I now know of what happened to 1st KSLI on 21st/22nd March, fixes the time of grandfather's story.”

The following is from the 1 KSLI War Diary;

21st March. Desperate enemy offensive commences, remnant of Battalion mixed with portions of other units, endeavour to hold the enemy in the Haig Line. Inflicted enormous losses on the enemy; before the retirement to the Haig Line those of the Battalion (the great majority under Colonel H.M. Smith DSO) seeing themselves surrounded, determined to fight to the last.  Owing to the fact that very few got away from this ‘mêlée’ very little is known of the actual details of this fight.  Sunset found a handful of the Battalion under Lieutenant A.B. Rogers MC still in the Haig Line.  Quiet night.

22nd March. The remnant of the Battalion wedged between 1st The Buffs and 2nd York & Lancasters put up a desperate fight in the Haig Line.  About 3 p.m. unsupported by artillery who were moving back, the enemy having succeeded in outflanking the line in overwhelming numbers, it became necessary to fall back on to VAULX.  The retirement was conducted in good order. At dusk the Battalion received orders to withdraw to the G.H.Q line behind VRAUCOURT. In this the heaviest fighting the Battalion has ever known i.e. 21-22nd March 1918. The Battalion loss was in ‘Killed, Wounded or Missing’ 21 Officers and 492 Other Ranks, and earned for itself the admiration of all who fought with them and added fresh laurels to the history of a gallant Regiment. Only 44 O.R’s survived on the evening of the 22nd of those who were in the battle.

Main area of operations for 1 KSLI, with position of HQ shown at junction of Dunelm trench and the sunken road.  I have also marked the position where Pte Hanson and the Lewis Gunners started from.

The following is from an Appendix to the War Diary entry. some of the places referred to can also be seen in the photos I have on separate pages. These were supplied to me by Neil Hampson who took them earlier this year, 2003.

At 5 am the enemy heavily bombarded our trenches in the forward area, but did not shell the Defended Area about C.17.c and C.23.b  [this refers to the area in the square to the left of the HQ and the square below it, in the map above.  J Dillon] until about 5.45 am.  He used gas shells and HE mixed, and also shelled our batteries around VAULX and BOIS DE VAULX [below the bottom left of the map above J Dillon] very heavily with HE from 5 am onwards.

At 5 am on the 21st March, 1918 the enemy opened a very heavy bombardment of our trenches and communications. Communication was kept up till 7.30 am with all Companies, from Battalion Headquarters - ‘OK’ was received until then, when the Line to ‘A’ and ‘B’ was cut.

About 8 am the barrage lifted from the Front Line. Battalion Headquarters then received a message from O.C. ‘A’ Company, by runner, that ‘B’ Company was falling back on to ‘A’ Company, and that no Officer of ‘B’ Company had been seen. Also that the enemy were right through NORUIEL and advancing over Ridge towards Left flank of K.S.L.I.  A message then came through from 2/York and Lancaster regiment then on our Right that they were falling back, and a number of them came into LEEDS and BRADFORD RESERVE with ‘C’ Company 1/KSLI.  Headquarters and 3 platoons ‘D’ Company were in new trench round Battalion Headquarters facing NORUIEL.

With increasing pressure from direction of CORNHILL towards LAGNICOURT, troops in LEEDS and BRADFORD were falling back down DUNELM towards Battalion Headquarters defending DUNELM in both directions.

Colonel Smith then took forward the three platoons of ‘D’ Company (about MACAULAY AV) to counter attack towards NORUIEL. The enemy was by then in LAGNICOURT and well through NORUIEL and garrison at Junction of Sunken Road of (sic) DUNELM were heavily enfiladed down sunken road from NORUIEL; Major Osborne who was last seen at junction of DUNELM and sunken road (C.17.d.10.00) gave the order to fire down DUNELM, and keep up firing to both flanks.  He was last seen with another officer at the junction firing a rifle towards LAGNICOURT.

Those of the 1/KSLI who got out (55 in number) were collected in Haig Line and towards evening were withdrawn to Headquarters of 1/The Buffs in VAULX. A few remained with Brigade School platoon, who then had orders to counter attack a post on left of 1/The Buffs, from Major Morgan, 1/The Buffs. The enemy were bombed out of about 8 or 9 bays and a block established and held by 2/Lt. Snelling, 2/York & Lancaster Regiment. The enemy apparently held several hundred yards of Haig Line to left of 1/The Buffs.

At about 7 am, 22nd March, 1918, the enemy were reported to have broken through at BOIS DE VAULX.  All riflemen were collected and the road running to the right of old Brigade Headquarters was manned. Three attempts to launch a counter attack (see the reference on 2 York & Lancs page) were made, but with covering fire from artillery it was impossible to cover the 800 or 900 yards to the Wood.  A party of about 200 reinforcements of 51st Division came up, and again tried, but were held up.  At the time (about midday) there was no one on the right of the garrison holding the road near Headquarters for about 900 yards.  On the left was a gap of about 600 yards to 1/The Buffs in the HAIG LINE, left of the VAULX-LAGNICOURT ROAD. On their left the enemy held the HAIG LINE.  The enemy made several attempts to concentrate in the BOIS DE VAULX, but was dispersed by rifle and M.G. fire.

At about 2.30 pm parties of our men were seen withdrawing, about 1,000 yards left of VAULX, along high ground, left of BAPAUME-CAMBRAI ROAD.  About 3 to 3.30 pm a message was received that 1/The Buffs had fallen back towards VAULX. The enemy was now well round the left flank, and was in VAULX, and was also getting round the right flank, advancing down valley from BOIS DE VAULX. We inflicted heavy casualties on him, but as we were unable to get Artillery on to him and the batteries were withdrawing, we were unable to stop him.

Under heavy enfilade fire from VAULX, which the enemy now held, the left flank resting on VAULX broke and retired, and the line fell back on to positions in front of the G.H.Q. Line. At dusk we received orders to withdraw behind wire of G.H.Q. Line.

Some reasons were given for the success of the German breakthrough.

1. Failure to hold positions to last possible moment due to heavy percentage of casualties to Officers and NCO’s in Forward Areas.

2. When enemy opened bombardment, our Artillery put most of their barrage in NO MAN’S LAND and until 8 o’clock no enemy had advanced from his trenches, by which time our barrage had diminished considerably.

3. The rifle grenade S.O.S. rocket in most cases failed to go off properly.

4. Lack of communication with Artillery in order to obtain local barrage.  The enemy used white Very lights to indicate his position to his artillery, which replied effectively.  He also fired Red Lights when resistance was met with, and his Artillery concentrated in front of that area.

5. There was no communication between LEFT Battalion of the Division and the RIGHT Battalion of the Division on our left, although communication within the Division was sustained right through.

Points Observed.

1. Enemy’s first wave very thin. Lightly equipped and carrying M.G’s. Also pushed forward snipers. Second wave came on in mass. [This is the Storm Troop tactics J Dillon]

2. Enemy’s Field Artillery advanced with Third wave and were in action in NO MAN’S LAND before the Artillery had reached LAGNICOURT.

3. Enemy chiefly advanced along high ground in mass formation and through valleys in thin skirmishing lines, except down CORNHILL which was attacked in mass.

Suggestion - That in order to be able to put up a local barrage, Light Trench Mortars should be with Battalions (as Lewis Guns are) and that small dumps of L.T.M. Ammunition should be placed in places where a stand could be made, or counter attack launched.

This was signed on the 28 March by Lt. A.B. Rogers, 1/K.S.L.I.