This page copies a similar one elsewhere on the site, and covers the actions involving the 6th Battalion York & lancaster regiment at Suvla Bay.

On this page I have included some extracts from a book of letters home sent by 2/Lt Priestman of the 6th Battalion “With a B-P Scout in Gallipoli.”

Suvla Bay Chocolate Hill Ismail Oglu Tepe Private James Dillon Cpl. Joseph Rackstraw Private Wheeler Decision to withdraw Map of the area

A 6th Battalion officer wrote to the family of an officer who had died at Gallipoli

“Few of us were spared.  The bravest and best were taken.”

The involvement of the 6th Battalion was to be as part of the August 1915 offensive in Suvla Bay.  Here the IX Corps under the temporary command of Lieut.-General Sir F.W. Stopford, and made up of the 10th, 11th, 13th, 53rd & 54th Divisions would land in Suvla Bay. The plan for the 11th Division was: the 32nd Brigade (with the 6th Yorks & Lancs) to land at Suvla Point (this is from the Battalion history, but this landing point is incorrect, see map at the bottom of the page), and then, moving north of the Salt Lake, take Yilghin Burnu and the high ground to the north and east of it.  They would be followed by two battalions of the 33rd Brigade, while the 34th Brigade would advance in line with, and on the left of the 32nd Brigade.

The move to the landings by sea would test the constitution of many of the men.  On the day before sailing they had been inoculated against Cholera, a process which in 1915 had a sledgehammer effect on the strongest constitution. They were crowded on the transports with very little room.

“One by one we began to nod and doze, like old tired cart horses standing asleep in their stalls.  And one by one we began to lean heavily against each other, to lurch and sag and give at the knees, until at last we sank slowly down into a sprawling overlapping heap.  We had been on our feet since dawn. Most of us had “gyppy tummy” and many were suffering from sand-fly fever, a mild form of dysentery.” Water would be a vital commodity once the men were ashore and Hamilton had gone to some lengths to try to ensure that there would be sufficient during the landings; “Experience at Anzac had shown quite clearly that the whole plan must be given up unless a certain amount of water could be counted upon, and, fortunately, the information I received was reassuring. But, in case of accidents, and to be on the safe side, so long ago as June had I begun to take steps to counter the chance that we might, from one cause or another, find difficulty in developing the wells”. He looked everywhere for water containers; “...I addressed myself to India and Egypt, and eventually from these three sources [including the War Office] I managed to secure portable receptacles for 100,000 gallons, including petrol tins, milk cans, camel tanks, water bags, and pakhals”.

At 04:30 p.m. on the 6th August the battalion embarked, and was landed at 12:30 a.m. on the 7th and were moving forward in support of troops landed earlier.  They were in the area of Lala Baba, and remained on the reverse slope of this minor hill until dawn.  As soon as it was light, the battalion moved forward in two lines of double companies, in support of the 9th West York, towards Hill 10, “A” and “B” Companies in the first line and “C” and “D” in support, these coming now at once under heavy shrapnel fire from the direction of Anafarta Sagir and Anzac. Hill 10 was none the less reached by the battalion at 6:15 a.m., the two leading companies then continuing the advance to Chanak Cheshme with a few details of “C” and “D” Companies, the remainder of these covering the advance by rifle fire from Hill 10.  At 10 a.m. the Brigade reorganized in the rear of Hill 10 and General Stopford sent a message to General Sir Ian Hamilton giving a situation report and including “Consider Major-General Hammersley and troops under him [this included 6th Y&L] deserve great credit for result attained against strenuous opposition and great difficulty.” Hamilton was critical of the command organization during the attack on Hill 10, in his Last despatch he said; “No one seems to have been present who could take hold of the two brigades, the 32nd and 34th, and launch them in a concerted and cohesive attack. Consequently there were confusion and hesitation, increased by gorse fires lit by hostile shell, but redeemed, I am proud to report, by the conspicuously fine, soldierly conduct of several individual battalions.”  I believe this was a criticism of Stopford who had stayed aboard his sloop at sea rather than command from the beaches.

In his last despatch Hamilton wrote; “This attack [on Lala Baba] was carried out by the 9th West Yorkshire Regiment and the 6th Yorkshire Regiment (sic), both of the 32nd Brigade, which had landed at B beach and marched up along the coast.  The assault succeeded at once and without much loss, but both battalions deserve great credit for the way it was delivered in the inky darkness of the night.”

At 13:30 Brigadier-General Haggard, commanding the 32nd Brigade, was severely wounded.

At 15:00, it having been reported that the enemy had fallen back towards Anafarta Sagir, the 10th Division was ordered to attack Ismail Oglu Tepe, while the 33rd Brigade on the right of the 10th Division was to advance against Yilghin Burnu, with the 34th in support and the 32nd in reserve. Later, however, these orders appear to have been altered, the 32nd Brigade being now directed to move in support of the 33rd against Chocolate Hill, the battalion and the 8th West Riding forming the second line on the right and left respectively.  By 7 p.m. the lower slopes of Chocolate Hill had been reached by the battalion, and an hour later the hill was captured, the 33rd Brigade remaining in the position and there establishing an outpost line, while the 32nd Brigade withdrew to a position in reserve on Hill 10.

2/Lt. Priestman in one of his letters home describes their introduction to action that day: “As we push on, through sweet, sickly-smelling scrub now, the darkness in front takes the form of a peaked hill and we meet the first slopes of its flank. And then, to our straining ears, there comes a voice from the blackness on our right. Almost inaudible at first, it swells up into a shrill, wordless whine, quavers for a moment, and then dies again into silence.  Then again, “Ah-h-h-h-h ....” This time it halts and inflects as though trying to frame some word, then, almost as though it would sing a few quivering notes, it sinks down the scale into the night and the shadows again.”

There had been considerable confusion during the action against Chocolate Hill, and this was commented on by the Dardanelles Commission; “none of the Brigade commanders accompanied their troops.  Also, “In the absence of superior military control and guidance on the spot, a force of inexperienced troops, unacquainted with local conditions and consisting of a number of battalions drawn from five brigades - namely, two from the 30th, three from the 31st, two from the 32nd, two from the 33rd and one from the 34th - must have been lacking in cohesion and co-operation, and the evidence discloses the confusion and delay which resulted from this cause.”

On the 8th the battalion was advancing to the line Sulajik-Anafarta Ova, but the advance was held up, and they finished that afternoon some 800 yards north-west of Sulajik.  On the 9th the battalion was supporting the 9th West York and 6th Yorkshire, and ended the day entrenched in their position, with the 53rd Division now reinforcing both flanks of the 11th Division.

At 3:45 a.m. on the 10th the 53rd Division was ordered to attack, the 11th holding its ground, and only advancing should the attack by the 53rd be successful.  When, however, the assault was launched, the Turks had been very strongly reinforced, and by mid-day there were heavy losses on both sides. An attempted advance in the afternoon was checked, and by 7:30 p.m. the 32nd was ordered to remain where they were.  They held this position until 7 p.m. the following day, the 11th, and the Brigade was ordered to retire, the 6th Battalion bivouacking for the night at Lala Baba.  The battalion had suffered heavily during these actions: two Majors and one Captain as well as eight men had been killed; a Major, three Captains and two 2nd Lieutenants as well as 57 other ranks were wounded; one 2nd Lieutenant and 207 non-commissioned officers and men were missing.  A total of 282.    

On the 12th the companies within the battalion were reorganized, and at 6:45 p.m. the battalion moved to Hill 53 (Yilghin Burnu) with the Brigade, coming at once under heavy shrapnel fire and having three men killed, as well as a 2nd Lieutenant and 28 men wounded. The position on the hill was reached after dark and the battalion took over trenches from battalions of the Queen’s and Sussex Regiments, and here during the 13th Turkish snipers were responsible for the deaths of two and the wounding of four men of the battalion. The battalion held on to the position here until the 18th under many and heavy attacks, and it was relieved at night and withdrew to the beach in the rear of Lala Baba, where it bivouacked, and enjoyed a short but much needed rest; it left its bivouack, however, on the evening of the 20th and proceeded to the relief of the 5th Battalion Dorset Regiment to the east of Chocolate Hill, preparatory to a general advance which was planned to take place on the 21st.

One of the officers with the 6th Battalion was 2/Lt. E. Y. Priestman and some of his letters home were published in a boo ‘With a B-P Scout in Gallipoli’, in this he gives a description to his mother of their surroundings; “You must try to imagine us squatting on our haunches in a shallow and dusty trench, listening to the most appalling uproar you could dream of.  Behind us our big guns are roaring, above us the shells are tearing through the air, and in front of us, all up the long valley ahead, the crash of their bursting is simply deafening. Somewhere (all too vaguely described to us) are three lines of Turkish trenches which must be taken today.  But the valley is broad and thick with bushes, and the enemy is cunning to conceal his position.  No matter! this terric bombardment will surely overawe him and make our advance a simple matter.  So we sit and listen and wait for the hour to come when we are due to hurl line after line of British Tommies against those trenches.  Can you picture the feelings of all of us as we watch the minute-hand slowly creep towards three?  Ten minutes only now. Now only seven.  And what of us all when that hand shall have touched the half-hour ...... ?”

The 11th Division, together with the 29th was to attack Ismail Oglu Tepe.  The 32nd Brigade was to attack a hill (Hill W) on the east of Ismail Oglu Tepe, where, if successful, it was to dig in while the 33rd Brigade passed through and captured Hill 101.  In the 32nd Brigade the 6th Yorkshire and the 6th Yorks & Lancs were to be the assaulting battalions on right and left respectively, the 9th West York and the 8th West Riding were to follow in support; on the right of the 32nd Brigade was the 34th, while the 29th Division was on its left.  The objective of the assaulting battalions of the 32nd Brigade was the trench on the lowest slopes of Ismail Oglu Tepe, where the two leading battalions would dig in, allowing the two battalions in rear to pass through and advance on the Turkish trench beyond.  Hamilton described the conditions that day before the attack; “By some freak of nature Suvla Bay and plain were wrapped in a strange mist on the afternoon of the 21st August. This was sheer bad luck, as we had reckoned on the enemy’s gunners being blinded by the declining sun and upon the Turkish trenches being shown up by the evening light with singular clearness, as would have been the case on ninety-nine days out of a hundred. ..... I wished to postpone the attack, but for various reasons this was not possible......”

The attack commenced at 3 p.m. on the 21st and came under very heavy shrapnel fire at point-blank range, causing many casualties but the first objective was reached and the enemy fell back. However the attack had not gone to plan. According to Sir Ian Hamilton the 32nd and 34th Brigades, leading the 11th Division, lost direction and moved north-east instead of east, while the 33rd Brigade, following in support, not only fell into the same error, but became divided, with the result that the attack by the 29th Division on the left of the 11th, and which was directed against Scimitar Hill, failed equally. Hamilton in his Last Despatch; “....but the 32nd Brigade, directed against Hetman Chair and the communication trench connecting that point with the south-west corner of the Ismail Oglu Tepe spur, failed to make good its point. The brigade had lost direction in the first instance, moving north-east instead of east, and though it attempted to carry the communication trench from the north-east with great bravery and great disregard of life, it never succeeded in rectifying the original mistake.”

Extract from the Dardanelles Commission report; “Major-General Hammersley attributes this brigade’s loss of direction to the fact that its right battalion lost all its officers within the first few hundred yards.” By 4 p.m. the attack had come to a standstill, and on the 22nd the Brigade was withdrawn and the battalion withdrew to the reserve area on the beach. There were only five officers and 287 other ranks in the battalion.  Because of the heavy casualties in the 32nd Brigade, the four battalions were reconstituted into two composite battalions until they could receive new drafts.  The 6th Yorks & Lancs together with the 9th West York became the No. 1 Composite Battalion.

From the Commission’s report; The casualties in the IXth Corps on August 21st were approximately as follows: in the 11th Division, 58 out of 129 officers and 2,300 other ranks out of 6,400.  In the 29th Division a little under 5,000 officers and men. In the 2nd Mounted Division which was about 4,000 strong, 1,200 officers and men, or 30 per cent.

In the fighting on the 21st August, one of those from the 6th Battalion who was killed was Private James Dillon (11355).  His death is recorded on the Helles Memorial on the tip of the Gallipoli Peninsula, panel 171. I don’t know if my grandfather knew him or not.  But with the same family name and in the same battalion, it’s quite possible as so many of them came from the same local areas back home.

Another who took part in the attack was Corporal Joseph Rackstraw who served in the 6th battalion. He was the great grandfather of Andrew Pike who contacted me via the site, he is remembered on the Helles memorial panel 55-58. Also Sandra Edwards has told me that William John Byott in the 6th BN East Lancashire Regiment, Sevice no. 17090 was a family member and he died on 20th August 1915 and is Buried at Alexandria War Cemetary Chatby.

I have also been contacted by Mike Wheeler whose grandfather, “10702 Private Frederick Wheeler (whom he unfortunately never met) joined the 6th Battalion Yorks & Lancs at Pontifract aged 22, born in Rotherham. He joined the regiment on 18th August 1914, was wounded in action at the Dardenelles on 22nd August 1915 and was discharged on medical grounds on 6th April 1916. He spent some time at the convalescent camp,Ripon, Yorkshire, before being discharged.”

Following the action in August, the months of September and October were relatively quiet, the war diaries showing a repetition of “nothing to report.”  There were a number of drafts of men from England in September, so allowing the battalions to recover their individuality. It is quite likely that it was at this point that my grandfather joined the battalion. His overseas service being noted as starting on the 5th September, 1915. In October General Sir Ian Hamilton was replaced by General Sir Charles Monro.  he then recommended the cessation of the attempts to gain the Dardanelles, and the evacuation of Gallipoli. By now the 32nd Brigade was under the command of Brigadier-General A.G. Dallas following the previous wounding of General Haggard.

The decision having been taken the 6th Battalion, like all the others, began to pull back from the 10th December, the last of the battalion strength leaving on the night of the 19th.  The battalion withdrew to Imbros where they remained until the 28th January, 1916.  They then embarked for Lemnos and onward transportation to Alexandria, where they arrived on the 2nd February.  This was then followed with a move to Sidi Bishr where they made camp and the battalion was taken over by Major G.H. Wedgwood.  They now started their spell of duty in Egypt, which is covered briefly in my grandfathers notes.

But the evacuation did not save 2/Lt. Priestman of the 6th Battalion who died on the 19th November. The Sheffield of February 5th, 1916 carried an article covering his death.

“Our trenches ran along the coast, near Jeffson’s Post, and orders had been received for us to work along the furthermost sap to enable us to gain a portion of higher ground on the left of our sap. In order to do this it was necessary to leave our trenches at night, run forward with sandbags to the place marked, and dig in as rapidly as possible.  On this particular night, Lieutenant Priestman and about thirty N.C.O.’s and men were detailed to make good this position. Leaving the trenches about 1am, they gained the position without incident, and commenced to entrench as quietly as possible.  Shortly afterwards the Turks rushed the position. Lieutenant Priestman did not retire, but opened a rapid fire, which kept the enemy at bay for a while, but, coming on again with a combined rush, they decimated the whole of the gallant little band. Lieutenant Priestman fell, fighting till the last, and Regimental Sergeant Warr was also killed whilst taking up a message to him.

We attacked the position again in larger force next night, and succeeded in holding it.  The bodies of Lieutenant Priestman and several men were discovered, all the wounded having been removed by the enemy.  The captured position was named ‘Priestman’s Post’ by Headquarters, to commemorate the gallantry of this young officer, who was respected by all who knew him.”

The map below is from the Battalion history.  I believe there is an error, all other sources have the Battalion landing, along with the rest of 32 Brigade, south of Nibrunesi Point, around the area “Sand Hills”.