The following is the report written by the C.O. of the 2nd Battalion York and Lancaster Regiment, Lt. Colonel Flint. It is useful to refer to the trench map to get a picture of the area detailed in the report.  All other references state clearly that the infantry attack did not start until after the artillery barrage finished at 09:40. In this report the infantry attack commences around 08:30, I can only assume that this report is written against a different base time, 1 hour different.  I have read and re-read the report, and can still not make up my mind whether or not those who are referred to as surrendering are from this Battalion or from units of the 71st Brigade who were on the right of the 2nd York & Lancs.

See the photos on the page from my visit to the area of the attack.

I forward the following report on the operation on 21st inst.  On that date my Battalion was disposed as follows.

D Coy. Front line from Cornhill to Wakefield with 1 platoon in York Support.

C Coy. in Leeds Reserve on either side of Dundee Avenue.

A & B Coys. in Sunken Road, A Coy on the right, B Coy on the left side with alarm posts in Lagnicourt trench on the right and left Battalion HQ.

At 5 a.m. on 21st the German Barrage commenced and was put down extremely heavily on Lagnicourt Trench and the Sunken Road immediately in rear, and outside Battn HQ and York Support.  H.E. and gas shells being employed.

Only a light barrage was put on the front line and reserve line.

At about 7:30 hrs an intense barrage was put on the front line and this was maintained until about 8:30 a.m. when it lifted to the reserve line, remained there till about 8:45 a.m. and then lifted right back.

The barrage lifted from Battn HQ and Lagnicourt trench at 9 a.m

The barrage killed and wounded practically the whole of the front line Coy., only 15 O.R. surviving and eventually getting back to the reserve line. The barrage did not cut the wire in front of the front line or reserve line.

No infantry attack developed against my front line from the front.

At about 8:30 a.m. as far as I can ascertain the enemy infantry assaulted the front line of left Battn. of 71st Brigade (Sherwood Forresters) and captured the front line; they spread outwards and elements of them crossed CORNHILL and advanced towards York Support and Re..(can’t read this word) Ave.  The remnants of the front line Coy. fought these for some time but were eventually forced back to the Reserve Line. The right Lewis gun detachment in the front line engaged the enemy towards MAGPIES NEST and kept up the fire until the gun was knocked out.  The next phase was the attack on the Reserve Line.  The enemy advanced in considerable numbers along POULTRY and reached the Reserve Line about 9 a.m.  Every man of both C & D Coys. whom I have questioned state that no resistance was offered there and that the garrison surrendered without fighting, being plainly visible leaving the trench with their hands up as the enemy approached.  This left my right flank exposed. The enemy quickly got into Lagnicourt in large numbers and attacked C Coy. in flank and right rear.  At about the same time this Coy. was also attacked from the left by enemy who had evidently got in the strong point between Bolton Ave. & Wakefield Alley as part of the garrison was driven down into my company. This Coy. had suffered considerable casualties from the barrage as they came out of their dugouts when the enemy was seen advancing on the right before the barrage lifted from Reserve Line.

They were eventually driven out of the reserve line and retired down Dundee.

In response to a request for reinforcements by C Coy. I had ordered A Coy. to reinforce them at about 8:45 a.m.

A Coy. got out of their dugouts into Lagnicourt trench preparatory to moving up, suffered considerable casualties, got out of the trench to our wire when they saw large numbers of the enemy advancing from Leeds Reserve. They engaged these when the enemy shortened his barrage to the wire and killed and wounded the greater part of A Coy. B Coy. had moved from the Sunken Road to their alarm posts in Lagnicourt trench at about 5:30 a.m.   At about 8:50 a.m.  I received a message to say that they had suffered considerable casualties, that large numbers of the enemy were advancing from Leeds Reserve and that they were going to fight it out.  The only survivors of their Coy. were a few men who had been left behind in the dugouts.

At 9:00 a.m. when the barrage lifted from Battn. HQ I went up and saw the enemy in Bradford Reserve about POULTRY & advancing through Lagnicourt village. I manned the trenches round HQ & opened fire but owing to the cover afforded by the houses could not stop them. They went through the village & continued to advance along the ridge & up to the Vaulx Road.  I had to detach men to hold them at the crucifix at C23. B65.55 (map reference) & also in Dunedin Av. to prevent them getting round behind me.

This weakened my available garrison and eventually after about 1/2 or 3/4 hour I was driven out of Dunelm Av. & the enemy got into the Sunken Road by Hd Qtrs.

I hung on until machine guns opened on us from about (map ref I can’t read) when I decided to withdraw not having sufficient men to form all round defence & seeing no signs of counter attacks coming up.  I withdrew my Headquarters & those of left Battalion & the remnants of Coys. down Dunelm forming flank defences on both sides to prevent the enemy carrying out his endeavour to press in from both sides.

Arrived at the next Sunken Road I took up a position to hold on but here again was outflanked from the north and eventually retired to the Vaulx Line where I put in all my men to strengthen the garrison of that line.

I attribute the success of the enemy to;

(1) the extremely heavy barrage

(2) the large numbers he employed

(3) the lack of training in open warfare of our men

(4) the tactics of the enemy in breaking in on certain fronts & then spreading outwards thus taking our defences in flank and rear.

(5) the lack of counter attacks from behind at the crucial moments.

(6) the men though game to fight were tired from the enormous amount of work they had been called upon to do.

Lt. Col.

24 Officers & 390 O.R. Killed/Wounded/missing