The operations on the Gallipoli Peninsula did not involve the 6th Battalion, York & Lancashire Regiment until the landings at Suvla Bay in August 1915. This section and its associated pages gives the background to why the British opened a theatre of operations in the Dardanelles, and the build up to the August landings.

Some of the material has been taken from the report of the Dardanelles Commission, 1914 - 1916.

As the world moved towards war the geographical position of Turkey (the sick man of Europe) became critical. The Ottoman Empire straddled the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, so controlling access to the Black Sea, and Russia’s trade through those narrow waters. Turkey was neutral and it was important to Russia, Britain and France that she should remain that way.

Two days before the outbreak of war Germany and Turkey agreed an alliance against Russia, though it did not commit Turkey to military action.  At this point Britain, who had been building two dreadnought battleships for Turkey, requisitioned them for Britain.  This caused great indignation in Turkey. Germany responded by immediately sending a battlecruiser and a light cruiser to Turkey to become part of the Turkish Navy.  These two ships were part of a force which bombarded Russian positions on the Black Sea coast on the 29/30 October 1914. The Allies then declared themselves officially at war with Turkey on the 31st October.

The idea of an attack on the Dardanelles had been conceived before the outbreak of war by Churchill (First Lord of the Admiralty) and Kitchener (Secretary of State for War). In this plan the invasion force would have been Greek, however, come the day the landing forces would be British, Australian and New Zealand men.

The operational plan was built on the premise that strong naval forces could destroy the strong ground forts that defended the narrows, with little use of ground forces. The naval forces would then force their way up to Constantinople.  Once started the operation must continue as it was felt that withdrawal would involve to much humiliation for the Allies.  The attack plan would be forced to change, as would the view on withdrawal.  The supposed ability of the naval guns to overcome the land forts was based on the success of the Germans against the Belgium forts of Liege and Namur.  A strong element of that success however had been the use of howitzers, and these were not part of the naval armoury. In the words of the Commission “Looking to all the facts of the case, we are disposed to think that undue importance was attached to the ease with which the Belgian forts were destroyed, and that the extent to which there was any analogy between those forts and the forts at the Dardanelles was over-rated.”

At the War Council held on January 13, 1915 Vice-Admiral Carden, C-in-C for the Mediterranean briefly outlined his plan;

“His proposal was first to concentrate fire his fire on the entrance forts.  When they were demolished he would proceed to deal with the inner forts, attacking them from the Straits and from the seaward side of the Gallipoli Peninsula.  This plan was based on the fact that the Dardanelles forts are armed mainly with old guns of only thirty-five calibre.  These would be outranged by the guns of the ships, which would effect their object without coming into range.”

The decision arrived at by the War Council was;

“The Admiralty should prepare for a naval expedition in February to bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula, with Constantinople as its objective.”

The Dardanelles Commission were to say of this; “It is impossible to read all the evidence, or to study the voluminous papers which have been submitted to us, without being struck with the atmosphere of vagueness and want of precision which seems to have characterised the proceedings of the War Council.”

There was to be much discussion over how much the decision makers intended this to be a naval or a combined operations attack.

Lord Grey (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) “My recollection is that it was distinctly said to us that the troops would not be asked for; that if the Navy could not carry out the operation by itself, the operation would not be proceeded with; and that our first consent was given on that understanding; and I gave my consent on that understanding because I was informed - I believed Lord Kitchener’s opinion to be - that no troops were available.”

The final decision to go ahead with the Dardanelles operation was taken at the War Council on January 28, 1915. Churchill was a strong advocate for the operation while Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson, and The First Sea Lord, Fisher were less so. The Dardanelles Commission felt later that the experts should have been more encouraged to make their views known to the politicians; “What actually happened was that the stress laid upon the unquestionable advantages which would accrue from success was so great that the disadvantages which would arise in the not improbable case of failure were insufficiently considered.”

The naval attack would start on the 19th February, 1915.