The photo on the right is from the Illustrated London News. The caption when it was published was;

IN COMMAND OF THE BRITISH ARMY IN FRANCE AND FLANDERS: GENERAL SIR DOUGLAS HAIG, WHO HAS SUCCEEDED FIELD-MARSHAL SIR JOHN FRENCH.

After the battle the post-mortems and analysis began, with the employment of the raw untried 21st & 24th Divisions as a focus for many of the arguments; why were they used in the battle at all, why not have used experienced troops withdrawn from the line and their place taken by the new divisions; and why, if they were used, were they starting from so far back so causing their involbvement to come too late.

At this point I will use an extract from the War Diary of the 12th West Yorkshire. It is rare to see comments on the conduct of actions in the diaries, making this officers comments on the conditions experienced as the Reserves moved up, more telling; “Certain points should be borne in mind. The men had breakfast in the wet bivouac on Saturday morning and cookers were set going for the midday meal. A certain amount of rations was carried on the men, one M & V [don’t know what this refers to  J.Dillon] to three men and, of course, the iron ration.  Next day’s ration had been brought up, but had to be left, because there were no means of carrying it, the supply waggons having been taken away. from the time of leaving that bivouac the men received no more food till Sunday night. The hot meal in cookers for Saturday noon was never served out, and most of the men, practically all, obeyed the order “not to touch the iron ration till ordered by an officer”, and order which no officer gave as far as can be gathered.  The packs were wet and heavy, the men wet through.  The worst was the thirst.  The men had always been able to get liquids when they wanted them, and suddenly had to go without from Saturday midday till the return next day, while carrying a wet pack of 200 rounds of ammunition.  The packs were only taken off once, from bivouac to battle, and then for one hour only, when the battalion lay down in the dark, on the N side of the road between PUITS No.7 and our front line trenches.”

While neither Sir John French nor Haig can be blamed for the organization that led to the conditions experienced by 12th W. Yorkshire, and the rest of the Brigade, it is perhaps a measure of the rawness of the officers from Divisional Commander down that these conditions prevailed on the march to the battle, after they had already had a number of night marches from the rear area.  These were not troops fully ready for battle but there was also an argument employed that said troops who had not seen battle would not know what to expect and may be more ready to get ‘stuck in’ than those who knew what happened if you did.

The decisions on the involvement of the divisions and the timing of that involvement were the responsibility of Sir John French as Commander-in-Chief.  He had deliberately retained this control rather than give it to Haig. Sir John had given an assurance to the Divisional Commanders that they would only be used when the attack had succeeded and the breakthrough had started.  Clearly that assurance was not kept to, however it should be remembered that communications were poor on a World War 1 battlefield, and such as they were they relied on observations from individuals who also only had a limited view of what was happening.  No satelites, no mobile phones! The HQ staff had received messages on the first day that led them to believe that I and IV Corps were indeed succeeding. Alas this information was misleading so the reserves were employed, but at a time when the Germans had been able to reinforce their second line, something that the British believed they would not be able to do.  The breakout had not happened and the situation for First Army was somewhat desperate. 

It was stated at the beginning of the section on Loos that Kitchener had pushed French and Haig to go along with the battle, but after that the planning would seem to have under estimated the Germans as opponents.  They were not considered to be able to reinforce their second line, some unit commanders believed that the enemy in front of them would surrender rather than hold on although there was no evidence to back up that belief. The employment of gas, for the first time by the British, was a little like their first use of tanks at Flers in 1916, there was not sufficient to give the weapon a decisive impact, and just as the ground was poor for the tanks, so the weather conditions for gas were less than ideal. While commanders have to believe in the success of their venture when they launch a battle, there is no point in assuming you will lose Day 1, at the same time there has to be reasonable provision for what happens on Day 2.  There was insufficient artillery to provide the support that the troops would need on the 26th September.

Haig was in no doubt that the C-in-C was at fault for not putting the reserves under his command earlier when he could have used them, he believed, to good effect. He put his views in writing to Lord Kitchener in a letter of the 29th September;

“You will doubtless recollect how earnestly I pressed you to ensure an adequate Reserve being close in rear of my attacking Divisions, and under my orders.  It may interest you to know what happened.  No Reserve was placed under me. My attack, as has been reported, was a complete success. The enemy had no troops in his second line, which some of my plucky fellows reached and entered without opposition........The two Reserve Divisions (under C. in C.’s orders) were directed to join me as soon as the success of the First Army was known at GHQ.  They came on as quick as they could, poor fellows,.....

The final result is that the enemy had been allowed time in which to bring up troops and to strengthen his second line............

I think it right that you should know how the lessons which have been learnt in the war at such cost have been neglected.  We were in a position to make this the turning point in the war, and I still hope we may do so, but naturally I feel annoyed at the lost opportunity...........

Yours very truly, D. Haig

For Haig to claim that his first attack “was a complete success” does not accord with the facts, nor is it one with which most people would agree, but his intent was for French to carry the responsibility for the failure to use the reserve correctly, and so lose the opportunity, as he saw it, for a victory.

On the 8th december 1915 Sir John French tended his resignation to the Prime Minister and was replaced as Commander-in-Chief by General Sir Douglas Haig.