Andjelkovic, Miroslava [1999] 'Williamson on Bivalence', Acta Analytica 14, pp. .

I criticize two proofs Timothy Williamson gives in support of the thesis that the denial of bivalence leads to absurdity. In “Vagueness and Ignorance” this denial is expressed as ¬(T(‘p’) w T(‘¬p’)). Since bivalence is about truth and falsity this could be correct only if T(‘¬p’) means F(‘p’). I argue that T(‘¬p’) means F(‘p’) only if bivalence for ‘p’ holds. In Vagueness, from ¬(T(‘p’) w F(‘p’)) and Aristotle’s dictum (T(‘p’) : p) v (F(‘p’) :¬p) plus classical logic Williamson derives a contradiction. That is correct, Aristotle’s dictum really implies bivalence. What is wrong is the claim that this proof proves that bivalence must not be denied of a particular vague sentence. Since a vague sentence can be used to convey information I argue that we can consistently say that “’TW is thin’ is neither true nor false” is true if F(‘p’):¬p does not hold.