This book defends, with qualifications, the ontology of common sense. It argues that, in all ontological strictness, there exist such familiar objects as trees, humans, glaciers and snowflakes; even, indeed, some artifacts. Most contemporary metaphysicians recognize as real only objects far less familiar, and generally objects far smaller, e.g. the microparticles of physics, and some recognize no objects at all, but only "world-stuff". The book begins by arguing that attributing strict reality to any objects is harder than is sometimes understood: the properties which mark out the existences of real objects, viz. their essential properties, must mind-independently hold their status as essential. But this raises an epistemological mystery: for how could we ever identify mind-independently essential properties? The book answers this question. We can, then, claim there are at least some objects in the world. Can we claim there are familiar objects? Arguments against such objects as trees and glaciers are fueled by worries about causal exclusion and about vagueness. The book addresses these. The book concludes with a case for the reality of (some) artifacts and of ourselves as products of evolution, a case which is partly independent of the replies offered to causal exclusion and vagueness.