Copeland, Jack [1997] 'Fuzzy Logic and Vague Identity', Journal of Philosophy 94, pp. 514-34.

Fuzzy logic extends deductive methods to situations in which the information available may be only partly or approximately true. Fuzzy logic has often been championed as a logic of vague terms, and it does indeed provide an intuitive analysis of what goes wrong in Sorites reasoning. Here a fuzzy semantics is given for a language containing the quasi-modal operators 'Determinately' (Î) and 'Indeterminately' (Ú). The semantics is sensitive to higher-order vagueness. For example, the semantics distinguishes between Herbert's being a clear borderline case of a bald man and his being a borderline borderline case of a bald man. I show that a famous reductio ad absurdum of the statement 'Ú(a=b)', due to Gareth Evans, is not valid when the background logic is fuzzy logic. Moreover, an improved form of Evans's reductio due to Harold Noonan is also not valid.