The second reason, that if they were shown to be real, they should not be allowed to affect any Allied solidarity in the war against Germany.

The British Foreign Office and the United States State Department's refusal to acknowledge this bit of German propaganda they said was designed to undermine the solidarity of the allies, said the Germans were to blame, and  it made the lie that more easy to establish.

But the Foreign Office documents relating to Katyn in 1943 to 1944, dealt mainly with the implications that the evidence might undermine the close relationships already under strain between the British allies, Soviet Union and Poland.  In fact they avoid any suggestion of guilt and avoid pointing the finger at any nation.  Giving credence to the idea that they wished it had never surfaced.

The British Government's only interests lay in looking forward to victory, and the importance of good Soviet-Polish relations in the future.

The Russian denial of the German accusations was resentful but vague. However the Russian Government wanted to discredit  Germany in any way it could and were quick to make political gains out of the affair in order to mollify the Polish, whom they had future designs on.

The animosity and lack of trust caused by the affair would only damage future  Soviet-Polish relation.. This would have been complicated if Polish attempts to get the International Red Cross to investigate Katyn had succeeded.

The Russians attack alarmed the British Government.. The view at the Foreign Office was that the Soviet Union had been actively looking for just such an opportunity to pick a fight with Poland that they could, without a doubt win.

At the time talks aimed at settling the boarders of Poland and Russia were in progress, as files found in the Foreign Office show.

The ordinary Polish people believed that the Russians were responsible for the massacre, and that Russia was involved as the files of Special Operations Executive point out in a note regarding the Katyn massacre.

'Most Poles were convinced that the officers in question were dead after it became evident in 1941 that the Soviet Government would give no information as to their whereabouts'