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Post-Autistic Economics Network
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from post-autistic economics newsletter : issue no. 5, March, 2001
Gilles
Raveaud (co-founder of Autisme-Économie)
In this article, we present
the reasons for our discontent as students of economics in France (1.) and
find that they have a broad cause : the (desperate) quest of economists for
scientificity (2.). Our proposal is to turn the teaching of economics in a
completely different direction, where teaching of controversies would be
given priority (3.). We then explain why teaching through controversies is
preferable to current methods (4.), and, well, how to do it (5.). Finally, we offer a very tentative insight
into the theory of knowledge, by pointing out affinities between the
classical works of Max Weber and those of Tony Lawson. We then suggest that
this more general framework of comparisons (in a well defined sense) may prove
a useful guide, not only for teaching, but for research as well. 1. Reasons for our discontent I will briefly review here the reasons for our
discontent, as expressed in our petition (full text on our website: www.autisme-economie.org) : - First, we criticized the construction of
“imaginary worlds” by economists. That is, worlds which do not have any link
with any plausible mechanism in reality. Such worlds (the famous “models”)
are just developed for their own sake, because of their tractability. We no
longer want to be taught such fairy tales, the aim of which is not to explain
« reality », but just to show the ability of the writer to
construct a « nice model ». It may be fun for the authors, but we
do not want to be part of the game. - Second, we highlighted the excessive use of maths
in the curriculum. Here, the situation is well known and does not require
further explanation. Let me just emphasize the fact that in France, the
fascination with maths is particularly developed, and the level required of
students extremely high in most cases. - Third, we stressed the fact that most
« explanations » given in lectures are derived from neo-classical
economics. Marxism and Keynesianism, just to name a few alternate views,
which were living schools of thought in France not so long ago seem to have
completely disappeared[1][1]. Nowadays, virtually no student has the
opportunity to study Marx as part of the common curriculum. Furthermore, the
explanations given are not thought of and presented as possible explanations of complex phenomena (say, unemployment, or
international trade), competing with different approaches. They are supposed
to be the only possible economic analysis of such phenomena, in the following
sense: even if people do not actually behave according to these views, it is
because other elements (social, traditions, imperfections, etc.) blur the
picture. But the proper economic part of their activity is as defined. As one can see, the situation is disastrous[2][2]. As so many writers have already given
possible reasons for such a situation in economics, we will simply focus on
one aspect of the problem: the quest for scientificity for economists. There
are two reasons for selecting this problem: first, these are the terms which
have been used by teachers reacting to the first teachers’ petition, which
supported our views. Second, we consider it as the central source of our
problems, even if this view is only a conjecture and is subject to revision. 2. The underlying causes: seeking
for scientificity A few weeks after launching our petition in May
2000, we were supported by a petition from teachers, signed by approximately
140 teachers, with some very famous people among them (Aglietta, Orléan,
Boyer, etc.). This text from the teachers stressed the lack of pluralism in
economics and rejected the overall domination of neo-classical economics on
courses. Later on, another text, signed by only a dozen
economists, but nearly all of them important in the Establishment, reacted
against both the students’ and teachers’ petitions. Their purpose was, as
they put it, to « preserve the scientificity of economics ». This
had to be done in the most traditional of ways, following the known
recipe. The following principles were
insisted upon in this tract: - First, the “precise identification and definition
of concepts and behaviours which characterize economic activity (consumption,
production, investment, etc.) and the formulation of basic hypotheses
concerning such behaviours.” - Second, “the formulation of theories expressed as
formalised relationships between the concepts previously defined ” - Third, “the verification of such theories through
experience. This can only take place through confrontation with history, as
quantified by statistics and econometrics. They then denied that there was any illegitimate
domination by neo-classical economics : any views are valid, as long as
they respect this canvas. One can note that their reaction did not engage with
our criticism: where we talked about teaching,
they talked about science. They did
not answer any of our points : imaginary worlds, the excess of maths and
lack of pluralism. Instead, they gave us a mythical description of science,
where everyone is simply doing their best with their limited means (isn’t
that rational ?). In short, leaving the classrooms, the debate was now
entering the field of methodology. So much the better, as this suddenly gave coherence
to our protest. We had focused on specific points which, through related, did
not lead to any necessary coherence. Now, with the help of the
« counter-appeal », we had more than coherence: we had a common
cause. Let’s take this case seriously[3][3]. In the construction of a « science » so
naively understood, one has few options. The phenomena studied, even analysed
as « stylised facts », are so complex that you have to choose among
them if you want to produce a « result ». From claiming to be global,
the analysis in fact turns partial. Then, if your purpose is to construct
logical relationships between « objects » (to be defined), you can
hardly do without maths. But then again, as you progress, things will get
just so complicated - leading either to many solutions or none at all - that
you’ll have to spend your time simplifying your hypotheses. Besides, for reasons which cannot be explained here,
the dominant view in neoclassical economics is that everything starts with
the individual, you then have to define your « individuals » as
narrowly as possible. Actually, you will not deal with
« individuals », nor even economic « agents » any
more : you simply declare them to be their (unobservable) preference
curve, and that’s it. You then have a solid basis on which to ground your calculations.
Does this lead to any analytical success? We know that it hardly does. Even the logical basis of such a simple
phenomenon as the « law of supply and demand » cannot be
established[4][4]. The logical consequence is that the whole approach
should be re-thought. But as the « scientificity » of economics is
to preserved, this is not an option. You have to follow this road, produce
results, refine your hypotheses, in order to « make science
progress ». You are not going to give up the possibility of constructing
a science, are you? Following the magi’s’ scientific recipe has three
consequences: - First, models are not supposed to be realistic:
their aim is not to give insights into real phenomena, but to participate in
the global and fascinating construction of a science. One can no longer
criticise models on the grounds of irrelevance. From the point of view of this major achievement, which is the
construction of a general economic science, universally valid, these models
are, on the contrary, perfectly relevant. But, yes, in a sense, they are
« imaginary ». - Second, science understood this way has to be
mathematical. There is no precise reason for that, apart from the fact that
any science is mathematical, isn’t it ? You would not call sociology a science,
would you ? As economists, theoreticians deal with quantitative data
(inflation rates, balance sheets, etc.), so there is no reason for them not
to use them. More fundamentally, their purpose is to construct a general and
logical theory, on the model of classical physics[5][5] – so they need maths. And, as they need
maths for research, maths needs to be taught[6][6]. So there cannot be an excess in the
use of maths. The only possible difficulty is not enough maths, or inadequate
maths. But not too much. - Third, as their aim is, I hope you’ve understood
it by now, the construction of a « science », the idea of competing
theories is nonsense. Well, of course, you can debate specific problems,
propose different tools, but this game is required to take place on the same
field. You cannot play against someone situated on a different pitch, can
you? We need common rules, a common language. So you have to learn this
language first of all: after that, you will be absolutely free to make any
use of it, honest. The points we highlighted are not here by random.
Even more, as we hope to have shown it, they
are not a problem for those who subscribe to the line of « scientificity ». They are, on the
contrary, perfectly coherent. That is, our critics can no longer concern
themselves only with teaching: they have to encompass theory as well, and
methodology.
Let’s turn back to the image of science insisted
upon by those economists : aren’t there any conflicts of power, any
competing views on the good in economics? Aren’t there completely opposed
conceptions of what a society and an economy is among economists? Does
everybody agree on the way to produce scientific analyses of economic
problems? To put it frankly, the conception of science those economists have
is really naïve: many works, written by sociologists studying natural sciences, have shown how
knowledge is constructed through
the conflict of theories[7][7]. Moreover, they’ve shown how the permanence
of such debates is intrinsic to science, and is, one could say, its engine.
No science is a calm and eternally defined pitch. On the contrary, its lines are constantly evolving, and
sometimes scientists do not even agree on the shape of the ball ! Would economics be an exception? Fortunately not.
One knows how economics has been the scene of terrific fights over the years
since its very origin, whenever one locates that beginning. Moreover, the
point of such battles was often over the very foundations of the discipline
(the forms of the lines of the pitch), not only its methodology (the rules of
the game) and objects (shape of the ball, if any). Such controversies do
exist in economics, they are numerous and persistent. What does « controversy » mean? A strict
definition of it could be the following : A formulates a theory, that B
criticises, A replies, and so on. Examples of such controversies are for
example, the « Vining-Koopmans » controversy on the place and role
of maths and theory in economics. The controversy started with Koopmans
qualifying Burns and Mitchell Business
Cycles of « measurement without theory », because it was not
based on neo-classical grounds. In his reply, Vining pointed out that
Koopmans’ judgement relied on a stringent definition of economics, according
to which only his approach (neo-classical theory) was valid, although he had
no firm results which showed the productivity of such an approach. The
controversy concerned the definition of acceptable theory and the reasons why
neo-classical economics should be preferred[8][8]. As one can see, this controversy has never been
settled : there is no « scientific answer » to the problems
raised above, even if the majority of economists support one view rather than
the other at a certain time. This is what economics is really about : conflicting views about problems and the way
to deal with them ; competing claims on which policy to support. This is
just so obvious that one is surprised to have to recall this. Newspapers are
filled with economists contradicting one another on the policies to be
followed, because their theories differ. Everyone knows that there is no such
thing as an economic science, at least not in the sense understood above, but
the students are required to believe there is. Only economics students are
supposed to believe that there is a knowledge about economic facts which is
coherent, precise, and which leads to clear policy recommendations. 4. Teaching through controversies Controversies, even understood in the restricted
sense given above, are numerous in economics (see the classical debates on
value ; the question of the nature and measurement of capital ; Keynes and
Hicks on the IS-LM model ; Romer and Solow on growth theory ; etc.)
But one can understand controversies in a broader sense : that is, the
competing views on recurring problems in economics. Theories of consumption
are an excellent example of this: starting with the Keynesian
« consumption function », one can trace back the attempts by Brown,
Modigliani and Duesenberry to « save » the Keynesian function. One
can then turn to Friedman’s radical criticism, with his « permanent
income hypothesis », and its revision through the life-cycle model. All these models are not to be presented as trials
and errors on the road to an ever better theory : on the contrary, they
are to be presented as what they are,
that is, conflicting views on an economic problem of central importance. In
particular, such theories, and the differences between them, simply cannot be
understood if one is not aware of their consequences in terms of economic
policy. Teaching these models should be quite different than at present; each
theory should be presented on an equal footing, given its chances in the
competition of science. In particular, one should focus not only on the
« model » itself (if any), but also on three crucial aspects of the
problems surrounding the use of the model: the context of the debate ;
the role and place of empirical data ; the consequences for economic
policy. As one can see, teaching is much more demanding in
this context, as it is supposed to encompass all the dimensions of the
problem under consideration. In fact, what we are suggesting here may already
exist, in some shape or other, but, even if it is the case, it is done
through various courses, which are not linked to one another. Statistics are
taught for their own sake, with no or little reference to economic
theory ; the history of thought very often overlooks the mathematical
contents of theories ; and economic theory is presented as being
autonomous from everything else. The complete absence of economics textbooks
constructed in the way we propose is a clear indication of this disastrous
« division of labour » among researchers and teachers. As a result of the present state of teaching, the
student does not acquire any knowledge of the economy he lives in, nor of the
competing theories that set out to explain it. With what we propose here, it
could be hoped that both lacks would be filled : controversies make
theories lively and real ; and their empirical content gives us
knowledge of « facts », as we show below.
Teaching should focus on controversies, past and
present. The idea of neutral tools would quite simply disappear.
« Micro » and « macro » lessons would be replaced by a
single and large course on « economic theories », presenting them
in the way described above, in historical (and not logical) order. There
would then be the time to present Classical and Marxian approaches seriously,
spending time on reading texts, and not simply solving silly ready-made
exercises. In practice, this implies that neo-classical theory should not be
taught in the first year, and perhaps even not in the second year. Besides,
we propose a broad course on political
philosophy, explaining the ethical and political backgrounds and the
consequences of the theories proposed. A canvas would therefore be laid down for a stimulating
debate inside economic departments : theories would be presented as
being in permanent confrontation with one another, the course on economic
theories following their historical development and reasons for success and
decline. As we stressed above, the purpose of such a course would be to
present both the historical context
of the theories and their precise
analytical content[9][9]. This would be completed by the
political philosophy course, which would show the permanence of questions
such as the role of the State in economic matters; the fairness of the
market; the definition of money; etc. and the varying answers given to such
questions through history. Statistics and econometrics would then be taught in
close relationship with such lessons. Even if these subjects are necessarily
autonomous in the sense that they need to present their own techniques,
tutorials (at least) should be entirely devoted to the examination of
problems linked with what is presented in the two courses defined above (how
does one measure the « natural rate of unemployment »? How did it
evolve in the UK or the US or Gambia? What is « purchasing power
parity » and how to measure it? How can one measure the value of the
Keynesian multiplier nowadays in a particular country? What is the value of
the rate of profit ; is it declining? etc.). In particular, it is
important that students should work on real data, with its imperfections, and
not, once again, on artificial sources[10][10]. A common and simple consequence of all this is that
we would get rid of all ready-made
exercises. Well, one or two may be tolerated, as they are useful aids to
understanding a theory precisely. But
the aim of teaching should no longer be the mastering of such tools. They
should remain what they should never have ceased to be, that is, analytical
tools with limited relevance. The object and purpose of economics and its
teaching is the world outside: what do we know about it? How do we know it?
Do we all agree on this knowledge, and if not, why? What do our theories have
to say about it? And above all, to be honest: how to make it a better place
to live in?
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