Notes on Naval Strategy and Tactics
Lieutenant H. STANSBURY R.N. PREFACE.
Every member of a naval mess has probably either listened to or taken part in discussions concerning naval strategy and tactics, and has probably noticed, with myself, that such discussions rarely, if ever, lead to any useful result; each disputant at the finish being just as bigoted in his own opinion as at the commencement.
A long time ago, comparatively speaking, I came to the conclusion that the reason was that both sides argued superficially and from different and unproved data, in fact, that nobody seemed to have any ideas on the fundamental laws of their subject.
This led me to try and find out what those laws were, with the hope, I suppose, of being better equipped than my adversary when next I should be drawn into a similar discussion; and the result of such studies is contained in these few notes, which I hope will prove of use to others, even if they only provide some sort of a basis for argument.
I do not claim any, or but little, originality, but merely to have condensed the observations and conclusions of the eminent writers whose works I have read, in a handy form for reference to any particular branch of the subject, such as, I hope, corrected and enlarged, may some day blossom into a manual on the same subjects.
INTRODUCTION.
The elements of naval organisation, as of any war-like organisa-tion, may be generally enumerated as: -" Personnel," " Material," Strategy," and " Tactics."
If we apply these terms to the simplest of all war-like organisa-tions, namely, to a solitary armed man, we have for personnel the man, for material his weapon, while his strategy is the position in which he places himself for attack or defence, and his tactics are the operations he performs either to damage his adversary, or to ward off his opponent's attack.
These four elements are so intimately bound up with each other that it is impossible to discuss any one without bringing in the others, just as it would be impossible to discuss the proper strategy and tactics for single combat without mention of the weapon used, or, still more so, to advise concerning tactics before we knew something concerning the strategic position assumed
But, in these notes, the personnel and material are only referred to where absolutely necessary for making clear points connected with the strategy and tactics, which latter may be defined as follows
"Strategy" is the science of distributing the personnel and material in the most advantageous manner.
"Tactics" is the art of delivering an attack or of repelling one.
PART I. - STRATEGY.
CHAPTER I.
LAWS OF STRATEGY.
PERMANENT AND TEMPORARY BASES.
THE great fundamental law of strategy is concentration, by which is meant that the principal object the science would teach us is to attack our enemy in detail with an overwhelming force. The reason of this is that the victor in any combat, if the victory is at all decisive, always inflicts far more damage than he receives.
Thus, supposing two hostile forces of equal strength are each divided into three fleets, A, B, and C, and that by superior strategy the combined fleets A, B, and C of one bring the opposing A fleet into action, the chances are that this A fleet will be practically destroyed, while the combined fleet, although each ship may have received a certain amount of damage, are very unlikely to have lost one-third of their force in the operation, and, therefore, are left superior to the B and C fleets of the enemy.
The truth of this law has been practically demonstrated by nearly every great commander the world has seen, and there is hardly any big war, whether on sea or land, whose history we may study, that we don't perceive how much the victory has rested on a true appreciation of it; though, perhaps, the best examples may be seen in Nelson's victory of the Nile, as far as sea warfare is concerned, and in all the operations of Napoleon and von Moltke in land warfare.
But in naval warfare, as in land warfare, the weapon of attack has also to act as the shied, and, while preparing to strike, has also to ward off the enemy's strokes; or, better still, by the perfection of the guard, prevent the enemy delivering an attack.
In fact, to return to our simile, in the same way that a swordsman uses his weapon to guard himself till the actual moment of delivering his attack, and as, should his attack wholly or partially fail, he is always ready to return at once to a position of guard, so must our forces be disposed to protect the source of supplies and the means of obtaining them, as well as to keep open a way of retreat.
In other words, since the source of supplies for the British Navy is ultimately the British Empire and trade, the second fundamental law of strategy may be enunciated as "Protect our possessions and keep open the lines of communications."
But for the operations of the fleet, the most important parts of our possessions, in fact, the vital parts of the Empire's anatomy, are the naval bases, from which supplies are drawn and to which the ships must resort for repairs. Thus, in the same way that our swordsman would be justified in exposing some non-vital part so that he could get in a fatal blow simultaneously, so would our fleets be justified in temporarily exposing part of our possessions or trade to attack, if by so doing they could deliver a more damaging blow at the enemy's forces.
From which, I think, we are perfectly justified in limiting the second law to " Protection of the bases and lines of communication," especially as such would, as will be seen, imply protection for certainly our most important possessions and trade routes.
Having obtained these two laws to guide us, we will now discuss the disposition of the fleets, and more especially their bases of operation.
Bases of action for a fleet are of two descriptions, namely, permanent, or those constructed and fortified in time of peace, and temporary, or those constructed during hostilities with the material at disposal and for convenience during the carrying out of certain operations.
The selection of the most appropriate sites for permanent bases is the great strategical problem for solution in time of peace, and is attended with serious difficulties owing to our having no certain know-ledge as to who will be our opponents; the only thing remaining is for us to choose those places best situated for operating against the principal arsenals of possible enemies.
The present bases on the coast of England itself, namely, the Nore, Portsmouth, and Plymouth, seem well situated with regard to the North Sea and Baltic, Cherbourg and Brest respectively, besides being adjacent to one another, so we will proceed to consider the bases of the Mediterranean Fleet.
Now, the requirements of a permanent base that is not situated in England itself, and which has not, therefore, the whole resources of the country to draw from, arc as follows: -
1. It must either contain sufficient supplies to provide the fleet during the war and sufficient plant to effect all necessary repairs, or it must be so situated as to enable communications to be kept up with home.
2. It must be capable of such defence as will permit the fleet to lie therein without danger from torpedo attack or from surprise, always supposing proper precautions to have been taken.
The advantage Gibraltar possesses over Malta with regard to situation lies in the first of these conditions, namely, the ease with which communication could be maintained with England, which would be impossible at Malta with anything like a strong enemy in the western basin of the Mediterranean. For most of the principal naval arsenals in the Mediterranean lie much nearer to the Straits of Gibraltar than does Malta; and this would render it absolutely impossible for any ships stationed at the latter place to bring into action a fleet attempting to leave the Mediterranean. On the other hand, Gibraltar is so placed that a fleet using it as a base of Operations could entirely prevent any of the enemy's ships in the Mediterranean interfering with our Atlantic trade, or combining with allies outside without being first brought to action, which would leave only our Mediterranean trade open to serious attack; and this would be small if the trade route for Eastern seas were diverted round the Cape, as it presumably would be by the blocking of the Suez Canal.
It is impossible to avoid the fact that the attempt to use Malta, except as an advanced base, in the event of the scene of hostilities being in the Adriatic or eastern basin of the Mediterranean, would be a serious strategical error, leaving, as it does, the enemy to make a descent on the line of communications at will.
In the fulfilment of the second condition, Gibraltar is certainly not naturally well endowed, but engineering science is rapidly over-coming the natural defects, and making it tactically as well as strategically strong.
We will now turn to the remainder of the world, where, leaving the United States out of the question, the only foreign arsenals at all worthy of the name lie among the South American Republics and on the east coast of Asia.
The present situation of the latter resembles, in a way, that of North America and the West Indies a century ago, and it seems probable that it will occupy much the same position with regard to naval operations in the next great war as did the latter at that time.
This behoves us to look to our bases in those parts, and to see that they fulfil the two conditions we have laid down, and that they are conveniently situated with regard to foreign arsenals.
Wei-hai-Wei is at present the most advanced base we possess on this coast, and the line of communications is well supported by such fortified posts as the Cape, Mauritius, Singapore, and Hong-Kong, with the whole resources of the Indian Empire almost in the line; while, if the command of the Mediterranean and Suez Canal were obtained, the line would be still stronger through Aden and Ceylon.
The key of the line of communications is at Singapore, which would of necessity be the base of operations for any ships required to keep clear the narrow seas and straits, through which lies the route to China, and this point should be made as strong as possible.
For this purpose it would be well if the resources of the Empire now employed in providing a naval defence for the arsenal at Bombay, which, being quite out of the strategic line of communications, and having no foreign arsenal opposed to it, can only be of use as a base of operations for small punitive expeditions, were transferred to Singa-pore, where the seven torpedo-boats would be most valuable for service among the islands of the Eastern Archipelago.
Halifax and Bermuda form the bases from which to conduct a blockade of the east coast of the United States, while Esquimalt seems as good a one as can be obtained from which a fleet could act for the protection of British territory on the west.
In South America we have no territory so situated as to form a base of operations, the Falkland Islands being much too far south and having foreign arsenals situated on the line of communications; so in the event of hostilities in this quarter it would be necessary to occupy some harbour on the enemy's coast, and there erect a temporary base.
This second description of base we will now discuss.
Temporary bases, as we have said, are those formed during hostilities for the carrying out of certain operations - such, for instance, as was constructed in August, 1891, by the fleet of the Chilian opposi-tion at Quinteros Bay. There it was the object to defend the bay against torpedo attack while the transports discharged their troops, there being no force of war-ships to oppose the landing; but the object might equally be to fortify the place as a coaling station, or as a resort for the battle-ships while waiting for the enemy to put to sea, or preparatory to an attack on some fortified position of the enemy.
It is probable that these bases would be on the enemy's coast, when it would be necessary to command the surrounding country; and the position must be so chosen that there will be but little chance of the line of communications to the permanent base being inter-rupted, as all supplies, except those that could be obtained in the surrounding country, would have to be drawn thence.
At the same time, the position must not be so close to the enemy's base as to allow of a surprise attack by his fleet before our own could be got ready in all respects to meet him. For example: Supposing the distance between the bases to be 50 miles, intelligence could be passed by the watching cruisers in clear weather in under an hour, taking the distance between the cruisers as 10 miles, and signals to be plainly seen at 5 miles, whereas the enemy would take three hours at 17 knots to perform the journey. But even in thick weather, when presumably the fleet would be holding themselves in readiness, information could be brought by a fast cruiser half an hour before the enemy arrived, allowing a cruiser to have 3 knots more speed than a fleet of battle-ships; and this warning could be greatly lengthened by the use of sound signals.
By the employment of wireless telegraphy the information would, of course, be passed immediately.CHAPTER II
DISPOSITION OF FORCES.
The strength of any fleet must naturally depend upon the force which it is required to engage. As examples of the strategic disposi-tion of our forces, we will first discuss war with single nations, and what, at the present time, seem the most likely combinations against us.
As France is our nearest, and, from a naval point of view, our most powerful possible adversary, we will take her case first.
At the outbreak of war her fleet would probably be distributed between Toulon, Cherbourg, Rochefort, and Brest.
Taking the Atlantic side first, it will be seen, on reference to the map, that the distances apart of the three French arsenals named are much greater than between our naval ports of Plymouth, Portsmouth, and the Nore, so that, even allowing equal rates of mobilising, our fleet should possess a corresponding advantage in power of concentration.
Supposing the French Northern Squadron, on the outbreak of war, to be distributed between the three ports named, it is obviously to our advantage, in accordance with the first strategic law, to keep them from uniting.
This could only be done by a close blockade of Brest, with a cruiser surveillance of Cherbourg and Rochefort.
By this means, the Brest fleet could not leave the harbour without being brought to action, nor could either of the other fleets join it without exposing themselves to the attack of a vastly superior force.
For instance, suppose the admiral received news that the Cherbourg fleet had come out and were standing to the westward, he would move to meet it, when one of the following things must happen
The Brest fleet may put to sea either (a) to meet the Cherbourg fleet, when the probabilities are that the British fleet, being between them, would destroy them in detail; or (1) to join with the Rochefort fleet, which it could effect, but would lay itself open to being shut out from Brest by the return thither of the English fleet, either having destroyed the Cherbourg fleet or forced it to return to its port. The situation then of the squadrons at Cherbourg and Rochefort would be worse than before, as they would be much less likely to effect a junction.
The Rochefort fleet may try to enter Brest. The British fleet, unless certain of bringing the Cherbourg fleet to action, should not allow itself to be drawn so far from Brest that it could not return in time to prevent either the Rochefort fleet, or the united Brest and Rochefort fleets, from entering Brest without giving battle.
By following this plan a British fleet no stronger than the united French squadrons should be certain of bringing them to action separately, and so of achieving victory. But, as we saw, it would be easy for either the Rochefort or Cherbourg fleets to draw off the blockade and so allow the Brest fleet to escape to combine with the other squadron.
And since in these days of possible torpedo attack a close blockade is a very risky operation with battle-ship, and entails a tremendous amount of worry and strain on the personnel, and probably also on the material, it would be equally effectual if the blockading fleet of battle-ships were kept between the two stronger hostile squadrons, but sufficiently close to Brest to prevent the opposing squadron entering unattacked.
For example, if the Cherbourg squadron is more powerful than the Rochefort one, it would be quite sufficient if the British fleet were kept within an area enclosed by longitude 40 to 50, latitude 48~0 to 49~0, which would prevent all possibility of the Brest and Cherbourg fleets joining, or of the Rochefort fleet getting into Brest before the British fleet could get there, always supposing the scouting to be efficient.
There would be a further advantage in this disposition, in that the fleet would be at times within 60 miles of Plymouth, which would naturally be their base of Operation, so that a vessel need only be detached for some 14 or 15 hours at the most for coaling purposes.
It is obvious that the success of this scheme depends on rapidity of concentration and on successful scouting.
Turning now to the squadron at Toulon, the first thing to be noticed is the very limited amount of harm they are capable of doing us as long as we are able to prevent them leaving the Mediterranean.
By maintaining a fleet at Gibraltar at least as powerful as any they can bring against us from the east, and temporarily diverting the line of communications to the east round the Cape, the only harm they can do is primarily to stop our local Mediterranean trade, and, secondarily, to make a descent on Malta or Egypt.
Now, nothing could be more fatal to them, or play better into our hands, than for them to waste their energy against Malta, or to send their fleet to the eastern basin of the Mediterranean ; for, not only would it make it absolutely easy for us to force a battle on them when-ever we wished, but we could also plant a force on their line of communications, and so eventually force them to return and fight us when more or less exhausted by their expedition.
Such being the case, it would be mere waste of energy and incurring unnecessary risk, for our fleet to enter the Mediterranean as long as the Toulon fleet is at or near its base.
With the fleets so distributed, we saw it was possible for the Brest and Rochefort fleets to unite to the southward, so that, acting in co-operation with the Toulon fleet, they might attempt a concentration at Gibraltar. If such were attempted, the Gibraltar fleet would at once advance to meet those from Brest and Rochefort and give them battle, after which they could be reinforced by our Channel Fleet, which would be close on the heels of the French, and would be in a most advantageous position for meeting the Toulon squadron.
Thus we see that, even with equal forces, the strategical position we are able to take up gives us an advantage over the naval forces of France; let us see how this plan would have to be modified if she were aided by Russia.
As far as Europe is concerned, the latter's Navy is situated in the Black and Baltic Seas.
Considering the Northern Fleet first, the only possible way of preventing the junction of the French and Russian fleets and at the same time keeping our own fleet together, would be to shift the blockade from Brest to Cherbourg, using Portsmouth as the base.
Then either
The Brest and Cherbourg fleets would unite and proceed to the Mediterranean, when the whole or part of the Channel fleet, sufficient to combat them, would be bound to follow; or
The Russian Baltic fleet would attempt to pass round the North of Scotland and join the French at Brest or Rochefort, whereupon the blockade of Brest would be re-established and that of Cherbourg abandoned.
The hostile fleets would attempt to concentrate at Cherbourg, which would probably, if not certainly, allow one of them to be brought to action while the other two were joining forces.
This plan would be further open to the objection that, by abandoning the blockade of Brest, we have a strong hostile force on the line of communications to Gibraltar, which is our m6st important line.
It would be more advantageous, on the whole, to maintain the Brest blockade and only move up Channel in time to meet the Russian fleet before it entered Cherbourg, when the Cherbourg squadron would, in all probability, have effected a junction.
In the Mediterranean the problem would be to prevent the French and Russian fleets uniting and at the same time to keep both fleets from leaving that sea.
This could only be done by virtually a blockade of Toulon.
The British fleet would have to be so disposed as to be certain of bringing the Toulon fleet to action if it left its port; then, if the Russian fleet advanced into the western basin, it would move to meet it either to the east of the Straits of Bonefacio or to the southward of Sardinia.
If the Toulon fleet seized the opportunity to escape from the Mediterranean it would make matters very dangerous in the Channel for a few hours till our Mediterranean Squadron could arrive; the blockading fleet off Brest would be obliged to advance to meet the Toulon squadron, when it would be a matter of time after they met-whether the British Mediterranean Squadron or the squadrons from Brest and Cherbourg arrived on the scene of action first as to who would have the advantage.
In fact, it would depend to a great extent on the strength of the Brest blockading fleet whether the destruction of the Russian Black Sea fleet compensated for giving the Toulon squadron an opportunity for leaving the Mediterranean; but on the whole, it seems probable that it would.
The only alternative is to retain the Mediterranean Squadron at Gibraltar and allow the French and Russian to unite, which is certainly contrary to our first law.
It would obviously be a mistake for the Brest blockading squadron to retreat to its base on the approach of the French Mediterranean Squadron, as that would enable all the hostile fleets to unite without hindrance and attack our Mediterranean fleet.
The relative strengths of the hostile battle fleets, judged by their probable strengths in 1000, may be represented very fairly by the following figures
Russian Baltic =8 French Northern Squadron = 6
" Black Sea = 7 " Mediterranean = 9
And as we may assume that our squadrons will be proportional, we will represent them by the figures: -
Channel = 14 Mediterranean = 16.Thus we see that if the foregoing strategic plan were carried out our 16 units in the Mediterranean would have to meet the Russian 7.
Meanwhile the Channel Fleet might have to oppose its 14 units either to about 10 of Russian Baltic and French Cherbourg squadrons combined, or to the 9 of the Toulon squadron, probably or possibly reinforced by 4 or 5 more from Brest and Rochefort, which would then only just produce equality of numbers.
An objection may be raised that this plan would leave the coasts of the British Isles to the mercy of the Russian fleet. But in modern war-fare it has been recognised that a bombardment of unfortified towns, etc., is against the custom, if not the law, of civilisation, and even were it not, the wanton destruction of property could hardly affect the result of the war, but would merely increase the bill of costs were we victors, and would matter little if we were vanquished.
With regard to fortified places, it would be sheer madness for the enemy to waste his strength on them before coming to conclusions with our fleet.
Of other European combinations, as long as France was one of the combatants, there would seem to be no way of bettering the strategical disposition, the only thing being to adjust the strength of the fleets off Brest and at Gibraltar in proportion to the hostile forces outside or inside the Mediterranean.
If all Europe were in arms against us it would only be the greater reason for us to take every advantage of superior strategy.
In the Channel there would be no possibility of preventing the German and Scandinavian fleets from reinforcing the Russian, so that the strategy would be unaltered with a stronger foe from the north to be accounted for. The Atlantic fleets of Portugal and Spain would merely be a reinforcement for the Rochefort squadron and would be similarly dealt with.
In the Mediterranean it is improbable that we could prevent a junction between the squadrons of Toulon and Genoa, so that our fleet would blockade them both and await, as before, the arrival of the united Russian, Austrian, etc., fleets in the western basin.
This would, of course, be the most powerful combination that could be brought against us, and if the strength of the enemy in either the Mediterranean Or Channel was too great for our fleets in those places to combat with any likelihood of success, the Mediterranean Fleet would have to be withdrawn to reinforce the Channel, the combined fleets then devoting all their energies to prevent the junction of the enemies' Mediterranean and Northern Fleets; but if, on the other hand, we were sufficiently strong to make success possible with such adversaries, war with any other combination would be a comparatively simple matter.
Taking what is known as the Triple Alliance for instance, a blockade of the Elbe and Skager Rak, conducted with the Nore for base, would effectually prevent any harm from the German fleet, while in the Mediterranean we should probably' be quite strong enough to keep our fleet at Malta, to prevent the junction of the Austrian and Italian fleets from Trieste and Genoa respectively, and at the same time a strong enough squadron at Gibraltar to prevent any of the enemy leaving that sea or interrupting the communications.
By this means the Mediterranean would still be kept open as a trade route and line of communications to the East.
The only fortified harbours possessed by European countries out of Europe are in Chinese waters, and the principal ones are Vladivostok and Port Arthur. The strongest combination that we might have to meet in those seas would be Russia and Japan.
According to our strategic laws it would be an obvious error to maintain the base at Wei-hai-Wei with the resources of Japan and Vladivostok on our line of communications, even though, by so doing, we should be able to prevent a junction by those fleets with the Port Arthur squadron.
The proper place for our squadron would undoubtedly be blockading the Japanese ships in Nagasaki, ready to advance and meet any enemy advancing from the N.W. or N.E., so making certain of attacking one of the three squadrons from Nagasaki, Vladivostok, and the other Japanese ports, or Port Arthur respectively, before the arrival of the other two.
If Russia were deprived of the assistance of Japan we ought to be sufficiently strong to blockade Port Arthur from Wei-hai-Wei and also keep a strong enough force in the neighbourhood of Quel-part to prevent the interruption of the communications, otherwise \Vei-hai-Wei must be abandoned.
It would seem then that the most advantageous position for the advanced permanent base for our fleet in these waters would be in the vicinity of the mouth of the Yang- tse-kiang, 500 miles from Nagasaki; and near the latter a temporary base would probably be constructed after the outbreak of war.PART II. -TACTICS.
CHAPTER I.
SCOUTING.
Scouting is the art of obtaining information of the enemy's movements.
The importance of it is at once seen when reading the chapters on strategy, as the whole success of the dispositions depends on accurate knowledge of the position of the hostile fleets.
It has been maintained by at least one naval writer that an admiral would be able to obtain all necessary information by means of the telegraph through neutral countries; but experience in every modern war has shown such information to be absolutely unreliable. Therefore, to obtain accurate information, an admiral would be obliged to trust to his cruisers.
The following are the principal operations required of cruisers employed as scouts
To watch a harbour within which an enemy's fleet is lying, and inform the admiral at once if they leave it.
To keep touch with an enemy's fleet at sea, reporting its movements to the admiral.
To form a screen for the movements of their own fleet, thereby preventing the enemy's scouts obtaining informa-tion of its position or movements.
To find a hostile fleet or ship within a given area.
To watch a given channel or strait for the passage of an enemy's ship or ships.
For the first three operations it is necessary for our force of cruisers on the spot-i.e., omitting those necessary for the passing of intelligence-to be at least as strong as the enemy's cruisers; other-wise they are liable to be driven from their post of vigil, or, in the third case, to be unable to keep the hostile scouts at bay.
In the third operation, mobility, obtained by numbers and speed, is at least as important as strength; while for the fourth and fifth, mobility is the chief essential.
Also, it is obvious that for all the operations the cruisers must have greater speed than the enemy's battle-ships, as otherwise they would lay themselves open to capture.
A force of cruisers employed on the first or second operations would combine with either the third operation, since, when watching a harbour or fleet, they would naturally do their utmost to prevent hostile cruisers being detached from the main body.
Cruisers watching a harbour would run as little risk as possible of damage from the forts and batteries, and so in fine, clear weather, would keep outside dangerous range as long as it did not prevent them keeping a watch on the entrance of the harbour.
In accordance with the law of concentration, they would also remain together as much as possible, or at least so situated as to be able to rapidly concentrate for attack.
But in dark or foggy weather, when the enemy's cruisers would have the best chance of breaking out, it would be necessary to close in towards the entrance, and to spread out as much as possible, to prevent the enemy escaping unobserved.
This would expose individual cruisers to a concentrated attack either from the whole of the hostile fleet leaving the harbour, from a combination of the enemy's cruisers, or from what would probably be more to be feared under the circumstances-their torpedo craft.
To guard against this, the vessels would have to rely on their good look-out and their speed; but so that the risk should be mini-mised as much as possible, it would be wise to have the smaller craft, as a look-out squadron, as close in as practicable, while the big cruisers formed a reinforcing squadron outside, prepared to act on information signalled by the look-outs.
If it were possible to have the scouting squadron accompanied by destroyers or torpedo-boats, they would be invaluable for this in-shore duty, both for guarding against torpedo-boat attack and for attacking the enemy's ships if they attempted to come out, even if the mere fact of their presence was not sufficient to keep the enemy inside the harbour. This possibility would rest on the distance of the watched port from the base or nearest harbour of refuge.
The number of vessels required to keep watch on the harbour would depend
On the strength of enemy's cruisers within the port.
On the distance from the nearest base or coaling station, since allowance must be made for some ships to be away coaling.
On the distance of, and facilities for passing information to, the admiral. For instance, it would make consider-able difference in the number of vessels required, say, to pass information from the scouts watching Rochefort to the admiral off Brest if wireless telegraphy' were employed, or if the news had to be passed by flag, or, worse still, by sound.
News could be passed the distance of 200 odd miles by the former means by three vessels, with only the delay necessary for making the signal, whereas 10 or 20 would be required at least to pass it by flag without delay, and delay would probably mean diminution of chance of success.
Or, again, scouts watching in the Straits of Dover or North Sea for the advance of the Russian or other squadron would naturally make use of our land wires for passing intelligence.
The method of performing the second operation, namely, keeping touch with a fleet at sea, would be practically the same as for the first operation.
In this case the main body of the scouting- force would keep on the side of the enemy nearest its own fleet, and at a distance regulated by the dangerous range of the guns of the hostile battle-ships.
Detached parties would probably be required to watch the flanks of the enemy' to see that no cruisers were despatched from the main body, and, if they were, to send a pursuing force to capture them or drive them back.
In a similar manner, and for similar reasons, as in the first opera-tion, in darkness or thick weather it would be necessary to push home the reconnaissance to avoid risk of losing touch, when the same plan of using the smaller vessels as inside look-outs would probably answer best.
The third operation, namely, to form a screen for the move-ments of the battle-fleet, except as carried out in conjunction with the two former, would only, as a rule, be required when a weaker fleet is attempting to hide its movements from a stronger one-such as would be the case if a fleet were trying to unite with another, or reach the protection of a fortified harbour, before meeting the enemy'.
The object in this case is to prevent all hostile ships from approaching within sight of the battle-squadron, or, if any do, to prevent their rejoining their own fleet with - the information, at the same time taking every precaution against giving any indication by your own movements of the position of your squadron.
The best disposition of the scouting force will depend on the direction your own fleet wishes to take with regard to the position of the enemy. This will be either to escape by running more or less directly' away from him, or to pass within reach of him unobserved, most likely in some channel or narrow sea.
If the former, the best disposition would be between the pursuer and pursued as close to the chasing fleet as safety would allow, using every possible endeavour to drive back his fast ships, and to hinder him so as to give your own fleet time to get away.
\Whether the scouts in this case were kept together would depend chiefly on their strength relatively to the opposing scouts, but if possible they should still try to conform to the law of concentration, though, of course, detached parties would probably have to be despatched to prevent ships passing on the flanks.
In the latter case, where a weaker fleet were trying to pass a stronger unobserved, the only' safe way is to drive in the enemy's scouts, pushing home the reconnaissance till in touch with the enemy's battle-fleet, with the movements of which you could keep your own admiral informed, who would shape his course accordingly.
The only other method, by forming a cordon round your own fleet, would simply have the effect of making it much easier for the enemy's scouts to ascertain its position; better than that would be to have no scouts at all.
Should the scouts lose touch of the enemy from any cause, it would be necessary to regain it as quickly as possible.
In this they would, in all probability, be guided to a greater or less extent by knowledge of the probable or possible aims of the foe and the routes open to him; so that a fairly accurate guess could be made at the area in which he would be found.
The narrower the sea or channel in which touch was lost, the easier it would be to regain it, thus it would be easier to find an enemy' in the North Sea or English Channel than in the Atlantic Ocean.
In fact, the best course to follow would vary with each individual case; as an example to show the general principles for guidance, we will assume that, in the disposition of our forces against those of France proposed in the second chapter on strategy, the French fleet escaped unobserved from Rochefort.
The commander of the scouting force would know that the only objectives of that fleet could be a union with the Brest fleet or with the Toulon fleet. In other words, he would know that it is either steering for Brest or Finisterre, and judging that the former would be the more serious blow to our strategy, he would put the whole force available to scout the route to that place, at the same time sending the news to the admiral at Gibraltar, so that he should not be caught napping.
For efficiently performing this operation the scouts must be kept sufficiently close to prevent any possibility of the enemy passing between them unobserved, and this will naturally depend on the clearness of the weather.
Also, it will be of no use one vessel sighting the enemy unless he can at once communicate his intelligence and summon reinforcements, as otherwise the hostile scouts would quickly drive him away, and the time spent in steaming towards other ships would give the enemy a further opportunity to escape. Thus, for the scouting to be of any practical use, the units must keep within signalling distance, and, if possible, should be able to receive rapid reinforcement.
Where it is necessary to overtake an escaped force, no time could be lost in forming zig-zags or curves, and so the best way of searching as large an area as possible, and still making concentration possible, would be to open out to signalling distance apart, if visual signals were in use, or to double the range at which a vessel could be seen if wire-less telegraphy were employed, and steering a straight course in the supposed direction of flight of the enemy.
In fine, clear weather, by the latter method, the scouts would cover a zone of from twenty to thirty miles per ship, and by the former of from eight to ten; while if the most powerful ships were kept in the centre, the concentration would be as rapid as possible; but in darkness or mist the distance apart would have to be greatly reduced.
An example of a different kind would be the attempt of scouts to get into touch with the Russian Black Sea fleet steering west, with the purpose of uniting with the French Toulon fleet, supposing it to have passed the Dardanelles before they could get there, or that they after-wards lost touch.
In this case the scouts would certainly choose the narrowest possible channel to watch, as so there would be less chance of the enemy passing unobserved, and thus it would resolve itself into the fifth operation.
But if there were no narrow channel on the line of advance of the enemy's fleet, as in the case of the Russian Fleet leaving the Baltic and advancing from the westward of Ireland, having rounded the north of the British Isles, then the most likely way of getting into touch with them would be to try and meet them off the Irish coast, sending enough scouts to make sure they did not pass unobserved through the North Channel, which could afterwards rejoin to the southward of Ireland, information being sent by land wires,
We will suppose ten cruisers are despatched from the Channel Fleet, on the receipt of news that the Russian Fleet have left the Baltic, with orders to get into touch with them and report their move-ments, the cruisers in the North Sea having lost sight of them, and afterwards ascertained they were not moving to the southward.
We will suppose that, from the news received, the commander of the scouts calculated the probable position of the enemy to be not further west than longitude 5~ when his squadron was passing Land's End.
As it is only about thirteen miles between Fair Head and the Mull of Cantire, one cruiser would be sufficient to make sure the enemy did not pass unobserved through that channel even if favoured with a fog.
With the remainder he would stand across to Cape Clear and then open out from the land in a line to the westward, when, if fitted with wireless telegraphy, they would cover a zone of about 180 miles wide, or practically to the 15th degree of longitude.
He would expect to meet the enemy between latitude 54~ and 55~, and if there were no signs of him then, and the weather had remained clear all the time, he could be fairly certain he was steering further to the westward. If, on the other hand, there had been a good deal of thick weather, there would be the danger of the enemy having slipped past, and he would have to make his plans accordingly.
In the first case he would probably move his line to the west for three or four hours, and then stand to the southward again, making the land at Cape Clear to be sure he had not passed inside.
If now his efforts were without reward, his best plan would be to patrol over the area enclosed between latitude 48~ to 51~, longitude 10~ to about 14~, through which area the Russian Fleet would almost certainly pass, and which it could not do without being seen, unless it were still behind him. To make sure that was not the case he would then stand north-east, when he would be sure to meet them if they were trying to make Brest. If still without success, the only remaining thing would be to patrol from latitude 50~ to 48~, making Ushant and Land's End each time with his easternmost ship.
If he considered it possible that the enemy had slipped through him, it would be much the safest plan to return on his tracks until certain of being to the southward of them and then carrying out the rest of the plan.
In the event of knowing the position of a hostile fleet or ship at any given time, and also the approximate speed it would be steaming, the scouts might profitably' proceed along a curve of search.
This is formed as follows :-In Plate I., supposing squadron or ship at A hears that enemy left
B two hours ago and starts to catch him.
Calling the squadrons by the places they left, A estimates B's speed at 15 knots, while he can steam 20, for example.
A knows, when he leaves, B will be somewhere on a circle of radius BD=30 miles.
In the first case we will suppose it is all open sea to the left of line AB, and A does not know anything about B's probable movements.
If they steam towards one another they will meet at C where
AC: CD:: 20: 15.
A not finding B at C, knows that in one hour's time he must be on circle HJ, where CH= 15 knots.
With centre C and radius = 20 knots he finds he can be on that circle at fin the hour.
Not finding B at J, he knows B will be on circle KL an hour later, so with centre J and radius 20 knots he finds it cuts KL at L, and therefore steers for L.
Similarly he finds the other points on the curve CG, which is called a "curve of search."
If owing to laud intervening, or from other knowledge, he is certain B will not steer more towards him than along the line BE, he finds out where along the line BE' he can meet B by describing B's time circles, and cutting them with his own.
Thus he finds his 7-hour circle cuts B's 9-hour circle (2 hours being added for B's start) at M, their 8 and 10-hour circles at iv; and their 9 and 11 hour circles at E, on the line he wants. Therefore he shapes his course straight from A to B, and there starts his curve of search along EF.
It will be seen that by so doing he can save a lot of time.
Where curves of search fail is that they' are totally upset by any alteration of speed or course on the part of the chase, so that, although they may prove of some assistance to a scouting body, it would be dangerous to rely on them too much.
For instance, supposing, in the case we discussed, the Russian fleet had been sighted from the Orkneys or Hebrides, and the news conveyed to the commander of the scouting force, he might, if he failed to meet the enemy at the latitude he expected, send his scouts out along curves of search, calculated from the position the enemy had been last heard of.
In this case two courses are open to him, either to let one ship follow the curve and the rest to be spread out on a given bearing from it, or else to let each ship follow a curve drawn out for a different speed of enemy. Of these, the former would keep the ships better in hand and give less chance of the enemy slipping between by an alteration of course.
In searching for a single ship, or ships cruising singly the same methods would be employed, only in this case there would be a much greater chance of the enemy slipping through the line of scouts, so that they should be, if anything, closer together; while there would not be the same necessity for keeping the force ready to concentrate.
We now come to the fifth and last operation, namely, watching a strait or channel, in illustration of which we will take the case already mentioned of scouts watching for the approach of a fleet from the eastward into the western basin of the Mediterranean.
The difficulty in this case would be that it would be possible for the enemy to pass either through the Straits of Messina or between Cape Bon and Sicily, and although one cruiser would be ample for watching the former, it would not he sufficient for maintaining touch with the enemy once he were through.
For instance, if one cruiser were watching the Straits of Messina and the remainder between Cape Bon and Sicily', the British fleet being from 150 to 200 miles to the westward of the Straits of Bonefacio watching Toulon, by the time that cruiser had given information to the others that the enemy were passing the former strait, they would have arrived somewhere about the 40th parallel, when it would be impossible to regain touch, and only just possible that the admiral would have the information in time to cut him off to the north of Corsica.
It would require at least three more cruisers to pass the news by wireless telegraphy along the north coast of Sicily, and that should make it fairly certain that the cruisers would have concentrated for a strong reconnaissance before the enemy had passed the 4Oth parallel, and, if word could be sent to the admiral in under six hours, which would require at least six more cruisers along the line of communications, he could be certain of meeting the enemy before he reached the 42nd parallel.
Allowing a minimum of five cruisers for watching the 100 miles between Cape Bon and Sicily, it will be seen that the smallest number of vessels that could efficiently perform this operation would be fifteen, and if such a large number could not be spared, some other plan would have to be resorted to.
The actual distribution of the cruisers in the strait would be the same as in the fourth operation, namely opened out across it to the greatest distance at which they can be sure of nothing passing between them; or, if wireless telegraphy is not employed, at extreme signalling distance, the most powerful ships being in the centre.
But since, if a fleet wanted to pass through a strait, their scouts would try to drive in our scouts, and so prevent them getting touch, it would be much safer to have a second line dividing the intervals, which could have orders to concentrate for repelling any attack, while the advanced line would have orders to maintain their look-out positions as long as possible, or until in touch with the enemy's battle-fleet.
If the admiral could not spare this number of vessels for scouting duties in addition to those necessary for watching Toulon, it would be better to abandon the watch of the straits, and to search for the enemy to the eastward, according to the methods discussed under the fourth Operation, only returning to watch the straits if unsuccessful in finding the enemy, or apprehensive of him having slipped past.
Suppose only eight vessels could be spared for the work. Five of these must be employed to watch the larger and one the smaller passage, which leaves two to be disposed of.
These two should be the fastest ones available, and, if possible, the least powerful, and should be employed for carrying the news to the admiral as soon as touch is obtained with the enemy.
For this purpose one should be stationed at full signalling distance from each set of look-outs, so as to get as much start as possible.
Supposing the enemy appeared at the Strait of Messina, the look-out there would at once pass the news to the despatch-vessel, and then start off itself to give the news to the other scouting party, so that they could follow up and gain touch as soon as possible, though their being able to would be highly improbable unless they possessed very greatly superior speed.
Thus the best use would be made of the means at disposal, and with more means the larger the guarantee of safety.
So with different circumstances, different plans would be devised.CHAPTER II.
FLEET ACTIONS.
The object of an admiral, when manoeuvring his fleet in action against another, should be to so place his ships as to enable them to deliver the heaviest possible fire at the enemy, and, if possible, so as to prevent the enemy developing their maximum fire. This is the true tactical law of concentration, which is based on the same principle as the strategic law, namely, that the total damage done by the victor is greater than i~ done to him.
In other words, if six ships go into action against another six, but owing to superior manoeuvring are able to take them two at a time, the fire of the six ships will do immeasurably more damage to the first two opponents than those six ships will receive, and similarly for the next two opponents, so that, when the last two approach, the six ships should still be far more powerful than those two.
This was so well shown at the Nile, and accords so well with what one might expect, that it requires no other proof.
It may be pointed out that the law of concentration does not in any way state, as is somewhat popularly believed, that there is any advantage, while the maximum fire of both fleets is being developed, in concentrating one's fire on any one portion of the enemy's fleet, neglecting the rest of it.
The only time when this could profitably be done would be when one portion of the enemy's fleet was at shorter range than the remainder. At any other time the advantage would probably be the other way, as all your guns would he in action tinder fire, while a large portion of the enemy would have nothing to make their shooting erratic at the same time, some of your ships would probably be firing at a target at a greater range than need be - itself a cause of disadvantage
The best formation for developing the maximum fire is undoubtedly "single line ahead," with the ships steering such a course that their after guns will bear on the enemy.
We will try to show the superiority of such a formation over all others.SINGLE LINE AHEAD versus QUARTER LINE.
Plate II. shows the engagement between single line ahead and quarter line, the ships being two cables apart.
A keeps the whole of his broadside bearing on the enemy while they approach. In the plate the after guns are supposed to bear 30' before the beam. B, on the other hand, can only fire at the most with his bow guns, and with the majority of those only at A's more distant ships.
If B had thrown his quarter line out to port, A would have passed the starboard side of B.
The disadvantage to B is obvious, as if he stands on he will have his line raked by the whole of A's squadron in succession at a distance of less than 2,000 yards, with only one ship able to reply.
The only possible thing for B to do is to turn or form into line ahead, and then alter course so as to develop his fire, though that would not prevent his leading ships receiving a concentrated attack during the manoeuvre.SINGLE LINE AHEAD versus GROUP FORMATION DISPOSED ASTERN.
Plate III. shows the groups formed in quarter line. The result would be practically the same if they were in line abreast.
The weakness of this formation is obvious, as it has all the deficiencies of the last, with the one exception that it allows of more rapid formation into line ahead.
In addition, it has the defect that the leading group blankets the fire of the rear group on the advancing foe.SINGLE LINE AHEAD versus GROUP FORMATION DISPOSED ABEAM.
In Plate IV. the groups are shown in line ahead. It would be practically the same if they were in quarter line, except that they would be able to develop a better fire on the advancing fleet while at a distance, but would be in a worse position to meet him as he moved on to the bow.
But while B remained in that formation and kept the same course, he could only fire his foremost guns, and that at a disadvantage as regards his rear ships, while A would have a whole broadside in action.
If B holds on, his port squadron will blanket his starboard one.
If he alters course in any direction, the same thing happens, or else he retains his first disadvantage.
Again, the only feasible plan is to turn into single line ahead, though here also the leading ships would be likely to suffer during the manoeuvre.SINGLE LINE Versus INDENTED LINE.
In Plate V. A is in single line as before B in indented line. Here it is obvious' that, except when A is abeam, the fire of the ships in B's starboard line will be entirely blanketed.
Supposing the squadrons in the respective positions marked (1) at a distance of from 4,400 to 6,000 yards, it is evident that the starboard line is blanketed. To avoid this, the course must be altered to star-board. This allows the single line to follow a more incurved course, so that when the enemy were at (a') the leading ship would be at (b), when her stern gun could be directed at the enemy's leading ship, or at (a), if she required to fire at the rear of the line. But now the position of the enemy is just as bad, or worse, than ever, as the rear ships are laid open to a concentrated attack; so that, instead of keeping on to (a), the course of the leading ship must be kept parallel to the course of the leading ship of the single line, which will bring the position of the enemy to (c'). This will allow a further incurvature of the course of the single line to (c).
Observing now the positions of the two squadrons, the bows of the vessels forming the single line, with the exception of the leading ship, being marked with a cross, we notice how much better the single line formation is for the delivery of a concentrated fire. The enemy's ships in the starboard line, finding their fire blanketed, would naturally slow down until they could obtain a clear range. This would necessitate the port line opening out to save themselves from being fired into, and so the line would straggle out until they would naturally form themselves into single line. This operation would be considerably hastened during any altering course manoeuvre. Another great disadvantage of the indented line, as may be observed from the plan, especially with the vessels in the second position, is the very compact target they expose; in fact, almost the best possible one for an enemy to fire at, since there is every chance of projectiles that miss the ships of the port line hitting those in the starboard one.SINGLE LINE AHEAD versus SINGLE LINE ABREAST.
It is plain that if, in any of the diagrams, B's fleet advanced in single line abreast, they would have only their bow guns bearing against the whole broadsides of A's ships, and so would be at a disadvantage.
If they held on they would expose their flank to a concentrated attack; so here also they would be obliged to turn together, sooner or later, into line ahead.
Thus we see the only possible formation for a fleet going into action is single line ahead, and that if it does not start in that formation it will soon be obliged to get into it, and will probably suffer somewhat heavily in doing so.
The great objection made against single line ahead is its length when at all a large fleet is concerned, which is generally supposed to make it liable to be cut through by the enemy, who would thus have an opportunity of concentrating on the rear of the line before the leading ships could come to their assistance.
But, no matter how long the line, it is always open to the admiral to turn together eight points away from the enemy, so forming line abreast retreating, which, next to line ahead, is the best formation for a fleet, owing to the opportunity it affords for torpedo attack.
If the enemy continued to chase, no matter what their formation, they would be at a disadvantage if only from that cause; and if they turned or formed into single line ahead, so as to bring their whole broadsides to bear on the retreating ships, the latter would at once reply by again turning together eight points, and so also forming line ahead.
The only chance of an enemy cutting the line would be in the event of his possessing superior speed but even then, if the tactics just described were followed, it would be a very perilous operation, during which his leading ships would suffer terribly, supposing they were able to stand the attack long enough to reach the retreating line.
Now, we must turn to the case where both fleets go into action under equally advantageous conditions, namely, both in single line ahead, or, at least, so that every ship can deliver its whole broadside.
The only other formation except single line ahead is shown in Plate VI. for the B fleet, but this has the disadvantage that it is much harder for the ships to preserve their correct stations than if in line ahead. As the fleets approach one another, to the second position shown, an artillery duel will proceed, on the result of which will depend the further procedure. For it is obviously to the advantage of the fleet that has obtained the advantage by gun power to prolong the duel to their utmost, while it is equally to the advantage of the inferior gunners to introduce as quickly as possible a new factor, viz., either the torpedo or ram.
Thus the latter will do all they can to get to close quarters, while the former will probably bear away so as to keep their opponents on their quarter. Which will be successful in their aim must depend entirely on their relative speeds. Thus, if the better gunners have also the greater speed, they will practically be able to select their own range; while, on the other hand, if the other side have the speed they may, if they choose, push home the attack, when the less damaged fleet would turn away from them so as to make them chase, which would have the effect of prolonging as much as possible the gunnery duel, and also would give the chased fleet the advantage of position for torpedo attack.
Thus, it would be a sounder policy for the more damaged fleet also to turn away, and, owing to their superior speed, make good their retreat, or else try to tempt the other squadron within range of torpedo attack.
With regard to the use of a torpedo flotilla in action, there is no doubt it would be a valuable addition to the battle-fleet. In Plate VI. there is one method shown of the way it might be used.
A still better chance of using the torpedo-craft would be on the occasions when the fleet in line abreast was being chased by the faster fleet with the hope of getting to torpedo range.
In the first place, it is obvious that the chased has a much better chance of using his own torpedoes than the chaser, and, at the same time, his torpedo flotilla would have an excellent opportunity for making a dash at the advancing enemy.From what has been said it will be seen
1. That it is most unlikely that a modern battle will be reduced to a melee, as a large number of people apparently believe
2. That an admiral need never lose control of his fleet during an action.
3. That on gun-power will rest the ultimate victory, as the winner in the artillery duel need never allow his opponents to get to close quarters except under the most adverse conditions for them.
4. That a fleet properly handled and kept well under control will possess an immense advantage over one that is not.
5. That the best formation for delivering the heaviest fire is single line ahead, which is, therefore, the best formation for going into action.
As to the employment of cruisers during a fleet action, unless they were powerful enough for a place in the line of battle, remembering that a weak ship, or one that is liable to be soon disabled, would be a great weakness in that line, or small and fast enough for work with the torpedo flotilla, it would be best to form them into a flying squadron, for which their high speed would eminently fit them.The duties of this squadron would be to attack all the hostile ships detached from their fleet, or that became detached or were disabled, to assist any of their own ships that were disabled or broken down, and to be ready to assist the line of battle at any critical time; also one of their chief duties would be to chase a defeated enemy.
If well handled, their assistance would be invaluable, but great care should be taken in no way to hamper the line of battle or blanket their fire.CHAPTER III.
CRUISING FORMATION OF A FLEET.
The formation of a fleet when cruising in waters where they are liable to attack should fulfil as well as possible the following conditions
1. The ships should be able to form into the battle formation of single line ahead in any required direction, as quickly as possible.
2. The formation should afford the least opportunity possible for an effective attack by torpedo craft, especially at night.
3. It should be such that station keeping would be as easy as possible, to avoid undue strain on the officers of the watch and so allow them time to give their attention to the look-out and other matters.
4. It should allow of rapid communication by signal.
As there are several formations that apparently fulfil equally well the first requirement, we will proceed to discuss the second.
The principal object would he to deliver as hot a fire of Q.F. guns as possible at the attacking craft, and to keep them under fire as long as possible before they got within torpedo range.
Since the attack would presumably be sudden, the ships should be already in the desired formation. This is the more necessary as an attack of that nature is always liable to produce confusion.
As the most dangerous point from which an attack could be delivered at a squadron under way is right ahead or slightly on the bow, owing to the rapidity with which the two forces would be approaching and to the time the ships would take to turn away from such an attack, it is especially in that direction that the fleet should be able to deliver a hot fire.
This seems to point to line abreast as the best cruising formation, for in the event of an attack the ships could turn together away from the direction from which it was being made, until the attacking boats were brought on the quarter, but only sufficiently so as to enable the whole broadside to still bear.
This formation would also well fulfil the first condition, but it would not be very good for the third and would be bad for the fourth unless the wireless telegraph were used for making all signals.
There is also in its favour the fact that if any one boat did manage to get within torpedo range there is little or no danger of a torpedo fired at one ship striking another, as there is in many formations, nor is it likely that one boat would get an opportunity of firing its torpedoes at more than two ships; whereas, if the fleet were proceeding in line ahead, a boat might easily, after once getting within range, run along a line firing its torpedoes at each ship in succession until they were all expended.
The next best formation for fulfilling the second condition is probably quarter-line, especially if the attack were expected from one bow, such as would he the case if passing an enemy's port.
In that event the quarter-line would be formed in the direction of that port, i.e., if the port were on the starboard side starboard quarter-line would be formed.
This formation would be equally good for the first condition, some-what better for the third, and, if the fleet were in columns of quarter-line disposed abeam, very much better for the fourth condition.
In a fog there is only one possible formation for keeping station, namely, columns in single line ahead, which is by far the worst for repelling torpedo attack. But, as under those weather conditions it would be impossible for the battle-fleet to prevent the boats getting to close quarters, that drawback would be amply compensated for by the compactness of the formation and the corresponding chance of escaping observation.
The chief safeguard for a fleet under those conditions, as indeed at most if not all times when liable to attack by torpedo craft, lies in the protection afforded by "destroyers."
There are two ways of obtaining this protection
1. By a destroyer watch on all the harbours from which the torpedo-boats could deliver their attack.
2. By forming a cordon of destroyers round the fleet, but more especially right ahead, at such a distance that they would not interfere with the Q.F. gun-fire of the battle squadron.
Of these two methods the first is undoubtedly the more efficient, combined as it would be with the cruiser blockade of those ports in which any of the larger enemy's ships were lying.
The second has the great disadvantage that in a fog the destroyers are very liable to miss the boats, while, if extended for the purpose of shielding the battleships, they would form a guide to the attacking force of the fleet's position.
The efficiency of the former method was fairly shown in the 1899 manoeuvres, when, thanks to the watch of the destroyers on Waterford and Queenstown, the B fleet passed twice along the south coast of Ireland without being in any way molested.CHAPTER IV.
POLICING.
By "policing" is meant the employment of vessels to act as police to prevent acts of robbery on the highways of the sea and burglarious attempts on our oversea possessions. During the critical period of a naval war, i.e., before some decisive victory had been won, it is doubtful if ships could be spared for this duty on any but the naval lines of communication, and it would be far better to risk the loss of a certain amount of our property for a time than to run the chance of missing a victory through want of vessels for obtaining information or any other of the duties we have already discussed.
Again, if on the outbreak of war the enemy despatched a number of his cruisers for the work of commerce-destroying he would con-siderably reduce his chances of obtaining information of the movements of our fleet, and so of successfully countering our strategy. Thus his action would be to our advantage, while any success he obtained in destroying our merchant shipping, or other unprotected property, would have to be paid for if victory ultimately rested with us, whereas such losses would matter little in the event of defeat.
The nation whose ports are best situated for such depredations is France, but with a cruiser or destroyer blockade of every port on the French coast which contained a war-vessel even as small as a torpedo-boat, and a strong British fleet at the mouth of the Channel, there would be little chance of sufficient cruisers escaping to prey on our commerce to the extent of even threatening England with starvation, as some critics have believed possible; and those commerce-destroyers that had got to sea before the establishment of the blockade would have great difficulty in returning or bringing prizes into port. Added to which, the cruisers passing to and from their coaling bases, and those placed for passing information, would still further limit the chance of such depredations.
Then the vessels on foreign stations would have the task of pro-tecting the coaling stations and preventing any enemy's cruiser taking up its position off the port with the purpose of preying on vessels trying to make it for coal. If, in addition to this, ships could be spared in sufficient numbers to watch all ports at which an enemy might obtain coal, he would have a very limited run and would be fairly certain of being captured at the end of it.
As soon as our naval supremacy was assured, there would be ample vessels to spare either for patrolling trade routes or for acting as convoys.CHAPTER V.
SINGLE SHIP ACTIONS.
THE same laws apply to a battle between single ships as to one between fleets, and in this case it is an easier matter to act according to those laws. For instance, if two hostile ships were steaming straight for one another, the one that turned so as to bring her whole broadside to bear at the other would obtain an immense advantage if the other held on her course, but in this case, where there is only one ship to develop its fire, it would be able to delay turning till well within effective range.
Supposing the two ships to be approaching at equal speeds and the extreme bearing of the after guns of each to be 300 before the beam, the turn should be made at a range of from 4,000 to 4,500 yards, if the speeds are maintained.
If the enemy held on its present course, the ships would be moving parallel to one another at a distance of about 1,200 yards, and not till then would the whole of the enemy's guns bear, while all the broad-side of the vessel that turned would have been bearing during that time, which at that range should have made a considerable difference.
If the ships continued to move parallel to one another, they would pass at a range of about 1,000 yards, given sufficiently accurately for practical purposes by the formula: -
y = x sin Ø = (k - x (1 + cos Ø) ) tan (60- a)
where y = distance they will pass abeam or perpendicular distance from course of enemy at any time.
x = distance either ship has run.
k = total distance between them when turn is made.
a = angle between courses of the ships.
Ø= mean between a and 60°, or more accurately, cos Ø should be the mean of the cosines of all the angles between 60° and a and sin Ø the mean of the sines.
Of course, when running parallel, a = 0 and Ø = 30°.
It might be a still better plan to turn a good deal sooner, so that, in case of the enemy holding on her course, you could ease down and so keep her as long as possible at a disadvantage; only it is very unlikely she would do so for long, and more advantage would be gained in those few moments at close range than if the turn were made sooner.
The only way for the enemy to make matters equal, as far as tactics are concerned, would be to turn also so as to bring into action her whole broadside, and then, as with fleets, the result would rest with the gunnery duel.
The faster ship would be able to select the range that suited her best, and the stronger ship would try to prolong the gunnery duel as much as possible.
If the stronger ship were also the faster, she would in all proba-bility keep at the range most suitable for herself until victory were obtained on the other hand, if she were the slower, she would try to prolong the gunnery duel as much as possible by turning away if the other ship tried to get to close quarters, when she would also have the superior position for torpedoing.
The best plan for the weaker ship, whether she were the faster or slower, would be to run away and so place her opponent in the position of the chaser. By so doing she would limit his fire to his bow guns and would place herself in the more advantageous position for torpedo-ing if she could entice her adversary within range, which she should try, by superior handling, to do.
There is no doubt that the best position for a ship to get, if she wishes to torpedo her opponent, is on that opponent's bow.
By so doing she decreases the effective range of the enemy's torpedoes, and increases that of her own.
Ramming can only be done by the faster ship delivering the blow on the quarter or stern of her opponent, during which; needless to say, she runs great risk of being torpedoed.
For to attempt to ram an enemy on the bow must equally expose yourself to being rammed, and, in fact, unless your ship is very much the handier, the chances are in favour of the enemy being the rammee, or of forcing you to meet her bows on.
Perhaps the best method for a fast ship to deliver a ramming attack on a slower one would be to get into position just before her beam, and as close as possible, with room to turn, and then quickly put the helm over.
If the enemy turns towards you, she would hardly gets bows on to you in time, unless she were very handy and lost no time in putting her helm over; and, if she turned away, she would expose her quarter to your ram, when, being the faster ship, success might be possible.
But to carry out a ramming attack must always be a very hazardous thing, and require extremely smart handling of the ship, so long as the enemy is under way:CHAPTER VI.
DEFENCE OF BASES.
The tactical requirement of a base was stated in the first chapter on strategy to be that "it must be capable of such defence as will permit the fleet to lie therein without danger from torpedo attack or from surprise."
The means by which such a defence of a permanent base may be procured are
1. Heavy guns mounted in forts.
2. Quick-firing guns in batteries.
3. Submarine mines fired by observation from stations on shore.
4. Submarine mines exploding when struck.
5. Moving torpedoes, such as the Brennan, Whitehead, and we may include with these any submarine torpedo-boats.
6. Booms, either solid or fitted with explosive charges, for the destruction of attacking boats.
7. Search-lights.
Before discussing the best means of arranging these various defensive weapons, it would probably be as well to study the form and object of the attack we have to guard against.
In the first place, we may be quite sure that as long as we have a fleet at sea, no enemy will be foolish enough to expend his naval strength on any other objective than our ships of war, and that if he did so it would be so much the more to our advantage.
It ma)' be argued that an enemy would attack a naval port for the purpose of destroying the supplies, docks, etc., with the hope that by doing so the operations of the fleet would be hampered; but, in reply, we would point out
1. That such loss would not have much effect, except at the base from which the fleet was operating.
2. That at those bases there would almost certainly be some ships either coaling or repairing, and that an attacking force would not turn its attention to the (locks and dock-yard as long as the ships were capable of harm; and
3. That, therefore, fortifications that are capable of allowing the ships to rest in comparative security should be amply sufficient to protect the base itself.
In the second place, we may be sure that as long as our fleet is powerful enough to remain at sea, the enemy will not be able to attempt anything more than a raid or surprise attack.
Of course, the narrower the entrance, and the fewer the entrances, to a harbour, the easier it is to prepare the defence, which would then be concentrated at the narrowest part.
But there are other considerations to be taken into account in selecting the line of defence for a harbour, the most important of which may be classified as follows: -
1. The line of defence should be as far out is possible so as to prevent an enemy's ship or ships lying outside it and carrying out an effective gunnery attack on ships engaged in coaling or repairing or on the docks and stores.
For example, the narrowest part at Portsmouth is the entrance to the harbour, but the defences should not allow an enemy to bombard the harbour from Spithead.
2. The mine-fields must be commanded by artillery, so as to protect them from countermining operations on the part of the enemy.
3. The defences against torpedo-boat attack, namely, those defences numbered (2), (6), and (7) should be as little as possible open to attack from the enemy's heavier guns, against which they would have little protection.
From these considerations it would seem that the best harbours to protect are those in which two lines of defence are possible, namely, an outer one against the larger ships and an inner one, if possible at the narrowest part of the entrance, against torpedo attack.
The outer line would be formed of mine-fields completely closing the entrance to large ships, with Brennan or Whitehead torpedo stations situated in the best position for destroying any ship that had passed the mine-field, and as well protected as possible from the enemy's fire, and search-light stations by which the passage could be illuminated, also well protected, the heavy guns being so mounted as to command the mine-fields and all points from which a bombardment might be attempted.
The inner line would be formed by a boom completely Closing the entrance at the narrowest part, the boom being commanded by batteries of Q.F. guns and search-lights, the latter being best placed so as to form a fixed beam some little distance the outer side of the boom with a movable light to show up any boat that reached the boom.
This inner line should be sufficiently far from the outer that there would he no danger of the projectiles from the Q.F. guns striking the outer forts or stations, or the lighter guns must be so mounted that, though they command the approach to the boom, they will not train to harm the other defence.
A harbour capable of such a method of protection is capable of being made very strong, and it is unnecessary to point out how well most of our principal naval ports conform to the ideal.
If the natural shape of the harbour will not permit of such a dis-tribution of the defence, the nearest approach to that method possible must be made, and if the harbour runs back very little it would be necessary to unite the two lines, placing the boom just behind the mine-field and both heavy guns and Q.F. batteries to command them, selecting their positions as much as possible according to the principles already stated.
Temporary bases would be fortified in a similar manner, though they would probably have to rely on the guns of the ships themselves to protect the mines and booms.CHAPTER VII.
ATTACK ON SHIPS IN FORTIEIED HARHOURS.
Though it may be presumed no admiral would attempt to attack fortifications with ships in order to destroy those fortifications unless he were in great superiority, and in such exceptional circumstances as happened at Alexandria, when there was no hostile fleet in existence to be encountered, it may often happen that it would be to the ultimate advantage of the nation for him to attempt to destroy or capture the hostile ships when they are lying in a fortified harbour.
For instance, by so doing he might considerably diminish the length of the war, and thus lessen its cost, although the actual Operation proved expensive.
Again, by making the attack he would obtain the immense advantage of being able to select his own time, whereas, in a blockade, that advantage always remains with the blockaded force.
Also, especially in these days of torpedoes, it is to the advantage of the weaker sea Power to prolong the blockade and trust to weaken the opponent by sudden attacks and raids; while the blockading force is still further liable to loss through storms and accidents, which are not likely to affect the fleet comfortably ensconced in harbour.
Taking the defences, as described in the last chapter, in detail, let us see what means we have of nullifying them so that our ships can meet theirs on even terms.
1. Heavy guns can only be opposed by artillery, unless land troops are present in sufficient numbers to effect the capture from the land side, as was done at Valparaiso in 1891, and Port Arthur and Wei-hai-Wei in 1894-5.
2. Quick-firing guns must be silenced in a similar manner.
3. Observation mines can best be destroyed by Countermining, or by obtaining possession of the shore ends of the cables.
4. Contact mines either by countermining or by means of a heavy sweep towed between two ships.
5. Mobile torpedoes can only be met by destruction of the shore stations and by the use of nets.
6. Booms can either be destroyed by explosives, or perhaps, better still, by being charged through by some heavy merchant-ship or other vessel useless for fighting purposes.
7. Search-lights must be destroyed by gun-fire.
In addition to these, there are the enemy's ships themselves and their torpedo craft, which must also be opposed by an equally strong force of our own.
Thus, since it is possible to counteract the effect of each form of defence, it must also be possible to counteract the whole, if only the attacking force be strong enough. For engaging the forts and batteries special vessels should be employed, other than the line-of-battle fleet, as the latter must be reserved for the fleet action.
With regard to the best conditions of time arid weather for delivering such an attack, darkness and obscurity would be all in favour of the attack, always supposing that the harbour was well known to the attacking force, since the position of the defences would remain unchanged, while the defenders would be unable to ascertain the whereabouts of the attack. Thus dark or misty weather would tend to considerably equalise matters, especially with regard to the fire of the batteries and the use of torpedoes and observation mines. There is no doubt that an attack under such circumstances would require a high state of discipline and efficiency on the part of the personnel, but the defenders would suffer like strain practically to the same extent.
The use of merchant-vessels, such as empty colliers, during the attack would considerably help. To them might be entrusted the task of sweeping the channel for mines, of breaking up the boom, and they would probably, being in advance, draw off a considerable amount of the defence from the real attack before (in dark or foggy weather) the mistake was discovered. These should be accompanied or closely followed by the torpedo flotilla, both to protect them from the enemy's guard and torpedo boats and also to get into position for their own attack. Then, if thought necessary, the countermining lines should be run while the ships told off to engage the forts and batteries moved into position and opened fire. Directly the channel was thus cleared, the fleet would move in to support the torpedo attack or to complete their work.
Under suitable conditions of weather, and if well carried out, such a plan should not be much more hazardous than a battle on the high seas.
Although Part I. has been entitled Strategy, and Part II. Tactics, the two things are so intimately connected that it has been found impossible to keep them apart and to make the work intelligible. In fact, Part II. would, perhaps, be more appropriately entitled Tactics and Minor Strategy.
But, whereas strategy is a science and thus capable of mathematical solution and of accurate calculation, tactics is an art, and no amount of book study will make a perfect tactician, any more than it will make a perfect swordsman. Practice in handling ships and Carrying out tactical operations, with a quick eye for detecting opportunities, are essential quali-fications for a tactician and the most a book can hope to do to help him is to give a few principles and laws for his guidance in selecting weak spots in his opponent's guard and for strengthening his own attack and defence.
