In April 2005 I took part in an escorted tour of the area of the battle where Vth Army were fighting. The guide was Richard Holmes and using info I gave him he detoured to take in the area where my Grandfather was captured.  I’m very grateful to Richard.

Map showing 2/York & Lancs dispositions Start of day, 21st March Attack starts Map showing 6 Division area Noreuil Cemetery

Richard consulting the various maps; from the map below he is at point ‘X’ with point ‘Y’ on his right.

For those who have the book by Ernst Junger, “The Storm of Steel”, take a read of his chapter on the Great Offensive.  His Regiment attacked to the left of the 2nd Battalion, he was in Noreuil and took a ride out of the area on the Noreuil-Queant road when he was wounded.

The map below shows the area where the 2nd Battalion found themselves on the morning of the 21st march, 1918.  We arrived on a grey and windy day, approaching through the village of Noreuil and drove to the point ‘X’ on the map and here Richard described what he believed had happened based on the report of the 2nd Battalion C.O. and also that from the K.S.L.I.  Using maps from documents in the National Archives at Kew, the 2/York & Lancs dispositions for the attack were as on the map below; ‘D’ Company was in the front line trench with the four platoons as shown in red, ‘C’ Company were in Leeds Reserve and Bradford Reserve, this was the front of the Battle Zone.  The two companies in support, ‘B’ & ‘A’, were in the sunken road behind Lagnicourt trench, and the Battalion H.Q. was in the area of the junction of the sunken roads, to the right of ‘A’ Company.  The battalion to the left of 2/York & Lancs was 1/K.S.L.I.  So, our tour was stood in the area of the K.S.L.I. trenches.

The map above is taken from the IWM Trench Map CD.

The photo above was taken from the point ‘X’ and the sunken track and bushes are roughly at point ‘Y’, you can see that the higher ground would be a good fire position for a German breakthrough, allowing trenches either side of this to be caught in enfilade fire. The photo below is from the same position but looking along the road towards ‘Leeds Reserve’ which was probably around the bushes in the middle distance, just by my wife’s back. The small stream on the map by the ‘X’ hardly exists at the moment, but it’s track can be seen sweeping from the right of the photo to reach the road and then run alongside it.  The trench position is not so overlooked as the small ridge of high ground flattens out.

The photo above has the little Hirondelle river (not much above a small stream) coming from the right of the photo to meet and then run parallel to the road.  The Bolton Avenue trench was on the right of the photo. Some maps call it Bolton Alley.

The morning of the 21^st March 1918 dawned with a thick mist lying over the area manned by 16 Infantry Brigade, and the rest of the 6^th Division; the troops had been ‘stood to’ in their battle positions since 5.30 because of a growing certainty that a German attack was imminent. The area held by 16 Brigade was the VAULX section of the front as shown on the second map; the front covered the area between CORNHILL on the right and HOBART AVENUE (left of the Hirondelle stream) on the left.  The defensive system held by the brigade had a number of flaws that were outlined in the Official History, the Forward Zone was described as being “difficult to hold, being exposed to enemy view and direct fire.”  Preparation of the zone was also less than ideal, there were insufficient dug-outs, few communication trenches and one battalion commander described the sector as “the most disgusting” he had ever met, with little cover to fall back upon, once the Forward Zone had been lost.”  The Battalion History for the 2/York & Lancs had a brief description of the front; “The front held by the 6^th Division was generally on a forward slope opposite the villages of Queant and Pronville. No-Man’s-Land averaged three-quarters of a mile in width. The whole area was downland and very suitable for the action of tanks. The position lay astride a succession of well-defined, broad spurs, and narrow valleys (like the fingers of a partially opened hand), merging into the broad transverse valley which separated the British line from the two villages above mentioned.  All the advantages of ground lay with the defence, and it seemed as if no attack could succeed, unless by the aid of tanks.”  This would prove to be an over optimistic appreciation of the position; the defenders were outnumbered, battalions were under strength and machine guns were not in ‘hardened’ defensive positions.

The disposition of the 16^th Brigade was as follows; 2/York & Lancs as the Right Battalion, 1/K.S.L.I as the Left Battalion and 1/The Buffs as Brigade Reserve.  The map above shows the disposition of 2/York & Lancs with ‘D’ Company in the front line, ‘C’ Company in the Battle Zone in LEEDS RESERVE and BRADFORD RESERVE and ‘B’ & ‘A’ Companies in support in the dug-outs in the Lagnicourt-Noreuil Sunken Road, ready to go into their battle positions in the LAGNICOURT TRENCH. On the right of 16 Brigade was the 71^st Brigade, with the 2/Sherwood Foresters as their Left Battalion, i.e. the right flank of the 2/York & Lancs was covered by the Sherwood Foresters.  The Right Battalion of the 71 Bde was manned by the 9^th Battalion of the Norfolk Regt.

The photos above give an appreciation of the area occupied by 1/K.S.L.I. From the map contour lines one can see that the trench positions are going roughly at right angles across the ground undulations; the defensive position taken up is from the Hirondelle Valley on the left to the Lagnicourt Valley on the right.  This would mean that the higher ground, shown in the top photo, lies between the two front battalions, making it difficult for them to see what is happening in each others area and also means that if the Germans get the higher ground between or on the flanks of the battalions, they will have an advantage. This they would do later in the battle.

The attack started, as normal, with an artillery bombardment which, according to the Brigade report, consisted mainly of gas shells from 5 am to 7 am, after which, from 7 am until 10 am it was mainly H.E. with a ‘liberal sprinkling of gas shell.”  According to the CO of the 2/York & Lancs the barrage came down heavily on LAGNICOURT TRENCH and the Sunken Road behind it, but initially it came down only lightly on the front and Reserve lines.  This is at variance with the Brigade report and also that of 1/K.S.L.I. which both speak of a heavy bombardment from the start on the front line system.  The C.O. of 2/York & Lancs goes on to say that this changed at around 7.30 am when the front line came under an intense barrage for an hour. “The barrage killed and wounded practically the whole of the front line Company, only 15 O.R. surviving and getting back to the reserve line.”  This was also the experience of the other two brigades of the 16^th Division where, in all cases, the garrisons of the front line were effectively wiped out by the bombardment.  The C.O. of the 71 Bde wrote of the casualties on his front; “Of the companies in the front line system very few survivors came back; they were practically wiped out by the heavy 5 hours bombardment, having no dug-out accommodation in which to shelter pending the infantry attack and I have no doubt that the ease with which the enemy gained our front line system was simply due to the fact that there was practically no one left there to resist him, the remains of our thick wire proving no obstacle as it was not under fire.”

By 08.30 that morning ‘D’ Company, York & Lancs, had been almost wiped out by the initial barrage. In the Brigade War Diary there is a comment that “it is certain that troops of the 6 Divn. in the front line fought, died or were captured as few came back.”  An NCO from 2/Sherwood Foresters on the right of 2/York & Lancs said that he entered the 2/York & Lancs front line trenches on his left at 8.45 and found them ‘evacuated ….thereby exposing (his) left flank – the trench was badly damaged and there were many dead in it.” 

Interestingly the barrage was deemed not to have cut the wire in front of the frontline or reserve trenches, even so a prisoner captured later by 71 Bde said that “the wire offered little or no obstacle.”   The C.O. [2/York & Lancs] reported that “No infantry attack developed against my front line from the front”, the Germans may have been aware of all the mines that had been laid in the area in front of the front line during the nights of the 11^th and 15^th and so took advantage of the Lagnicourt and Hirondelle valleys to effectively go round the front line.  The report from 71 Bde is different, here it states that “…the enemy’s infantry had attacked their [2/Sherwood Foresters] front line…” and that “At 9.50 a.m. the enemy’s infantry attacked along the whole front…”

Between 8.30 and 9.15 (depending on the report) the Germans developed an attack on the front of the Sherwood Foresters on the right of 2/York & Lancs, this started moving down the Lagnicourt Valley towards Lagnicourt but also across CORNHILL towards YORK SUPPORT and the remnants of ‘D’ Company York & Lancs who had not become casualties during the intense bombardment of the front line trench.  The C.O. of 2/York & Lancs reported that by 9 am the Germans had advanced down POULTRY to the Reserve Line (BRADFORD RESERVE), this is earlier than the time in the Brigade report. The move down POULTRY would have taken the Germans between the front area defended by 2/Sherwood Foresters and that of 9/Norfolk who were the right front battalion in 71 Brigade. The C.O.’s report goes on to say that “Every man of both C & D Coys [of 2/Y&L ] whom I have questioned state that no resistance was offered there [the 2/Sherwwod Forester area of Bradford Reserve] and that the garrison surrendered without fighting, being plainly visible leaving the trench with their hands up as the enemy approached.  This left my right flank exposed.”  It is fair to say that this description of the action taking place in the trenches of the 71 Brigade is at variance with that brigade’s report; “The Fog of War” makes it very difficult for commanders to get a good and timely view of the situation at the front.  The 71 Brigade report states that “The few survivors of the front line companies offered a stout resistance until finding themselves being surrounded by masses of the enemy they fell back to the reserve line.”  Also the 2/Sherwood Foresters in BRADFORD RESERVE “had suffered very heavy casualties from the bombardment, about half having been either killed or wounded – these were joined between 10 a.m. and 10:15 a.m. by the survivors from the front line held by the Left Battalion, 1 Officer and 6 Other Ranks, and also by a Corporal and 12 men from the Battalion on their left [this would be 2/York & Lancs, J Dillon], who reported that they had been cut off by the enemy from the remainder of their Battalion.”

It is important when we read the reports to remember that it was extremely difficult for Battalion Commanders to keep abreast of activities on their battalion front once the action had started, telephonic communication relied on land lines which were very vulnerable to being cut during heavy artillery barrages.  The 16 Brigade report states that “At 5.45 a.m. all lines forward of line Battalion Headquarters were cut and communication by telephone was not afterwards restored.” 18 Brigade similarly reported that “telephonic communication with the front Companies ceased at 7 a.m.,” two runners then managed to reach the front and return to say that casualties were high but “this was the last message received from the front line.”

Also around this time ‘C’ Company [2/York & Lancs], who were still in LEEDS and BRADFORD RESERVE trenches, but coming under increasing pressure on their right flank, had asked for reinforcement. The Battalion Commander ordered ‘A’ Company to go forward from their position in LAGNICOURT TRENCH to reinforce ‘C’ Company.

The strength of the enemy attack on the right increased and according to the Brigade report, by a little after 10 a.m. the Germans had broken right through the 71^st Brigade, getting into BRADFORD RESERVE; this meant that they had now successfully driven a wedge between the 2/York & Lancs on the right of 16 Bde, and the 2/Sherwood Foresters on the left of 71 Bde. Both of these battalions were now being strongly attacked on their flanks, and 2/Sherwood Foresters were pushed back into SKIPTON RESERVE, the 71 Bde report stated that “...attacked in front, from the left and left rear the survivors of the garrison gradually had to give ground towards BRADFORD SWITCH and the SKIPTON Strong Point.”

The attack against 16 Brigade though was not only against the 2/York & Lancs, the left flank of 1/K.S.L.I  was being attacked by the enemy coming down the Hirondelle Valley, towards Noreuil, and by 10.30 (Brigade timing) “the main attack was developing along the valleys of LAGNICOURT and L’HIRONDELLE respectively.”  At about 10.30 a runner from 2/York & Lancs arrived at 1/The Buffs to ask for reinforcements as the Lagnicourt Line was being very hard pressed from Noreuil and could not hold out much longer, two platoons were sent from ‘B’ Coy of The Buffs.  The Buffs were holding the VRAUCOURT SWITCH at this time, which faced west towards the Hirondelle Valley and the two platoons sent to help 2/York & Lancs came from this trench, their position being ‘backfilled’ by two platoons of ‘D’ Company who were now in the VAULX-MORCHIES Line.

The map above, also from the National Archives, shows the area held by 6 Division with 16 Brigade holding the VAULX SECTION on the left. I have marked the VAULX-MORCHIES trench line in black. This was the ‘Corps’ line that the Division would fall back to at the end of the day on the 21st.

The Hirondelle valley was a weak point for a couple of reasons; the valley was a natural ‘channel point’, especially with the fog that was a main feature of the morning of the 21^st; the front of the battalion on the left of 1/K.S.L.I. was at right angles to theirs for a couple of hundred yards, facing east, and the valley was a Brigade, Division and Corps boundary. Communication and co-operation across Corps boundaries were a structural weakness, and it was exploited by the Germans who moved down the flank of 16 Brigade to then attack units from the flank and rear.

Although the C.O. of 2/York & Lancs says in his report that “No infantry attack developed against my front line from the front”, sometime after 9 a.m. ‘C’ Company were attacked from the left by an enemy who had “evidently got in the strong point between BOLTON AVENUE and WAKEFIELD AVENUE.” To have done this they would have either had to come across the frontal defences, or they had moved right down LEEDS RESERVE  from the Hirondelle Valley, having gone through 1/K.S.L.I.

It is mentioned above that ‘A’ Company [2/York & Lancs] were moved from their support position to reinforce ‘C’ Company in the 2/York & Lancs section of LEEDS and also BRADFORD RESERVE, however, en route ‘A’ were met by the enemy who were advancing from LEEDS RESERVE (having got through the strong point mentioned above in the 1/K.S.L.I. area), ‘A’ Company did not get far, “the enemy shortened his barrage to the wire and killed and wounded the greater part of ‘A’ Company. ‘B’ Company had also been ordered forward from support, but suffered badly like their colleagues in ‘A’, as their C.O. reported; “I received a message to say that they had suffered considerable casualties, that large numbers of the enemy were advancing from LEEDS RESERVE and that they were going to fight it out.  The only survivors of their Company were a few men who had been left behind in the dugouts.”

By mid morning then, the 2^nd Battalion of the York & Lancaster Regiment had suffered considerable casualties; the forward company in the front line (‘D’) were largely wiped out in the initial barrage, both ‘A’ and ‘B’ companies were decimated by the enemy advancing from LEEDS RESERVE while they were trying to reinforce ‘C’ Company, and ‘C’ Company was being strongly attacked by the German breakthrough on both flanks.  The main German attack was developing strongly down the Lagnicourt and L’Hirondelle Valleys, with the Germans now in the villages of Lagnicourt and Noreuil.

Around midday there was an act of gallantry mentioned in a handwritten note in the Brigade Diary, as well as in the post battle report by Brigade. The reserve company of 1/K.S.L.I. had been moved up to MACAULAY AVENUE to form a flank defence facing Noreuil and the Hirondelle valley.  “Lt Col Smith, O.C. 1/K.S.L.I. said that he was holding on to the last, and is reported as last seen leading a bayonet charge by 12 men against the enemy”, this was either from LEEDS RESERVE or from MACAULAY AVENUE, I have been unable to determine which of the two.  It was afterwards reported that “No single officer of their Regt. [K.S.L.I.] who was in the front line area came back.”  A dreadful loss. The Germans were by now in the sunken road at C.17.b on the map (where our tour had been with Richard) and both battalions of the brigade were pulling back to LAGNICOURT TRENCH, described in the Official History as ‘not much more than a ditch’, their position here was not tenable. The following is from 16 Bde report; “As flank brigades could not hold this attack in the valleys, troops in the Battle Zone were now compelled to withdraw to the line of LAGNICOURT TRENCH with defensive flanks thrown out to face LAGNICOURT and L’HIRONDELLE Valleys. At 1 p.m. this position was rendered untenable by the fact that the enemy was coming up in strength on the flanks and making further progress down the valleys, particularly on the high ground east of LAGNICOURT.” The pull back from LAGNICOURT TRENCH put 1/The Buffs in VRAUCOURT SWITCH in an awkward position and they had to withdraw ‘B’ and ‘D’ companies; “(They were) compelled to withdraw their platoons from VRAUCOURT SWITCH owing to the advancing enemy taking them directly in the flank…. As long as LAGNICOURT TRENCH was in our possession the occupation of the VRAUCOURT SWITCH would have materially checked the enemy’s break through down the NOREUIL VALLEY. But the LAGNICOURT LINE having fallen this position became almost untenable.”  The Germans were doing a good job of rolling back 16 Brigade because of the strength of the attacks on the flanks.

The withdrawal of the ‘remnants’ of both battalions continued down DUNELM to the VAULX-MORCHIES Line but by now both battalions were severely depleted; 1/K.S.L.I had lost all its officers who were in the front line, and their war diary says that there were only 55 men left at the end of the day, the 2/York & Lancs war diary says that their losses were 24 Officers and 390 Other Ranks. The remnants continued in the VAULX area until withdrawn during the night of the 22^nd after fighting off a number of attacks on the Vaulx-Morchies line.

This photo is taken from the same spot as those above, but looking back to Noreuil which is out of picture on the right at the end of the road.  The sunken road behind Lagnicourt Trench with the reserve companies is below the ‘X’ in the photo above, probably behind the small trees on the left of the photo.  From where we stood Richard was not surprised that 2nd Battalion and the rest of 16 Brigade had a hard time (they suffered some 50% casualties), it was not a strong position and as soon as the Germans got any of the slightly higher ground on either side they would have a distinct advantage.  The forward companies found that this was indeed what happened and the Germans were able to get behind them in the mist and fog.

For Private 20003 Patrick Dillon, 2^nd Battalion York & Lancaster Regiment, the war was over on the 21^st March, somewhere in the action described above he was captured. Given the casualty rate the surprise is that he was not killed.

In a written note in the 18 Brigade diary Major General T.O. Marden says of the battle; ”It was essentially a soldiers battle in which units under their commanders were set to fight without hope of reinforcements against vastly superior numbers of the enemy supported by an overwhelming artillery.”

A couple of days after the trip Richard sent me an email following up on the visit, and I have included a short extract; “The big surprise to me was how poor flanking views (and thus flanking communications) were. Any sort of serious penetration on either flank would make that particular position very vulnerable, even in perfect weather.”

For my Grandfather this was the end of the war as he went off to become a P.O.W., and it was very satisfying to know that after all these years I was very close to where his war had ended. Those who died were probably buried in a mass grave by the Germans. There is an Australian cemetery on the road from Noreuil to Morchies, this is from 1917 with no graves from 1918. However, in due respect to the York & Lancs we did drive to the Australian cemetery to see if we could find any headstones for the regiment, we found two; both were from the 2/4th Battalion, O. Garland who died on the 12 July ‘17 and J.T. Burgess who died on the 20 July.

Two soldiers of the York & Lancaster Regiment, 2/4th Battalion, in the Noreuil Australian Cemetery.  They both died in July 1917.

For a view of how the action affected 6 Division, as seen by IV Corps HQ, go to the separate page.