Change to plan

This page has a number of extracts from Ian Hamilton’s Last Despatch, they deal with his frustration at the inertia he saw on the beaches and his direct intervention in the plans.   He is critical of the way the action stalled on the 7th, and the way the Divisional Commanders “overbore the Corps Commander’s resolution”.

 

 

Following the landings and the action on the 7th, the men were exhausted and short of water and while General Stopford, commanding from his sloop, “urged his Divisional Commanders to push on” they themselves believed the men “were exhausted by their efforts of the night of the 6th-7th and by the action of the 7th.” But Hamilton says that while the pleas for delay were “well founded”, they failed to take account of the fact that the Turks were also exhausted. Anyway, the views of the Divisional Commanders held sway over Stopford’s.  Hamilton then becomes quite critical of the command decisions.

“But it was lack of artillery support which finally decided him [Stopford] to acquiesce in a policy of going slow which, by the time it reached the troops, became translated into a period of inaction. the Divisional Generals were, in fact, informed that, “in view of the inadequate artillery support,” General Stopford did not wish them to make frontal attacks on entrenched positions, but desired them, so far as was possible, to try and turn any trenches which were met with. Within the terms of this instruction lies the root of our failure to make use of the priceless daylight hours of the 8th August.” Hamilton agreed that normally the infantry would only advance after good artillery bombardment had prepared the way, but in the situation where the infantry is landing on a hostile shore this does not hold true, indeed the success; “...must absolutely depend on the infantry being able instantly to make good sufficient ground without the aid of the artillery other than can be supplied for the purpose by floating [ie Naval] batteries.”

In Hamilton’s view the artillery argument was an excuse, inertia had set in because there was insufficient resolution to push the troops on, “.. a certain ruthlessness..” was needed, but was lacking. Hamilton decided he needed to go to Suvla at the risk of “cutting myself adrift, even temporarily, from touch with the operations at Anzac and Helles.” He went to see Stopford on his sloop.

“On arrival at about 5pm I boarded H.M.S Jonquil, where I found Corps Headquarters, and where General Stopford informed me that the General Officer Commanding 11th Division was confident of success in an attack he was to make at dawn next morning (the 9th). I felt no such confidence.”  Hamilton believed that precious hours had been lost by inaction and “when I urged that even now, at the eleventh hour, the 11th Division should make a concerted attack upon the hills, I was met by a non possumus. .......the Divisional Commanders disliked the idea of an advance by night, and General Stopford did not care, it seemed, to force their hands.” His next comment is even more damning of Stopford’s lack of ‘grip’ (as Montgomery would have expressed it) over his commanders. “...I was driven to see whether I could not, myself, put concentration of effort and purpose into the direction of the large number of men ashore.  The Corps Commander made no objection.  he declared himself to be as eager as I could be to advance.  The representations made by the Divisional Commanders had seemed to him insuperable. if I could see my way to get over them no one would be more pleased than himself.” That is a pretty damning report of Stopford’s command capabilities.

Hamilton decided he had to get involved directly in the plans for the coming operations, in a way which a Commander-in-Chief would not ordinarily do. There would later be controversy over this intervention and whether or not he had interfered in Stopford’s orders for General Hammersley commanding 11th Division.

The following is an extract from the report of the Dardanelles Commission, and deals with the controversy over Sir Ian Hamilton’s intervention into the plans of Generals Stopford and Hammersley for the attack on the 9th August.

Sir Ian Hamilton arrived at Major-General Hammersley’s headquarters about 6 pm, and in his despatch of December 11th, 1915, he describes the conversation which took place, and the extent to which he modified the orders previously given by Sir Frederick Stopford for the attack next morning.  Hamilton says; “I warned him [Hammersley] the sands were running out fast, and that by dawn the high ground to his front might very likely be occupied in force by the enemy.  he saw the danger, but declared that it was a physical impossibility, at so late an hour (6 p.m.), to get out orders for a night attack, the troops being very much scattered.”

Sir Frederick Stopford and General Hammersley had decided against a night attack, but Sir Ian Hamilton thought that the advantages of such an attack in the matter of forestalling the enemy outweighed its disadvantages, and hearing that the 32nd Brigade was more or less concentrated and ready to move he gave General Hammersley a direct order that, even if it were only with this brigade, the advance should begin at the earliest possible moment instead of at dawn the next morning as previously arranged. Sir Ian Hamilton further directed that the 32 Brigade should endeavour to occupy the heights north of Anafarta Sagir, presumably Tekke Tepe, but beyond giving these orders he states that he did nothing and said not a word calculated to effect the attack as originally planned.  In his despatch he speaks of the 13 battalions detailed for the attack, but the correct number appears to be eleven, namely, four battalions of the 33rd Brigade, together with one from the 31st Brigade, on the right, with Ismail Oglu Tepe as the objective; four battalions of the 32nd Brigade on the left, with Anafarta Sagir as the objective; and two battalions of the 34th Brigade in reserve. It will be remembered that the remaining two battalions of the 34th Brigade had been placed at Sir Bryan Mahon’s disposal on the morning of August 8th.

Hamilton was conscious of the fact that he was directly intervening between the Corps Commander and the Divisional Commander; “In taking upon myself the serious responsibility of thus dealing with a detail of divisional tactics I was careful to limit the scope of the interference.  beyond directing that the one brigade which was reported ready to move at once should try and make good the heights before the enemy got on to them I did nothing, and said not a word, calculated to modify or in any way affect the attack already planned for the morning.” Perceptions differ.

Sir Ian Hamilton’s description of the nature and scope of his intervention is not fully corroborated by Sir Frederick Stopford and General Hammersley. Thus Sir Frederick Stopford points out in his report of October 26th, 1915, that his intention had been to make a concentrated attack upon the front stretching from Ismail Oglu Tepe to Anafarta Sagir, a distance of 4,100 yards, while under Sir Ian Hamilton’s direct orders the front to be attacked was extended northward from Anafarta Sagir to Tekke Tepe, lengthening the front by an additional 2,200 yards.  Moreover, the advance on this northern extension was through extremely difficult ground covered with dense bush, which had not been reconnoitered, and this greatly militated against the success of a night operation. Sir Frederick Stopford says in his report that, in view of the radical changes made by Sir Ian Hamilton in his plans and dispositions for the attack on the 9th, he repudiates any responsibility for the results of the action.

General Hammersley states that Sir Ian Hamilton’s personal instructions quite upset the pre-arranged plans, and obliged him to re-issue his divisional orders late in the evening. Difficulty was experienced in communicating with the battalions of the 32nd Brigade, which were less concentrated than General Hammersley had supposed, and as a result only one battalion together with a section of engineers advanced in the direction of Tekke Tepe before 4 am on the 9th.

The change in the plan of operations approved by Sir Frederick Stopford was not communicated to him [Stopford] either by Sir Ian Hamilton or by General Hammersley.  Sir Ian Hamilton states that he thought it would be reported by General Hammersley, and General Hammersley states that it did not occur to him at the time that he ought to report it. Later on, he imagines, the change was reported by some member of his staff to some member of the Corps staff. We think that this was an unfortunate omission.  Sir Frederick Stopford might have expected to hear from the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, and was entitled to hear from his divisional commander, in what respects his scheme of attack had been modified by direction of superior authority.  If, however, Sir Frederick Stopford had accompanied Sir Ian Hamilton to Lala Baba, and been present at the latter’s interview with General Hammersley, the alteration in the plan could not have been made without his knowledge.

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