The Guards Division, Coldstream and Grenadier, operated to the west of 6 Division and had 10 tanks allocated to them.

Map of Guards Division area Clarke & Smith’s tanks advance Map of area for Clarke & Smith Bates & Elliot’s tanks advance Map for Bates and Elliot Map of Calf Alley

The Guards Division was commanded by Major General Fielding, and was on the left of the 6th Division.  They would start from the village of Ginchy, and in front of them they had the Germans in strength in ‘The Triangle’ and Serpentine Trench, the latter was also the Green Line, or 1st Objective, for the Guards. Unlike 6 and 56 Divisions, who only had three tanks each, nine were allocated to the support of the Guards, plus a tenth in reserve.  The nine tanks were organized in three columns of three tanks each, their initial assembly area was Trones Wood and they had to make their way to Ginchy to arrive at 2.20am, 4 hours before zero at 6.20am.

The following is from Malcom Brown’s book “The Somme”, it is Captain Sir Iain Colquhoun of the Grenadier Guards; “Sept. 15th. Started digging 2.30am, finished 3.15am. Went round all my Company to see they were all in their right places, etc.  Anyone can see that there must be hopeless confusion when we start. Lay down in a shell hole at 4 am.  About 4.30am the Tanks began to arrive behind us. The Germans heard them and sent up many rockets and shelled slightly.  At 5.40am the Tanks started and went through our front line.  At 6.30am the entire British Line advanced, the 1st Guards Brigade on our left the 6th Division on our right.  As we anticipated the entire wave formation had disappeared before we had crossed our own front line, and we advanced in a great mass, Grenadiers, Coldstream, Irish and Scots Guards all inextricably mixed up. Within 30 yards I found myself in front of the Grenadiers with a few of my men.  Our barrage was about 50 yards in front of us, and the whole landscape was obscured by smoke, and it was impossible to see anything or keep direction. About 100 yards on we found a few Germans lying in shell holes.  I shot one and clubbed one. We then came under heavy machine-gun fire, and the Lines disappeared into shell holes.

The Lines again moved on, passed over a German Line which no-one knew existed, and came under heavy fire from German 1st Line. Many men began to fall, and the Coldstream lost almost their whole Batt. by walking into our own barrage. The lines began to move in parts, some swinging to the right, and others to the left, and eventually everyone got into shell holes.  In 10 minutes, we were off again, and the officers took charge of any men they could see, and began to try and get some order and direction.”

Of the three tank columns, the one on the right, closest to 6 Division was tanks A, B & C [Lt Tull, 2/Lt Clarke & 2/Lt Smith]. Having found their way, with some difficulty, through the ranks of the infantry (3rd grenadiers and 1st Coldstream) they set off at 5.40 in the mist that lay over No Man’s Land in front of them. They were to make for Straight Trench, go north on Low Road, then east on the Hogs Back and into 6th Division’s area to attack Morval. 

The map is from the IWM Trench Map CD. I have shown the divisional boundaries and the start position of the Guards units. The Green Line, or 1st Objective lies along Serpentine Trench.  Low Road can be seen on the right, going north, with the Hogs Back then going east, near the 150 contour.

Right from the start ‘A’ tank broke their tail-wheel unit and had to go back leaving tanks B & C to continue on their way across No Man’s Land. They would have seen the artillery barrage come down on the Green Line at zero (6.20am) while behind them the infantry would have come out of the trenches.  The artillery plan called for a barrage to be laid down 100 yards in front of the troops, and for this to creep forward at 50 yards/minute.  There was a gap 100 yards wide in the barrage for the expected advance line of the tanks, who were luckily within their lane or they would have been hit by their own artillery.  The infantry behind them met a hail of bullets from Straight Trench as well as enfilade fire from the Quadrilateral in 6 Division area. One of those who fell in this advance was Lt. Raymond Asquith, eldest son of the Prime Minister.

Map showing area of operations for Clarke and Smith’s tanks.

Both B & C tanks are believed to have got to the area of Low Road, with C tank going a little further, but both of them went back for different reasons.  They did not make it on to Morval as planned.

The three tanks of the centre column, D E & F, did not make it into the battle for a variety of reasons, so the Coldstream Guards they were to support had to make do without and unfortunately ended up attacking more to the north than to the north-east as intended, causing them to push up against the boundary with XV Corps.

The three tanks of the left-most column, G H & K, were to start just west of Ginchy and move up Lager Trench to Serpentine, go east on this then north-east on Calf Alley to Les Boeufs. Before moving off they were joined by the tenth, reserve, tank ‘L’.  In the even 2/Lt Cole in ‘L’ received confusing orders, but did not get far from his start point before having to stop, damaged.  Of the original three tanks in this left-most column ‘K’ did not get far before breaking down, leaving H & G to continue.

Map shows start point for left-most column as well as German machine gun points along the Flers Road.

As the tanks went forward they did not spot the machine gun points along the Flers road out of Ginchy, these would cause great trouble for the infantry.  When the 2nd and 3rd Coldstream started from their positions at the northern end of Ginchy they met a murderous fire from these machine-guns.  The C.O. of 3rd Coldstream, Lt. Co. Campbell won the V.C. leading an attack against these guns.  Like the 1st Coldstream further to the right, these two units also swung north in their attack, pushing up on XV Corps. This incorrect advance line caused them to believe that the trenches they had now taken were their objective on the Blue Line, after some time they realised the error and had to move to the right and resume their advance in the correct direction, taking the second objective, the Brown Line.

Map shows detail of Green Line, Calf Alley, and Bates & Elliot some way west of their intended area, in 14th Division sector.

The original orders for the left-most column called for them to move along Calf Alley to Les Boeufs, but in their inexperience they followed the northward swing of the infantry before ‘G’ tank (Bates) was ditched and ‘H’ (Elliot) began to run short of petrol and had to go back.  They were now both well west of their intended operational area.  Given the poor visibility from these tanks, the problems of poor compasses in a complete steel shell, and the fact that the infantry they were supporting had gone left, it is probably not surprising that the two tank commanders, new to battle, went left as well.

One consequence of the central column not moving forward and of the tanks on the left losing direction was that the path they should have followed was a gap in the artillery barrage. Enemy units in these paths should have been dealt with by the tanks as they advanced but because they were not in their alloted paths the Germans there were not subjected to the artillery barrage and so could fire on the infantry, almost untouched.

Major General Fielding, as Divisional Commander, was not complementary in his written comments after the battle. he said of the tanks “..they were of no assistance in the attack......the moment they started they lost all sense of direction and wandered about aimlessly.”  This was unfair, they gave a great deal of support to the infantry and four of them made it to the first objective, but of the ten tanks allocated, six did not. Those in the tanks tried all they could with this new unproven weapon of war.