The landings at Suvla Bay, August 1915, were intended to bring the land campaign on the Peninsula to a successful conclusion.  This was not to be.

Sketch map Stopford’s plan Hammersley’s Op Order Private Charles Hawthorne Command changes Private James Dillon

There is a separate page for the involvement of the 6th Battalion York & Lancaster regiment..

The landings at Suvla Bay were to take place on three beaches, A, C & B as shown on the map below. The forces involved came under Lt-General Stopford, he had 25,000 men and was opposed by only some 1,500 Turkish soldiers spread across the high points of Kiritch Tepe, Hill 10, Lala Bala, Chocolate Hill and Green Hill.  With a determined attack these would be good odds, unfortunately Stopford was not the man for the job.

Sketch of the Suvla Bay landing area.  Anzac is south of the Sari Bair Ridge.  The landing area for 6 York & Lancs is at variance with the Battalion history map, but agrees with all other sources. You will note the way the beaches go A, C then B.  Originally the plan had been for A beach to be south of B but General Stopford requested A be moved into Suvla Bay. For some reason, C & B were not re-designated.

While the landings were effected without loss, they were not without some confusion. 34 Brigade (of 11 Division) was due to land on “A” beach but an error put them ashore somewhat south of this.  Also 31st Brigade (of 10th Division) should have landed on “A” but most of them ended up on “C” with 11th Division causing some chaos.  Control of proceedings was done from a distance as Hamilton was at Imbros and Stopford was at sea rather than on the beaches.  Comment of the Commission on Hamilton’s position at Imbros; “This choice of Imbros has been criticised, but we think that the reasons given for it are satisfactory.”

It would take time for the Turkish forces to be re-inforced, the need now was for resolute command and action by the British.  The following is from the Operation Order, dated August 3rd, 1915, from General Stopford to General Hammersley commanding 11 Division (and so the 6th York & Lancs).

(a) To safeguard the landing places.

(b) To occupy the enemy posts of Lala Baba and Ghazi Baba, and to establish a footing along the ridge from Ghazi Baba through Karakol Dagh and Kiretch Tepe Sirt to Hill 156, immediately overlooking Ejelmer Bay.

(c) To occupy Chocolate Hill and Ismail Oglu Tepe.

(d) To seize Baka Baba and establish connection northwards between that point and the troops advancing on Hill 156.

General Hammersley then translated these into his orders for his three brigades:

The 34th Brigade on the left to land at the original Beach A 800 yards west of Hill 10; one battalion to move north towards Kiretch Tepe Sirt and occupy Suvla Point; one battalion to occupy Hill 10; the remaining two battalions to concentrate at Hill 10. These three battalions at Hill 10 then to move to the assault of Chocolate Hill, and if successful, to the assault of Ismail Oglu Tepe.

The 32nd Brigade (this included 6th York & Lancs) in the centre to land at Beach C; to assault and occupy Lala Baba, and then move north along the sand-spit in support of the 34th Brigade.  [Hamilton’s Last Despatch states that 32nd Brigade came ashore on B beach].

One of those from the 6th Battalion who died that day was Private Charles William Hawthorne, 3/3222, who is commemorated on the Helles memorial.  He was the great uncle of David Greenall who contacted me to say that his grandmother, 90 years old, had told the family about her father’s brother who was killed at Gallipoli. Up to that point the family were completely unaware.  He was born and lived in Castleford, was married but the family don't know how many children, he was 38 when he was killed, and he probably enlisted in either Castleford or Pontefract at the outbreak of the war. David is now trying to research his great uncle.

The 33rd Brigade on the right to land at Beach B about a mile south-east of Nebrunesi Point; two battalions to hold the line from the south-east corner of the Salt Lake south-westerly to the shore. Two battalions to follow the 32nd Brigade along the sand-spit to a point 800 yards east of Hill 10, there to form the divisional reserve with the divisional Pioneer Battalion (6th East Yorkshire Regiment).

The artillery to concentrate at Lala Baba, where the divisional report centre was to be established.

By dusk on the 7th Chocolate Hill had been captured but Stopford had still not gone ashore, causing Hamilton (on the morning of the 8th) to send an officer to hasten him. As this bore no result, Hamilton went himself to meet Stopford on his sloop Jonquil.  From there Hamilton continued on to the beaches, but Stopford remained on Jonquil.  A general attack was ordered for the 9th August by the 11th Division plus 31 Brigade (10 Division) and forward elements of the 53rd Division. The planning for this had been done by Stopford and Hammersley, but there was to be some controversy over the intervention of Hamilton in these plans. By the time that the leading elements reached the objective (Tekke Tepe) they found the Turkish reinforcements in place. At the same time the attack by 10 Division on Kinitch Tepe also ground to a halt, the British had again fought themselves to a stalemate.  Heavy casualties had been sustained with no real gains because of poor and irresolute leadership.  Over the next few days there were more attacks, some involving 6 York & Lancs, but none were conclusive.

Hamilton believed that the attacks on the 8th and 9th could have been much more successful had they been prosecuted with strong resolution by the senior commanders, and if they had seen the necessity of pushing on rather than taking too much account of the extent to which the men may be feeling exhaustion.  He believed that the Turks would also be suffering and any hesitation now would only need even greater efforts later. From his Last Despatch; “I have not been able to get a clear and coherent account of the doings of the 32nd Brigade; but I have established the fact that it did not actually commence its advance till 4am on the 9th of August. The reason given is that the units of the brigade were scattered. In General Stopford’s despatch he says that ‘one company of the 6th East Yorks Pioneer Battalion succeeded in getting to the top of the hill north of Anafarta Sagir, but the rest of the battalion and the 32nd Brigade were attacked from both flanks during their advance, and fell back to a line north and south of Sulajik.  Very few of the leading company or the Royal Engineers who accompanied it got back, and that evening the strength of the battalion was nine officers and 380 men.’ After their retirement from the hill north of Anafarta Sagir (which commanded the whole battlefield) this 32nd Brigade then still marked the high-water level of the advance made at dawn by the rest of the division.  When their first retirement was completed they had to fall back further, so as to come into line with the most forward of their comrades.  The inference seems clear. Just as the 32nd Brigade in their advance met with markedly less opposition than the troops who attacked an hour and a half later, so, had they themselves started earlier, they would probably have experienced less opposition. Further, it seems reasonable to suppose that, had the complete division started at 4am on the 9th, or, better still, at 10pm on the 8th, they would have made good the whole of the heights in front of them. That night I stayed at Suvla, preferring to drop direct cable contact with my operations as a whole to losing touch with a corps battle which seemed to be going wrong.” Hamilton has obviously lost confidence in the command structure at Suvla.

Belatedly Hamilton realised he had to make command changes;

His telegram to Kitchener, 14 August “There is nothing for it but to allow them [the troops at Suvla] time to rest and reorganize, unless I force Stopford and his Divisional Commanders to undertake a general action, for which, in their present frame of mind, they have no heart. In fact, they are not fit for it.”

On the 15th he knew Stopford had to go.  The man appointed to replace him was Major-General de Lisle from 29 Division at Helles. Unfortunately his assumption of command now put him over Lt-General Sir Bryan Mahon of 10 Division, who was senior to de Lisle.  Mahon refused to serve under de Lisle and abandoned his command (it is interesting to contrast this action with the way ordinary soldiers were disciplined for refusing orders in the field.  Many were “Shot at Dawn”.)  De Lisle’s temporary command would only last until the 28 August when he returned to 29 Division and Lt-General Byng took over IX Corps.  Other changes were; Lindley resigned 53rd Division on the 17th August, Sitwell was removed from 34 Brigade following a report from Hammersley, and Hammersley himself was relieved of 11 Division on the 23rd.

In another comment by the Commission on a despatch from Hamilton; “As regards Suvla, he remarks that the units of the 10th and 11th Divisions had shown their mettle in the act of landing, when they stormed Lala Baba, when they tackled Chocolate Hill, and when they drove the enemy from Hill 10.  He continues;

Then had some hesitation.  The advantage had not been pressed. The senior commanders at Suvla had had no personal experience of the new trench warfare; of the Turkish methods; of the paramount importance of time.  Strong, clear leadership had not been promptly enough applied.”

Following the replacement of Stopford, Hamilton scheduled another attack for the 21st August against the Anafarta Spur and Ismail Oglu Tepe.  11th Division (with 6 York & Lancs) would be part of this action. A supporting attack would also take place from the Anzac area (29 Division had been moved there from Helles on the 20th) to Hill 60.  The 11th Division attack failed to take its objectives but the Anzac forces advanced sufficiently for their left flank to connect with the right wing of the Suvla forces, so forming a continuous front.  One of those who died that day was Private 11355 James Dillon of the 6th Battalion.

Unfortunately, after all the bravery and sacrifice, things were moving towards a decision to evacuate from the Peninsula.