On the 15th September, 1916, Tanks made their first appearance in warfare. Their introduction by the British brought a new and formidable weapon to the battlefield, although in this, its first outing, it was not a complete success.

German defence lines Drawing of IVth Army area Haig wanted ‘boldness’ in the attack Arguments for & against their early use Allocation of tanks Summarising the use of Tanks at Flers

On the 1st July the Allies launched their major assault against the Germans in the Somme offensive, however the attack became bogged down with massive loss of life on both sides.  Haig was under a lot of pressure from Joffre to launch another attack, and whilst he felt unable to say ‘no’, he did feel that he wanted to be ready before launching it, and he felt that mid-September was the time. He wanted a breakthrough, one through which he could release his cavalry to exploit the opening and get into the area behind the German lines.  The area chosen was to be south of the Ancre, north of the Albert-Bapaume road, with the main attack south of this towards Morval and Les Sars.  To add an element of surprise, and also to hopefully effect the needed breakthrough, he elected to use the new ‘Tank’ weapon, although there were arguments for holding back its use until more of them were available.  All 50 of the available tanks were to be allocated to IVth Army for this attack.

The commander of the IVth Army was General Sir Henry Rawlinson who was commanded by Haig to plan the attack, using the new Tanks.  The Germans had a strong line, with three lines of defence behind their front line; these lines were known by the British as ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’. The first of these, ‘A’, varied from some 200 to 600 yards from the British front line, but then there was some 1000 yards to ‘B’, and a similar distance to ‘C’.  Haig wanted an attack that would go all the way to the third line, ‘C’, he needed this for his breakthrough. Rawlinson believed that without the Tanks he could achieve an attack that would take ‘A’, and that the Tanks may enable him to make ‘B’, but there was the risk that if the Tank did not live up to expectations then a plan that aimed for ‘B’ could come unstuck and be over-extended; it would also give away the secret of the new weapon. To get as far as ‘C’ Rawlinson was thinking in terms of night attacks over three consecutive nights, not a plan that was in keeping with Haig’s thoughts, he wanted all the way on Day 1.  The Instruction to Fourth Army issued on 11th September had the timing for attainment of the 1st, 2nd & 3rd objectives amended to Zero + 1hr, Zero + 2 hr and Zero + 4hr 30mins, a very aggressive schedule.

Map to show corps dispositions and approximate positions of the first, second and third objectives.

Haig’s view of Rawlinson’s slow, phased attack was made known to Rawlinson; “The Commander-in-Chief considers that the situation is likely to be favourable for an operation planned on bolder lines. Accordingly he desires that the tanks may be used boldly and success pressed in order to demoralise the enemy and if possible to capture his guns.”

G.H.Q’s aim was outlined in a memorandum of the 19th August; “All arrangements are to be made with a view to overwhelming the enemy at the outset by a powerful assault and following up every advantage gained with rapidity and vigour. The exploitation of success to the full during the first few hours is essential to a decision and it must be impressed on all Corps and Divisional Commanders that the situation calls for great boldness and determination on their part.  It lies with them to feel the pulse of the battle and to turn favourable opportunities at once to the fullest account.  In particular it is of great importance to reach the enemy’s artillery positions quickly and capture his guns.  Risks must be minimised not by declining to accept them but by skilful handling of reserves.  The necessity for great vigour and determination in this attack, and the great results that may be achieved by it, must be impressed on all ranks as soon as considerations of secrecy will permit of their being informed of what is required of them.  It will also be necessary then to impress on all leaders that the slow methods of trench warfare are unsuited to the style of operations they will be called on to undertake after the enemy has been driven from his prepared lines of defence.” So, boldness, risk taking and a move away from the rigidity of trench warfare would be the hallmarks of the attack to allow the breakthrough with the follow-on of cavalry exploitation.

A Mk1 tank with bogie at the back for steering and wire netting on top to ward off grenades.

Haig’s plan involved the first use of tanks, and there were arguments against using them in September 1916; only 50 would be available, these would only make it to France a few days before the attack, there would no longer be any secrecy about the weapon.  Haig however was under pressure to launch an attack and here was a weapon that he believed would assist in wire clearing, in assaulting strong points, in demoralising the enemy, and last but not least, might reduce the number of casualties in the IVth Army attack.  Also, although the tank had not yet been used, it was known that the state of the ground was important and while it was relatively solid at the moment, it would not be at the end of the winter. Winston Churchill was one of those who felt it was wrong to use them this early before numbers had built up.  Lt-Gen Sir William Robertson, (C.I.G.S.) in July, wrote to Haig to ask him to consider the arguments against their use. Last paragraph of his argument; “That to await the employment of a large number of Tanks in January as outlined, will do more to ensure final success on a large scale than to use them in detachments now and so discount the future full value of a new method of fighting which is at present in its infancy.”

Haig’s response was; “It is evident, however, that the general offensive now being prosecuted by all the Allies cannot be maintained for more than a limited period under existing conditions, and that if the enemy is not forced from his entrenched positions - as there is good hope that he will be - before the autumn, it is unlikely to prove possible to arrange for another simultaneous effort on a large scale before next spring.

In these circumstances, if opportunity should offer to gain valuable results in the present struggle by the use of even a few tanks, I should have no hesitation in taking advantage of it, and I consider it of very great importance that such number of tanks as can be made available should be sent to France with the least possible delay.”

Haig wanted the advantage that he hoped the tank would give him, and while with hindsight it may have been better to have waited.........who knows, and it is difficult to blame him for wanting grab an advantage after the way the 1st July offensive had not lived up to expectations.

Those who were involved in the planning for the production and tactical use of tanks, men such as Lt-Col Swinton, were sure that for the tank to be successful it should be used in concentrations to maximise its offensive shock, it should not be used in ‘dribblets’.  Unfortunately this is what would happen on the 15th September, with so few tanks to distribute through IVth Army.  For the 3 mile sector of the front there would be 49 tanks to allocate

XIV Corps on the right 17 tanks 10 to Guards Div; 3 to 6th Div; 4 to 56 Div. III Corps on the left 8 tanks   XV corps in centre 17 tanks   Reserve 7 tanks

Rawlinson’s view on using them was; “...to use them in groups a short distance in front of the infantry line for seizing the strong points and trench junctions.  As soon as they have enabled the infantry to gain possession of the system they would move forward and similarly put them into the next line, and so on until all objectives have been gained.” Fourth Army had planning conferences for the attack on the 31st August and the 5th September, and although these meetings, involving Corps Commanders, were discussing the tactical use of tanks (something they had never used before, and so had no experience) there were no ‘Tank’ men present. Major Allen Holford-Walker, commanding the tanks in C Company later wrote; “It may seem very curious, looking back on the preparations before a battle and the use of a completely new arm, that the officer commanding the tanks on the XIV Corps front was never once consulted as to the action, movement, distribution or use of his tanks.  But it is so.”

The Fourth Army Instruction issued on 9th September included the following; “The attack will be pushed home with the utmost vigour all along the line till the most distant objectives have been reached. For the last two and a half months we have been gradually wearing the enemy down, his moral is shaken, he has few, if any, fresh reserves available, and there is every probability that a combined effort will result in a decisive victory.” 

The tanks arrived in France about 10 days before the attack, but then needed to be moved to the forward area, they needed their side sponsons re-fitting after transport by rail and they were crewed by men, most of whom had not been in France before. The new arm was going into battle with very little experience. The men became very tired before the attack even started, some of this tiredness brought on by the need to demonstrate the tanks in ‘stunts’ for Army officers who were unfamiliar with the tanks. Preparation for the attack was cursory, the tank commanders had not seen the ground over which they would attack, and as F. Mitchell wrote in his book ‘Tank Warfare’, “In the meantime the crews of the tanks were trying hard to find out what they were supposed to do. The orders, maps, and time-tables issued to the commanders were insufficient, only one set being available for three tanks; consequently they had to be almost learnt by heart and then passed on to the next tank.”

But for all that, they would take part in the attack, or at least the 36 out of 49 that managed to reach the start line. The new weapon had a long way to go yet in terms of mechanical reliability.

A photo I took in the Tank Museum, smoke effect is the result of a little ‘messing about’ with Photoshop. It shows the 6 pounder in a side sponson, and the assembly at the front for tightening the tracks.

To summarise the use of Tanks at Flers.

In August 1916 Haig needed another offensive to follow up on the stalled offensive of 1^st July, and he assigned this new ‘push’ to Rawlinson commanding ‘XX’ Army. In an attempt to ensure success, Haig decided to employ the new Tank weapon, as yet untested in battle. Proponents of the Tank believed this was too early; there were insufficient numbers, and the time between the decision to use them, and the planned date for the offensive was very short. It would not allow adequate time for the Tank commanders to get used to the terrain and their role in the coming battle. In addition, they believed strongly that using the Tank in the small numbers available would lose them the important element of surprise that would work to their advantage if the Tanks were used in large numbers. Haig, however, felt that he needed them.

With hindsight, it is possible to criticise Haig’s decision, and we can come to the operational problems shortly, but his decision is also understandable. He needed a ‘push’, he needed a victory and he needed it soon. Delay in use of the Tank would mean either using it during the winter months, with all that this meant in deterioration in the ground with wet weather, or waiting until the ground was dryer in the Spring. He could not wait that long. Given the expectation that rode on the Tank, that it would terrify the defenders, was armoured against machine-guns, could cross and destroy trenches, there is little wonder that he wanted it included in the September battle.

Because they were only available in small numbers, the Tanks would be allocated piecemeal to the support of the infantry divisions.  Although they had never yet been used in action the supporters of the Tank believed the correct way to deploy the new weapon was in strength through large numbers. Deploying them sometimes as singletons, sometimes in groups of only two to four units would prevent them really punching through.  On the other hand, they were not there in sufficient n umbers to do that. However, rather than spread the available number of Tanks, approximately 50, through all the divisions in the attack, they might have been retained in larger groups, only in the centre, so bringing force to bear at one point.

Overall, the infantry were complementary about the assistance they received from the Tanks, but there was also criticism.  Usually this criticism was from groups who believed that the presence of the Tanks caused the German artillery to lay down heavier bombardments than the infantry might otherwise have had to withstand.  The Tanks were a long way from being much more than pre-production machines and their reliability was very poor, with many breaking down before they reached their start point. They were very slow, difficult to manoeuvre and incredibly noisy inside, making it a hellish fighting environment. At first sight the 28-ton weight and thick metal armour made it appear that the crew were well protected, in fact they were vulnerable to armour piercing machine-gun ammunition.  When struck by these bullets, splinters and shards of metal would be released from the inside walls of the Tank, under high velocity, and these could cause a great deal of injury to the crew. Anyone visiting the Tank Museum at Bovington can see the holes in the tanks that they have on exhibition.

When the tanks arrived in France, there was little time to get them from the railheads to the Front and when they did get there, the tank commanders had little time to reconnoitre the land over which they would go forward and fight. By the time they reached their start points some crews were late and had to set off behind rather than in front of the infantry. All the crews were dog-tired by the time they got there.

While the crews had practiced operating their machines, most of this had been on the tank ranges, not over ground destroyed by artillery shell holes, collapsed trenches and wire. Tanks found the ground they experienced in No-Man’s-Land very hard going, also commanders and drivers could see little through their periscope openings, making it easy to lose their way.  Once in the tank, and with a hurried understanding of their orders and objectives, the crew were on their own.  It was almost impossible to communicate with their command structure; they had pigeons but no radios. To communicate with the infantry someone would have to get out of the tank. From the air the RFC could see hem, but not communicate with them. These were not Combined Operations, as we know them from WW2 or the Gulf. The tank was almost like a ‘fire and forget’ torpedo, once they left the start point they were on their own.

Having said all that the British forces wanted a success, and the initial use of the Tank went some way to giving them one. Although not all the objectives were taken on The 15^th September, there were considerable advances; Flers was taken with the added fillip of D17 going up the High Street of Flers and giving newspapers back home a good news story. The success of the Tank at Flers was sufficient for the High Command to recognise its potential and order more to be built.

In the pages below I will split up the action between the three corps involved, but will concentrate on XIV Corps as this included 2nd Battalion York and Lancs.  The pages for III & XV Corps will be loaded later.