The 16th Brigade and the tanks assigned to 6 Division commenced their attacks.

Map showing tank advance The infantry attack Quadrilateral taken on the 18th 2nd Battalion War Diary

For the attack on the 15th September 6 Division had three tanks assigned to it, these were C19 (Capt. Holford-Walker), C20 (Lt. Macpherson) and C22 (Lt. Henriques). Because of the artillery plan and the way it pretty much ignored the Quadrilateral, there was a heavy dependence on the tanks taking this strong point for the infantry. During the night of the 14/15 the tanks moved forward from Chimpanzee Valley, but unfortunately this would not go to plan. C20 developed engine trouble, was repaired but later broke down again for good. C19 & C22 carried on together until the stub axle on the trailing unit of C19 broke and while this was repaired, it was not finished until it was too late for it to take part in the battle.  6 Division were now down to only one tank, C22 of Lt. Henriques who carried on following his guide and the white tapes laid out to mark the route. The route taken by C22 is shown on the map below.

During this move forward there was an ‘incident’ which caused some upset with 9th Norfolks of 71st Brigade who were north of the railway (by the word ‘incident’ below). The tank was believed by the Norfolks to have fired on them, while Lt. Henriques believed that his tanks arrival had brought down a German barrage on them.  Trevor Pidgeon in his comprehensive “The Tanks at Flers” argues that the Norfolks were probably wrong in believing C22 fired on them, the argument hinging on who was where and when. ‘Blue on Blue’ as it is referred today is an unfortunate factor in modern war, so it would not be surprising if it had in fact happened. This was Henrique’s first tank action, it was difficult to know where they were, and their visibility from the tank was very poor.

There has been a deal of confusion over when the tank moved out from the British lines but it was intended to reach the front German trenches at the Quadrilateral about 6am, before the scheduled time for the infantry, and before the British artillery barrage at 6.20am.

It must have all been pretty frightening for Henriques and his crew, they were taking part in the first ever assault with tanks, they were very tired from the move up during the night and the training of the previous days, and they were on their own instead of being one of three.  With limited visibility through the viewing prism, and finding themselves on the unexpected end of armour piercing ammunition from the Quadrilateral, they were to have limited success.  C22 would seem from all reports to have made it into the Quadrilateral, but being alone, and with crew members being wounded from the armour piercing ammunition, Henriques withdrew.

Henriques later wrote of his part in the attack; “As we approached the Germans they let fire at us with might and main. At first no damage was done and we retaliated, killing about 20. Then a smash against my flap at the front caused splinters to come in and the blood to pour down my face.  Another minute and my driver got the same, I think it must have been a bomb, right in my face.  The next one wounded my driver so badly we had to stop. By this time I could see nothing at all, my prisms were all broken, and one periscope, while it was impossible to see through the other. On turning round I saw my gunners on the floor.  I could not make out why. As the infantry were now approaching and as it was impossible to guide the car, and as I now discovered that the sides weren’t bullet proof I decided that to save the car from being captured I had better withdraw.”

Mitchell in “Tank Warfare” wrote; “These bold pioneers, boxed up in their narrow iron sheip, perspiring with the heat, stifled by petrol and cordite fumes, deafened by the clamour of the engine and the roar of the 6-pounder guns, jolted this way and that with every lurch of their clumsy vessel, did not appreciate the funny side of the battle.  Knowing what high hopes had been set on them, they were disappointed with the results achieved.”

While the tanks had not been a great success for 6th Division, they had helped XV and III Corps to gain Flers, Courcelette, High Wood and Martinpuich, and a sizeable advance was made, but no breakthrough, and no cavalry exploitation.  [Sections on the tank exploits with the rest of Fourth Army will follow later].

Below is a record of the infantry involvement, particularly 2nd York and Lancs.

The Quadrilateral, from the trench map.  The soldiers referred to Leuze Wood and Bouleaux Wood on the map as “Lousy” and “Bollocks”.

In the Operation Orders the Fourth Army would attack the enemy between the Combles Ravine and Martinspuich with the object of seizing Morval, Les Boeufs, Gueudecourt and Flers (all were in ruins).

The 16th Infantry Brigade attacked early on the morning of the 15th September on a single-battalion front, the 8th Bedfordshire being in the first line and some of their companies attacking from Leuze Wood and the remainder over the open to the north; they were supported by the 1st Buffs and these again by the 2nd Battalion The York and Lancaster; but about 8.45 a.m. all three battalions found themselves held up in the Bedfords’ original position by very heavy machine-gun fire from the Qadrilateral and Bouleaux Wood. About noon orders came for the Battalion to make a fresh attack, all preparations were put in hand, “A” and “D” Companies were to be in the first and “B” and “C” in the second line, and covering fire by our guns was arranged for; but in the end the attack was indefinitely postponed.

The following is from the War Diary of the 2nd Battn. York & Lancs.

7.20 am. Moved from assembly trenches in Artillery Formation [this means having about 10 feet between each soldier to avoid being ‘taken out’ in bunches.  J Dillon] A & D Coys leading followed by C & D Coys.  Each company on a two platoon front.  Distance between lines 100 yards. Frontage of each Coy 250 yards.  Battalion HQ in centre of first line.

9.50 am. 8/Bedfords and 1/Buffs still held up by machine gun fire from Quadrilateral and Bouleaux Wood. Battalion close behind 1/Buffs, not in touch with 1/KSLI.  No information from 71 Brigade. One tank appears out of action in front of Quadrilateral. [This may be C22 in the text further up the page. J Dillon]

12 noon. Battalion received orders to attack point 1417 from the south.  [This can be seen just above the red arrow, in the Quadrilateral, in the map above. J Dillon]

1.20 pm. Attack postponed.

7 pm. 11 Essex to attack Quadrilateral.  D Coy to assist with bombing attack down the trench.

7.35 pm. Attack commenced.

7.50 pm. Attack on Quadrilateral failed. Attack on both sides lost direction and missed objective. Situation unchanged. Enemy holding Bouleaux Wood.

16th September.  Quiet day.

17th September. Attack on Quadrilateral ordered at 5.50 am. 18 Sept.

18th September. 6 am. Attack on Quadrilateral successful.

[This planned, and later postponed attack, would include two tanks commanded by Lt. Macpherson and 2/Lt Murphy.  The 6th Divn. instruction was that “These two tanks will advance against the Quadrilateral moving down the railway. They will clear the Quadrilateral and continue their advance eastwards along the road and cut the wire in front of the Blue Line.” This would have put them just outside Morval.  It is believed that the tanks did reach the Quadrilateral, although the infantry assault had been postponed.]

At 5 p.m. the Battalion relieved the Buffs and the Bedfords in the front trenches, and two hours later was ordered to co-operate in an attack to be made by the 11th Essex Regiment on the Quadrilateral, and the position of the companies was now as follows: in front line “A” Company, with two machine-guns, on the left, “D” and “C” Companies north and south respectively of the communication trench up to the front line, with “B” Company in reserve.  This attack, however, failed, direction being lost in the advance and the objectives missed.

The 16th and 17th were on the whole tolerably quiet days, no doubt chiefly for the reason that, except on the 6th Division front, the whole line had gone forward; and fresh dispositions were now made for an attack on the early morning of the 18th on the Quadrilateral, the garrison of which by this time had been considerably reinforced.

“The King’s Shropshire L.I. dug themselves in with their left on the railway, so as to assault the south-west face of the strong point. The weather having cleared, the trenches were now carefully located from the air and heavily bombarded, and on the 18th September, under both a stationary and creeping barrage, and with the York and Lancaster bombing up the trench from Leuze Wood, and the 18th Infantry Brigade attacking the north-west face and the trench running north from the Quadrilateral, this redoubtable strong point was at last captured with comparatively small loss, after what must be conceded as a magnificent defence.”  The battalion captured fifty-one prisoners and three machine-guns, and having been relieved on the early morning of the 19th went back into billets at Morlancourt.

The battalion was back in action, briefly, on the 25th September as part of a divisional attack on the ground between the north end of Morval and the road which passes through the centre of Les Boeufs.  The battalion moved into assembly trenches at 1 p.m. and some 15 minutes later all objectives had been gained and the troops were consolidating the position.  At 10 p.m. on the 26th the battalion was relieved in the front line.

The last action the battalion took part in, associated with the Somme, was in October. On the 12th they were part of an attack on the trenches running north from Le Transloy.  “At 2.5 p.m. the flank brigades attacked, but with only partial success. The failure to make ground, which was general all along the British front, was attributed to want of surprise, as we had bombarded the position for two days, and always attacked in the early afternoon. Further the ground was very heavy and observation extremely bad. The Germans were fresh troops and fought well.”  (This from the 6th Division short history).

“The Division had taken part as a whole in three general attacks on the Somme (15th and 25th September and 12th October) and had also carried out subordinate operations on 13th and 18th September and 18th October.  It had suffered casualties amounting to 277 officers and 6,640 other ranks, and had well earned a rest.”

It may well have been at this point or earlier that my grandfather joined them, I can’t be sure.  He may have been part of the October actions above.

On the 25th November the 6th Division took over the La Bassee Sector, which included Givenchy Ridge and the Cuinchy Brickstacks.  Shortly after Christmas the Division moved to the Cambrin-Hohenzollern Quarries front, taking over the front line in the left sub-sector of the Hohenzollern Sector. The trenches were in very bad condition, requiring much repair, while No-Man’s-Land appeared to be covered by old trenches, mostly wired, and shell craters full of water.

In February 1917 the 6th Division relieved the 37th Division in the Loos and Hulloch sectors. I believe this is a good point at which my grandfather may have found himself moving to the 10th Battalion, as at this time the 10th was a part of the 37th Division.  Without the old records, who can say, but there is some logic behind the assumption.

My grandfather would be back again in the 2nd Battalion in February 1918, following the disbandment of the 10th Battalion. He would be with the 2nd when they took part in Kaiserschlacht, the German offensive of March 1918, where my grandfather was captured.