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To continue operations Hamilton reported that he required substantial reinforcements, and it looked as though he might get them as the French proposed sending four divisions.
However, the situation in Europe changed and help had to be sent to Serbia. As a result Hamilton lost two divisions.
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Hamilton’s view of the situation; “To sum up, there is, in my opinion, no better alternative than to
make fresh effort at Suvla and Anzac.
You will understand that any appreciation I can send must inevitably alter from day to day, and that it must be again modified by any accession to my strength in the shape of fresh Allied troops or an alteration in the political situation in the Balkans. Meanwhile all preparations are being made for a winter campaign.”
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On October the 14th the Government decided to recall Hamilton and replace him with General Sir Charles Munro.
Munro, believing forces should be concentrated on the Western front, soon made up his mind that withdrawal from the Dardanelles was necessary, and estimated it would cost 40,000 casualties. Kitchener made a personal visit and recommended immediate evacuation of Anzac and Suvla, with the Helles forces remaining for the time being.
There is a description of Kitchener’s visit to the Australians at Anzac, by Charles Bean, in King’s book on Alec Campbell; “One of the men on the beach called for a cheer and the sound of cheering
brought every Australian out of his burrow and scuttling down like rabbits.
The tall red cap [Kitchener] was rapidly closed in amongst them - but they kept a path and as the red cheeks turned and spoke to one man and another, they cheered him - they, the soldiers - no officers leading off or anything of that sort. It was purely a soldiers welcome
Lt-General Birdwood would supervise the evacuation. The War Committee agreed, November 23rd;
Having regard to the opinions expressed by Lord Kitchener in his telegram dated November 22nd, 1915,
and by the General Staff in their memorandum dated November 22nd, 1915, the War Committee feel bound to advise the evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula on military grounds, notwithstanding the grave
political disadvantages which may result from the decision.
They have carefully examined the naval considerations in favour of the retention of Cape Helles as stated in a note by the Chief of the Admiralty War Staff, printed with the General Staff Memorandum referred to above. They are of the opinion, however, that the naval advantages to be gained by this course are not commensurate with the military disadvantages involved.
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Colonel Monash was commander of the Australian 4th Brigade, the following is his journal entry when he heard of the evacuation [from King’s book]. “Like a thunderbolt from a clear blue sky has
come the stupendous and paralyzing news that, after all, the Allied War Council has decided that the best and wisest course to take is to evacuate the Peninsula, and secret orders to carry out that
operation have just reached here.
The secret is known so far to only a small handful of men and already we have stopped the further arrival of stores, mails, reinforcements, and munitions but the first thing to do id to secure as great a measure of secrecy as possible.
The operation of withdrawal is going to be every bit as critical and dangerous an enterprise as the first landing, and if the Turks were to get the slightest inkling of what was intended, it would mean
the sacrifice of at least half our men. As it is, it will mean the sacrifice of some men, and of vast quantities of munitions and stores.
At a conference of the commanders it was decided to put up the bluff that, owing to the severe winter conditions, it is intended to form a winter rest-camp at Imbros, and take the brigades and battalions there by turn. In this way we should be able in two or three stages to remove about two-thirds of the total army, leaving the remaining third to man the defences very lightly, and then finally to make a bolt for the beach, in the dead of night and into boats which will be in waiting. It is of course an absolutely critical scheme, which may come off quite successfully or may end in a frightful disaster. But orders are orders. I need not say I feel very unhappy and I am almost frightened to contemplate the howl of rage and disappointment there will be when the men find out what is afoot, and I am wondering what Australia will think at the desertion of her 6000 dead and her 20,000 other casualties.” In the event the evacuation went extremely well. The ill feeling towards the way the the British were seen to have handled Gallipoli was expressed by Charles Bean before the evacuation; “The British nation has not the brains to make war and the troops there were being sacrificed to that pure British incompetence.”
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In contrast to the landings, the evacuation was well organized.
The Anzac and Suvla forces were told of the plan on 12 December and by deception they kept the evacuation hidden from the Turks. By the 18th only 20,000 remained as a bridgehead, amongst them the 6th York and Lancs. By dawn on the 20th everyone had been taken off.
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When they realised what had happened the Turks turned their attention to the Allied forces who remained in the Helles positions.
These positions were now untenable and by December 23rd the War Committee had decided to evacuate Helles as well; “The General Staff therefore recommend that the Gallipoli Peninsula should be entirely evacuated, and with the
least possible delay,”
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By the 7th January only 19,000 of the 40,000 in that area remained. They were the object of one last attack by the Turks, but this was beaten back. On the night of 8/9 January the remaining
forces were withdrawn via “V” and “W” beaches.
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The Dardanelles campaign ill conceived and poorly commanded, both in the field and from the UK.
Many brave men fell as a result, many from Australia and New Zealand, who felt that they had been poorly served by the British commanders. Lord Moyne wrote; “We heard this morning that Lord Kitchener is on his way out.
It is difficult to see how we can withdraw from here without great losses. Never can a campaign have been worse managed. Although 17 divisions have been sent out here, it has always been by driblets which have not even sufficed to replace the wastage. If all the men who have been out here could have been available simultaneously, something might have been done.”
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The 6th Battalion York and Lancs moved from the Dardanelles to Egypt, before moving to France in July 1916.
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