The Naval attacks of February, 1915.

Original plan de Robeck replaces Carden Hamilton appointed

The plan would change from a primarily naval operation, to a joint Navy & Army landing.

The plan for the Dardanelles involved a naval attack through the narrow waterway which was heavily fortified on both the European and the Asiatic side.  The naval officer commanding the Aegean, Vice Admiral Sackville Carden believed the Dardanelles could be forced if sufficient warships were used.  It would involve a three stage plan; neutralize the Turkish forts guarding the entrance to the waterway (Sedd-el-Bahr and Kum Kale), then clear the Turkish minefields, then force the way into the Sea of Marmara. The attack began on the 19th February and by the 25th the two strong points had been subdued.

Effect of the naval guns on Sedd-el-Bahr

One of the guns at Sedd-el-Bahr

On the 2nd March Carden declared that he hoped to be through to Constantinople in two weeks, this was not to be. Back home Churchill was impatient for more progress, which he made known to Carden in some of his telegrams.  The text of the following is from a telegram on March 11th;

“.....If, however, success cannot be obtained without loss of shipa and men, results to be gained are important enough to justify such a loss.....

We have no wish to hurry you or urge you beyond your judgement, but we recognise clearly that at a certain period in your operations you will have to press hard for a decision; and we desire to know whether, in your opinion, that period has now arrived.  Every well-conceived action for forcing a decision, even should regrettable losses be entailed, will receive our support.”

Carden replied;

“Your 101 (telegram number) is concurred in by me.

I consider the stage when vigorous sustained action is necessary for success has now been reached. I am of opinion that, in order to ensure my communication line immediately Fleet enters Sea of Marmora, military operations on a large scale should be opened at once.”

Only days later Carden had a nervous breakdown and was replaced by Vice Admiral Sir John de Robeck who commended the next large attack on the 18 March.  De Robeck believed that a combined operation would have been best, but that it was his job to get on and do the job he was given.  In his evidence to the Commission;

Question; I think from the first when you went there you rather looked at the matter from the point of view of an Admiralty order to force the Dardanelles, and your job was to do it if you could?

Answer; Yes; that was our first object.  Therefore, the order was to carry out a certain operation or try and do it, and we had to do the best we could.   

Sir Ian Hamilton

On the 18th the naval forces started to advance up the waterway in lines, a number of vessels were damaged and some were sunk.  They did not force their way through and by the 22nd March the decision was taken to use the army in a much greater way than they had originally intended. Sir Ian Hamilton was appointed to be commander in chief on the 13th March, and arrived in the theatre on the 17th, he then went on a reconnaissance of the beaches from the sea. On the 19th March, he telegraphed his views of that reconnaissance to Lord Kitchener;

“I have not yet received any report on the naval action, but from what I actually saw of the extraordinarily gallant attempt made yesterday I am being most reluctantly driven towards the conclusion that the Dardanelles are less likely to be forced by battleships than at one time seemed probable, and that if the Army is to participate its operations will not assume the subsidiary form anticipated.

The Army’s share will not be a case of landing parties for the destruction of forts etc., but rather a case of deliberate and progressive military operation carried out in force in order to make good the passage of the Navy.”

Kitchener responded;

“You know my views that the passage of the Dardanelles must be forced, and that if large military operations on the Gallipoli Peninsula by the Army are necessary to clear the way, those operations must be undertaken after careful consideration of the local defences, and must be carried through.”

The whole operation had now very much moved from a primarily Naval bombardment and forcing of the Dardanelles to a combined operation with major landings on the Gallipoli Peninsula.  These were to start in April.