A large part of the time of the soldiers in France was taken up behind the front line, time spent on training, on fatigues and drill. There was a strong belief in practicing set piece attacks before they were carried our for real.

Units rotate in & out of line Edmund Blunden describes some training Training for an attack Comment on an attack ‘demonstration’

Very often when we think of the First World War we think immediately of the trenches, but men only spent a few days at a time in the front line, they would then be rotated back through outher support duties, much of the time taken up with fatigues, drill and all forms of training. In General Jack’s diary we can see this rotation because he always indicates where his unit is.  So, taking just one period in 1915; Nov 5 - 10, Divisional Reserve; Nov 11 - 16, In the Line; Nov 17 - 18, Brigade Support; Nov 19 - 23, In the Line; Nov 24 - 26, Army Reserve; Nov 27 - Jan 10, First Army Reserve. And so the cycle would go on, and in these 2 months only 9 days were ‘In the Line’.

Many of the attacks were practiced in the rear areas, where ground similar to that to be attacked would be marked out, approaches to the ‘enemy’ trenches would be marked out by white tapes which the men would be expected to follow. This might give them some idea of the trenches they were expected to attack, but it could not re-create the terror of the barrages and the enemy machine guns, or seeing their ‘mates’ fall at their sides.

The following is from Edmund Blunden’s book, and is a description of training in 1916; “Near this place was an extent of open country (chiefly under wheat) which in its ups and downs and occasional dense woodlands resembled the Somme battlefield; here, therefore, we were trained for several days. The Colonel told us that the ground was held to be an excellent facsimile of the scene of our ‘show’.  Hardly a man knew so much as the name of the southern village from which we were to attack; but from our practice we saw with mixed feelings that the jumping off position was one side of a valley, the position to be captured the other side, and all began to be proficient in moving to the particular ‘strong point’ or other objective plotted out for them.  Gas was loosed over us; we ran out wire at the edge of the swiftly captured woods; we crouched down in trenches while the roaring heat of the flammenwerfer curled up in black smoke above; a Scottish expert, accompanied by well-fed, wool-clad gymnastic demonstrators, preached to us the beauty of the bayonet, though I fear his comic tales of Australians muttering ‘In, out, - on guard,’ and similar invocations of ‘cold steel’ seemed to most of us more disgusting than inspiring in that peacefully ripening farmland. In the intervals we bought chocolate from the village women who had brought their baskets far enough to reach us; and so we passed the time.  Our manoeuvres and marches were quite hard work, and in the evenings the calm of Monchy-Breton and its mud huts under their heavy verdure, or its crucifixes beside the downland roads, was not much insulted.”

Again a photo from early in the war showing the training of a group in the use of the machine-gun. The barrel of the gun can be just left of centre of the photo. The instructor is pointing to a painting of a landscape that they are aiming at! All a little basic. Much of the training was done at Infantry Base Depots (I.B.D.) before men joined their units.

In the old regular army great store was laid on the training of marksmen, the infantry should be good with their main weapon, the Short Lee-Enfield rifle.  Richard Holmes describes the training in his book Tommy: “The trained soldier’s course consisted of 250 rounds fired at ranges from 100 to 600 yards, with the firer kneeling or lying, sometimes with his bayonet fixed, and with a ‘mad minute’ when he fired fifteen rounds at a target 300 yards away.  Part III of the classification shoot decided a man’s marksmanship standard.  He fired fifty rounds, from various ranges, at a target with three scoring rings, earning four points for a bull (24 inches wide), three for an inner and two for an outer. The highest possible score was 200 points, and to qualify as a marksman a soldier needed 130 points; 105 made him a first-class shot, and 70 a second-class shot.” But this emphasis on training in marksmanship did not last, Holmes again; “Marksmanship training of this quality was one of the casualties of the first few months of the war.  The army expanded so quickly that old standards could not be maintained.  There were too few experienced instructors, too little range-space in Britain, and, at least until early 1916, such a limited supply of rifles that some recruits graduated from wooden dummies, through a series of stopgaps .... to the Short Lee-Enfield.” The way the war was being fought, and would be fought in the coming years, laid less emphasis on rifle shooting skills.  Trench warfare gave limited opportunity to use the skills of a marksman, although both sides did use snipers. More and more the infantry would come to use grenades (bombs) and gas.

In his book, ‘Subaltern on the Somme’ Max Plowman describes the preparations for an attack.  Some of the officers are at a briefing; “There’s going to be an attack at Hebuterne very shortly, and you fellows are going over with the company. Number nine platoon will take the German front line, “Fall.” Number ten will go on and take the support trench, “Fame.”  Number eleven will go over both those lines and take “Fate.”  Smalley as our company bomber will clear the communication-trenches and help you to consolidate when he comes up.  That’s the bare outline.  Of course you’ll get details, but we’re going to practise this stunt on ground marked out at Halloy; so the C.O. thought it as well that you fellows should know what you are practising for. You’re not to tell the men anything - not even the N.C.O’s.”

He then goes on to describe the training for the attack; “We have been at Halloy a week, drilling, training and pracising our stunt.  First we did it by spoken orders in daylight: then by the watch: then by spoken orders at night: finally by the watch at night. Out here, where there are no shells dropping about, where we have to imagine our own barrage-fire and all the enemy elects to put up in reply, we can do it perfectly, and a pretty tame affair it looks. It would be howled out of the arena at a military tournament.  No dashing, hell-for-leather, with wide throats and bayonets extended: just men getting up for no apparent reason and going forward at a slow marching-pace in extended order for a given distance, followed by others doing precisely the same, time and distance being almost everything. Over and over again we have impressed upon us the necessity of keeping close up to the barrage: even if we have a few casualties from our own fire, we are told that our only chance lies in keeping close up.”

Plowman also has another comment on it all; “....but what lies at the back of my mind all the time is the recollection of that German wire.  I believe they might shell it for weeks and still we should get hung up.”

In my grandfather’s brief diary he mentions going on a ‘bombing’ course (grenade throwing), and their were many different courses that both officers and men would be sent away on.  Courses ranged from machine-gun operation, bombing, signalling, sniping all the way to the treatment of mules used in the transport sections.  Max Plowman has a brief description of his sniping course; “This school is quite good fun. It is run by elderly officers who have Bisley reputations and, like all men who are really keen on some particular branch of knowledge, they know how to make the subject interesting....We have a lecture at 8.30: spend the morning on the range: come back for lunch: then on to the range again at 2, and back again for another lecture at 5.30.  The course only lasts a week and there’s an examination at the end of it.  It’s rather ironic that I should be on such a course, for we haven’t a telescopic rifle in the battalion.”

Trench warfare imposed a lack of mobility and ‘spontaneity’ on both sides.  Battles had to be prepared a long way in advance, and troops would be taken out of the line to practice their coming attacks on ground laid out to be similar to that over which they would have to attack.  This had its limitations, however, both in scope and in realism.  Also, because the British had insufficient manpower available for all the labouring jobs that trench warfare required, this also had to be done using troops out of the line on ‘fatigue’ duties; instead of resting they were often doing hard labour.  One aspect of the training was ‘demonstrations’ by troops who had rehearsed the ‘act’ and would do it without the inconvenience of enemy fire. General Jack gives his comments in his diary after witnessing one of these; “...a motor bus arrived to convey me and three other officers of the battalion ... to witness a ‘demonstration’ by specially trained troops of the manner in which attacks should really be delivered - not as we have imperfectly carried them out under fire for the past year or two...One must not be unfairly critical about ‘demonstrations’.  They are very carefully arranged by the Staff and are a valuable means of training troops. But were our soldiers sent to France properly trained as they ought to be, or even if they had the same practice here as the demonstrators, under good conditions and with the best coaching, they also would likely put up as fine a performance in the absence of shells, bullets, mud and exhaustion...”

Jack also commented on the training they did prior to the Somme offensive, a constant complaint of his is the extent to which the men are required to do ‘fatigues’, or manual labour, when they should be resting; “At 4.30 am on the 1st (of June) all the officers, with skeleton companies, left camp to take part in a large-scale Divisional Practice Attack .... Flags represented the enemy’s redoubts and strong points while his trenches had been traced partially with sods of earth.  At the end of the exercise conferences were held on the spot to discuss errors and improvements.  The men are pretty fit; the fourteen-mile march there and back did us good.  But the practice was not complete and thorough enough to provide real lessons for the small number of troops engaged in it...  The battaleion is moving forward this afternoon, following our fortnights ‘training’ here.  We have done our level best to instruct all ranks and tune them up for the battle ahead. But the very heavy all-nightly and daily fatigues - carrying stores to the front and other manual labour, in the forward area, often under shell fire, often in the rain - have swalloed up almost all the officers and men who should have been putting the finishing touches to practice for operations, and who in my opinion are still not PROPERLY TRAINED, although full of courage.....”