HEARING DATE 7 NOVEMBER 1997 (Transcript: Smith Bernal)
University - Natural justice - Fairness of reconsideration of matters by same assessment board - Academic judgments - Internal university procedures - Judicial review - Relief which court can grant
COUNSEL
The Applicant appeared in person;
The Respondent did not attend and was not represented
PANEL: LORD WOOLF MR, SWINTON THOMAS LJ
JUDGMENT BY LORD WOOLF M.R.
This is an application for leave to appeal a judgment of Collins J given on 20 June 1997. The applicant is Michele Hayes, who has become embroiled in long and contested issues as to whether or not she has been properly assessed in relation to exams she took at John Moores University.
The facts are set out in considerable detail in a long judgment of Collins J. Collins J describes the various complaints that Miss Hayes has and the history of the matter. He stresses that, on an application for judicial review, there can be no question of the court ordering the university to grant a degree. The most the court could do on such an application is to ask for one or more of the various hearings which have taken place within the appeal system at the university to be reconsidered.
During the hearing, counsel appearing for the university confirmed to Collins J that the 1996 decision was one in relation to which the university would be prepared to continue within the internal appeal process. He indicated, as I have, the limits of the court's powers on an application for judicial review and said, in effect, that as the internal appeal process could still take place, there was no remedy he could appropriately grant.
I fully accept the force of Collin J's judgment in that regard. However, having heard Miss Hayes for some time, she makes the point that because there were directions given by the Vice Chancellor of the University in relation to the 1995 decision, which were never complied with by the lower tier of the appeal process, she still had a remedy, or a possible remedy, by way of judicial review. She contends that as a result of the Vice Chancellor's directions she would be in a better position on a hearing of the appeal in relation to the 1995 decision than she would in relation to the 1996 decision. As a result of the directions which the Vice Chancellor gave, the matter was reconsidered by the lower tier, PAB/MAB, but Miss Hayes submits that they did not comply with the Vice Chancellor's directions. It is possible that there may be force in that submission. I cannot form a view today as to whether or not that is the situation. On that matter, before deciding whether or not Miss Hayes should have leave, I consider it would be right that the university should be able to be represented.
The appeal process, in relation to the 1996 decision, has not yet been exhausted. If that appeal process was to achieve what Miss Hayes requires, then there would be no purpose in this court reconsidering any possible problem with regard to the 1995 decision. Miss Hayes is naturally reluctant to be in a situation where she could be liable for costs in relation to proceedings in this court.
Having looked at the situation as a whole, it seems to me that the most satisfactory outcome of the present impasse, and the outcome which would be the most beneficial to the university (having regard to the costs it might incur if the matter had to come before this court, and having regard to the costs Miss Hayes might have to incur if this appeal proceeds), would be, if when the matter goes back before the Appeal Committee they look at the whole history of Miss Hayes' dispute with the university with regard to this matter. I am certainly not directing them to do so. I am merely indicating that it appears to me that there are advantages from everybody's point of view in their doing so. If that happens Miss Hayes should have no possible grounds for complaint.
If the matter is confined to reconsidering later decisions within the internal system, it may be necessary for the present application for leave to appeal to proceed. As all this court could do on the basis of that appeal is to order the 1995 decision to be taken again, it would seem, if the matter is being reconsidered, that it would be sensible and pragmatic to hear the whole matter again and not to cut out consideration of what happened in 1995.
I emphasise that I have formed no concluded view on whether this is a case on which it would be appropriate to grant leave to appeal. I merely indicate a solution which may be possible which does not involve a determination of that issue.
JUDGMENT BY SWINTON THOMAS LJ
I agree.
DISPOSITION
Judgment accordingly.