HEARING DATE 16 December 1994
Freedom of speech - Universities, polytechnics and colleges - Education (No 2) Act 1986, s 43 - Former teacher of German at University College London - Successfully bringing claim for unfair dismissal and being offered, and refusing, monetary compensation - Offered renewal of employment subject to condition relating to involvement in matters concerning language centre and entry into language centre premises - Whether contractual powers of UCL limited by statutory guarantee of freedom of speech - Justiciability of s 43 of 1986 Act
COUNSEL
The Applicant appeared in person;
the Respondent did not appear and was not
represented
PANEL: Stuart-Smith, Farquharson, Evans LJJ
JUDGMENT BY STUART-SMITH LJ
This is a renewed application for leave to apply for judicial review. The application was refused on paper by Popplewell J It was renewed before Sedley J, who also refused it on 9 September.
I should make it plain, first of all, that we have read all the documents in the case as well as Miss Riniker's submissions to us, and also that being a renewed application, this is not an appeal from the single judge, but it is a fresh look at the case by this court, and if we think that there is an arguable point suitable for argument that judicial review should be granted, then this court will give leave, notwithstanding the views of the court below.
The brief facts of the case are these: that for many years Miss Riniker has been a German Teacher employed by University College London; latterly, disputes arose between her and the college about the way in which the Language Centre was being run. It is plain that there was some clash of personalities between Miss Riniker and perhaps others, and the new Director of that organisation.
Such was the situation that on 10 June 1992 the college wrote to Miss Riniker saying that:
"I am sorry to let you know that when the matter of teachers for the coming academic year is raised at the next Management Committee Meeting on 7th July, I will recommend that you are not to be invited to teach in the Language Centre for next year".
Miss Riniker objected to that, but on 21 July that decision was confirmed. Further negotiations occurred and on 6 July the college offered to renew her engagement, but the appointment was to be subject to a condition in these terms, which were set out in the letter of 6 August:
"It is a condition of your appointment that you should cease to be involved in matters concerning the running of the Language Centre and that you should not enter the Language Centre premises except with the prior permission of the Director of the Centre or the Chair of the UCL Language Centre Management Committee."
Perhaps not surprisingly, Miss Riniker was not prepared to accept an appointment on those terms. She made various attempts to persuade the university to change it's mind and to offer her an appointment without that condition included. She wrote to Sir Robin Ibbs, the Chairman of the University College London Council in October. In November she wrote to Dr Roberts, the Provost, and in due course she wrote to the Master of the Rolls, who was the Visitor for the college. He replied that he had no jurisdiction to deal with her matter.
She also made three separate claims in the Industrial Tribunal for unfair dismissal. The Tribunal apparently ruled that she had a sufficient continuity of employment to bring a claim within the provisions of the Employment Acts.
On 21 January 1994, University College London accepted that her dismissal had been unfair and they offered her £12,500 in compensation. They refused to reinstate her, but that offer was not acceptable. So far as I am aware, those proceedings are continuing and have not yet been brought to a conclusion.
On 7 April 1994, Miss Riniker brought her proceedings for judicial review. The relief which she sought can be summarised in this way:
Under para 1, an Order for Mandamus that Sir Robin Ibbs, Chairman of the Council, Dr Roberts, and Mr Bowles, the Vice-Provost, comply with the statutory duty imposed on them by S43 (1) and (2) of the Education (No 2) Act 1986, and to let the applicant teach in college without restrictions on her freedom of speech.
Secondly, a declaration that her dismissal was in breach of natural justice, because no appeal had been granted.
Thirdly, a mandatory injunction requiring the University to reinstate the applicant in part-time teaching.
Fourthly, a mandatory injunction requiring Mr Bowles, the Vice-Provost, to remove the offensive and irrational clause which he had inserted, without giving a reason, into the applicant's new contract of employment (that being the proposed condition to which I have referred).
I do not think the other reliefs sought add very much to what I have already read out. In addition to that, she asks for damages and costs.
Popplewell J refused the application on four grounds. He said, first, that this was not a public law case. Secondly, it is hopelessly out of time. Thirdly, there is no possibility of any court ordering reinstatement, and fourthly, given the admission of the unfair dismissals and the offer of financial settlement, the discretion, that is to say the discretion of the Court, would not, in any event, be exercised in her favour.
University College London is clearly a public body and, in respect of some of its actions and decisions, it may be amenable to judicial review. But not all such decisions are amenable to judicial review and it is clear, in my judgment, that this is a question which arises purely out of the contractual relations between Miss Riniker and the college. There is ample authority for the proposition that even though a public body is involved, such questions are not amenable to judicial review; Ex Parte Walsh is one of the cases in the line of authority to that effect.
Miss Riniker seeks to pray in aid S43 of Education (No.2) Act 1986, which provides in these terms:
"Every individual and body of persons concerned in the government of any establishment to which this section applies shall take such steps as are reasonably practicable to ensure that freedom of speech within the law is secured for members, students and employees of the establishment, and for visiting speakers.(2) the duty imposed by subsection (1) includes in particular the duty to ensure so far as is reasonably practicable that the use of any premises of the establishment is not denied to any individual or body of persons on any ground connected with:
(a) the beliefs or views of that individual or of any member of that body; or
(b) a policy or objectives of that body."
In my judgment that really has nothing to do with this case at all. It imposes a duty on the University and similar bodies to see, so far as they can, that people with ideas that are unpopular with the majority, or a vocal minority, should not be prevented from expressing those views. The proposed condition, which was not accepted, does not prevent Miss Riniker from expressing any views at all.
In my judgment, this is a simple case of wrongful dismissal in which it has now been accepted that the dismissal was wrongful, and the question is: what is the appropriate compensation for Miss Riniker?
I agree with the reasons give by Popplewell J In my judgment this is not a public law case at all. It is one where it is really certain that the applicant, even if it was a public law case, could not obtain reinstatement from the Courts.
It is substantially out of time and although it is right to say that Miss Riniker has sought other means of redressing her wrongs, that is not necessarily, and in my judgment, in this case is not, a reason for delaying as long as she did. And finally, in my judgment, the appropriate remedy here is the one which she had sought, namely, through the Industrial Tribunal.
For those reasons, in my judgment, there are no arguable points of public law here, and this is not a case in which leave to move for judicial review should be granted.
JUDGMENT BY FARQUHARSON LJ
I agree.
JUDGMENT BY EVANS LJ
I agree.
Transcript:John Larking