University of Essex vs. Ratcliffe

The Court of Appeal

Before Lord Justice Harman, Lord Justice Phillimore and Lord Justice Megaw

Judgment delivered 28th November 1969

An interlocutory injunction was granted restraining the defendant, Mr Christopher Paul Ratcliffe, aged 24, the former student in sociology of the University of Essex, from trespassing on the university premises. The court allowed an appeal by the University from the refusal of Mr Justice Bridge to continue an interlocutory injunction made ex parte take on the defendant undertaking not to enter the university premises unless invited and, in effect, to be of good behaviour, which the judge thought was all that the university needed pending a speedy trial of the action for a permanent injunction.

Mr Conrad Dehn QC and the Mr Esyr Lewis for the university; the defendant who comes from Brightlingsea, Essex, in person.

Lord Justice Harman said that the University of Essex was recently incorporated by Royal Charter and so had the right to do anything which a natural person might do it unless there was something in the statutes which prevented it. It was not like a limited company. The constitution of the corporation (the university) might have been a matter of considerable controversy. In the university, unusually, students were included in the corporation, but the difference between Essex and older universities was that the student was a person who was registered as such and his obligation, if he wished to continue as a student, was to register. The student did not choose to re-register himself and he admitted that for present purposes he was not at present a member of the university. The question therefore was not what obligation the university owed to members, or what obligation the corporation owed to members of the corporate body. The defendant had to be treated as a member of the public and his rights were those which a member of the public had.

His Lordship said that the university were owner and occupier of the site at Wivenhoe Park. They had no extra-mural activities. All their activities went on inside their boundary. They occupied their property by virtue of a conveyance from the local authority. They sought to restrain the defendant from going on the property saying that they had a right as occupiers to do so; and having failed to be able to do so since he had ceased to be a student they sought the aid of the law.

It was a sorry state of affairs that during the three years that the defendant was a student the university's disciplinary powers were not put into effect. The defendant argued that he had done nothing which warranted such action and the university said that the fact that they had not held the reins tighter should not now be taken against them; and that in any event any occupier was entitled to say against any member of the public "I do not wish this person to come on my property" and, unless there was some express or implied right to do so in the member of the public concerned there was no answer to that.

It was rather tragic to find that the defendant leant too heavily on the intra-mural activities of the university and desired to remain in or about the precincts. He had said that without going there he could not write a novel he was engaged on; that he wished to go on being a member of the university societies and the students' union, which his Lordship found a little touching but also a little childish. He had apparently become so occupied with the activities of his alma mater that he clung to it and said he felt it necessary to his health and happiness to continue to haunt the corridors of the university.

He also said he was a journalist and must go on the campus, but he did not earn his living in that way. He also claimed that when he was invited by dons or by registered students who lived there, it was a deprivation to him and to them to prevent him from making use of those invitations. But it could not possibly be right that the university as an owner must allow members or tenants to invite exactly whom they like. They must have a right to exclude certain persons.

His Lordship saw no answer to the university's claim it was an interlocutory application and it was discretionary to grant an injunction. What was the court to do? He would be glad to accept any arrangement that could be come to between the university the defendant, but what the university considered to be in good behaviour and what the defendant considered that to be did not coincide.

What was important was that the university said: "We have an absolute right to exclude this defendant from our property. He has no contractual right to be an exception. We demand our rights and in the exercise of the court's discretion, having regard to the evidence, it is right that an injunction should be granted." His Lordship thought that was right. If compelled, he would so hold.

Lord Justice Phillimore, concurring, said that the defendant had put forward his case with ability, good temper and moderation. It was clear that he was anxious to be able to continue to visit all his friends, so much so that he was living in lodgings a few miles away. He was not attempting to get any employment, although he was going into the question of a graduate course elsewhere and was living on social security.

It seemed that at the University of Essex matters had been allowed to get into a pretty pickle and there had been evidence of some gravity, but the university, not having exercised their powers properly in the past, were now trying to establish the authority they should never have allowed to lapse and were taking severe action in the course of so doing.

That having been said, however, it was absolutely clear that in seeking to ban the defendant from the university premises they were doing no more than what they were entitled to do. Perhaps the result would be that the young man, instead of wasting his time as he seemed to be, would find some useful means of earning his living.

Lord Justice Megaw agreed.

Solicitors: Douglas Mann & Co.