Making Names Publishers' Introduction

Making Names is an unusual philosophy text. Unusual, by modern standards, because whilst serving as an accessible and readable introduction to the subject for any generally educated layman, it at the same time proposes certain apparently rather odd solutions to the various philosophical problems which it addresses. As the thesis progresses, these odd conclusions interweave and reverberate, culminating in the last two chapters in a fierce and radical attack upon the metaphysics and the language of explanation of modern science, and in particular, of modern particle theory.

Making Names is also unusual, by modern standards, in being cast in dialogue form, as a long (roughly 20 hour) conversation between two men who meet one hot summer's day in a (thinly-disguised) old English university town. Making Names is unusually long too (about 180,000 words), and covers an unusually wide range of philosophical questions, the first seven chapter-headings marking out seven fairly distinct traditional problem-areas. The power of the whole thesis thus comes not just from a number of individual arguments, but also from the ways in which they, and the various repeated themes and examples and images employed, reinforce, resonate and re-echo one another throughout the book, by the end providing all the 'ingredients' for a final, rich dramatic allegory (Chapter 8). Though each of the chapters (certainly the first five) would 'stand up on its own', to enjoy the full impact of the work one needs to read it as a whole, and in the order in which it is assembled.

While the chief aim of the book is to draw in an entertain and enlighten the lay-reader, I hope that the writing, which inevitably grows somewhat denser as the dialogue proceeds, is multi-layered and sophisticated enough to intrigue (infuriate?) the academic reader too, and that the arguments contain enough recognisably 'orthodox' and 'serious' philosophical discourse to merit academic attention. If Making Names were lucky enough to achieve these twin ambitions of popular readability and academic authenticity (notoriety?), it might just become an extremely fashionable book.

Although obviously unusual in both form, content and ambition (philosophy books are not like this nowadays), I personally would regard the book's style as being true to many of the conventions of Platonic dialogue and its arguments as springing perfectly naturally from the mainstream of the Anglo-American, empiricist-positivist tradition. The modern linguistic movement however, is regarded in the book, both implicitly and explicitly, as being an interesting, and occasionally valuable, but ultimately barren intellectual side-road. Making Names can therefore be seen as being, apart from anything else, an attempt on the part of philosophy to 'wrest back' some of the ground it has lost in recent years at the hands of the positivists and the scientists, an attempt to demonstrate the power of philosophical argument; it could be subtitled: "speculative metaphysics lives!"

The Two Protagonists

The two men of whose day-long conversation Making Names consists are bluntly named Andrew Cause and Malcolm Effect. Malcolm Effect is a research scientist working at the University and represents, roughly speaking, modern, informed, 'orthodox' liberal opinion on the various topics that are discussed. On the one hand, he accepts unquestioningly the general validity and correctness of the atoms/fundamental particles/cosmic forces theory of matter and has never examined critically the philosophical assumptions (e.g. concerning the duality of mind and body, the nature of causality, the role of perception, the relationship between language and the world and so on) upon which the theory rests, while on the other hand, somewhat inconsistently, he displays a highly-developed sense of moral responsibility, subscribes to an enlightened, utilitarian justification of public law-making, canonizes, loosely speaking, a Christian set of moral virtues, and pays lip-service to a Christian theology. He is a law-abiding, socially responsible, middle-aged happily married father of three and seems to be a thoroughly knowledgeable, reasonable, comfortable man.

Andrew Cause is a philosopher. By instinct, he is a rebel, a cynic and a troublemaker. He fancies himself as something of a subversive, an outsider, an anarchist figure. He is single, promiscuous and drives a battered old sports car. The conversation he initiates with Effect becomes a systematic attack by him upon the various assumptions, shortcomings and sacred cows implicit or explicit in the scientist's world-view. Steadily, throughout the day, he reduces Effect to beating a retreat into various positions of self-contradiction, confusion and doubt, finally 'rescuing' him from their depths with the proposal (in Chapter 8 [subsequently 9]) of his own 'alternative' atomic theory.

The Dialogue Format

The use of the conversational device has a number of advantages. Firstly, several of the philosophical arguments themselves naturally fall into a dialectic form of exposition. Secondly, it is often useful to be able to pre-empt, or at least anticipate possible objections to the philosophical conclusions. Thirdly, although the weight of the book's support generally tends to fall on the side of the philosopher, it does not do so unremittingly; the philosopher's habit, for example, of exaggerating and distorting his opponent's views in order to make them more obviously absurd and more easily disposable is repeatedly exposed. Fourthly, the conversational format provides lots of opportunities for non-philosophical 'business' with which to leaven the dough of the arguments. The conversation takes place in various apt or interesting or amusing situations and locations; the conversation is punctuated by the men's activity at various suitable moments, enabling the reader to relax and digest the arguments stage by stage; the non-philosophical interludes provide amusement, reveal aspects of the two men's personalities and sometimes themselves even demonstrate certain philosophical (or anti-philosophical) points. Fifthly, thanks to these interruptions of non-philosophical 'business', neither the reader nor the two disputants are allowed to forget for long the realities of the sort of world which we and they inhabit; the sort of landscape, natural, urban and moral with which we/they are confronted; the sorts of objects and machines and animals and people by which we/they are surrounded; the sorts of backgrounds, familial, educational and social against which we/they are set.

One danger of the conversational device is that the disputants' characters and the non-philosophical 'business' will become a distraction from the central, theoretical concerns, so I have tried to keep their intrusions down to a minimum. Also, while the two men's psychological traits in some ways do reflect their philosophical positions on the various questions and my choices of location are obviously similarly contrived, I would not want this aspect of the conversational device to be pressed too far or the details of the men's non-philosophical behaviour to be squeezed too hard for significance. Neither of the men's sets of professed beliefs is exhaustively coherent or consistent, and neither matches particularly closely with the ways in which the men in fact behave. Neither the world nor philosophy is like that; things are not that neat.

Finally, the conversational format facilitates the introduction, in barest outline, of certain interesting psycho-philosophical sub-plots: the two men's differing attitudes towards women, sexuality and parenthood; their self-justifications and motives for their work (Effect is engaged in hydrogen fusion research, Cause is writing a book); their developing personal friendship; their hopes for the future.

The Style

Each new topic is introduced in an easily understandable, sometimes even a chatty way, although the general texture of the discourse inevitably grows more dense as the conversation progresses and as the reader is drawn into the philosophical 'language-game'. A minimum of philosophical jargon is used, and where it is found necessary, the words and phrases are introduced explicitly. Also avoided is the usual monotonous series of references to and quotes from other obscure authors, the modern indulgence in show-offery and laziness. Reference is made to certain key figures in the history of Western philosophy and various important or useful texts are manipulated into the dialogue (see separate index), but in no stronger way than this does Making Names attempt to present a history of the subject's development.

The Content

In each of the early chapters, a traditional philosophical problem is introduced in a more-or-less traditional way, with the layman (both the scientist in the book and the reader of the book) being drawn by the philosopher into a state of confusion or doubt over some question that had never before seemed to him to be problematic or uncertain. Traditional arguments are run through and each time the traditional conclusions are either given a new or unexpected twist, or are pursued in an extreme or a literal way. While some of the arguments are by no means new (what in philosophy ever is?), I would claim that others are original and that some of my new presentations of the old positions do give them certain interesting new applications.

When it comes to Cause's attack upon the scientist's atomic and particle theories, none of the positions he takes up or the weapons he deploys is particularly novel. However, firstly the attack is coming, unusually, from a man who has no vested interests at all in preserving (a role for) atomic explanations, and secondly, its sceptical conclusions are taken unusually literally, with several surprising results. The final chapter is, I believe, an entirely original, and I hope and endlessly fruitful, pun; I take no credit for its raw materials, but I do think that I have created something new and exciting and useful with them.

A number of "What is... ?" questions are asked during the course of the conversation ("what is a table?", "what is a brain?", "what is a mind?", "what is moral goodness?", "what is philosophy?" and so on), and all are answered, in true Socratic style, by a mixture of definition-proposing, exception-indicating, instance-pointing and remark-making. Half-way through the book (in Chapter Four), this procedure, and the error of demanding scientific-style criteria from language are explicitly explained, although the lesson still takes some time to sink in. Also, besides the major issues discussed, two current moral/philosophical awarenesses rumble away throughout the conversation, sometimes surfacing in the men's discussions, sometimes half-visible in the text: firstly, our modern self-consciousness about language and about the relationship between language and the world, and secondly, the inescapable shadow that the prospect of nuclear Armageddon throws over our perception of our own role and future in the world.

During the course of the day, Effect tells three important scientific stories, stories which represent the modern scientific answers to certain key philosophical questions. Firstly, in Chapter One, an account of Darwinian evolution. Secondly, in Chapter Six, an outline of modern atomic and particle theory. Thirdly, in Chapter Seven, A brief history of modern cosmology. In each case, although by no means ignorant of the science involved, the philosopher 'plays dumb'. This is partly because Cause wants to hear Effect tell his stories in his own words (which he then frequently cross-examines), and partly so that readers who are largely ignorant of, or who have forgotten what the scientific positions are on these matters, will be reminded of them. Making Names thus serves as an introduction not only to philosophy, but also to some of the scientific theories (in highly abbreviated versions) which it is attempting to subvert.

It may be objected that, for all its length, the analyses made in Making Names both of philosophical problems and of scientific theories are superficial and over-simplified. My reply to this would be: true, the insights and merely superficial, they skate across the surface of things, but then what else can our perceptions of the world and our sciences do? Important philosophical truths and helpful scientific explanations are simple. The modern tendency of the 'experts' in philosophy and science, the men who claim to be working at the 'frontiers' or the 'depths' of their fields merely to pile up great monoliths of specialised language in their attempts to solve their mysteries, is precisely the mistake that this book is trying to expose. Superficiality is of the essence.

Andrew Malcolm, 7 Southover Street, Brighton.

Go to the next item in the evidence (red) file.

Go to Malcolm's Statement of Claim, to the Case History, to the Affidavits: Ivon Asquith (1), Asquith (2), Henry Hardy, William Shaw (solicitor) (1), Sir Roger Elliott (1), Margaret Goodall, to the Witness Statements: Elliott, Hardy, Richard Charkin, Nicola Bion, Goodall, to the courtroom testimony of the Oxford Six, 14/3/1990: Elliott, Goodall, Bion, Asquith, Charkin, Hardy, to the testimony of Andrew Malcolm 13/3/1990, to the Chancery Court Judgment, the Appeal Court Judgment, the Damages assessment, the Settlement agreement.

Return to the Malcolm vs. Oxford I (1984-92) Index or to the Malcolm vs. Oxford II (2001-02) Index or to the SITE INDEX.