Although Greek law provided for the election of the Muslim religious leaders (muftis) by the members of the minority in Thrace, when the Mufti of Rodopi died, the President of the Republic, following standard practice, proceeded to the appointment of a replacement without any elections. When two independent Muslim Members of Parliament requested the State to organise elections, as it was in their view obliged to do under the 1913 Treaty of Athens between Greece and others and the Ottoman Empire, the law was changed so as to provide for the appointment of the muftis by the President of the Republic. In December 1990 a number of Muslims attending Friday prayers proclaimed the applicant as the Mufti of Rodopi. The applicant was subsequently convicted under Articles 175 and 176 of the Criminal Code of usurping the functions of a minister of a "known religion" and of publicly wearing the robes of such a minister without being entitled to do so. His conviction was upheld by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.

The Court considered that the applicant's conviction under Articles 175 and176 of the Criminal Code, making certain acts against ministers of "known religions" criminal offences, amounted to an interference with the applicant's right under Article 9 § 1 of the Convention "in community with others and in public, to manifest his religion in worship and teaching". The Court did not consider it necessary to rule on the question whether the interference was "prescribed by law". Given that the applicant was not the only person claiming to be the religious leader of the local Muslim community, the Court considered that the interference in question pursued a legitimate aim under Article 9 § 2 of the Convention, namely "to protect public order". As regards the question of whether the interference was necessary in "a democratic society" the Court noted that, although Article 9 of the Convention did not require States to give legal effect to religious weddings and religious courts' decisions, under Greek law, weddings celebrated by ministers of "known religions" were assimilated to civil ones and the Muftis had competence to adjudicate on certain family and inheritance disputes between Moslems. In such circumstances, it could be argued that it was in the public interest for the State to take special measures in order to protect from deceit those whose legal relationships could be affected by the acts of religious ministers. The Court noted in this connection that, despite a vague assertion that
the applicant had officiated at wedding ceremonies and engaged in administrative activities, the domestic courts that convicted him did not mention in their decisions any specific acts by him which purported to produce legal effects. The domestic courts convicted the applicant because he had issued a message about the religious significance of a feast,delivered a speech at a religious gathering, issued another message on the occasion of a religious holiday and appeared in the clothes of a religious
leader. Moreover, it had not been disputed that the applicant had the support of at least a part of the Moslem community in Rodopi. In the Court's view, punishing a person for the mere fact that he acted as the religious leader of a group that willingly followed him could hardly be considered compatible with the demands of religious pluralism in a democratic society. Moreover, the Court did not consider that, in democratic societies, the State needed to take measures to ensure that
religious communities remained or were brought under a unified leadership. The Court recognised that it was possible that tension was created in situations where a religious or any other community became divided. However, it considered that this was one of the unavoidable consequences of pluralism. The role of the authorities in such circumstances was not to
remove the cause of tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that the competing groups tolerated each other. The Court noted that, apart from a general reference to the creation of tension, the Government did not make any allusion to disturbances among the Moslems in Rodopi that had actually been or could have been caused by the existence of two religious leaders. Moreover, the Court considered that nothing was adduced that could warrant qualifying the risk of tension between the Moslems and Christians or between Greece and Turkey as anything more than a very remote possibility.

In the light of all the above, the Court considered that it had not been shown that the applicant's conviction under Articles 175 and 176 of the Criminal Code was justified in the circumstances of the case by "a pressing social need". As a result, the interference with the applicant's right, in community with others and in public, to manifest his religion in worship and teaching was not "necessary in a democratic society for the protection of public order" under Article 9 § 2 of the Convention.

[fn] This judgment is not final. Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17-member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious
question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its Protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer.