Copyright Ian Pearson, BT Futurologist
Click here for contact details, other articles and personal details
The future of direct action
October 2000
The internet is starting at last to affect
the way people organise themselves. This was inevitable and very predictable -
in BT, we predicted network based communities as a new power group in 1993 and
I doubt if we were the first. Having spent the years between regularly talking
to government about this potential problem for them and having being dismissed
as technologists that live in a different world, the temptation to say 'we told
you so' is irresistible. This last year, we have seen the internet being
regularly used by the 'reclaim the streets' movement to co-ordinate their
demonstrations, and more recently the action against capitalism and
globalisation, genetic modification and now the fuel protests. We have seen
further evidence of the speed that messages travel via email, manifested in
rapidly building panic buying based on nothing more than a rumour. But
government still doesn't understand the magnitude of the potential problem
facing them.
Recent actions took place in a world where
only 5% of people worldwide use the internet, and few of those use it
regularly. Even in the UK, where well over 10 million people have home access
to the internet, only a fraction of those are regularly active. Access rates
are very slow, e-mail is primitive, and there are no simple ways of finding and
reaching others who share the same viewpoints. Nevertheless, protesters have
discovered that protests can be co-ordinated without any formal leadership,
with no ring-leaders to arrest. Action can be arranged and implemented very
quickly indeed through the speed of email, and relevant information spreads
extremely rapidly through the population.
But in a few years, almost everyone will be
using the internet. It will be embedded, all pervasively, into every area of
life, simply because it will make things much easier and involve much less
stress. Access rates will be high, and intelligence on the net will be well
developed. With our preferences known to our computer and various agents acting
on our behalf, we could be instantly informed about events that are of interest
to us. We may actively choose to belong to various cybercommunities, and
informally belong to others simply because of our preferences. So any actions
we have seen to date are the very tip of the iceberg, just a glimpse of what is
to come.
Imagine an email from the world's Chief
Environmentalist (there isn't one today but there may be), being sent to
everyone using the net. In the right climate, this could happen within minutes.
The email tells users that the USA has been damaging the environment through a
reckless energy policy, and refuses to agree to reductions of CO2 emission. It
recommends imposing economic sanctions to pursuade them. At the bottom of the
mail are two buttons. By pressing the 'I agree' button, the user's e-commerce
preferences are automatically set to exclude products and services from the
USA. The result could be a billion or more of the richest people on the planet
excluding the USA from business, within a few minutes. No geographically based
power structure or country can impose such a penalty so quickly.
What is more interesting is that if the USA
still refused to change policy on the basis of economic sanctions, the pressure
can be made even more direct. Having a high-technology-based economy makes them
particularly vulnerable to all forms of cyber-attack. They are well aware of
this and defend against it. But most of their activity is focused on hostile
countries, such as Iraq, who they perceive as hiring hackers to bring down
their networks and computer systems. Unfortunately, there are an infinite
number of ways to bring down systems as complex as theirs. To name just a few,
electronic bombs; evolving adaptive viruses, trojans and worms; information waves,
correlated traffic cultivation, exploiting emergent behaviours, even selling
them systems with embedded switches are all likely to be used in the future, as
well as many conventional forms of cyber-attack. If a few hackers can bring
down Yahoo, E-bay and Amazon, what can thousands of simultaneous attacks from a
massive cyber-community achieve? Many automated attacks could be distributed
and co-ordinated using smart e-mails, making it more difficult to defend
against. The key problem is that the best possible defence can only defend
against a finite number of approaches, whereas the vulnerability set is
infinite.
It is also impossible to retaliate. You
can't fire a missile at a cyber-community, and anonymity technology could make
it easy for them to hide on the net too. So it is hard to find anyone to
retaliate at, let alone actually retaliate!
The potential for such direct action is
very real, and is a high price to pay for the convenience and effectiveness of
an IT enabled economy. We are not far behind the USA in our levels of
vulnerability. The Y2K problem showed us how dependent we already are on our
electronic systems. As that dependency increases over the next decade, we
should ensure that we retain at least the skeleton of industrial-age systems as
a fallback for use when the new systems are crashed by a hostile
cyber-community. We will certainly face such threats, from a few people trying
to electronically close a few oil refineries, through to major economic attack
by global cybercommunities.