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| It is clear that every
sentence in our language ’is in order as it is’. That is to
say, we are not striving after an ideal, as if our ordinary
vague sentences had not yet got a quite unexceptionable sense, and
a perfect language awaited construction by us. - On the other hand it
seems clear that where there is sense there must be perfect order. --
So there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence.
For remember that in general we don't use language according to strict rules - it hasn't been taught us by means of strict rules, either. We, in our discussions on the other hand, constantly compare language with a calculus proceeding according to exact rules. Ludwig Wittgenstein |
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There is no clear definition - and indeed still no general consensus among philosophers - about what vagueness is or what the word 'vague' means. The phenomenon and the problems it has caused philosophers (sporadically, at least) for so many centuries are best brought out by considering the Sorites Paradox, which first appeared in ancient Greece. During the 20th century, and especially the last 30 years, there has been a resurgence of interest in vagueness, particularly in connection with the problems it is thought to pose to Classical Logic and the prospects of constructing theories of meaning for natural languages. This site is intended to be a helpful resource for philosophers and other researchers working in this fascinating and complex area. It includes a bibliography on vagueness (arranged alphabetically, chronologically and thematically), plus lists of online articles, homepages of people working in the area and related external resources. If you spot any errors or omissions on these pages, or have any suggestions for improving the site, please let me know. |
© Justin
Needle 1998-2003
Site last updated: 16th July 2003
