Abstract: Shafer-Landau argues that occasional indeterminacy in the metaphysics of morals--i.e. that moral predicates are vague and, thus, that some moral judgments are neither true nor false (i.e. indeterminate in truth value)--is compatible with 'moral realism,' the view that there are objective moral truths. I argue not that his argument is unsound, but that the view he tries to undermine--that indeterminacy and moral realism are incompatible--is a position held by no philosopher informed on the issues surrounding vagueness and moral realism (nor is it one that would be held upon sustained reflection by those informed on these debates). Thus, since there is little antecedent reason to presume that indeterminacy poses a problem for a realistic conception of morality, Shafer-Landau's argument for their compatibility shows us little.