Rosanna Keefe (`Vagueness by Numbers' MIND 107 1998 565--79) agues that theories of vagueness based upon fuzzy logic and set theory rest on a confusion: once we have assigned a number to an object to represent (for example) its HEIGHT, there is no distinct purpose left to be served by assigning a number to the object to represent its DEGREE OF TALLNESS; she claims that ``any numbers assigned in an attempt to capture the vagueness of `tall' do no more than serve as another measure of height.'' In this paper I defend fuzzy theories of vagueness against Keefe's attack. I show that the numbers that we assign to objects to measure (for example) heights serve a quite distinct purpose from the numbers that fuzzy theories of vagueness assign to objects to measure degrees of tallness: the two sorts of assignment are both FORMALLY and CONCEPTUALLY distinct; the fuzzy approach to vagueness is well-motivated and free of confusion.