Who Did What On 9/11? And Who Did Nothing?

'Fight Smart', 19 September 2004
'Protocolgate'
911 Commission Report
The US Air Defence Failure On 911
Who Hijacked The Emergency Response Procedures On 911?
www.btinternet.com/~nlpwessex/Documents/WAT911airresponse.htm
Why Were Cheney And The Secret Service In The Loop
And Rumsfeld, Myers And The President Out On 911?

Page	911 Commission Report Excerpt	Comment
40/41	"The President told us he was frustrated with the poor communications that morning. He could not reach key officials, including Secretary Rumsfeld, for a period of time. The line to the White House shelter conference room—and the Vice President — kept cutting off..."	Why would the Presidential communications systems fail when the President was still within US territory? Who was in charge of the President's communications systems on 911? This communications systems 'failure' is in addition to the one between the FAA and NMCC during the 'air threat' conference call. What are the explanations for these failures? This is one of the more remarkable aspects of the report - remarkable because so little is said on this subject. However, one of the 9/11 Commissioners, Jamie Gorelick, let slip the following astonishing information in an interview with PBS, 17 June 2004 "On Air Force One, the president was unable to reach most of the people or at least many of the people whom he tried to reach. He could not functionally lead the government from Air Force One at a time of great national stress and national emergency." From this description it would appear it was not only the White House that the President was allegedly unable to contact.And there it would seem the matter has been left to rest. Yet either the President has lied on this matter to cover-up his own inaction on the day or some serious questions need to be asked of those in control of Presidential communications systems on 9/11. In the PBS interview Gorelick goes on to say that the problem has since been fixed, but she doesn't confirm that she knows what the problem was. What was that problem? If it's been 'fixed' then someone knows.
40/41	"The President emphasized to us that he had authorized the shootdown of hijacked aircraft. The Vice President’s military aide told us he believed the Vice President spoke to the President just after entering the conference room, but he did not hear what they said. Rice, who entered the room shortly after the Vice President and sat next to him, remembered hearing him inform the President,'Sir, the CAPs are up. Sir, they’re going to want to know what to do.' Then she recalled hearing him say,'Yes sir.' She believed this conversation occurred a few minutes, perhaps five, after they entered the conference room. We believe this call would have taken place sometime before 10:10 to 10:15. Among the sources that reflect other important events of that morning, there is no documentary evidence for this call, but the relevant sources are incomplete... At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called 'a quiet moment,' suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. He said he had not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President. The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a two minute conversation that obtained the confirmation. On Air Force One, the President’s press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary."	The Commission has been unable to verify the President's claim that he authorised a shoot-down order, although he claims to have done so. The Vice President is presented as being directly engaged with the President concerning the authorisation (and by implication the relaying) of the alleged shoot-down order. However, nowhere in the relevant protocols is the Vice President referred to in the chain of command. The use of 'lethal force' is a matter for the President and Secretary for Defense - who was apparently not available to the NMCC until after the last of the hijackings was over. Moreover as reported by Newsweek magazine 28 June 2004 the staff of the 911 commission (although this is not recorded in the final report authorised by the Commissioners themselves) have expressed doubt that the Vice President obtained consent for a shoot down order from the President. The staff's effort to have this reflected in the final 9/11 Commission report was successfully blocked by the White House.
General Richard Myers (Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 911) Twelfth Public Hearing (Of the eleven page statement five paragraphs deal with what General Myers did on 911)	"There was a significant increase in terrorist threat reporting during the late spring and summer of 2001, clearly indicating a major Al Qaida terrorist operation was pending, but the location and timing were unknown. To the extent that the warnings pointed to specific areas, they pointed to the Arabian Peninsula.... The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) also issued a number of warnings in the months prior to 9/11. Those warnings were also non-specific, and focused primarily on threats against US citizens abroad and traditional hijackings."	The President's Daily Brief of 6 August referred to both potential preparations within the US for hijackings and surveillance of Federal buildings in New York, and also confirmed that Bin Laden was "determined to strike" in the US. The 911 Commission Report confirms (p. 260/262) that no further discussion of this brief by the President and his senior advisers ensued prior to the attacks. Myer's reference to "traditional hijackings" is a diversion. The required initial military response to both traditional hijackings and 911 type hijackings - the scrambling of fighter aircraft - is the same. At the time that a hijacking alert arises it will generally not be known whether it is a 'traditional' or a 911 type hijacking. The NMCC did not receive any requests for fighter scramblings on 911 as required by the relevant protocols.

"The defense of U.S. airspace on 9/11 was not conducted in accord with
preexisting training and protocols....."
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, JULY 2004 (p 31)

SUMMARY
CORRECT CHAIN OF COMMAND FOR MILITARY AIRCRAFT ESCORT ASSISTANCE AS PART OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO HIJACKINGS ON 9/11 ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL PROTOCOLS
FAA > NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTRE > PRESIDENT/ SECRETARY OF DEFENSE > NORAD > MILITARY UNITs
ACTUAL CHAIN OF COMMAND DURING COURSE OF 9/11 HIJACKINGS AS DIFFUSELY DOCUMENTED BY THE OFFICIAL 9/11 REPORT
FAA > SECRET SERVICE/VICE PRESIDENT > MILITARY UNITs

What The 9/11 Commission Report Said
".... none of the information conveyed in the White House video teleconference, at least in the first hour, was being passed to the NMCC. As one witness recalled, '[It] was almost like there were parallel decisionmaking processes going on; one was a voice conference orchestrated by the NMCC . . . and then there was the [White House video teleconference]. . . . [I]n my mind they were competing venues for command and control and decisionmaking.”
National Crisis Management
9/11 Commission Report, p36

"Air National Guard units with different rules of engagement were scrambled without the knowledge of the President, NORAD, or the National Military Command Center."
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, JULY 2004,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

"Shortly after the second attack in New York, a senior Secret Service agent charged with coordinating the President’s movements established an open line with his counterpart at the FAA, who soon told him that there were more planes unaccounted for—possibly hijacked—in addition to the two that had already crashed. Though the senior agent told someone to convey this information to the Secret Service’s operations center, it either was not passed on or was passed on but not disseminated..."
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, JULY 2004 (p 464)

"By 10:45 there was, however, another set of fighters circling Washington that had entirely different rules of engagement. These fighters, part of the 113th Wing of the District of Columbia Air National Guard, launched out of Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland in response to information passed to them by the Secret Service.... A Secret Service agent had a phone in each ear, one connected to Wherley and the other to a fellow agent at the White House, relaying instructions that the White House agent said he was getting from the Vice President......"
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, JULY 2004 (p 44)

What Cheney Nearly Said
"The Secret Service has an arrangement with the F.A.A. They had open lines after the World Trade Center was...[sentence unfinished by Cheney] "
Vice President Cheney discussing Flight 77 with Tim Russert
'Meet The Press', 16 September 2001

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION 3610.01A AND DOD DIRECTIVE 3025.15 REFER TO THE FAA, THE NMCC, THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENCE, NORAD, AND MILITARY UNITS
NOWHERE DO THEY REFER TO THE VICE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRET SERVICE

"....it is apparent that the FAA's involvement with the Secret Service on 911 was far greater than its involvement with the NMCC which appears to have been minimal during the course of the hijackings."
'Protocolgate' - Who Hijacked the Emergency Response Procedures on 911?
'Fight Smart', 19 September 2004

"The footnote says 'A senior Secret Service agent charged with coordinating the President’s movements established an open line with his counterpart at the FAA'. Although the location is not stated it seems likely that this 'counterpart' was at FAA headquarters, the organisation which failed to make any requests for military assistance on 911 as required by established protocols. Was FAA HQ (if that's who was involved here) lead to believe by the Secret Service that informing them of the situation was sufficient for NORAD to be informed or was the Secret Service only communicating with the FAA concerning, for example, the security of Air Force One? Who in the Secret Service's operation centre was responsible for not passing on or disseminating the information about hijacked planes provided in this way by the FAA? Who are Nelson Garabito and Terry Van Steenbergen?"
'Protocolgate' - Who Hijacked the Emergency Response Procedures on 911?
'Fight Smart', 19 September 2004

"FAA headquarters were in contact with the Secret Service headquarters but not the NMCC. Is it possible that the Secret Service took charge of the FAA HQ's response to the attacks on 911 thereby by-passing the established chain of command to and through the military and ultimately causing a failed response to the attacks? Who is the 'Chuck Green' mentioned here? He is not referred to in the report other than in the footnotes. According to the New York Observer 21 August 2003 'The F.A.A. and the Secret Service, which had an open phone connection, both knew at 8:20 a.m. that two planes had been hijacked in the New York area and had their transponders turned off.' Although this press report may or may not be accurate as to precise timing, if otherwise correct it would appear that the Secret Service had a direct communication link with the FAA from the early stages of the first hijacking."
'Protocolgate' - Who Hijacked the Emergency Response Procedures on 911?
'Fight Smart', 19 September 2004

It Appears The Secret Service Were Taking Orders From Dick Cheney

"Why was the Secret Service issuing commands to the air force from Cheney and why was Cheney by-passing the NMCC? After the hijackings were over the fighters at Andrews were launched completely outside the military chain of command. The Vice President's claim that he was unaware of this does not sit easily with the statement that 'A Secret Service agent had a phone in each ear, one connected to Wherley and the other to a fellow agent at the White House, relaying instructions that the White House agent said he was getting from the Vice President.' So it remains undetermined whether the Secret Service were acting unilaterally or in conjunction with the Vice President. In either case questions of legality are raised."
'Protocolgate' - Who Hijacked the Emergency Response Procedures on 911?
'Fight Smart', 19 September 2004

Did Cheney Lie To The 911 Commission?

"Dick Cheney, huddled in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center under the White House, had just urged the traveling George W. Bush not to return to Washington. The president had left Florida aboard Air Force One at 9:55 a.m. on 9/11 'with no destination at take-off,' as last week's 9-11 Commission report noted. Nor had Bush given any known instructions on how to respond to the attacks.... Nor did the real-time notes taken by two others in the room... reflect that such a phone call between Bush and Cheney occurred or that such a major decision as shooting down a U.S. airliner was discussed.... by the time Cheney issued his shoot-down order ...... the last plane-turned-missile on 9/11, had already crashed in Pennsylvania...the question of Cheney's behavior that day is one of many new issues raised in the remarkably detailed, chilling account laid out in dramatic presentations by the 9-11 Commission. NEWSWEEK has learned that some on the commission staff were, in fact, highly skeptical of the vice president's account and made their views clearer in an earlier draft of their staff report. According to one knowledgeable source, some staffers 'flat out didn't believe the call ever took place.'... the White House vigorously lobbied the commission to change the language in its report.... The report 'was watered down,' groused one staffer."
Who Was Really In Charge?
Newsweek, 28 June 2004

FAA PROTOCOLS FOR HIJACKINGS APPLICABLE ON 911 - Click Here

AIRCRAFT PIRACY (HIJACKING) AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES
US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE DIRECTIVE PROTOCOLS APPLICABLE ON 911 - Click Here

"These footnotes identify the relevant FAA and Department of Defense protocols for emergency response to hijackings as: i) FAA Order 7110.65M ii) FAA Order 7610.4J iii) DOD memo, CJCS instruction, 'Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects,' June 1, 2001. The latter in fact has a reference number (CJCSI 3610.01A) although this is not quoted."
'Protocolgate' - Who Hijacked the Emergency Response Procedures on 911?
'Fight Smart', 19 September 2004

Page	911 Commission Report Excerpt	Comment
9	"At 9:34, Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport advised the Secret Service of an unknown aircraft heading in the direction of the White House."	More details of the role of Secret Service in the US government response to the attacks on 911 feature elsewhere in report (see below).
25	"The Command Center kept looking for American 77. At 9:21, it advised the Dulles terminal control facility, and Dulles urged its controllers to look for primary targets. At 9:32, they found one. Several of the Dulles controllers 'observed a primary radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed' and notified Reagan National Airport. FAA personnel at both Reagan National and Dulles airports notified the Secret Service."	No primary radar tracking for Flight 77 is found until 36 minutes after its transponder is switched off. Communication lines were open with the Secret Service at airport level.
39	"At 9:33, the tower supervisor at Reagan National Airport picked up a hotline to the Secret Service and told the Service’s operations center that 'an aircraft [is] coming at you and not talking with us.' This was the first specific report to the Secret Service of a direct threat to the White House. No move was made to evacuate the Vice President at this time."	FAA Secret Service communication also continued at airport level.
40/41	"The President emphasized to us that he had authorized the shootdown of hijacked aircraft. The Vice President’s military aide told us he believed the Vice President spoke to the President just after entering the conference room, but he did not hear what they said. Rice, who entered the room shortly after the Vice President and sat next to him, remembered hearing him inform the President,'Sir, the CAPs are up. Sir, they’re going to want to know what to do.' Then she recalled hearing him say,'Yes sir.' She believed this conversation occurred a few minutes, perhaps five, after they entered the conference room. We believe this call would have taken place sometime before 10:10 to 10:15. Among the sources that reflect other important events of that morning, there is no documentary evidence for this call, but the relevant sources are incomplete... At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called 'a quiet moment,' suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. He said he had not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President. The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a two minute conversation that obtained the confirmation. On Air Force One, the President’s press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary."	The Commission has been unable to verify the President's claim that he authorised a shoot-down order, although he claims to have done so. The Vice President is presented as being directly engaged with the President concerning the authorisation (and by implication the relaying) of the alleged shoot-down order. However, nowhere in the relevant protocols is the Vice President referred to in the chain of command. The use of 'lethal force' is a matter for the President and Secretary for Defense - who was apparently not available to the NMCC until after the last of the hijackings was over. Moreover as reported by Newsweek magazine 28 June 2004 the staff of the 911 commission (although this is not recorded in the final report authorised by the Commissioners themselves) have expressed doubt that the Vice President obtained consent for a shoot down order from the President. The staff's effort to have this reflected in the final 9/11 Commission report was successfully blocked by the White House.
41	"At 10:02, the communicators in the shelter began receiving reports from the Secret Service of an inbound aircraft—presumably hijacked—heading toward Washington. That aircraft was United 93. The Secret Service was getting this information directly from the FAA."	Why was the FAA liasing with the Secret Service but not with the NMCC as required by protocol?
42	"..... The NMCC learned of United 93’s hijacking at about 10:03. At this time the FAA had no contact with the military at the level of national command. The NMCC learned about United 93 from the White House. It, in turn, was informed by the Secret Service’s contacts with the FAA. NORAD had no information either. At 10:07, its representative on the air threat conference call stated that NORAD had 'no indication of a hijack heading to DC at this time.'"	In the 911 Commission Staff Statement No 6 (p25) the wording is broader: "The FAA had not yet been connected to the Air Threat Conference and in general had practically no contact with the military at the level of national command." The implication is that prior to 10:03 the FAA had no significant contact with the military national command.
43/44	"At 10:39, the Vice President updated the Secretary on the air threat conference.... As this exchange shows, Secretary Rumsfeld was not in the NMCC when the shootdown order was first conveyed. He moved to the NMCC shortly before 10:30, in order to join Vice Chairman Myers. Secretary Rumsfeld told us he was just gaining situational awareness when he spoke with the Vice President at 10:39."	Why was Rumsfeld taking these instructions from Cheney and not the President? There is no provision for this in the protocols. Why was Rumsfeld not in the NMCC? And why did he not have "situational awareness" until 10.39, more than two hours after the hijackings had begun and more than half an hour after they were all over? In the 911 Commission Staff Statement No 6 (p27) some of the wording is broader: "As this exchange shows, Secretary Rumsfeld was not involved when the shoot down order was first passed on the Air Threat Conference".
44	"By 10:45 there was, however, another set of fighters circling Washington that had entirely different rules of engagement.These fighters, part of the 113th Wing of the District of Columbia Air National Guard, launched out of Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland in response to information passed to them by the Secret Service. The first of the Andrews fighters was airborne at 10:38. General David Wherley—the commander of the 113th Wing—reached out to the Secret Service after hearing secondhand reports that it wanted fighters airborne. A Secret Service agent had a phone in each ear, one connected to Wherley and the other to a fellow agent at the White House, relaying instructions that the White House agent said he was getting from the Vice President..... Thus, while the fighter pilots under NORAD direction who had scrambled out of Langley never received any type of engagement order, the Andrews pilots were operating weapons free—a permissive rule of engagement. The President and the Vice President indicated to us they had not been aware that fighters had been scrambled out of Andrews, at the request of the Secret Service and outside the military chain of command. There is no evidence that NORAD headquarters or military officials in the NMCC knew—during the morning of September 11—that the Andrews planes were airborne and operating under different rules of engagement."	Why was the Secret Service issuing commands to the air force from Cheney and why was Cheney by-passing the NMCC? After the hijackings were over the fighters at Andrews were launched completely outside the military chain of command. The Vice President's claim that he was unaware of this does not sit easily with the statement that "A Secret Service agent had a phone in each ear, one connected to Wherley and the other to a fellow agent at the White House, relaying instructions that the White House agent said he was getting from the Vice President." So it remains undetermined whether the Secret Service were acting unilaterally or in conjunction with the Vice President. In either case questions of legality are raised.
464	[Footnote] 208. "USSS [United States Secret Service] memo, interview of Gregory LaDow, Oct. 1, 2001,p. 1. Shortly after the second attack in New York, a senior Secret Service agent charged with coordinating the President’s movements established an open line with his counterpart at the FAA, who soon told him that there were more planes unaccounted for—possibly hijacked—in addition to the two that had already crashed. Though the senior agent told someone to convey this information to the Secret Service’s operations center, it either was not passed on or was passed on but not disseminated; it failed to reach agents assigned to the Vice President, and the Vice President was not evacuated at that time. See Nelson Garabito interview (Mar. 11, 2004); USSS memo, interview of Nelson Garabito, Oct. 1, 2001; see also Terry Van Steenbergen interview (Mar. 30, 2004).	The footnote says "A senior Secret Service agent charged with coordinating the President’s movements established an open line with his counterpart at the FAA". Although the location is not stated it seems likely that this 'counterpart' was at FAA headquarters, the organisation which failed to make any requests for military assistance on 911 as required by established protocols. Was FAA HQ (if that's who was involved here) lead to believe by the Secret Service that informing them of the situation was sufficient for NORAD to be informed or was the Secret Service only communicating with the FAA concerning, for example, the security of Air Force One? Who in the Secret Service's operation centre was responsible for not passing on or disseminating the information about hijacked planes provided in this way by the FAA? Who are Nelson Garabito and Terry Van Steenbergen?
464	"[Footnote] 217. .. At Secret Service headquarters, personnel from the intelligence division were also on a phone conference with FAA headquarters. Chuck Green interview (Mar. 10, 2004)."	FAA headquarters were in contact with the Secret Service headquarters but not the NMCC. Is it possible that the Secret Service took charge of the FAA HQ's response to the attacks on 911 thereby by-passing the established chain of command to and through the military and ultimately causing a failed response to the attacks? Who is the "Chuck Green" mentioned here? He is not referred to in the report other than in the footnotes. According to the New York Observer 21 August 2003 "The F.A.A. and the Secret Service, which had an open phone connection, both knew at 8:20 a.m. that two planes had been hijacked in the New York area and had their transponders turned off." Although this press report may or may not be accurate as to precise timing, if otherwise correct it would appear that the Secret Service had a direct communication link with the FAA from the early stages of the first hijacking. Investigative journalist Tom Flocco had been a regular attendee at the Commission's public hearings. In an online article 17 June 2004 he reported that: "President Bush is attended by a round-the-clock Secret Service detail which would of necessity been connected to the secure phone bridge conference lines. Most Americans think that President Bush first became aware of the attacks when his Chief of Staff Andrew Card whispered in his ear at 9:06 am at the elementary school while he was meeting with the first graders. Facts indicate otherwise. Laura Brown, Public Affairs Director at the FAA, initially told this writer at the first 9-11 hearing in Washington that the phone bridges started around 8:20 or 8:25 am, which would be reasonable since American 11 was determined to be hijacked at 8:13, 8:20 or 8:24 am. This, depending upon which news report, official, or air traffic controller is referenced--and to what extent one permits the government to shorten the official time-line of the actual attacks, thus reducing potential culpability should a grand jury ever be impaneled. After returning to her office and conferring with superiors, Brown sent an email to this writer later that same evening after 7:00 pm, revising her initial assertions for the commencement of Leidig’s phone bridges to around 8:45 am, thus shortening the official attack time-line to the government's advantage." Bush was attending a school in Sarasota, Florida, on 911. According to the November 2001 edition of Sarasota Magazine which was covering the Presidential visit for the local community: "[On the morning of 911] After a four-and-a-half mile run, the President returned to the Colony and showered. He left promptly at 8:35 but not before thanking the Klaubers and the Colony staff, each member personally when possible. The motorcade set out and soon disappeared southward on Gulf of Mexico Drive. The President was on Highway 301, just north of Main Street, heading toward Booker Elementary when, on the phone that Katie Moulton had been admiring just hours before, he received the news that a plane had crashed in New York City. A ride on Air Force One is usually one of the more pleasant perks that members of Congress enjoy. Bradenton’s Congressman Dan Miller had experienced the pleasure three times before. As a Presidential courtesy, it transcends party. Miller, a Republican, had last flown aboard the fabled jet, probably the most famous plane in the world, as the guest of President Clinton. Miller and his wife Glenda had been in Washington for the weekend, but he flew back to his Bradenton home on Monday night. At 8:55 Tuesday morning he was standing in front of Emma E. Booker Elementary School as part of the official greeting party, along with Congressman Adam Putnam. An aide had just whispered to Miller the news of the first plane crash in New York, but if the President yet knew, his greeting as he got out of the limo did not give it away. He did, however, make an unscheduled stop in a communications room, where he talked with Condoleeza Rice in Washington. He then proceeded into a classroom where 16 second graders, led by their teacher, Sandra K. Daniels, were going to demonstrate their reading skills."
465	"[Footnote] 225. On the NMCC, see DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001. On the Secret Service’s contacts with the FAA, see notes 208, 217. On the Secret Service conveying information to the White House, see DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001; Nelson Garabito interview (Mar. 11, 2004)."	Who is Nelson Garabito? Referred to in several footnotes, but not in the main text, he appears to be a member of the Secret Service.
465	"[Footnote] 236 The 113th Wing first learned from the FAA tower at Andrews that the Secret Service wanted fighters airborne. The FAA tower had been contacted by personnel at FAA headquarters, who were on an open line with senior agents from the President’s detail. See Nelson Garabito interview (Mar. 11, 2004); Terry Van Steenbergen interview (Mar. 30, 2004). On the Secret Service agent relaying instructions, see USSS memo, Beauchamp to AD Inspection, September 11 experience, Feb. 23, 2004. On the order to fly weapons free, see David Wherley interview (Feb. 27, 2004); DOD memo, interview of David Wherley, Oct. 3, 2001, p. 12."	This instruction from the Secret Service only came after all the hijackings had terminated. The report in various places refers to documents which are not available to the public. However, it is apparent that the FAA's involvement with the Secret Service on 911 was far greater than its involvement with the NMCC which appears to have been minimal during the course of the hijackings.

"The defense of U.S. airspace on 9/11 was not conducted in accord with
preexisting training and protocols....."
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, JULY 2004 (p 31)

It Appears The Secret Service Were Taking Orders From Dick Cheney

Did Cheney Lie To The 911 Commission?

FAA PROTOCOLS FOR HIJACKINGS APPLICABLE ON 911 - Click Here

AIRCRAFT PIRACY (HIJACKING) AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES
US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE DIRECTIVE PROTOCOLS APPLICABLE ON 911 - Click Here

Page	911 Commission Report Excerpt	Comment
26	"NORAD heard nothing about the search for American 77."	This is a reference to NORAD centrally. Meanwhile NEADS only found out that Flight 77 was missing when it placed its own call to the FAA's Washington Centre at 9.34 to ask about American 11 (p.27). In the process it was purely by chance that it found out about Flight 77. There was no notification to NORAD from FAA HQ as required by protocol.
27	"No one at FAA headquarters ever asked for military assistance with American 77."	As was the case with all the other hijackings on 911.
28	"By 9:34, word of the hijacking [of Flight 93 which later crashed in Pennsylvania] had reached FAA headquarters."	This plane did not crash until 10.03. No FAA request for military assistance was ever issued during this hijacking despite the fact that by 9.38 three high profile targets had been hit by other hijacked aircraft and Flight 93 was also by then known to be a hijacking.
28/29	"At approximately 9:36, Cleveland advised the Command Center that it was still tracking United 93 and specifically inquired whether someone had requested the military to launch fighter aircraft to intercept the aircraft. Cleveland even told the Command Center it was prepared to contact a nearby military base to make the request. The Command Center told Cleveland that FAA personnel well above them in the chain of command had to make the decision to seek military assistance and were working on the issue."	What on earth does "working on the issue" mean? What decision was there left to make other than to request military assistance - three airliners had already crashed by now.
29	"From 9:34 to 10:08, a Command Center facility manager provided frequent updates to Acting Deputy Administrator Monte Belger and other executives at FAA headquarters as United 93 headed toward Washington, D.C. At 9:41, Cleveland Center lost United 93’s transponder signal. The controller located it on primary radar, matched its position with visual sightings from other aircraft, and tracked the flight as it turned east, then south. At 9:42, the [FAA] Command Center learned from news reports that a plane had struck the Pentagon. The Command Center’s national operations manager, Ben Sliney, ordered all FAA facilities to instruct all aircraft to land at the nearest airport."	Flight 93 was captured by primary radar despite its transponder being turned off
29/30	"... At 9:53, FAA headquarters informed the Command Center that the deputy director for air traffic services was talking to Monte Belger about scrambling aircraft...."	Why was no such request issued to the NMCC? Mr Belger gave evidence at the twelfth and final public hearing held by the the 911 Commission. Only one paragraph of his statement deals with the FAA's failure to communicate with the NMCC on 911 in accordance with protocols (although the protocols themselves are not mentioned). That paragraph states: "Prior to 9/11, FAA’s traditional communication channel with the military during a crisis had been through the National Military Command Center (NMCC). They were always included in the communication net that was used to manage a hijack incident. When a hijacking was reported, FAA security personnel activated a command center in the Washington Operation Center and a senior executive from the FAA’s security organization was responsible for managing the situation and the communication network with other government and industry agencies. FAA would frequently ask the military, through the NMCC, for airborne surveillance of the hijacked aircraft to monitor its movements. On 9/11 FAA did not have formal dedicated communication channels directly to NORAD. Although the FAA had letters of agreement with DOD and the FBI which defined procedures to follow and roles and responsibilities, it became clear that the events of 9/11 went far beyond the scope of those existing agreements. In the Headquarters and in FAA field facilities we were reacting to a real scenario that had not been practiced or modeled. Decision makers were reacting quickly, and in my opinion professionally in an untested environment." Whilst the latter is an assertion which may be true in relation to FAA field facilities it is not self-evident in relation to FAA HQ. An explanation is required as to why standard hijack procedures worked satisfactorily before 9/11 but not on 9/11 itself. Once the first strike on the World Trade Centre had occurred, then never in the history of hijackings can the need to request military air support for the ensuing stricken aircraft from the NMCC have been more urgent or obvious. No such requests were ever made and no substantive explanation for this is offered in the 9/11 Commission's report. Moreover the statement that "On 9/11 FAA did not have formal dedicated communication channels directly to NORAD", may well be true but does not constitute an explanation as to why not. Under the established protocol (CJCSI 3610.01A) the FAA is required to communicate with the NMCC whose responsibility is then to set up the necessary communication link between NORAD and the FAA - a process which clearly worked satisfactorily before 9/11 according to Mr Berger's own testimony. No mention is made in Mr Belger's statement of the FAA's failure to request airforce intercepts via the NMCC in this way at any point during the hijackings. However, the statement does confirm that "The FAA security organization was participating in classified conversations with the intelligence agencies." No further information is provided about those conversations. The role of the FAA security organisation is important because Mr Belger confirms that it "was responsible for managing the situation and the communication network with other government and industry agencies." No explanation is give as to why the FAA headquarters was able to communicate with "intelligence agencies" on 9/11, but not with the NMCC with whom it had communicated satisfactorily and "frequently" in the past during hijack alerts. Mr Belger's statement confirming satisfactory pre-911 communications with the NMCC is not included in the 9/11 Commission's final report.
36	"The FAA, the White House, and the Defense Department each initiated a multiagency teleconference before 9:30. Because none of these teleconferences—at least before 10:00— included the right officials from both the FAA and Defense Department, none succeeded in meaningfully coordinating the military and FAA response to the hijackings. At about 9:20, security personnel at FAA headquarters set up a hijacking teleconference with several agencies, including the Defense Department. The NMCC officer who participated told us that the call was monitored only periodically because the information was sporadic, it was of little value, and there were other important tasks.The FAA manager of the teleconference also remembered that the military participated only briefly before the Pentagon was hit. Both individuals agreed that the teleconference played no role in coordinating a response to the attacks of 9/11. Acting Deputy Administrator Belger was frustrated to learn later in the morning that the military had not been on the call. At the White House, the video teleconference was conducted from the Situation Room by Richard Clarke, a special assistant to the president long involved in counterterrorism. Logs indicate that it began at 9:25 and included the CIA; the FBI; the departments of State, Justice, and Defense; the FAA; and the White House shelter. The FAA and CIA joined at 9:40....We found no evidence that video teleconference participants had any prior information that American 77 had been hijacked and was heading directly toward Washington. Indeed, it is not clear to us that the video teleconference was fully under way before 9:37, when the Pentagon was struck. Garvey, Belger, and other senior officials from FAA headquarters participated in this video teleconference at various times. We do not know who from Defense participated, but we know that in the first hour none of the personnel involved in managing the crisis did. And none of the information conveyed in the White House video teleconference, at least in the first hour, was being passed to the NMCC."	What were the more important tasks the NMCC claims it needed to attend to during the hijackings given that it wasn't involved in the launching of any fighter aircraft as required by the protocols? Although 'security personnel' at FAA HQ had set up a hijacking teleconference with several agencies the one organisation it needed to communicate with most, the NMCC, was not materially participating. Who set up this line of communication that turned out to be a blind alley for the frustrated Mr Belger? How is it that after a multi-million dollar inquiry the Commission is unable to establish who from the Department of Defense participated in the White House video teleconference?
458	"[Footnote] "102. See FAA regulations, Hijacked Aircraft, Order 7110.65M, para.10-2-6 (2001); David Bottiglia interview (Oct. 1, 2003); FAA report,"Crisis Management Handbook for Significant Events," Feb. 15, 2000. From interviews of controllers at various FAA centers,we learned that an air traffic controller’s first response to an aircraft incident is to notify a supervisor, who then notifies the traffic management unit and the operations manager in charge.The FAA center next notifies the appropriate regional operations center (ROC), which in turn contacts FAA headquarters. Biggio stated that for American 11, the combination of three factors—loss of radio contact, loss of transponder signal, and course deviation—was serious enough for him to contact the ROC in Burlington, Mass. However, without hearing the threatening communication from the cockpit, he doubts Boston Center would have recognized or labeled American 11 'a hijack.' Terry Biggio interview (Sept. 22, 2003); see also Shirley Miller interview (Mar. 30, 2004); Monte Belger interview (Apr. 20, 2004)." "[Footnote] 103. FAA regulations, Special Military Operations, Requests for Service, Order 7610.4J, paras. 7-1-1, 7-1-2 (2001); DOD memo, CJCS instruction, "Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects," June 1, 2001.	These footnotes identify the relevant FAA and Department of Defense protocols for emergency response to hijackings as: i) FAA Order 7110.65M ii) FAA Order 7610.4J iii) DOD memo, CJCS instruction, "Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects," June 1, 2001 The latter in fact has a reference number (CJCSI 3610.01A) although this is not quoted.
Michael Canavan (Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security at the Federal Aviation Administration on 911) Second Public Hearing	"During my tenure at FAA, my staff and I interacted routinely with the intelligence and law enforcement communities. We were advised of current and possible future threats against civil aviation and worked actively to implement measures to protect the flying public against those threats. Throughout 2001, as the intelligence reporting volume increased, the overwhelming majority was focused on likely targets overseas, particularly in the Middle East. Throughout this period, my office issued at least 15 Information Circulars to authorized aviation industry security professionals- corporate security directors, senior management personnel, ground security coordinators, supervisory personnel at overseas locations and as appropriate, to local airline managers and law enforcement personnel on a need-to-know basis. Often times, these were issued in concert with Department of State public announcements and FBI National Law Enforcement Transmittals. Information Circulars contained data derived from law enforcement and intelligence information focusing on domestic and international terrorism threats directed against aviation. The Information Circulars updated U.S. carriers against continuing violence against American citizens and interests around the world, with a particular emphasis on the Middle East, and encouraged airlines to practice a high degree of awareness. For example, one Information Circular described the plot to target a public area in the Los Angeles Airport terminal by Ahmed Ressam- who was arrested in December 1999 while attempting to enter the United States from Canada.... As I recall, the threat reporting during early to mid-2001 centered on U.S. targets abroad. In June and July 2001, the FAA was included in many interagency Counterterrorism Security Group meetings, held at the White House by the National Security Council (NSC) staff, regarding possible attacks in the Arabian Peninsula, Israel, and Europe. In early July, the NSC chaired a meeting at which the interagency was briefed about additional intelligence indicating that terrorist attacks seemed imminent; the Intelligence Community briefers emphasized attacks would likely take place overseas. While we all agreed that attacks within the U.S. would not be ruled out, there was no indication from the Intelligence Community that attacks focused specifically against airlines. Nonetheless, the entire CT [counter terrorism] community, including law enforcement and intelligence agencies, were placed on highest alert and we all sent out notifications for heightened security measures to be put in place immediately. The FAA sent out SD's and IC's to all interested parties."	Although General Cavanan reports that most threat warnings issued by the FAA related to the Middle East during the summer of 2001, one circular specifically referred to a previous plot to target a public area in the Los Angeles Airport terminal. Canavan also confirms that intelligence reporting volume was increasing throughout 2001. Threat circulars were issued to local airline managers as well as overseas personnel. The circulars focused on both domestic as well as international "terrorism threats directed against aviation". Canavan lays particular emphasis on threat reporting relating to overseas targets made at the White House meetings during June and July. However, a report of one of those meetings attended by the FAA in July 2001 published in the Washington Post 17 May 2002 describes how White House counter-terrorism chief Richard Clarke was of the view that attacks were going to take place in the US. Clarke said "Something spectacular is going to happen, and its going to happen here soon". Nonetheless Canavan confirms that the FAA was placed on highest alert during June and July. If so it is not clear why its lines of communication with the NMCC were not properly established by the time of 911, particularly as General Myers confirmed in his own evidence to the Commission's public hearings that the NMCC "serves as our worldwide monitoring crisis response center".
Jane Garvey (Head of Federal Aviation Administration on 911) Seventh Public Hearing	"During my May 22 testimony before the Commission, I was questioned about the FAA’s knowledge, prior to September 11, of intelligence reports regarding the use of commercial aircraft as weapons of mass destruction. The Commission cited several such reports. The staff of the former FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security Intelligence, which as been subsumed into the Transportation Security Administration, previously prepared a detailed, classified statement regarding those reports for the Joint Inquiry of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Hopefully, that statement answers most of the Commission’s questions regarding those reported episodes. I do not specifically address the incidents here. Instead, I wish to provide brief, general comments to the Commission regarding the FAA’s intelligence capabilities on September 11.... Prior to September 11, the intelligence provided to the FAA did not support a conclusion that there was any specific, credible threat of terrorists using aircraft as suicide weapons for attacks against the United States. This conclusion should not be construed as a failure to maintain a high level of vigilance. The FAA was aware of numerous, more traditional terrorist threats prior to September 11, and constantly warned airlines and airports about those threats, as well as adjusting countermeasures when warranted. The FAA and the intelligence community itself, believed that these more traditional terrorist threats – the bombing of aircraft, and hijacking and hostage taking – posed the more likely threats to aviation."	Ms Garvey's testimony of 22 May 2003 states that "following the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 it became obvious that the general terrorist threat in the United States had increased. It was not immediately clear what the threat might be with respect to domestic civil aviation but evaluation of the intelligence that continued to come in drove the FAA Office of Intelligence to the conclusion that some terrorist groups were preoccupied with the idea of attacking civil aviation and that, in fact the domestic threat to civil aviation had, in fact, increased.... We wish we had received the FBI/Phoenix memo on flight school students - and it would have worried us a lot - but we did not." It appears that some or all of the FAA's statement on pre-911 intelligence reporting provided to previous congressional Joint Inquiry investigations may remain 'classified'. The initial response to a hijacking of any kind is to launch fighter escort aircraft. This is the same for both conventional hijackings and those of the suicide type executed on 911. Ms Garvey does not explain why FAA headquarters did not request fighter escorts on 911. This anomaly is particularly difficult to understand given Ms Garvey's acknowledgement of the FAA's pre-911 recognition of the risk of "more traditional" hijackings and the resulting "constant" warnings to airlines and adjustment of "counter measures".
Cathal Flynn (FAA Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security 1993 - 2000) Seventh Public Hearing	"The statement of Ms. Jane Garvey, former Administrator of the FAA, to the Commission on May 22, 2003, summarized the development of the national aviation security program from its beginning..... I will try to avoid repeating these excellent summaries..... From 1993 to 2000, aviation security was implemented in an environment shaped by several developments and events: memory of the Pan Am 103 catastrophe and national determination that nothing like it should happen again; the World Trade Center bombing of February 1993 and the discovery, in the post-bombing investigations, of previously un-noticed groups within the United States that at least seemed to be connected with Middle Eastern terrorist organizations; the 'Manila Conspiracy', also called the 'Bojinka Plot', that aimed in early 1995 to destroy as many as twelve U.S. airliners nearly simultaneously as they flew from airports in East Asia; growing awareness of the al Qaeda terrorist organization; and the crash of TWA flight 800 on July 17, 1996, which initially appeared to have been caused by an on-board bomb and thus raised national awareness of a possible terrorist threat to aviation within the United States. The investigations stemming from the World Trade Center attack revealed terrorist interest in civil aviation within the United States. Because of that, and because Middle East-connected terrorists had a propensity to attack aviation, additional security measures were imposed by security directives and program amendments, at first only for a time around salient events such as the sentencing of World Trade Center terrorists. Later in 1995, the measures were re-implemented with some changes, and kept in effect.... By 1995, the FAA had become convinced that the baseline of aviation security, the aggregate of the permanent carrier and airport programs, had to be raised.....With the support of the Secretary of Transportation and the National Security Council staff, the FAA determined that its Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) was the forum in which to achieve the consensus for a new baseline. The ASAC met and formed the Baseline Working Group on July 17, 1996. Deputy Secretary of Transportation Mortimer Downey and Congressman James Oberstar addressed the ASAC and strongly endorsed raising aviation security in this manner. The destruction of TWA flight 800, which followed the Baseline Working Group’s creation by only a few hours, accelerated a process already underway. President Clinton formed the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security on July 25. Its members included the Directors of Central Intelligence and the FBI...... If, as has been reported, some of the terrorists used the names by which intelligence agencies knew them, the attacks could have been disrupted, perhaps completely defeated, simply by requiring all airlines to deny them boarding and report their reservations to law enforcement agencies. "	Nonetheless Admiral Flynn confirms FAA pre-911 awareness that "The investigations stemming from the [1993] World Trade Center attack revealed terrorist interest in civil aviation within the United States." Because of that "additional security measures were imposed by security directives and program amendments"although these are not elucidated here. He confirms FAA pre-911 awareness of "previously un-noticed groups within the United States that at least seemed to be connected with Middle Eastern terrorist organizations" and of "of a possible terrorist threat to aviation within the United States." It is clear from these remarks that the potential for attacks on aviation launched from within the United States was recognised by the FAA pre-911. The last major airline security event within the US was in 1996 (TWA flight 800) which accelerated a review of aviation security. Admiral Flynn bluntly states that "If, as has been reported, some of the terrorists used the names by which intelligence agencies knew them, the attacks could have been disrupted, perhaps completely defeated, simply by requiring all airlines to deny them boarding and report their reservations to law enforcement agencies." In this respect a report in the New York Times 25 March 2004 is relevant. It states "Reprising the scene in the White House on 9/11, [head of counter terrorism Richard] Clarke says he took a call from Dale Watson, the FBI's counterterrorism chief. 'We got the passenger manifests from the airlines,' Watson said. 'We recognize some names, Dick. They're al-Qaida.' Clarke recalled: 'I was stunned, not that the attack was al-Qaida but that there were al-Qaida operatives on board aircraft using names that FBI knew were al-Qaida.' Watson told Clarke that 'CIA forgot to tell us about them.'"
Claudio Manno (FAA Director of the Office of Intelligence on 911) Seventh Public Hearing	"On September 11, 2001, I was the Director of the Office of Intelligence, which was part of the Office of Civil Aviation Security of the FAA. My responsibilities were to oversee and manage the receipt, identification, analysis and dissemination of intelligence information focusing on terrorism and other threats to U.S. civil aviation. In this role, I provided intelligence support to the Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security, other principal officials of the FAA, and the Office of Security and Intelligence at the Department of Transportation. Although the magnitude of the events of September 11, 2001, had not previously been seen, FAA’s Intelligence Watch had managed multiple aviation crises prior to the tragic suicide hijackings..... Prior to September 11, 2001, the FAA Office of Intelligence received, on a daily basis, a steady stream of raw reporting and finished intelligence from DOS, CIA, NSA, and DIA. The reporting included items that were sent electronically, hard-copy products received via courier, and cables and finished intelligence retrieved using a variety of Intelligence Community databases. From this intelligence flow, FAA analysts working on a 24-hour Intelligence Watch identified, on average, between one and two hundred classified cables, reports, hard-copy products, faxes and e-mails each day that merited closer review. To further ensure the receipt of relevant information needed for the accurate assessment of threats to civil aviation, FAA assigned intelligence liaison officers to the CIA, FBI and DOS. Their primary duties were to identify and pursue information regarding actual or potential threats to civil aviation. By integrating FAA analysts into these agencies, additional access to intelligence was obtained. The access included the ability to read and review information that is disseminated externally to other agencies, as well as internal, operational, 'in-house' e-mails and message traffic that is not shared with outside agencies. As a result, FAA liaison officers often gained insight and information about a terrorist threat or incident that was not officially passed to other agencies; in these cases, they requested release of the information and would educate the agencies as to why such information was of importance to the FAA. In some cases, they were successful in getting access for FAA; in other situations, due to sensitivity of sources and methods, the information was not approved for release. FAA understood that this was the trade-off for those agencies granting the liaison officers access to their information. FAA fully appreciated restriction of access based on the 'need-to know' principle and the requirement to protect sensitive intelligence sources and methods."	This statement sets out the degree to which the FAA was reliant on external US intelligence agencies (CIA, FBI etc) for anticipating potential terrorist threats to US civil aviation.
Monte Belger (FAA Acting Deputy Administrator on 911) Twelfth Public Hearing	"On the morning of September 11th, the first indication to the FAA Headquarters of a potential problem was sometime after 8:30am when our Air Traffic office in HQ received a report that an American airlines aircraft had a communication problem. The Boston Center was aware that AA-11 was in distress and had started the process for a possible hijacked aircraft. Our air traffic personnel in the HQ immediately began to gather information from the field facilities. My first knowledge of a problem that morning was upon my return to my office from a meeting in the FAA HQ building. I was advised that an aircraft had hit the World Trade Center. I immediately went into the FAA Operations center and began to gather information. The initial reports to me were unclear—we did not immediately know that AA-11 had crashed into the World Trade Center. We launched into an information gathering response in HQ. Our Air Traffic HQ group established communications with the field facilities to get as much information as quickly as possible. And the tactical communications net, managed by FAA Security, was established in the Washington Operations Center to link HQ with other FAA facilities. I contacted the FAA Administrator who was in a meeting at the Department of Transportation and she immediately returned to the FAA building. During this time period I had several phone conversations with Sec. Mineta and his Chief of Staff. I was on the phone with his Chief of Staff when the second aircraft hit the Trade When UAL 175 crashed into the second tower it was clear that we were dealing with deliberate actions..... Prior to 9/11, FAA’s traditional communication channel with the military during a crisis had been through the National Military Command Center (NMCC). They were always included in the communication net that was used to manage a hijack incident. When a hijacking was reported, FAA security personnel activated a command center in the Washington Operation Center and a senior executive from the FAA’s security organization was responsible for managing the situation and the communication network with other government and industry agencies. FAA would frequently ask the military, through the NMCC, for airborne surveillance of the hijacked aircraft to monitor its movements. On 9/11 FAA did not have formal dedicated communication channels directly to NORAD. Although the FAA had letters of agreement with DOD [Department of Defense] and the FBI which defined procedures to follow and roles and responsibilities, it became clear that the events of 9/11 went far beyond the scope of those existing agreements..... Some of the major actions taken in the FAA Headquarters were... The FAA security organization... participating in classified conversations with the intelligence agencies.... After 9/11 the most significant improvement needed was establishing a direct communications link between FAA facilities, DOD, and NORAD. We could no longer rely on communication to NORAD through our Headquarters or through the NMCC."	Mr Belger confirms to the Commission that pre-911 the standard channel for obtaining a fighter escort for a hijacking was a request submitted to the NMCC and that the "FAA would frequently ask the military, through the NMCC, for airborne surveillance of the hijacked aircraft to monitor its movements." Why isn't Belger quoted on this in the final 9/11 Commission report? No one disputes the fact that the events of 911 were extraordinary but Belger does not explain why no fighter escort requests for any of the stricken aircraft were put through to the NMCC by FAA headquarters during the course of the hijackings on 911. Why would the events of 911 justify breaching protocol and providing a lesser response than for previous 'normal' and less serious hijacking alerts? Belger says "On 9/11 FAA did not have formal dedicated communication channels directly to NORAD". But the relevant protocol specifies that NORAD is required to set up such communications once a request for military assistance has been made by the FAA via the NMCC. No such requests were issued on 911. However, Belger does confirm that "The FAA security organization was participating in classified conversations with the intelligence agencies". Belger also states "After 9/11 the most significant improvement needed was establishing a direct communications link between FAA facilities, DOD, and NORAD. We could no longer rely on communication to NORAD through our Headquarters or through the NMCC." Belger doesn't explain why that link failed but he does identify it as the most significant factor in the failed response on 911. Clearly a further investigation is needed to provide an explanation. However, in his oral evidence Belger did elaborate as follows: "Prior to 9/11, the procedures for managing a traditional hijacked aircraft, as I said, were in place and pretty well tested.... The most frustrating after-the-fact scenario for me to understand is to explain is the communication link on that morning between the FAA operations center and the NMCC.... It is clear I think in the record that at 9:20 the FAA operations center did call the National Military Command Center and add them into the hijacking net. I can tell you I've lived through dozens of hijackings in my 30-year FAA career, as a very low entry-level inspector up through to the headquarters, and they were always there. They were always on the net, and were always listening in with everybody else.... this is very, very important, in response to your question.... at 9:20, the NMCC was called. They were added to this open communication net. In my 30 years of history, there was always somebody listening to that net.... Real-time information.... I truly do not mean this to be defensive, but it is a fact -- [I repeat] there were military people on duty at the FAA Command Center, as Mr. Sliney [FAA Command Center’s national operations manager] said. They were participating in what was going on. There were military people in the FAA's Air Traffic Organization in a situation room. They were participating in what was going on. " Mr Belger's observations here are not relayed in the Commission's final report. Apart from the near total inaction of Rumsfeld and Myers during the attacks this conclusion appears to go right to the heart of the failed response on 9/11. Why did the communication between FAA HQ and the NMCC fail on 911, on the very day it was most needed, when Mr Belger confirms the system had worked satisfactorily in the past with "frequent" requests for such assistance? Why were communications by FAA HQ on 911working easily with the "intelligence agencies" but not with the NMCC? From this description it is apparent that the "intelligence agencies" had a direct line into the FAA security organisation, the body managing the Washington Operations Centre and responsible for linking HQ with other FAA facilities during the emergency. It would also appear that FAA conversations with the "intelligence agencies" on 911 remain classified.
Jeff Griffith (FAA Deputy Director of Air Traffic on 911) Twelfth Public Hearing	"This testimony is provided at the request of the Commission to be made part of the record and carefully studied by the Commission..... Upon learning of the first aircraft 'hitting' the World Trade Center, Air Traffic Services called the Headquarters management team together and began preparing to address an aircraft accident. When word of the second aircraft 'hitting' the World Trade Center was received, Air Traffic Services set up a situation line with all Regional Air Traffic Division Managers, large facility managers and the Command Center. The purpose of this line was to have real-time information flowing to/from field elements. One person was designated to immediately start the data collection process, including radar plots and voice recordings. I assumed a role in the Washington Operations Center. In the Washington Operations Center, a direct communications line was set up to the Air Traffic Control System Command Center. This line became the real-time source of information on aircraft reported as missing or experiencing other unusual situations...."	Mr Griffith appears anxious to encourage the Commissioners to consider his report 'carefully'.
	"In Headquarters, Air Traffic Services set up an additional situation room in the front office that was occupied by DOD [Department of Defense] liaison officers who worked on the Air Traffic Services Headquarters staff."	Who were those DOD liaison officers stationed in FAA HQ and what was the role of their "additional" situation room? What part, if any, did these military officers play in the failure of FAA HQ to submit requests to the NMCC for air support on 911? According to oral evidence given in the same session as Mr Griffith by the FAA's Command Center’s national operations manager Mr Ben Sliney: "... at the Command Center of course is the military cell, which was our liaison with the military services. They were present at all of the events that occurred on 9/11.... If you tell the military you've told the military. They have their own communication web that I think defeated some of the notification processes, as I've been listening to today. But in my mind everyone who needed to be notified about the events transpiring was notified, including the military." The apparent implication of these remarks is that it was the military cell at the FAA Command Centre that was responsible for failing to notify the hijack assistance requests to the NMCC and not the FAA. Despite their potential importance Mr Sliney's observations here are not relayed in the Commission's final report.
	"In the Washington Operations Center, key personnel were assigned to multiple coordination positions with direct telephone communications to other Government agency key personnel. There were also other 'secure' lines established to coordinate with certain organizations. One of these organizations was the National Military Command Center. As information was received from the FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Center on aircraft reported as missing or experiencing other unusual situations over the direct communications line, that information was announced to all key personnel coordinating with other agencies. The key personnel would immediately provide this information to their counterpart on the phone line. The entire group was situated in a manner to facilitate this relay of information."	Given that the Washington Operations Center established a secure line with the NMCC, and given that the Washington Center had established a line with the Air Traffic Control System Command Centre (which according to Mr Griffith "became the real-time source of information on aircraft reported as missing or experiencing other unusual situations...."), how could it be that the NMCC would not instruct NORAD to scramble fighters even if (inexplicably) it had not received a direct request from FAA HQ (if that is really what happened)? Alternatively, if none was received, might the NMCC not at the very least have invited the FAA to make an urgent request if sticking to the letter of protocol was a concern even after the WTC had been hit ?
	"At the FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Center, the military officers assigned to the Air Traffic Services Cell became immediately involved in coordinating FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Center actions with military elements."	Even though it was an FAA facility military officers "became immediately involved in coordinating FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Center actions with military elements." This is another potentially very important statement which is not conveyed in the final report. Who were these military officers and what role did they play, if any, in fighter escort requests failing to reach the NMCC for any of the hijacked planes on 911?

"The defense of U.S. airspace on 9/11 was not conducted in accord with
preexisting training and protocols....."
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, JULY 2004 (p 31)

It Appears The Secret Service Were Taking Orders From Dick Cheney

Did Cheney Lie To The 911 Commission?

FAA PROTOCOLS FOR HIJACKINGS APPLICABLE ON 911 - Click Here

AIRCRAFT PIRACY (HIJACKING) AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES
US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE DIRECTIVE PROTOCOLS APPLICABLE ON 911 - Click Here

NMCC COMMUNICATIONS ON 9/11
Key-Player Communications Target	Communication Link Functionality	Notes
FAA HQ	Out	Telecomms failure despite DOD military staff stationed at FAA
Acting Chairman of Joint Chiefs	Out	Myers did not join NMCC until 10:00
Secretary of Defense	Out	Rumsfeld did not join NMCC until 10:30
Air Force One - President	Out	NMCC telecomms not connected
White House - Vice President	In	Cheney/Secret Service had most connectivity to state organs on 911 including NMCC

KEY MILITARY FIGURES NOT AVAILABLE TO PENTAGON'S NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTRE DURING HEIGHT OF 9/11 EMERGENCY 'The Incommunicado Response Team'
Name	Position	Availability During Height Of Crisis
George W. Bush	Commander In Chief	Air Force One not connected to NMCC conference call (The President has also since claimed that the communications systems on Air Force One itself failed generally on 9/11. According to 9/11 Commissioner Jamie Gorelick: "On Air Force One, the president was unable to reach most of the people or at least many of the people whom he tried to reach. He could not functionally lead the government from Air Force One at a time of great national stress and national emergency.")
Donald Rumsfeld	Secretary of Defense	Out of communication at Pentagon. "The Secretary of Defense did not enter the chain of command until the morning's key events were over." according to executive summary of 9/11 report
General Henry Shelton	Chairman of Joint Chiefs	Out of country 'somewhere over the Atlantic'.
General Richard Myers	Vice-Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff (Acting Chairman on 9/11)	Out of communication on Capitol Hill
Brigadier General Montague Winfield	Deputy Director for Operations, J3, in the National Military Command Center ("He was present as the General Officer in Charge during the terrorist attacks of 9/11" according to the official Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command US military web site. Winfield was Commander of JPAC).	Handed over NMCC command position at 8:30 am and didn't return until end of hijackings
Meanwhile What Were These Military Operatives Doing At The FAA Command Center On 9/11?
"In [FAA] Headquarters, Air Traffic Services set up an additional situation room in the front office that was occupied by DOD [Department of Defense] liaison officers who worked on the Air Traffic Services Headquarters staff.... At the FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Center, the military officers assigned to the Air Traffic Services Cell became immediately involved in coordinating FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Center actions with military elements." Jeff Griffith, FAA Deputy Director of Air Traffic on 911 9/11 Commission, Twelfth Public Hearing, Written Statement "... at the Command Center of course is the military cell, which was our liaison with the military services. They were present at all of the events that occurred on 9/11.... They have their own communication web that I think defeated some of the notification processes, as I've been listening to today. But in my mind everyone who needed to be notified about the events transpiring was notified, including the military." Ben Sliney, FAA Command Center’s National Operations Manager 9/11 Commission, Twelfth Public Hearing, Oral Evidence "Prior to 9/11, the procedures for managing a traditional hijacked aircraft, as I said, were in place and pretty well tested.... The most frustrating after-the-fact scenario for me to understand is to explain is the communication link on that morning between the FAA operations center and the NMCC.... The hijacking net is an open communication net run by the FAA hijack coordinator, who is a senior person from the FAA security organization, for the purpose of getting the affected federal agencies together to hear information at the same time.... It was my assumption that morning, as it had been for my 30 years of experience with the FAA, that the NMCC was on that net and hearing everything real-time..... I can tell you I've lived through dozens of hijackings in my 30-year FAA career, as a very low entry-level inspector up through to the headquarters, and they were always there. They were always on the net, and were always listening in with everybody else..... from my perspective there is no doubt in my mind that the FAA security organization knew what to do. There is no doubt in my mind that the air traffic organization knew what to do. They are the two key players in that type of scenario.... this is very, very important, in response to your question.... the NMCC was called. They were added to this open communication net. In my 30 years of history, there was always somebody listening to that net..... I truly do not mean this to be defensive, but it is a fact -- there were military people on duty at the FAA Command Center, as Mr. Sliney said. They were participating in what was going on. There were military people in the FAA's Air Traffic Organization in a situation room. They were participating in what was going on." Monte Belger, FAA Acting Deputy Administrator on 911 9/11 Commission, Twelfth Public Hearing, Oral Evidence

Page	911 Commission Report Excerpt	Comment
36	"The FAA, the White House, and the Defense Department each initiated a multiagency teleconference before 9:30. Because none of these teleconferences—at least before 10:00— included the right officials from both the FAA and Defense Department, none succeeded in meaningfully coordinating the military and FAA response to the hijackings. At about 9:20, security personnel at FAA headquarters set up a hijacking teleconference with several agencies, including the Defense Department. The NMCC officer who participated told us that the call was monitored only periodically because the information was sporadic, it was of little value, and there were other important tasks.The FAA manager of the teleconference also remembered that the military participated only briefly before the Pentagon was hit. Both individuals agreed that the teleconference played no role in coordinating a response to the attacks of 9/11. Acting Deputy Administrator Belger was frustrated to learn later in the morning that the military had not been on the call. At the White House, the video teleconference was conducted from the Situation Room by Richard Clarke, a special assistant to the president long involved in counterterrorism. Logs indicate that it began at 9:25 and included the CIA; the FBI; the departments of State, Justice, and Defense; the FAA; and the White House shelter. The FAA and CIA joined at 9:40....We found no evidence that video teleconference participants had any prior information that American 77 had been hijacked and was heading directly toward Washington. Indeed, it is not clear to us that the video teleconference was fully under way before 9:37, when the Pentagon was struck. Garvey, Belger, and other senior officials from FAA headquarters participated in this video teleconference at various times. We do not know who from Defense participated, but we know that in the first hour none of the personnel involved in managing the crisis did. And none of the information conveyed in the White House video teleconference, at least in the first hour, was being passed to the NMCC."	What were the more important tasks the NMCC claims it needed to attend to during the hijackings given that it wasn't involved in the launching of any fighter aircraft as required by the protocols? Although 'security personnel' at FAA HQ had set up a hijacking teleconference with several agencies the one organisation it needed to communicate with most, the NMCC, was not materially participating. Who set up this line of communication that turned out to be a blind alley for the frustrated Mr Belger? How is it that after a multi-million dollar inquiry the Commission is unable to establish who from the Department of Defense participated in the White House video teleconference?
37	"[White House counterterrorism adviser Richard] Clarke reported that they were asking the President for authority to shoot down aircraft. Confirmation of that authority came at 10:25. ...... Inside the National Military Command Center, the deputy director for operations immediately thought the second strike was a terrorist attack. The job of the NMCC in such an emergency is to gather the relevant parties and establish the chain of command between the National Command Authority—the president and the secretary of defense—and those who need to carry out their orders. On the morning of September 11, Secretary Rumsfeld was having breakfast at the Pentagon with a group of members of Congress. He then returned to his office for his daily intelligence briefing. The Secretary was informed of the second strike in New York during the briefing; he resumed the briefing while awaiting more information. After the Pentagon was struck, Secretary Rumsfeld went to the parking lot to assist with rescue efforts. Inside the NMCC, the deputy director for operations called for an all purpose 'significant event' conference. It began at 9:29, with a brief recap: two aircraft had struck the World Trade Center, there was a confirmed hijacking of American 11, and Otis fighters had been scrambled. The FAA was asked to provide an update, but the line was silent because the FAA had not been added to the call.... The call then ended, at about 9:34. It resumed at 9:37 as an air threat conference call, which lasted more than eight hours.... Operators worked feverishly to include the FAA, but they had equipment problems and difficulty finding secure phone numbers. NORAD asked three times before 10:03 to confirm the presence of the FAA in the teleconference. The FAA representative who finally joined the call at 10:17 had no familiarity with or responsibility for hijackings, no access to decision makers, and none of the information available to senior FAA officials."	The role and importance of the NMCC in such an emergency is made clear. Given that America was still under attack (and that by his own admission Rumsfeld was just gaining situational awareness even at 10:39 when he spoke with the Vice President) was attendance at the Pentagon parking lot the best use of the Secretary of Defense's time at this point? Rumsfeld gives an impression remarkably like that of a man endeavouring to delay his attendance at his command post for as long as possible. This section of the report again confirms that FAA contact with the NMCC was not established due to "equipment problems". Who was in charge of the communications equipment at the NMCC on 911? When a connection with the FAA was finally established after all the hijackings were over who was it that delegated an FAA official who knew nothing about the specific situation or general subject to join the conference call with the NMCC?
38	"We found no evidence that, at this critical time, NORAD’s top commanders, in Florida or Cheyenne Mountain, coordinated with their counterparts at FAA headquarters to improve awareness and organize a common response. Lower-level officials improvised...... But the highest-level Defense Department officials relied on the NMCC’s air threat conference, in which the FAA did not participate for the first 48 minutes.... By 10:03, when United 93 crashed in Pennsylvania, there had been no mention of its hijacking and the FAA had not yet been added to the teleconference."	When the top brass did nothing lower ranks looked for alternatives. Meanwhile "the highest level defense officials" joined a NMCC line of communication on which the FAA was not available for the first 48 minutes.
38	"[At 9.46] staff reported that they were still trying to locate Secretary Rumsfeld and Vice Chairman Myers [the most senior military officer in the country that morning]. The Vice Chairman joined the conference shortly before 10:00; the Secretary, shortly before 10:30. The Chairman was out of the country."	Rumsfeld himself did not join the NMCC air threat conference until just before 10:30. What was he doing before this time? The report doesn't tell us much about this, except in its separate Executive Summary when it is made clear what Rumsfeld did not do. It states "The secretary of defence did not enter the chain of command until the morning's key events were over." Meanwhile both Secretary of State Colin Powel and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were out of the country on separate trips on 911. Air force General Richard Myers was the most senior officer in the county at the time. As such he was the acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 911 (as he confirmed during his own statement to the 9/11 Commission public hearings). Moreover Myers had already been nominated by the Bush Administration to be the next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, a nomination which was confirmed by the Senate on 14 September 2001. On the morning of 11 September Myers was in a meeting on Capitol Hill discussing his up coming confirmation hearing due on 13 September. An airforce fighter pilot himself by training, he stayed in that meeting for what appears to be around 3/4 hr or more whilst the hijacking crisis was in full motion. He was aware of the first strike on the World Trade Centre as he went into the meeting. As confirmed by a Department of Defense press release 23 October 2001 Myers remained in the non-essential meeting until around the time of the hit on the Pentagon. The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are the two principal public officers designated to manage military assistance to civil authorities arising from terrorism or a threat of terrorism under Department of Defense protocols. Neither were materially available on 911 until the action was largely over. Yet according to a report in Newsweek 24 September 2001 on 10 September a group of top Pentagon officials had cancelled their own plans for travel on 11 September apparently because of security concerns.
459	"[Footnote] 121. In response to allegations that NORAD responded more quickly to the October 25, 1999, plane crash that killed Payne Stewart than it did to the hijacking of American 11, we compared NORAD’s response time for each incident.The last normal transmission from the Stewart flight was at 9:27:10 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time.The Southeast Air Defense Sector was notified of the event at 9:55, 28 minutes later. In the case of American 11, the last normal communication from the plane was at 8:13 A.M. EDT. NEADS was notified at 8:38, 25 minutes later. We have concluded there is no significant difference in NORAD’s reaction to the two incidents. See NTSB memo, Aircraft Accident Brief for Payne Stewart incident, Oct. 25, 1999; FAA email, Gahris to Myers,'ZJX Timeline for N47BA accident,' Feb. 17, 2004."	The 1999 Payne Stewart plane crash was an incident where a small private jet stopped communicating but continued flying on its own after the crew and passengers had lost consciousness (apparently due to cabin decompression). It was not an obvious hijacking at the time it lost communication as hijackings typically involve large commercial airliners, and neither did it prove to be one. In the event Stewart's jet eventually ran out of fuel over a non-populated area and no shoot-down was necessary. However, the incident confirms that the pre-911 principle that air force scrambles are launched when a civilian plane loses ground communication and goes off course irrespective of whether or not there is a hijacking. According to this footnote there was a 28 minute interval between the last communication from Stewart's jet and notification to SEADS (the equivalent of NEADS for that part of America). This makes an interesting comparison with the 25 minute response time to the hijacking of American 11 on 911. However, it overlooks the fact that there was in fact no response at all on 911 for American 11 through the officially designated command chain (i.e. FAA HQ and the NMCC). Moreover it is also reasonable to expect that ensuing notification periods would have been much shorter on 911 once the World Trade Center had been hit by the first plane (and certainly by the time it had been hit for the second time). 911 was a day of obviously much more urgent circumstances than those applying when Stewart's private jet went adrift in 1999 during which there was no indication of a national emergency or an escalating situation. Yet in the event NORAD centrally received no notifications at all during the currency of the remaining three flights on 911. American 77 made its last routine communication at 8:51 (p 8) and continued flying for around a further 46 minutes (although NEADS found out by chance it was missing a three minutes before it crashed: "The time was 9:34. This was the first notice to the military that American 77 was missing, and it had come by chance." (p 27)). United 93 made its last routine radio communication at 9:27 and continued flying for around a further 36 minutes before reportedly being downed by the passengers. NORAD had had no notification. In practice the Payne Stewart incident in 1999 was a dress rehearsal for 911. It was followed by open public discussion about whether it would be necessary for such an aircraft to be shot down if there was a danger it would crash into a populated area when it eventually ran out of fuel. CNN confirmed that such a decision could be necessary and would require the authorisation of the President. At the time "a senior advisor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff did raise the question" according to CNN. Such a concept did not therefore arise for the first time on 911 as far as the national military command was concerned. In fact Footnote 98 on p 457 of the 911 Commission report itself states "For the authority to shoot down a commercial aircraft prior to 9/11, granted to NORAD but not used against Payne Stewart’s plane in 1999 after the pilot and passengers lost consciousness, see Richard Myers interview (Feb. 17, 2004)......" So this pre-911 shoot-down scenario has been confirmed by General Richard Myers himself who at the time was himself Commander in Chief of NORAD. The Payne Stewart incident also involved an internal domestic flight departing from a US airport. Some have tried to claim, including the 911 report itself, that because in their view the most likely source of suicide hijacking flights would have been from external commercial flights the US military was not well prepared to respond effectively on 911 to hijackings of internal flights. However, when a plane loses communication with ground control the alert process is the same irrespective of the departure point of the plane as demonstrated in the Payne Stewart internal flight incident. The fact that Stewart's plane departed from a US domestic airport did not prevent fighters being scrambled to investigate. The point of departure is irrelevant. The only point of relevance is whether or not the FAA/NMCC move into action when they becomes aware of a hijacking over US airspace. When CNN covered the Payne Stewart incident in 1999 it reported that "Several Air Force and Air National Guard fighter jets, plus an AWACS radar control plane, helped the Federal Aviation Administration track the runaway Learjet and estimate when it would run out of fuel. And officers on the Joint Chiefs were monitoring the Learjet on radar screens inside the Pentagon's National Military Command Center [NMCC]." It is interesting that the Pentagon were able to follow Stewart's plane using their own radar systems. Is it realistic to assume that such systems could only follow planes transmitting a transponder signal as opposed to using primary radar instead? Developed intensively during the cold war Pentagon systems were built to aid the defence of the country. Were those systems really designed and installed on the assumption that enemy aircraft would conveniently have identification transponders transmitting to make them easy to follow if and when they crossed the US border?
463	"[Footnote] 193. For the Secretary’s activities, see DOD memo, interview of Donald Rumsfeld, Dec. 23, 2002; Stephen Cambone interview (July 8, 2004)."	The 9/11 Commission report - as is typically the case with documents referred to in its footnotes - does not provide details of the references referred to here. The precise activities of Donald Rumsfeld on 911 remain unclear.
Donald Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense on 911) Eighth Public Hearing (Of the 23 page testimony one is devoted to what Rumsfeld did on 911)	"On the morning of September 11, 2001, I was hosting a meeting for some of Members of Congress. Ironically, in the course of the conversation, I stressed how important it was for our country to be adequately prepared for the unexpected. Someone handed me a note that a plane had hit one of the World Trade Center Towers. Later, I was in my office with a CIA briefer when I was told a second plane had hit the other tower. Shortly thereafter, at 9:38 AM, the Pentagon shook with an explosion of a then unknown origin. I went outside to determine what had happened. I was not there long, apparently, because I am told I was back in the Pentagon, with a crisis action team, by shortly before or after 10:00 AM. Upon my return from the crash site and before going to the Executive Support Center (ESC), I had one or more calls in my office, one of which I believe was with the President. I left the ESC and went to the National Military Command Center where General Dick Myers, then Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had just returned from Capitol Hill. We discussed and I recommended to the President raising the U.S. Defense Condition level from 5 to 3, and increasing the Force Protection level..... In the National Military Command Center (NMCC), I joined the air threat telephone conference call in progress. One of my first conversations during the conference call was with the Vice President. He informed me of the President’s authorization to shoot down hostile aircraft coming toward Washington, D.C. My thoughts went to the pilots of the U.S. military aircraft that could be called upon to execute that order. I recalled an experience in 1975, while I was serving as White House Chief of Staff, when the ship Mayaguez was seized by pirates. During that incident, communications had been beamed into a room where President Ford and the rest of us could hear U.S. pilots as they weighed intercepting a boat moving from an island to the mainland -- very likely with the crew of the Mayaguez as captives..... I spent the remainder of the morning and into the afternoon in the NMCC and the ESC, participating in the Air Threat Conference, talking to the President or Vice President, or giving guidance and thinking about the way forward. During the course of the day, the President indicated he expected us to provide him with robust options for military responses."	Rumsfeld provides a very sketchy timeline of his actions on 911and he is particularly vague about his interaction with the President. In reality Rumsfeld appears to have done nothing of significance in response to the attacks before around 10:00 at the earliest, although we do not know what he did with the 'crisis action team' that he refers to at this time. Who was in that team? We do know, however, that Rumsfeld did not join the NMCC air threat conference until just before 10:30 and that he claims he did not have 'situational awareness' until around 10.39 (p 44 of 9/11 Commission report). Even after he was informed of the first strike on the WTC it would appear that Rumsfeld preferred to continue meeting with a CIA briefer until the Pentagon was hit, after which he went outside to inspect the damage (according to the 9/11 Commission report, p 37, the meeting was "his daily intelligence briefing". In other words it was a routine meeting). At no point during this time does it appear that Rumsfeld was coordinating a military response to the attacks. According to the Commission's Executive summary separate to the main report: "The Secretary of Defense did not enter the chain of command until the morning's key events were over." The relevant protocol states, however, that: "The employment of U.S. military forces in response to acts or threats of domestic terrorism may be requested only by the President (or in accordance with Presidential Decision Directives) and must be authorized by the President. All requests for assistance in responding to acts or threats of domestic terrorism must also be approved by the Secretary of Defense...... The Secretary of Defense shall manage the DoD’s response to any acts or threats of terrorism....." ('Military Assistance to Civil Authorities', Department of Defense Directive No 3025.15, February 18, 1997 ) In reporting the nature of his interaction with the Vice President Rumsfeld confirms he was out of the loop when it came to the President allegedly giving authority for a shoot-down. Rumsfeld confirms in his account of the Mayaguez incident that as far back as 1975 the White House itself was able to have direct contact with pilots of US military aircraft. This contrasts starkly with the apparently dysfunctional communications systems for Air Force One and the Pentagon on 911 which cut the FAA and the President out of the Defense response loop. Whilst the 9/11 Commission reports (p 44) the astonishing claim by Rumsfeld that he didn't have "situational awareness" on 911 until 10:39, the ability to draw fast conclusions which had apparently completely abandoned the Secretary of Defense in the morning suddenly made a miraculous return in the afternoon. According to the report (p 334/335): "On the afternoon of 9/11, according to contemporaneous notes, Secretary Rumsfeld instructed General Myers to obtain quickly as much information as possible. The notes indicate that he also told Myers that he was not simply interested in striking empty training sites. He thought the U.S. response should consider a wide range of options and possibilities. The secretary said his instinct was to hit Saddam Hussein at the same time—not only Bin Ladin. Secretary Rumsfeld later explained that at the time, he had been considering either one of them, or perhaps someone else, as the responsible party." For those prepared to read the detail of the official 9/11 report the situation is transparent. In the morning Rumsfeld failed to act against the hijackers when the evidence was massive, and in the afternoon he looking to act to act against Saddam Hussein when the evidence was non-existent. Even if the 9/11 Commission has studiously avoided drawing any explicit conclusions about the real reasons for the failure of America's defences during the hijacking attacks the relevant events of the day as diffusely recorded in its own report speak for themselves.
General Richard Myers (Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 911) Twelfth Public Hearing (Of the eleven page statement five paragraphs deal with what General Myers did on 911)	"As Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shelton's and my actions up to and on 9/11 were directed by Title 10 of the US Code. As Vice Chairman, I served as a member of the Joint Chiefs, performed duties assigned by the Chairman, and acted as Chairman in his absence."	Myers confirms his role as acting Chairman on 911 when General Shelton was out of the country that day. This means that the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense was not available to them until after the Pentagon had been hit on 911. During this period (from just after the first strike on New York until just after the strike on Washington) Myers was in a meeting on Capitol Hill discussing non-urgent matters not related in any way to the emergency in progress. Myers knew about the first strike on New York as he went into the meeting which appears to have continued as planned. Moreover the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs has a very specific role to play during terrorist attacks as prescribed by protocol: "The employment of U.S. military forces in response to acts or threats of domestic terrorism may be requested only by the President (or in accordance with Presidential Decision Directives) and must be authorized by the President. All requests for assistance in responding to acts or threats of domestic terrorism must also be approved by the Secretary of Defense...... The Secretary of Defense shall manage the DoD’s response to any acts or threats of terrorism..... The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall assist the Secretary of Defense when he or she is implementing the DoD operational response to acts or threats of terrorism. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall at all times maintain contingency plans for use in counterterrorism situations....." ('Military Assistance to Civil Authorities', Department of Defense Directive No 3025.15, February 18, 1997 ) So where was Myers' contingency plan for handling terrorist emergencies involving aviation given the report published in USA Today, 18 April 2004 entitled 'NORAD had drills of jets as weapons'? If NORAD had contingency plans to tackle suicide hijackings, where was Myer's own contingency plan for him to assist the Secretary of Defense in responding to them when they arose? After 9/11 Myers was not reprimanded for dereliction of duty. Rather he was promoted.
	"Unified command roles are directed by Title 10 and the Unified Command Plan. Each of the combatant commander’s chain of command runs through the Secretary of Defense to the President."	Myers confirms the key command role of the Secretary of Defense who also could not be located by Pentagon staff during key periods when the attacks were in progress (p 38 of 9/11 Commission final report).
	"Another exercise scheduled [pre-911] for November 2001 portrayed a terrorist threat to the Pentagon requiring evacuation of the facility and conducting operations from a relocation site."	The Pentagon was envisaged pre-911 as a potential terrorist target
	"There was a significant increase in terrorist threat reporting during the late spring and summer of 2001, clearly indicating a major Al Qaida terrorist operation was pending, but the location and timing were unknown. To the extent that the warnings pointed to specific areas, they pointed to the Arabian Peninsula.... The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) also issued a number of warnings in the months prior to 9/11. Those warnings were also non-specific, and focused primarily on threats against US citizens abroad and traditional hijackings."	The President's Daily Brief of 6 August referred to both potential preparations within the US for hijackings and surveillance of Federal buildings in New York, and also confirmed that Bin Laden was "determined to strike" in the US. The 911 Commission Report confirms (p. 260/262) that no further discussion of this brief by the President and his senior advisers ensued prior to the attacks. Myer's reference to "traditional hijackings" is a diversion. The required initial military response to both traditional hijackings and 911 type hijackings - the scrambling of fighter aircraft - is the same. At the time that a hijacking alert arises it will generally not be known whether it is a 'traditional' or a 911 type hijacking. The NMCC did not receive any requests for fighter scramblings on 911 as required by the relevant protocols.
	"North American Aerospace Defense Command did not have specific enough intelligence to warrant increasing their alert status or placing additional forces on alert."	The implication of this remark by Myers is that had sufficient information been provided an appropriate response would have been to increase NORAD's alert status or place additional forces on alert. The President's Daily Brief of 6 August referred to hijackings and that Bin Laden was determined to attack within the US.
	"I saw television reports of the first Trade Center tower being hit, and later received notification of the attacks via a phone call from General Eberhart at NORAD when I was on Capitol Hill. Leaving Capitol Hill, I received word that the Pentagon had also been hit."	Myers did not leave Capitol Hill until after the Pentagon was hit (09:37:46). Myers refers to a phone call he received from General Eberhart when he was on Capitol Hill. The time of this call is not stated but a Department of Defense 23 October 2001 press release confirms that Myers did not receive any calls in relation to the escalating emergency until he was coming out his meeting: "Myers said he was on Capitol Hill that morning in the offices of Georgia Sen. Max Cleland to discuss his confirmation hearing to become chairman. While in an outer office, he said, he saw a television report that a plane had hit the World Trade Center. 'They thought it was a small plane or something like that,' Myers said. So the two men went ahead with the office call. Meanwhile, the second World Trade Center tower was hit by another jet. 'Nobody informed us of that,' Myers said. 'But when we came out, that was obvious. Then, right at that time, somebody said the Pentagon had been hit.' Somebody thrust a cell phone in Myers's hand. Gen. Ralph Eberhart, commander of U.S. Space Command and the North American Aerospace Defense Command, was on the other end of the line 'talking about what was happening and the actions he was going to take.'" If Eberhart contacted Myers (or someone with him) on Capitol Hill via a cell phone then how was it that nobody else did? Eberhart was not at the Pentagon on 911 (he was at or in the vicinity of NORAD operations center in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado - p 42 of the report) so it appears no one from the Pentagon contacted Myers whilst he was on Capitol Hill. The Department of Defense press release also states that "On Sept. 11, Myers was vice chairman. He was sworn in as chairman {of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] Oct. 1. His predecessor, Army Gen. Henry Shelton, was 'somewhere over the Atlantic' en route to Europe when the attacks occurred, so it was critical for Myers to get back to the Pentagon." The press release confirms the critical role of Myers in the response to the attacks, yet he was apparently unavailable during the most critical period of the emergency. The following circumstances are therefore apparent: 1. The relevant protocol identifies the key role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in assisting the Secretary of Defense "when he or she is implementing the DoD operational response to acts or threats of terrorism". 2. Myers was acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 911. 3. Myers went into his non-essential meeting on Capitol Hill knowing that the first crash into the World Trade Centre had taken place after a summer of high terrorist threat alerts to American civil aviation. 4. He did not emerge from his meeting until around 9:38 at the earliest. 5. During this time no-one contacted General Myers to inform him that the World Trade Centre had been hit again at 9:03 even though at 9:05 the President had been told by his Chief of Staff that 'America is under attack'. In addition to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, the relevant protocol allocates specific responsibilities to the President regarding "The employment of U.S. military forces in response to acts or threats of domestic terrorism". When a President of the United States ("The Commander In Chief") is told the country is "under attack" why would he not contact his Secretary of Defense and his most senior adviser in the military - the Chairman or acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs? There is no evidence of any such contact on 911 before 10:00 and even then discussion with Rumsfeld was 'brief' and of such seemingly insignificant nature that neither the President nor the Secretary of Defense can apparently remember the content. Before going into the meeting on Capital Hill why did Myers not ask to be kept informed of developments given the high level of threat warnings "clearly indicating a major Al Qaida terrorist operation was pending" that he acknowledges elsewhere in his statement were arising that summer? If the original threat reporting was supposedly unspecific before 911 by the time Myers went into his meeting on Capitol Hill that morning things were getting very specific. As Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage put it in an interview broadcast by the BBC 20 August 2002 "I was seated in this very room, and my executive assistant came in and said one of the towers in New York had been hit by an aircraft. I ran in there, immediately picked up the phone and called to the assistant secretary for counter-terrorism. Even before the second airplane went in, I thought it was impossible to have this happen actually on a clear day and said, 'We've got a problem.' "
	"When I arrived at the Pentagon, I spoke briefly with Secretary Wolfowitz on my way into the building; he was on his way to an alternate location. After I reached the National Military Command Center (NMCC), I asked questions to determine where Secretary Rumsfeld was, how the FAA was handling airborne flights, and the status of fighters prepared to intercept any hijacked aircraft inbound to Washington."	The final 9/11 Commission report confirms that Myers did not reach the NMCC at the Pentagon until just before 10:00. Even though it was now around 1:40 hrs after the start of the hijackings and around 1:15 hrs since the first strike on the World Trade Centre it would appear that Myers did not even have the most elementary information about the situation including the whereabouts of the Defense Secretary. There is no indication in the Commission's report that Myers had made any contact with Rumsfeld or the President by this stage. We are not told why Wolfowitz was leaving the Pentagon or where he was going.
	"The NMCC serves as our worldwide monitoring, crisis response center. We maintain a continuity-of-operations contingency plan, and that plan was executed very soon after the attacks.... The NMCC had long-standing procedures and communications links to help DoD and some non-DoD organizations communicate and react to threats and incidents."	Myers does not explain why nobody communicated with him during the emergency until after the Pentagon was hit, or why no request to scramble fighter aircraft was ever received by the NMCC during the period of the hijackings.
Admiral Charles Leidig, United States Navy (Deputy Director for Operations, National Military Command Center on 911) Twelfth Public Hearing	"Approximately two months prior to 11 September 2001, I assumed duties as the Deputy for Command Center Operations in the J3 Directorate of the Joint Staff. In this role, I was responsible for the maintenance, operation, and training of watch teams for the National Military Command Center (NMCC). Further, I qualified in August 2001 to stand watch as the Deputy Director for Operations in the NMCC. On 10 September 2001, Brigadier General Winfield, U. S. Army, asked that I stand a portion of his duty as Deputy Director for Operations, NMCC, on the following day. I agreed and relieved Brigadier General Winfield at 0830 on 11 September 2001. The details of the Air Threat Conference are contained in the conference transcript. I was given the opportunity to review this transcript during testimony I gave to members of The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States staff on 29 April 2004. On that date, I recounted my actions as Deputy Director for Operations, NMCC, on 11 September 2001. Shortly after assuming duty, I received the first report of a plane’s striking the World Trade Center. Some time after, I learned of the second plane’s collision with the World Trace Center. In response to these events, I convened a Significant Event Conference, which was subsequently upgraded to an Air Threat Conference. During the Air Threat Conference, Brigadier General Winfield relieved me and reassumed duties as Deputy Director for Operations for the National Military Command Center."	This is the totality of Admiral Leidig's statement. He is an important figure (arguably the most important) because he was in charge of the NMCC for nearly all of the duration of the hijackings. The NMCC is the key junction point for communications between the civilian authorities (in the form of the FAA) and the military during a hijacking. Leidig's statement is very short. He says he gave full testimony about what he did on 9/11 to the commission on 29 April 2004 (if this testimony is available on the Commission's web site it is not to be found by using name 'Leidig' in the site's search facility). More details of some of his oral evidence provided during this twelfth hearing are given above. They are cause for concern. Leidig is not mentioned at all the 9/11 final report except in the footnotes. The same applies to Brigadier General Winfield. Given the absolutely pivotal role of these two individuals at the very point in the chain of command which failed on 911 (i.e. the sanctioned interface between the FAA and the military prescribed for handling a hijacking), this is 'surprising'. Leidig was asked by General Winfield on 10 September to stand a portion of his duty on 11 September. In the event that portion coincided with the main period of the attacks. Winfield left quarter of an hour before the first strike on the WTC and returned around the end of the fourth hijacking which terminated in a field in Pennsylvania at 10:03 (there appears to be no testimony from General Winfield on the Commission's web site using a search on his name). According to Newsweek 24 September 2001 "On Sept. 10.... a group of top Pentagon officials suddenly canceled travel plans for the next morning, apparently because of security concerns." This was the second time Newsweek had reported this. On 13 September 2001 it asked "Could the bombers have been stopped? NEWSWEEK has learned that while U.S. intelligence received no specific warning, the state of alert had been high during the past two weeks, and a particularly urgent warning may have been received the night before the attacks, causing some top Pentagon brass to cancel a trip. Why that same information was not available to the 266 people who died aboard the four hijacked commercial aircraft may become a hot topic on the Hill." If there were security concerns about September 11 within the Pentagon the day before it is unfortunate that Brigadier Winfield should have handed over to a relatively inexperienced deputy just as the first hijacking was getting under way and that he did not return until a late stage in the events. According to Leidig's oral testimony at the twelfth hearing "I was relieved on the watch by General Winfield. Right after we resolved what was going on with United 93, around that time General Winfield took over." According to ABC News 14 September 2001 "In dozens of exclusive interviews with ABCNEWS, Congressional leaders told of chaos on Capitol Hill, Cabinet secretaries described a war council deep in a secret bunker beneath the White House, generals and sergeants told of how they ramped up for a possible nuclear strike, and the president and vice president were said to have ordered U.S. pilots to shoot down any planes threatening the nation's capital..... 'When the second aircraft flew into the second tower, it was at that point that we realized that the seemingly unrelated hijackings that the FAA was dealing with were in fact a part of a coordinated terrorist attack on the United States,' said Army Brig. Gen. W. Montague Winfield, who was at the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon, and alerted the top brass there." Except that Leidig's testimony now shows that he wasn't and he didn't. Following 911 both Leidig and Winfield were nominated by the President for promotion. Investigative journalist Tom Flocco had been a regular attendee at the Commission's public hearings. In an online article 17 June 2004 he reported that "In May, 2003 the Commission was informed that the Pentagon had taped the Significant Event/Air Threat conference call during the attacks; and after repeated requests, the Pentagon created a classified transcript. (US News, 9-8-2003) On August 6, the White House conducted what was termed an 'executive privilege' review of the transcript for the phone bridge conference-call in order to censor the document, likely for 'national security' reasons." The 9/11 Commission's final report only provides brief details in relation to the conference-call. Flocco also reports that: "President Bush is attended by a round-the-clock Secret Service detail which would of necessity been connected to the secure phone bridge conference lines. Most Americans think that President Bush first became aware of the attacks when his Chief of Staff Andrew Card whispered in his ear at 9:06 am at the elementary school while he was meeting with the first graders. Facts indicate otherwise. Laura Brown, Public Affairs Director at the FAA, initially told this writer at the first 9-11 hearing in Washington that the phone bridges started around 8:20 or 8:25 am, which would be reasonable since American 11 was determined to be hijacked at 8:13, 8:20 or 8:24 am. This, depending upon which news report, official, or air traffic controller is referenced--and to what extent one permits the government to shorten the official time-line of the actual attacks, thus reducing potential culpability should a grand jury ever be impaneled. After returning to her office and conferring with superiors, Brown sent an email to this writer later that same evening after 7:00 pm, revising her initial assertions for the commencement of Leidig’s phone bridges to around 8:45 am, thus shortening the official attack time-line to the government's advantage."

"The defense of U.S. airspace on 9/11 was not conducted in accord with
preexisting training and protocols....."
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, JULY 2004 (p 31)

It Appears The Secret Service Were Taking Orders From Dick Cheney

Did Cheney Lie To The 911 Commission?

FAA PROTOCOLS FOR HIJACKINGS APPLICABLE ON 911 - Click Here

AIRCRAFT PIRACY (HIJACKING) AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES
US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE DIRECTIVE PROTOCOLS APPLICABLE ON 911 - Click Here