The death of Dr Kelly and what he knew

"Britain ran a covert 'dirty tricks' operation designed specifically to produce misleading intelligence that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction to give the UK a justifiable excuse to wage war on Iraq. Operation Rockingham, established by the Defence Intelligence Staff within the Ministry of Defence in 1991, was set up to 'cherry-pick' intelligence proving an active Iraqi WMD programme and to ignore and quash intelligence which indicated that Saddam's stockpiles had been destroyed or wound down. The existence of Operation Rockingham has been confirmed by Scott Ritter, the former UN chief weapons inspector, and a US military intelligence officer. He knew members of the Operation Rockingham team and described the unit as 'dangerous', but insisted they were not 'rogue agents' acting without government backing. 'This policy was coming from the very highest levels,' he added.... Ritter has also offered to give evidence to [the British] parliament."
Revealed: the secret cabal which spun for Blair
Sunday Herald, 8 June 2003

"At the very least it seems clear that Dr Kelly's views were being filtered and kicked into the long grass from somewhere within the system. Referring back to Dr Kelly's own conversation with BBC reporter Susan Watts suggests that he knew this. He told her that 'I reviewed the whole thing [dossier], I was involved with the whole process.... it was very difficult to get comments in because people at the top of the ladder didn't want to hear some of the things'. No wonder Dr Kelly may have felt obliged to speak more frankly to the press after the war. And no wonder former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter has offered to give evidence to the British Parliament about 'Operation Rockingham', the alleged British behind-the-scenes intelligence cherry-picking operation whose existence he confirmed to the press at the beginning of June."
Iraqgate 2003
'Fight Smart', Special Report - Click Here For Full Text

"The appointment of John Scarlett as head of MI6 was overseen by two key Government officials embroiled in the David Kelly affair, secret Whitehall documents have revealed. Papers released under the Freedom of Information Act show that Sir Kevin Tebbit and Sir David Omand were on the panel that recommended Mr Scarlett for the post of 'C'. Sir Kevin, the permanent secretary at the MoD, and Sir David, Downing Street's intelligence co-ordinator, recommended him to Jack Straw and Tony Blair. Sir Kevin was quizzed at the Hutton inquiry over the MoD's decision to identify Dr Kelly. Sir David was among those to decide that he should be pursued for talking to the media about the Government's dossier on Iraq's alleged WMD. Mr Scarlett's appointment in May last year triggered controversy because he was chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee that drafted the dossier. He was appointed before the Butler inquiry into intelligence blunders had finished."
Key Kelly pair helped appoint MI6 chief
Evening Standard, 11 February 2005

"Weapons expert Dr David Kelly told of 'many dark actors playing games' in an e-mail to a journalist hours before his suicide, it was reported on Saturday. The words appeared to refer to officials at the Ministry of Defence and UK intelligence agencies with whom he had sparred over interpretations of weapons reports, according to the New York Times.".
Kelly warned of 'dark actors'
London Times, 19 July 2003

Dark Actors
"Within the Defence Intelligence Services I liaise with the Rockingham cell..."
Evidence given by Dr David Kelly, in closed session 16 July 2003
To The British Intelligence and Security Committee

"Not only does this confirm the existence of Rockingham, it confirms that Dr Kelly was interacting with it. It also confirms that the information passed to Dr Kelly from this 'cell' may have been selective. Dr Kelly stated that he only got the intelligence that the principal officer at Rockingham 'thinks is of relevance'..... the reference to Rockingham does not elicit any specific reaction from the committee. Nobody asks 'Can you tell us a bit more about Rockingham?'. The chairman simply follows Dr Kelly's comments on his involvement with Rockingham and MI6 with 'Fine, are there any more questions?'..."
Iraqgate 2003
'Fight Smart', Special Report, October 2003

What Is 'Operation Rockingham'? - Click Here

Exaggerated Threat - The Essence Of The Deception
Dr Kelly's Expert Views Were Not Reflected In The Case Put To The British Public

"Above all he [Dr Kelly] should be asked to say what kind of a threat Iraq was in September 2002 ... If he is able to
answer frankly it should be devastating."
Email from Andrew Gilligan, BBC, to Greg Simpson Liberal Democrat’s deputy head of press suggesting questioning for Dr Kelly at the Foreign Affair Select Committee (before Dr Kelly was disclosed as Gilligan's source)
Hutton Inquiry Evidence, 19 August 2003

"I see the intelligence which is relevant to my expertise which is in the area of chemical and biological weapons..... I have no idea whether there were weapons or not at that time [of the September dossier].... It is possible it was not the case... I have referred to that: the issue of the 30 per cent probability of Iraq possessing chemical weapons. That is the sort of statement that I do make and may well have made to [Andrew Gilligan of the BBC]..."
Dr David Kelly
Evidence to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, 15 July 2003

"I'm a senior adviser to the [Ministry of Defence's] Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat on Iraq itself, on chemical and biological weapons and the United Nations' approach to dealing with the disarmament of Iraq... I see all the intelligence reporting concerned with both Iraq and ***, with regard to chemical and biological weapons, that arrives in the Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat and I have full access to that."
Evidence given by Dr David Kelly, in closed session 16 July 2003
To The British Intelligence and Security Committee

“The source appears to be an expert on current and recent past Iraq weapons capability, sufficiently well informed to give a statistical figure on that capability.”
Memo 9 July from the unnamed head of the Security Policy Division to the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, John Scarlett, during the hunt for the source (now known to be Dr Kelly) of the BBC's WMD 'sexing-up' allegations against the government
London Times 30 August 2003

"[the 30% probability] is what I have been saying all the way through.... I said that to many people... it was a statement that I would have probably made for the last six months..."
Evidence given by Dr David Kelly, in closed session 16 July 2003
To The British Intelligence and Security Committee

"Basically it would be very difficult to see how Iraq could deploy in 45 minutes."
Dr David Kelly
Evidence to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, 15 July 2003

"...the current threat presented by Iraq militarily is modest"
[from unpublished article written by Dr David Kelly days before the start of the Iraq war March 2003]
Observer, 31 August 2003

"What I believe the assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt is that Saddam has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons, that he continues in his efforts to develop nuclear weapons.... I am in no doubt that the threat is serious and current.... the document discloses that his military planning allows for some of the WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them.... The threat posed to international peace and security, when WMD are in the hands of a brutal and aggressive regime like Saddam’s, is real.... We must ensure that he does not get to use the weapons he has...."
Foreword by the Prime Minister, The Right Honourable Tony Blair MP
IRAQ’S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
THE ASSESSMENT OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT
September Dossier 2002

"In contradiction to Dr Kelly, the government's leading expert with access to the underlying intelligence, the foreword to the document comprises an unqualified assertion by the Prime Minister that at the time of the production of the September dossier Saddam Hussein had chemical and biological weapons. This was stated to be 'beyond doubt' based on 'assessed intelligence'. The Prime Minister was certain, whilst the country's leading expert had 'no idea'. On the basis of this dossier, and the follow-on one in February - itself based in large part on material copied from a ten year old student thesis - Members of Parliament voted for war.... Would MPs have voted for war had they known that the government's leading expert... considered the only current risk to be a 30 per cent chance that Iraq had chemical weapons. And would they have voted for war had they realised that the principal documents submitted to the UN as evidence of Iraq's nuclear ambitions were exposed as forgeries barely 10 days earlier?....."
Iraqgate 2003
'Fight Smart', Special Report, October 2003

"I knew from the outset, for example, that Dr Kelly had some distinctive views about whether Saddam Hussein's regime was still manufacturing weapons of mass destruction. He judged there was only a 35 per cent likelihood that was the case. That was a distinctive view that had been recognised by a colleague, which prompted him to come forward in the first place. Yes, I was aware that his views were not entirely consistent with those that, for example, had appeared in the dossier that had been published in September."
Minister of Defence, Geoff Hoon
Evidence to Hutton Inquiry, 22 September 2003

"I mean I reviewed the whole thing [dossier], I was involved with the whole process.... it was very difficult to get comments in because people at the top of the ladder didn't want to hear some of the things."
Dr David Kelly speaking to Susan Watts of the BBC, 30 May 2003
Transcript of audio recording of their conversation, Hutton Inquiry, 13 August 2003

"In David's opinion, Saddam was less of a threat in 2003 than he had been in 1991".
Julie Flint, Middle East expert, who spoke to David Kelly shortly before the start of the Iraq war
Observer, 31 August 2003

"Mr Scarlett [Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee had told Mr Campbell: 'There may well be people down the ranks [of the intelligence services] who are unhappy with this [dossier] but you have to know this is not the view of people at the top.'....."
Campbell defends dossier role [at Hutton Inquiry]
BCC Online, 19 August 2003

"[After the war] The Prime Minister wanted to know what we knew of Kelly's views on weapons of mass destruction... and what he would say if he appeared before the Intelligence and Security Committee or Foreign Affairs Committee."
The Prime Minister's Chief-of-Staff, Jonathan Powell
Hutton Inquiry, 18 August 2003

"If he appeared before a Committee, would he be likely to support or otherwise the Government position? JSc to seek advice from MOD."
John Scarlett, Chairman of Joint Intelligence Committee
Aide memoire, 21 July 2003, as released by Hutton inquiry

"Sir Kevin Tebbit warned Downing Street that Dr Kelly's emergence as the suspected mole was not some 'windfall bonus' in the row because he could have some awkward views"
Campbell 'suggested source leak'
BBC Online, 20 August 2003

"Geoff Hoon was under new pressure yesterday after the Hutton inquiry was told that he had set firm conditions on David Kelly’s appearance before the Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee. The Defence Secretary said that Dr Kelly, whose name had been revealed a few days earlier, should be questioned on Andrew Gilligan’s evidence to that committee, and not on the wider issue of weapons of mass destruction and the preparation of the Iraqi dossier."
Hoon sought to control questions asked of Kelly
London Times, 22 August 2003

"I am familiar with some of the intelligence that went into the dossier.... I see the intelligence which is relevant to my expertise which is in the area of chemical and biological weapons.....We are talking in terms of Iraq, in terms of what we knew ten years ago... I have no idea whether there were weapons or not at that time [of the September dossier].... It is possible it was not the case... I have referred to that: the issue of the 30 per cent probability of Iraq possessing chemical weapons. That is the sort of statement that I do make and may well have made to [Andrew Gilligan of the BBC]..."
Dr David Kelly
Evidence to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, 15 July 2003

"....we now know that not only was he [Kelly] probably the Government's most knowledgeable adviser on the history of Iraq's weapons programmes, but he also had a high security clearance, sat in on MI6 interrogations of Iraqi defectors and was a member of a high-level committee reviewing all the intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.... When it came to the contents of the dossier, in short, David Kelly was certainly in a position to know what he was talking about... He was not simply one expert among many on Iraq's weapons programmes: in his field - biological weapons - he was the expert."
Bit by bit, the real Dr Kelly emerges from the shadows
Independent, 27 July 2003

"...it is very much the Blair-Campbell tactic to start a tremendous row over something which is not the point. In whose hand the 45-minute warning was inserted is almost immaterial: the material allegation — the claim which should concern us citizens — is that there was pressure on experts such as Dr Kelly to override their better judgment, and that this pressure was concerted by 10 Downing Street...."
Campbell: the Blair that dare not speak its name
London Times, 26 July 2003

"The David Kelly waiting for me in the driveway of his Oxfordshire home 10 days ago was not his normal self. Gone were the usual smile and firm handshake.... Over those years Kelly combed former bioweapons manufacturing plants and interviewed dozens of Saddam’s officials and military officers involved in Iraq’s weapons programmes. He kept meticulous notes and detailed files. He had access to the world of top secret intelligence. He knew and had spoken to all of Saddam’s senior scientific advisers.... he had come to believe in a better world and had adopted the Baha’i religion, which seeks international understanding and reconciliation. This was the complex man who was assigned early last year to help to prepare a government dossier on Iraq. He knew that Saddam Hussein had for many years pursued terrible weapons and he had had a key role in compiling one of the government’s dossiers about them. However, ever the meticulous scientist, he felt it had exaggerated some aspects in its presentation.... His careful, scientific contribution was in a dossier designed for propaganda. And when the propaganda was eventually exposed, Kelly would be the casualty."
Focus: Betrayed - The torment of a man of morals
London Times, 20 July 2003

"As his long-time friend Mangold acknowledged after his death, Kelly was concerned that Gilligan may have misrepresented their conversation. However, he had also seemed to confirm in private conversations the central thrust of Gilligan's allegation - that there were serious questions about whether Iraq's chemical and biological weapons could be ready for use in '45 minutes'. According to Mangold, he had scoffed at the idea, saying it was unlikely that Iraqi technicians could even fill the warheads in that time."
A haunted man
Observer 20 July 2003

"In the period immediately before the second Gulf War, Kelly assessed that there was 'a 30 per cent chance' that Iraq possessed biological weapons. As events turned out, the basis for such a relatively precise opinion is less significant than the fact that he made it and expressed it frequently...."
David Kelly, Orbituary
London Times, 21 July 2003

"The difficulty I have is that there are other elements of it [Mr Gilligan's account] which do match the things that I say, and I have referred to that: the issue of the 30 per cent probability of Iraq possessing chemical weapons. That is the sort of statement that I do make and may well have made to him, and that is when I became concerned that I may, in fact, be part and parcel of the story".
Dr David Kelly
Evidence to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, 15 July 2003

"[David Kelly's daughter] Ellen Wilson, 30, told Tom Mangold, a former BBC journalist and friend of Kelly, that her father felt he had been badly treated during his years of working for the ministry.... While Wilson told Mangold her father had been 'quite happy' to speak to Gilligan, 'he had not discussed with him all the controversial matters surrounding alleged Downing Street interference with the September dossier'...”.
Daughter says father was badly treated by ministry
London Times, 20 July 2003

"Turning reporters into personalities impeded the message of this important story: that a weapons scientist and his colleagues were deeply worried by government abuse of intelligence about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. No amount of subsequent spin can hide that fact."
The BBC dragon needs slimming not slaying
London Times, 23 July 2003

"..in two of the BBC reports there is a sense that Kelly speaks not only for himself but for 'people in intelligence'. This raises the question of whether he acted alone or with the approval of others. Answering these questions may go some way to explaining why a man who survived confrontations with the vicious, secretive regime in Baghdad was finally destroyed by a supposedly free and open society."
The death of David Kelly
New Scientist, 23 July 2003

"Journalist or scientist, if you wanted to know about Iraq's past chemical and biological weapons programmes or their future potential there was only one man in Britain to ask: David Kelly."
The death of David Kelly
New Scientist, 23 July 2003

"It is just over a week since Dr David Kelly's body was found in the Oxfordshire countryside, yet the shock waves from his apparent suicide are still spreading.....we now know that not only was he probably the Government's most knowledgeable adviser on the history of Iraq's weapons programmes, but he also had a high security clearance, sat in on MI6 interrogations of Iraqi defectors and was a member of a high-level committee reviewing all the intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.... When it came to the contents of the dossier, in short, David Kelly was certainly in a position to know what he was talking about... He was not simply one expert among many on Iraq's weapons programmes: in his field - biological weapons - he was the expert."
Bit by bit, the real Dr Kelly emerges from the shadows
Independent, 27 July 2003

"President Bush, asked about the Niger issue at a news conference during his visit to South Africa, did not answer directly but said that he was 'certain that Saddam Hussein had a weapons of mass destruction programme'. Like Mr Blair, he has dropped the assertion that Iraq actually had weapons. Both now say that it had a 'programme.' "
Did Iraq try to get African uranium?
BBC Online 9 July

"There is no longer any serious doubt that Bush administration officials deceived us into war. The key question now is why so many influential people are in denial, unwilling to admit the obvious.... even people who aren't partisan Republicans shy away from confronting the administration's dishonest case for war, because they don't want to face the implications."
Denial and Deception
New York Times, 24 June 2003