BBC TV - Bush Administration Made Plans For War And For Iraq Before 9/11

"The Bush administration made plans for war and for Iraq's oil before the 9/11 attacks, sparking a policy battle between neo-cons and Big Oil, BBC's Newsnight has revealed..... Two years ago today - when President George Bush announced US, British and Allied forces would begin to bomb Baghdad - protesters claimed the US had a secret plan for Iraq's oil once Saddam had been conquered. In fact there were two conflicting plans, setting off a hidden policy war between neo-conservatives at the Pentagon, on one side, versus a combination of 'Big Oil' executives and US State Department 'pragmatists'. 'Big Oil' appears to have won. The latest plan, obtained by Newsnight from the US State Department was, we learned, drafted with the help of American oil industry consultants. Insiders told Newsnight that planning began 'within weeks' of Bush's first taking office in 2001, long before the September 11th attack on the US....The industry-favoured plan was pushed aside by a secret plan, drafted just before the invasion in 2003, which called for the sell-off of all of Iraq's oil fields. The new plan was crafted by neo-conservatives intent on using Iraq's oil to destroy the Opec cartel through massive increases in production above Opec quotas. The sell-off was given the green light in a secret meeting in London headed by Ahmed Chalabi shortly after the US entered Baghdad, according to Robert Ebel. Mr Ebel, a former Energy and CIA oil analyst, now a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, told Newsnight he flew to the London meeting at the request of the State Department.....Philip Carroll, the former CEO of Shell Oil USA who took control of Iraq's oil production for the US Government a month after the invasion, stalled the sell-off scheme.... Ariel Cohen, of the neo-conservative Heritage Foundation, told Newsnight that an opportunity had been missed to privatise Iraq's oil fields..... New plans, obtained from the State Department by Newsnight and Harper's Magazine under the US Freedom of Information Act, called for creation of a state-owned oil company favoured by the US oil industry. It was completed in January 2004 under the guidance of Amy Jaffe of the James Baker Institute in Texas. Formerly US Secretary of State, Baker is now an attorney representing Exxon-Mobil and the Saudi Arabian government.... "
Secret US plans for Iraq's oil
BBC News, 17 March 2005

"To make it clear that a post-war U.S. military operation in Iraq is not a nation-building exercise, the Bush Administration should state that the U.S. military will be deployed to Iraq to secure the vital U.S. security interests for which the campaign is undertaken in the first place. Specifically, these war aims should be [amongst other goals] to .... Protect Iraq's energy infrastructure against internal sabotage or foreign attack to return Iraq to global energy markets and ensure that U.S. and world energy markets have access to its resources.... Removing that regime from power and contributing a post-war military presence in Iraq to assure stability in the region and in energy markets is justified."
In Post-War Iraq, Use Military Forces to Secure Vital U.S. Interests, Not for Nation-Building
Heritage Foundation Report, 25 September 2002

What Is The Heritage Foundation?
And What Does It Have To Do With The Bush Administration's Policy Towards Afghanistan And Iraq?
Click Here

"....For the most part, U.S. oil policy has relied on maintenance of free access to Middle East Gulf oil and free access for Gulf exports to world markets, relying heavily on military preparedness. The U.S. has forged a special relationship with certain key Middle East exporters that had an expressed interest in stable oil prices and, we assumed, would adjust their oil output to keep prices at levels that would neither discourage global economic growth nor fuel inflation. Taking this dependence a step further, the U.S. government has operated under the assumption that the national oil companies of these countries would make the investments needed to maintain enough surplus capacity to form a cushion against disruptions. But recently, things have changed. These Gulf allies are finding their domestic and foreign policy interests increasingly at odds with America’s strategic considerations. They have become less inclined to lower oil prices in exchange for security of markets, and evidence suggests that adequate investment is not being made in a timely enough manner to increase production capacity in line with growing global needs. The opening of new media outlets in the Middle East has also increased the likelihood that a linkage will emerge in the minds of citizens there between the U.S. alliance with Israel and cooperation on oil prices. Moreover, a trend toward anti-Americanism could affect regional leaders’ abilities to cooperate with the U.S. in the energy area. The resulting tight markets have increased U.S. and global vulnerability to disruption and provided adversaries undue potential influence over the price of oil. Iraq has become a key 'swing' producer, posing a difficult situation for the U.S. government."
STRATEGIC ENERGY POLICY: CHALLENGES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND THE COUNCIL FOR FOREIGN RELATIONS, APRIL 2001

"When President George W. Bush took office last January, energy matters were a high-priority issue of public policy. Heating-oil and gasoline prices were reaching historic levels and consumers throughout the industrial world were concerned about what their governments were doing to relieve their burden. Natural gas prices in the United States had risen 400 percent over the previous 18 months, forcing many industrial users of gas to shut operations rather than make uneconomic fuel purchases. Electric power shortages disrupted daily life as well as economic growth in California and other U.S. states, as well as in Brazil, India, and other areas of rapid economic expansion. Members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) were producing at capacity and a supply interruption of significant international dimensions loomed on the horizon, whether because of internal conflict in an oil-producing country, political manipulation by Iraq or another oil-producing government, or surging energy demand.... One of the first acts of the new U.S. administration was to convene an energy policy task force, chaired by Vice President Dick Cheney. The task force was given high political importance and charged with formulating a coherent approach toward energy policy that would aim to provide long-term solutions to the critical shortages looming along the energy supply chain. The vice president’s chairmanship gave the administration an opportunity to consolidate and assess the inevitably contradictory interests of different government departments, which themselves reflected contradictory interests among the American public. This review created a process that for the first time allowed international strategic concerns to be balanced against domestic energy interests — hence the participation of both the State and Energy Departments.... Even before the [2000] presidential election occurred, the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University and the Council on Foreign Relations had decided to convene their own task force on strategic energy policy. The aim was to bring together individuals representing various public and private energy constituencies in order to map out for the new administration and for the public at large the main issues at stake. Our task force report was issued before the administration was able to produce its own study. Our report warned that years of negligence by policymakers had brought the U.S. energy sector to critical condition... it is incorrect for the public or for policymakers to assume that the oil situation is 'solved' or was simply fabricated all along.... it is certain that without an energy policy, energy shortages and temporary dislocations can easily reemerge once economic growth resumes its earlier accelerated path, or if international political events, extreme weather, or accident tilts demand back above available supply in certain locations.... reliance on volatile Middle East oil resources could increase dramatically over the next two decades unless policies are put in place to promote oil development in other regions, to shift to alternative sources, or to rein in unbridle or wasteful consumption.... Failure to respond would, in turn, leave the country vulnerable to the unacceptable future costs, as well as to the leverage that foreign adversaries could exert over our economy, if we were unnecessarily exposed to the possibility of recurrent dislocations stemming from a fresh round of volatile energy prices.....[more effective proposals are required for] Making progress in fostering the reopening of key oil-producing countries such as Saudi Arabia to foreign investment in their hydrocarbons sector......[and] Putting together more-realistic strategies in the Caspian Basin, which appear to be easing both decision-making on resource projects in the region and the speed with which new resources will be brought to market..... The administration has correctly shifted debate away from discussion of the need for U.S. energy independence. Such independence is not attainable at a reasonable cost. Policy must therefore focus on increasing the number of energy suppliers.... [We recommend that] U.S. encourages reopening of international investment in foreign oil fields [which] Provides U.S. firms long-term presence in important oil producing countries such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait; encourages capacity expansion; strengthens U.S. ties to oil producers and open investment opportunities for U.S. firms...."
STRATEGIC ENERGY POLICY UPDATE
JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND THE COUNCIL FOR FOREIGN RELATIONS, SEPTEMBER 2001

"For the world as a whole, oil companies are expected to keep finding and developing enough oil to offset our seventy one million plus barrel a day of oil depletion, but also to meet new demand. By some estimates there will be an average of two per cent annual growth in global oil demand over the years ahead along with conservatively a three per cent natural decline in production from existing reserves. That means by 2010 we will need on the order of an additional fifty million barrels a day. So where is the oil going to come from? Governments and the national oil companies are obviously in control of about ninety per cent of the assets. Oil remains fundamentally a government business. While many regions of the world offer great oil opportunities, the Middle East with two thirds of the world's oil and the lowest cost, is still where the prize ultimately lies, even though companies are anxious for greater access there, progress continues to be slow."
Dick Cheney, Chief Executive of Halliburton, now Vice President of the United States
Speech at London Institute of Petroleum, Autumn Lunch 1999

"On June 24, in Cheney v. U.S. District Court, the Supreme Court gave Vice President Dick Cheney only a partial victory in the suit that seeks to learn how his National Energy Policy Development Group developed its recommendations. The plaintiffs in the suit suspect that -- and want to find out whether -- there was extensive involvement and improper influence by private industry in what was supposed to be a government group.... This case received a great deal of press attention because Justice Antonin Scalia refused to recuse himself from it, despite his duck-hunting trip with Cheney. And unsurprisingly, Scalia did indeed side with Cheney in the case....The core issue in this case is whether the Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972 (FACA) applies to the National Energy Policy Development Group. If so, then the Group's proceedings must be revealed.... What will likely happen next in the case? That will be influenced by the results of the election."
More litigation will follow on the Cheney energy task force
CNN, 5 July 2004

"In the context of the recent history of 'regime change' as a foreign policy tool, it is interesting to note that the PFC figures show that within OPEC the country whose oil reserves are least depleted in percentage terms is Iraq. Besides its importance as a new military platform from which to police the whole of the Gulf, Iraq (with the third largest reserves in the world after Saudi Arabia and Iran) therefore has the greatest proportional capacity for increased production within OPEC. The US Energy Information Administration's (EIA) 2004 International Energy Outlook report has Iraq moving up the table of OPEC daily production from fourth in 2001 behind Iran and Venezuela (both these countries' production is already close to or past peak according to PFC data), to second in 2025 with only Saudi Arabia remaining ahead. To 2025 the EIA is projecting an increase of 136% in Iraqi production over 2001 levels, a higher increase than projected for any other country in the world. Realising as much as possible of this Iraqi potential will become increasingly important as the global 'peak' gets closer. However, the White House miscalculation of the Iraqi response to the occupation of their country has resulted in the opposite effect. Iraqi oil production has fallen as the fighting continues, thereby threatening an acceleration of the onset of the global peak all the time the situation has not been recovered (according to the London Times 4 January the director of Iraq's intelligence service estimates there are more than 200,000 insurgents in the country, a figure now greater than coalition forces)."
Peak Oil To Arrive As Early As 2014
'Peak Oil' Update, 4 January 2005

"The BBC last night gave another sign that it is determined to maintain its editorial independence by screening a Panorama programme strongly critical of Tony Blair's manipulation of thin intelligence, on the second anniversary of the invasion of Iraq..... In the programme, Sir Richard Dearlove, the head of MI6, was reported as having told Mr Blair that Washington had fixed policy on a war against Iraq and was going to fit the intelligence around that policy. In the most startling revelation, the programme claimed that at a meeting on July 23 2002, Sir Richard said a war was inevitable, adding that the facts and the intelligence were being fixed round the policy set out by George Bush's administration."
Blair manipulated intelligence to justify war, says BBC film
Guardian, 21 March 2005

Below is a modest 'little' story from BBC TV's premier current affairs programme 'Newsnight' for those who missed it and still believe the 'war on terror' lies that have been pouring out of Washington and London since 9/11. The BBC's report reveals new evidence that regime change in Iraq had been planned since the beginning of the Bush administration.

The Bush administration's pre-9/11 intention for Iraq was to topple Saddam. Accompanying plans for Iraq's oil eventually developed into a scheme by neo-conservatives, through increasing Iraqi oil production, to destroy the OPEC oil cartel according to this BBC report. The strategy was linked to plans for a post-invasion privatisation of the Iraqi oil sector.

Oil sector analysis shows that Iraq oil reserves are the least depleted within OPEC and therefore have the greatest relative potential for production growth. In theory, that is - or was.

Ultimately the Bush administration's plan was abandoned but only after the invasion. This was as a result of concerns raised by major oil companies who are reported to have considered that such a provocative scheme of acquisition would not to be in their best interests. After the invasion talk of the oil privatisation plan was being used by Iraqi insurgents to gain support for their cause. Their multiple attacks on Iraqi oil infrastructure succeeded in creating a fall, not an increase, in Iraqi oil production. This was the opposite of what had been planned in Washington.

Moreover, according to the BBC, there was concern within the oil industry that the neo-conservative plan risked a counterproductive political backlash. This might have resulted in US oil companies being excluded from any such privatisation opportunities by any new Iraqi government - as had already happened during the privatisation of the Russian energy sector.

Nonetheless, the abandonment of the Bush oil plan post-invasion was despite the privatisation sell-off scheme having been given the green light "in a secret meeting in London headed by Ahmed Chalabi" shortly after the US had entered Baghdad.

Meanwhile it is worth noting that Tony Blair himself appears to have acquiesced in the plan to invade Iraq just days after 9/11 according to former British Ambassador to the US, Sir Christopher Meyer. The Independent 4 April 2004 reported that "George Bush asked for Tony Blair's backing to remove Saddam Hussein from power just nine days after the 11 September attacks, over a private dinner at the White House, a US magazine reported last night. Sir Christopher Meyer, the former British ambassador to Washington, was at the dinner table as Mr Blair replied that he would rather concentrate on ousting the Taliban and restoring peace in Afghanistan. In a 25,000-word article in this month's American edition of Vanity Fair, Sir Christopher recounts Mr Bush as responding: 'I agree with you Tony. We must deal with this first. But when we have dealt with Afghanistan, we must come back to Iraq.' Mr Blair, Sir Christopher writes, 'said nothing to demur' at the prospect. Sir Christopher's account presents a new challenge to Mr Blair's assertion that no decision was taken on the invasion of Iraq until just days before operations began, in March 2003. It implies regime change in Iraq was US policy immediately after 11 September. "

The latest Newsnight report, however, (below) confirms that this intention was infact on the Bush agenda well before 9/11 (as has also been confirmed by former US Treasury secretary Paul O'Neill who witnessed such discussions at the National Security Council).

It is, of course, a near betting certainty that former oil sector executive Vice President Dick Cheney would have been at the heart of any of the plans to control Iraq's oil and break the OPEC cartel as reported by the BBC.

Much of the world is doubtless looking forward to those involved in these crimes facing trial in due course. Meanwhile the documents of Mr Cheney's energy task force convened at the very beginning of the Bush administration remain under lock and key despite a variety of litigation attempts to get them released.

Overall the Newsnight report simply provides confirmation of what much of the British public already believe. According to an ICM audit reported in the Observer 21 November 2004 four in ten people in Britain "believed the real reason for going to war in Iraq was oil" (and "A majority [52%] of the British population now thinks the US government knew in advance about the 9/11 plot to attack the World Trade Centre yet did nothing to stop it, on the basis that it would give America an excuse to wage war on Afghanistan and Iraq" - other polls show the figure is 63% in Canada, and 49% in New York).

Nonetheless the BBC deserves great credit for it courageous persistence in unearthing yet more evidence of an ongoing suite of criminal activities sponsored from Washington and London, of which a selection are provided below as a reminder.

Not surprisingly, in the light of all this, there have been calls from the Blair government for the BBC to be 'reformed'.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/4354269.stm
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/4354269.stm

BBC News

17 March 2005

Secret US plans for Iraq's oil

By Greg Palast
Reporting for Newsnight

The Bush administration made plans for war and for Iraq's oil before the
9/11 attacks, sparking a policy battle between neo-cons and Big Oil, BBC's
Newsnight has revealed.

Two years ago today - when President George Bush announced US, British and
Allied forces would begin to bomb Baghdad - protesters claimed the US had a
secret plan for Iraq's oil once Saddam had been conquered.

In fact there were two conflicting plans, setting off a hidden policy war
between neo-conservatives at the Pentagon, on one side, versus a combination
of "Big Oil" executives and US State Department "pragmatists".

"Big Oil" appears to have won. The latest plan, obtained by Newsnight from
the US State Department was, we learned, drafted with the help of American
oil industry consultants.

Insiders told Newsnight that planning began "within weeks" of Bush's first
taking office in 2001, long before the September 11th attack on the US.

An Iraqi-born oil industry consultant, Falah Aljibury, says he took part in
the secret meetings in California, Washington and the Middle East. He
described a State Department plan for a forced coup d'etat.
Mr Aljibury himself told Newsnight that he interviewed potential successors
to Saddam Hussein on behalf of the Bush administration.

Secret sell-off plan

The industry-favoured plan was pushed aside by a secret plan, drafted just
before the invasion in 2003, which called for the sell-off of all of Iraq's
oil fields. The new plan was crafted by neo-conservatives intent on using
Iraq's oil to destroy the Opec cartel through massive increases in
production above Opec quotas.

The sell-off was given the green light in a secret meeting in London headed
by Ahmed Chalabi shortly after the US entered Baghdad, according to Robert
Ebel.

Mr Ebel, a former Energy and CIA oil analyst, now a fellow at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies in Washington, told Newsnight he flew to
the London meeting at the request of the State Department.

Mr Aljibury, once Ronald Reagan's "back-channel" to Saddam, claims that
plans to sell off Iraq's oil, pushed by the US-installed Governing Council
in 2003, helped instigate the insurgency and attacks on US and British
occupying forces.

"Insurgents used this, saying, 'Look, you're losing your country, you're
losing your resources to a bunch of wealthy billionaires who want to take
you over and make your life miserable,'" said Mr Aljibury from his home near
San Francisco.

"We saw an increase in the bombing of oil facilities, pipelines, built on
the premise that privatisation is coming."

Privatisation blocked by industry

Philip Carroll, the former CEO of Shell Oil USA who took control of Iraq's
oil production for the US Government a month after the invasion, stalled the
sell-off scheme.

Mr Carroll told us he made it clear to Paul Bremer, the US occupation chief
who arrived in Iraq in May 2003, that: "There was to be no privatisation of
Iraqi oil resources or facilities while I was involved."

Ariel Cohen, of the neo-conservative Heritage Foundation, told Newsnight
that an opportunity had been missed to privatise Iraq's oil fields.
He advocated the plan as a means to help the US defeat Opec, and said
America should have gone ahead with what he called a "no-brainer" decision.

Mr Carroll hit back, telling Newsnight, "I would agree with that statement.
To privatize would be a no-brainer. It would only be thought about by
someone with no brain."

New plans, obtained from the State Department by Newsnight and Harper's
Magazine under the US Freedom of Information Act, called for creation of a
state-owned oil company favoured by the US oil industry. It was completed in
January 2004 under the guidance of Amy Jaffe of the James Baker Institute in
Texas.

Formerly US Secretary of State, Baker is now an attorney representing
Exxon-Mobil and the Saudi Arabian government.

View segments of Iraq oil plans at www.GregPalast.com

Questioned by Newsnight, Ms Jaffe said the oil industry prefers state
control of Iraq's oil over a sell-off because it fears a repeat of Russia's
energy privatisation. In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, US
oil companies were barred from bidding for the reserves.

Ms Jaffe says US oil companies are not warm to any plan that would undermine
Opec and the current high oil price: "I'm not sure that if I'm the chair of
an American company, and you put me on a lie detector test, I would say high
oil prices are bad for me or my company."

The former Shell oil boss agrees. In Houston, he told Newsnight: "Many neo
conservatives are people who have certain ideological beliefs about markets,
about democracy, about this, that and the other. International oil
companies, without exception, are very pragmatic commercial organizations.
They don't have a theology."

A State Department spokesman told Newsnight they intended "to provide all
possibilities to the Oil Ministry of Iraq and advocate none".

Greg Palast's film - the result of a joint investigation by Newsnight and
Harper's Magazine - will be broadcast on Thursday, 17 March, 2005.

Newsnight is broadcast every weekday at 10.30pm on BBC Two in the UK.

"There was no way of stopping the Americans invading Iraq and they would expect Britain, their most loyal ally, to join them. If they didn't, the transatlantic relationship would be in tatters. But there were serious problems. A Secret UK Eyes Only briefing paper was warning that there was no legal justification for war. So Mr Blair was advised that a strategy would have to be put in place which would provide a legal basis for war... ... the problem for Mr Blair was that he knew there was no stopping the Americans. That much was clear from the Secret UK Eyes Only 'options paper' on Iraq given to him on Friday, March 8, 2002.... Mr Bush had reportedly told one aide: 'F*** Saddam. We're taking him out'.... There was no greater threat that Saddam would use chemical or biological weapons now than there had been at any time in the recent past; regime change had no basis in international law; and there was no evidence that Iraq was backing international terrorism that might justify an action based on self-defence, as in Afghanistan, the options paper said.... It was now that Mr Blair sent Sir David Manning to Washington to try to impress on the Americans the problems they faced. Despite the fears in London over US belligerence, Sir David's memo was relatively optimistic. 'Prime Minister,' it began. 'I had dinner with Condi on Tuesday; and talks and lunch with her and an NSC [National Security Council] team on Wednesday (to which Christopher Meyer also came). These were good exchanges, and particularly frank when we were one-on-one at dinner. We spent a long time at dinner on Iraq. It is clear that Bush is grateful for your support and has registered that you are getting flak. 'I said that you would not budge in your support for regime change but you had to manage a press, a Parliament and a public opinion that was very different than anything in the States.' And you would not budge on your insistence that, if we pursued regime change, it must be very carefully done and produce the right result. Failure was not an option. Condi's enthusiasm for regime change is undimmed. "
'Failure is not an option, but it doesn't mean they will avoid it'
Daily Telegraph, 18 September 2004

"By July, the neocons had chipped away at the president's flirtation with multilateralism. Richard Dearlove, the head of MI6, and Kevin Tebbit, the permanent secretary at the Ministry of Defence, had returned from separate visits to the US and were reporting that an invasion was inevitable. Would the prime minister continue with his commitment to the Americans and risk a huge split within the parliamentary Labour party; or would he pull out and risk damage to the alliance? Dearlove reported that the 'facts and the intelligence' were being 'fixed' by the Americans 'round the policy', meaning not that they were inventing the intelligence on WMD, but that they were trawling around for intelligence to support the decision President Bush had already made to replace the Iraqi regime. Did something similar happen here? People close to Blair have told me that whenever he was invited to rethink his commitment to Bush, he closed down the conversation. ... Prior to July 23 [2002], the prime minister had been told the intelligence on Saddam still having weapons of mass destruction was thin. The joint intelligence committee, described it as 'patchy' and 'sporadic' and the defence and overseas secretariat said 'our intelligence is poor'. Two-thirds of MI6's intelligence on Iraq in 2002 had been coming from just two main sources. A draft dossier summarising the intelligence for the public had been postponed the previous March, partly because it was not convincing - though Blair flatly denied this at the time. We now know that the day after it was postponed, Peter Ricketts, the Foreign Office's political director, had penned his thoughts for Jack Straw to pass on to the prime minister: 'I am relieved that you decided to postpone publication ... even the best of Iraq's WMD programmes ... have not, so far as we know, been stepped up.' On July 23, Jack Straw again said he was not convinced Iraq posed a threat sufficient to warrant an invasion, having previously put this in writing to the prime minister. Straw thought the case was 'thin'.... A reliable source concludes that, as a result of the July 23 prime ministerial summit, 'there was a direct cause and effect' between the arrival of last-minute uncorroborated intelligence and the political imperative set by Blair in order to keep his commitment to Bush.... Yet if the JIC gave these new, meagre, intelligence pickings credibility beyond their merit, Blair went a step further in his foreword to the dossier by asserting the intelligence was 'beyond doubt', reinforced in parliament by his assertion that the intelligence picture was 'extensive, detailed and authoritative'. It was nothing of the sort, and we know from Lord Butler's review that he had been told of its inherent weaknesses.... Was the fervour of Blair's belief in weapons such that he did not recognise these weaknesses? Or, did he deliberately hide them because, as Robin Cook says, he was committed to the Americans? Blair had also been told by the attorney general of the risks he ran in going to war without the explicit support of the UN security council. To this day, these caveats have not been disclosed to parliament or even the cabinet. In judging the truthfulness of the prime minister on Iraq, the central question remains: how he reconciles what he said in public with what he knew in private."
John Ware, BBC Panorama
MI6, Jack Straw, defence staff: Blair ignored them all
Guardian, 26 March 2005

"So far as our objective, it is disarmament, not regime change. That is our objective. I've got no doubt either that the purpose of our challenge from the United Nations is disarmament of weapons of mass destruction, it's not regime change."
Tony Blair
Radio Monte Carlo - Middle East, 14 November 2002
(from BBC Panorama transcript)

Full text of Radio Monte Carlo Broadcast - click here
Why Blair spoke on Radio Monte Carlo - click here

".....allegations that Mr Blair misled the country persist. On the second anniversary of the Iraq war, Panorama reveals how several of the claims he made in public during the build up to the war - and afterwards - conflict with what we now know was going on behind the scenes, as evidenced for instance by government officials and documents. These cover the Prime Minister's statements about the quality and quantity of intelligence that he said showed beyond doubt Saddam was continuing to make chemical and biological weapons; that he was confident of getting the explicit support of the UN Security Council for invasion, that he would be bound by the rule of international law; and that his stated objective was disarmament not overthrowing the Iraqi regime...."
Iraq, Tony and the truth
BBC Panorama, 21 March 2005

"Mr Blair was told the Bush administration was considering overthrowing Saddam Hussein and invasion was the only way of doing this, but it would require a legal justification. The Prime Minister was advised: 'None currently exists.' Nevertheless Mr Blair would make a commitment to regime change, this would be a radical departure in British foreign policy which he withheld from most members of his cabinet......On Monday morning [11 March 2002] the American Vice President Dick Cheney arrived at No.10. The Prime Minister had been briefed that Saddam posed no greater threat now than in recent years. But at his press conference Mr Blair made no mention of that crucial qualification. He had decided that he and President Bush were going to row back the tide of proliferation and that Iraq was the place to start. ....... In Washington the British ambassador had been discussing Mr Blair's commitment to regime change with the Bush administration at Sunday lunch.....Sir Christopher Meyer reported back to No.10 on this latest meeting..... 'I opened by sticking very closely to the script that you used with Condo Rice last week. We backed regime change but the plan had to be clever, and failure was not an option. It would be a tough sell for us domestically.'.... In New York at Britain's UN mission the diplomat responsible for Iraq had no idea No.10 was now committed to helping the Americans overthrow Saddam. In meetings with other diplomats he was still promoting British policy towards Iraq as being the containment of any threat through sanctions and weapons inspections. ..... Several well placed sources have told us that Sir Richard Dearlove was minuted as saying: 'The facts and the intelligence were being fixed round the policy by the Bush administration.' By 'fixed' the MI6 chief meant that the Americans were trawling for evidence to reinforce their claim that Saddam was a threat. Not for the first time the Foreign Secretary questioned whether the threat was sufficient to justify invasion...... The government's claims that Iraq was now actively making weapons which could be swiftly deployed were based substantially on just two new intelligence sources. Both sources had supplied this information since MI6's call in July went out to build up the intelligence base. Mr Blair was briefed about both sources by the Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service, Sir Richard Dearlove, just days before he presented his dossier to Parliament.... Sir Richard told Mr Blair that one of the two new sources was claiming to know where chemical agent was being produced but he was untried and untested.... The second new source was linked to an Iraqi opposition group with an obvious interest in toppling Saddam. SIS had only three other main sources, and Mr Blair was told their reports were unremarkable or hearsay. What the Prime Minister told Parliament, however, had none of these qualifications..... For Mr Blair, UN weapons inspectors were the key to getting rid of Saddam. They had packed their bags in Iraq in 1998 after the dictator had ceased meaningful cooperation. The Prime Minister and the President had decided to get them back by means of a new disarmament resolution. We now know that in Washington in March 2002 there had been a discussion at the British Embassy on how sending back the inspectors might be used to trigger an invasion. The Ambassador, Sir Christopher Meyer, sent an account of that discussion back to London. It has since leaked out.....[According to the memo Meyer said] 'We backed regime change but the plan had to be clever and failure was not an option..... The US could go it alone if it wanted, but if it wanted to act with partners there had to be strategy for building support for military action. I then went through the need to wrong foot Saddam on the inspectors.'.... Thousands of British troops were now training in the desert. In public the Prime Minister continued to maintain no decisions had been taken. But on the 20th February he confided in Hans Blix that one had.....By early March the Inspectors had searched around 300 sites, no WMD had been found. Mexico and other countries asked Hans Blix how long he needed to be sure if Saddam had actually got any WMD. Three to four months said Blix.....The Attorney General has told us he doesn't wish to discuss how he came to his view that the war was legal other than to say it was his own view, genuine and independent. However, what has astonished so many senior civil servants is that the Cabinet only had the assurance from the Attorney General that war would be legal just three days before the bombing started.... But [Clare Short] says the Cabinet was impatient and they were happy to let Lord Goldsmith stick to his prepared text which was just one page, not the earlier 13 pages of advice with caveats and qualifications he'd sent to the Prime Minister. So the Cabinet was never told Mr Blair risked being brought before an international tribunal. To this day No.10 refuses to disclose the Attorney General's legal advice about the risks of going to war without a second resolution..... "
Iraq, Tony and the truth
BBC Panorama, 21 March 2005

"I have never put our justification for action as regime change. We have to act within the terms set out in Resolution 1441. That is our legal base."
Prime Minister's statement opening Iraq debate
10 Downing St Web Site, 18 March 2003

"Foreign Secretary Jack Straw is answering claims the attorney general changed his mind about the legality of the Iraq war just before it began. Lord Goldsmith initially thought the war was illegal without a new UN resolution but backed the invasion 10 days later, it is claimed. The claims are made in a Foreign Office lawyer's resignation letter. Opposition parties are now pressing Mr Straw for a full explanation about the issue in Parliament. The revelations came in a censored part of ex-Foreign Office lawyer Elizabeth Wilmshurst's letter, obtained by Channel 4 News.... Channel 4 quoted Ms Wilmshurst saying that Lord Goldsmith originally had agreed with Foreign Office lawyers that the war was illegal without a new UN resolution. He was reportedly more equivocal on 7 March, telling Tony Blair in a letter it would be safer to seek a new resolution. 'The view expressed in that letter has of course changed again into what is now the official line,' said Ms Wilmshurst. That was a reference to Lord Goldsmith's parliamentary answer on 17 March saying the war was legal without a new resolution."
Straw facing war advice critics
BBC Online, 24 March 2005

"The Bush Administration began making plans for an invasion of Iraq, including the use of American troops, within days of President Bush's inauguration in January of 2001 -- not eight months later after the 9/11 attacks, as has been previously reported. That's what former Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill says in his first interview about his time as a White House insider.... In the book, O'Neill is quoted as saying he was surprised that no one in a National Security Council meeting questioned why Iraq should be invaded. 'It was all about finding a way to do it. That was the tone of it. The president saying 'Go find me a way to do this,' says O'Neill in the book.... "
Saddam Ouster Planned Early '01?
CBS News, 10 January 2003

9/11 Was Simply The Springboard For Pre-Planned Attacks
On Both Afghanistan (Caspian Transit Route) And Iraq (Persian Gulf)

"A former Pakistani diplomat has told the BBC that the US was planning military action against Osama Bin Laden and the Taleban even before last week's attacks. Niaz Naik, a former Pakistani Foreign Secretary, was told by senior American officials in mid-July that military action against Afghanistan would go ahead by the middle of October. Mr Naik said US officials told him of the plan at a UN-sponsored international contact group on Afghanistan which took place in Berlin.... Mr Naik was told that Washington would launch its operation from bases in Tajikistan, where American advisers were already in place. He was told that Uzbekistan would also participate in the operation and that 17,000 Russian troops were on standby. Mr Naik was told that if the military action went ahead it would take place before the snows started falling in Afghanistan, by the middle of October at the latest. He said that he was in no doubt that after the World Trade Center bombings this pre-existing US plan had been built upon and would be implemented within two or three weeks. And he said it was doubtful that Washington would drop its plan even if Bin Laden were to be surrendered immediately by the Taleban."
US 'planned attack on Taleban'
BBC Online, 18 September 2001

"Both civilian and military officials of the Defense Department state flatly that neither Congress nor the American public would have supported large-scale military operations in Afghanistan before the shock of 9/11."
The Military
9/11 Commission Staff Statement No 6, 2004

"On the afternoon of 9/11, according to contemporaneous notes, Secretary Rumsfeld instructed General Myers to obtain quickly as much information as possible..... He thought the U.S. response should consider a wide range of options and possibilities. The secretary said his instinct was to hit Saddam Hussein at the same time......"
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, JULY 2004 (p 334/335)

9/11 Commission Report
'Protocolgate' - The Biggest Scandal Of Our Time
What Were Rumsfeld, Cheney and Myers Actually Doing On 9/11?
Click Here

"At 7:30 a.m [on 12 September 2001], half an hour after arriving for work in the Oval Office, President Bush phoned his friend Tony Blair. The two leaders agreed it was important to first move quickly on the diplomatic front to capitalize on international outrage about the terrorist attack. If they got support from NATO and the United Nations, they reasoned, they would have the legal and political framework to permit a military response afterward."
'We Will Rally the World'
Washington Post, 28 January 2002

"Another option discussed by Bush's advisers during the week-a military campaign against Iraq - also would be considered at Camp David [on 15 September 2001].... Rumsfeld raised another problem. Although everyone agreed that destroying al Qaeda was the first priority, singling out bin Laden, particularly by the president, would elevate bin Laden the way Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had been elevated during the Gulf War. Rumsfeld told the others the worst thing they could do in such a situation was to misstate their objective..... Vilification of bin Laden could rob the United States of its ability to frame this as a larger war..... Rice asked whether they could envision a successful military campaign beyond Afghanistan. In this context, the issue of Iraq once again was on the table. The full sequence is not clear from the recollections and notes of several key participants. But all agree that the Iraq strategy's principal advocate in the group was Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz. He had been the department's third-ranking official under Cheney during the Gulf War and believed that the abrupt and incomplete end to the ground campaign, with Hussein still in power, had been a mistake. The Bush administration had been seeking to undermine Hussein from the start, with Wolfowitz pushing efforts to aid opposition groups and Powell seeking support for a new set of sanctions. Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz had been examining military options in Iraq for months but nothing had emerged.... Wolfowitz argued that the real source of all the trouble and terrorism was probably Hussein. The terrorist attacks of Sept. 11 created an opportunity to strike. Hussein was a bad guy, a dangerous leader bent on obtaining and probably using weapons of mass destruction. He also likely was culpable in the attacks of the previous Tuesday, at least indirectly, and all of them ought to acknowledge it. Rumsfeld had helped raise the Iraq issue in previous meetings, but not as vehemently as his deputy. Now, Rumsfeld asked again: Is this the time to attack Iraq? He noted that there would be a big buildup of forces, with not that many good targets in Afghanistan. At some point, if the United States was serious about terrorism, it would have to deal with Iraq. Is this the opportunity?... Powell expected more general discussion but plunged ahead. If we weren't going after Iraq prior to Sept. 11, why would we be going after them now when the current outrage is not directed at Iraq, Powell asked. Nobody could look at Iraq and say it was responsible for Sept. 11.... Building a coalition to take advantage of the opportunities, [Cheney] said, suggests that this may be a bad time to take on Saddam Hussein in Iraq.... Still, the vice president expressed deep concern about Hussein and said he was not going to rule out going after Iraq at some point-just not now.".
At Camp David, Advise and Dissent
Washington Post, 31 January 2002

"According to [Bob Woodward's book] Plan Of Attack, it was Cheney who was particularly focused on Iraq before the terrorist attacks. Before Bush's inauguration, Cheney sent word to departing Defense Secretary William S. Cohen that he wanted the traditional briefing given an incoming president to be a serious 'discussion about Iraq and different options.'"
Bush ordered secrecy on war plans, book claims
Guardian Weekly, 22-28 April 2004

"The story of Dick Cheney and Iraq is illuminating both as a study of the most powerful Vice-President in US history, and of the inner workings of the Bush White House.... Silence and secrecy are key elements in the Cheney act that have sustained him at the top of Washington into a fourth decade.... no one has any idea what Mr Cheney says to Mr Bush when they are alone.... The Bush-Cheney private moments go to the heart of Mr Cheney’s extraordinary role..... Mr Bush has ceded vast areas of power to him. While most Vice-Presidents are fobbed off with largely meaningless areas of policy and are watched like hawks by the President’s aides, Mr Cheney has been entrusted with pivotal polices like energy...."
The White House Svengali
London Times, 24 April 2004

"Most vice-presidents spend their days at state funerals; Mr Cheney, more than anyone else, picked the members of the current administration. Thereafter he helped to shape the administration's policies on everything from energy policy to the invasion of Iraq.... The Republicans have repeatedly reminded Americans this week that September 11th 2001 defined this administration. But who was in charge on that terrible day? It was Mr Cheney who took most of the key decisions—from hiding the president to authorising the shooting-down of suspicious aircraft — while Mr Bush was holed up in Nebraska...... During the Ford administration, the Secret Service gave Mr Cheney the codename 'Backseat'."
The other president - Dick Cheney, backseat driver par excellence
The Economist, 2 September 2004

9/11 Commission Report
'Protocolgate' - The Biggest Scandal Of Our Time
What Were Rumsfeld, Cheney and Myers Actually Doing On 9/11?
Click Here

"We are writing you because we are convinced that current American policy toward Iraq is not succeeding, and that we may soon face a threat in the Middle East more serious than any we have known since the end of the Cold War. In your upcoming State of the Union Address, you have an opportunity to chart a clear and determined course for meeting this threat. We urge you to seize that opportunity, and to enunciate a new strategy that would secure the interests of the U.S. and our friends and allies around the world. That strategy should aim, above all, at the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime from power....It hardly needs to be added that if Saddam does acquire the capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction, as he is almost certain to do if we continue along the present course, the safety of American troops in the region, of our friends and allies like Israel and the moderate Arab states, and a significant portion of the world’s supply of oil will all be put at hazard."
Open Letter To President Bill Clinton
Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz et al, 26 January 1998

"George Bush asked for Tony Blair's backing to remove Saddam Hussein from power just nine days after the 11 September attacks, over a private dinner at the White House, a US magazine reported last night. Sir Christopher Meyer, the former British ambassador to Washington, was at the dinner table as Mr Blair replied that he would rather concentrate on ousting the Taliban and restoring peace in Afghanistan. In a 25,000-word article in this month's American edition of Vanity Fair, Sir Christopher recounts Mr Bush as responding: 'I agree with you Tony. We must deal with this first. But when we have dealt with Afghanistan, we must come back to Iraq.' Mr Blair, Sir Christopher writes, 'said nothing to demur' at the prospect. Sir Christopher's account presents a new challenge to Mr Blair's assertion that no decision was taken on the invasion of Iraq until just days before operations began, in March 2003. It implies regime change in Iraq was US policy immediately after 11 September."
Blair Told US Was Targeting Saddam 'Just Days After 9/11'
Independent, 4 April 2004

"Prime minister's questions was notable for the confidence Tony expressed about getting a second UN resolution. I don't know whether this is calculated bravado to keep Saddam wary, or whether he is in a state of denial. I saw Tony privately shortly after we left the chamber.... I expressed my concern about the hard-line rightwingers around Bush and warned him that many of them would regard it as a bonus in the present crisis if we were driven from office and replaced by a Conservative government. He laughed and said, 'Regime change is for Baghdad. It is not for here.'....The most revealing exchange came when we talked about Saddam’s arsenal. I told him, 'It’s clear from the private briefing I have had [with John Scarlett, Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee] that Saddam has no weapons of mass destruction in a sense of weapons that could strike at strategic cities... There were two distinct elements to this exchange that sent me away deeply troubled. The first was that the timetable to war was plainly not driven by the progress of the UN weapons inspections. Tony made no attempt to pretend that what Hans Blix might report would make any difference to the countdown to invasion. The second troubling element to our conversation was that Tony did not try to argue me out of the view that Saddam did not have real weapons of mass destruction that were designed for strategic use against city populations and capable of being delivered with reliability over long distances. I had now expressed that view to both the chairman of the JIC and to the prime minister and both had assented in it".
Extracts From The Diary of Robin Cook, Former British Foreign Secretary
Sunday Times (London), 5 October 2005