'Fight Smart' Special Report - October 2003

Don't Take the Bait - Fight Smart
ANIMATED 911 SUMMARY - CLICK HERE
Who is the enemy?

Dr Kelly and 'Operation Rockingham'
'Axis of Weasel' - Washington, London and Rome
Iraqgate 2003
www.btinternet.com/~nlpwessex/Documents/WATiraqgate2003.htm
Niger And Other Lies
Used As Pretext For War

David Kelly and Scott Ritter
The Weapons Inspectors Whose Talk Threatened
'Operation Rockingham' and 'The Office of Special Plans'

"How is the world ruled and led to war? Diplomats lie to journalists and believe these lies when they see them in print."
Karl Kraus (1874 - 1936)

"Charles Duelfer, another former inspector, had been a State Department functionary for years before joining the UNSCOM inspection team. At the U.N. Security Council, critics of U.S. policy viewed him with suspicion as a Trojan horse. Once his U.N. tour of duty was over, he became a 'resident scholar' at the conservative Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, appearing on TV news shows as an impartial authority. He answered technical questions on subjects like liquid bulk anthrax and aerial satellite photos, offering his considered judgment that Iraq unquestionably was hiding a huge arsenal. But off-camera, Duelfer admitted he was a committed proponent of regime change whether Saddam was harboring illegal weapons or not (Endgame, Scott Ritter): 'I think it would be a mistake to focus on the issue of weapons of mass destruction. To do so ignores the larger issue of whether or not we want this dictator to have control over a nation capable of producing 6 billion barrels of oil per day.... If you focus on the weapons issue, the first thing you know, Iraq will be given a clean bill of health.'"
The Great WMD Hunt
Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting, July/August 2003

"American and British politicians have used the covert nature of intelligence gathering as cover to pass all kinds of arguments to the public. There's a limit to that. Patience runs out. People demand accountability."
French Intelligence Official
Uranium, Not Mine: Time, 28 July 2003

"England is a tiny, little island in the world, but it's like a thorn in the family of nations. Destructive, bloody England ... creating chaos everywhere. And that is called diplomacy. So much of unrest is prevailing in the world due to the British diplomacy."
Maharishi Mahesh Yogi
Global Country of World Peace, Press Conference, 13 August 2003

"David Kelly, the British government scientist who was skeptical about evidence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, committed suicide after being mysteriously outed as a BBC source and later maligned by government officials. The Bush administration's alleged assault on Wilson's wife smacks in the same way of government retribution. If true, White House officials may have thought they were getting back at Wilson [for exposing one of  its false claims about Iraq], but the thing they will have damaged most in the long run is their own credibility".
CIA Outing Snaps Back
Los Angeles Times, 30 September

'Fight Smart' Special Report
The Inquiry Bush and Blair Refuse To Hold

"In addition the Times reports on a memo dated 9 July from the head of the Security Policy Division (whose name is blanked out) to John Scarlett, head of the Joint Intelligence Committee. It refers to Andrew Gilligan's source at the centre of the BBC's row with the government. The memo says 'The source appears to be an expert on current and recent past Iraq weapons capability, sufficiently well informed to give a statistical figure on that capability.' It would seem therefore that, even before his identity was known, there was not much doubt within the intelligence services about the expertise and knowledge credentials of Gilligan's source. Of course no such 'statistical figure' on Iraq's weapons capability featured in either of Blair's public dossiers because it is increasingly apparent now that Dr Kelly was being stonewalled from within the system. Only once Dr Kelly had started talking to journalists after the war did such a statistical figure begin to seep into the public domain, even though few have still to pay sufficient attention to this crucial fact. If the tabloid headlines the day after the publication of the September dossier had been 'Blair says only 30% chance Iraq has WMDs' (which was the opinion of the government's own unrivalled expert, Dr David Kelly) instead of 'Brits 45 mins from doom' (which is what came out of Rupert Murdoch's pro-war Sun newspaper) how likely is it that the House of Commons would have backed Bush's war for oil? Rarely can the use of spin have had such drastic consequences. The key question that remains is - who was responsible for the stonewalling of Dr Kelly?"
Iraqgate 2003
'Fight Smart', Special Report, October 2003

"Britain ran a covert 'dirty tricks' operation designed specifically to produce misleading intelligence that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction to give the UK a justifiable excuse to wage war on Iraq. Operation Rockingham, established by the Defence Intelligence Staff within the Ministry of Defence in 1991, was set up to 'cherry-pick' intelligence proving an active Iraqi WMD programme and to ignore and quash intelligence which indicated that Saddam's stockpiles had been destroyed or wound down. The existence of Operation Rockingham has been confirmed by Scott Ritter, the former UN chief weapons inspector, and a US military intelligence officer. He knew members of the Operation Rockingham team and described the unit as 'dangerous', but insisted they were not 'rogue agents' acting without government backing. 'This policy was coming from the very highest levels,' he added.... Ritter has also offered to give evidence to [the British] parliament."
Revealed: the secret cabal which spun for Blair
Sunday Herald, 8 June 2003

"Weapons expert Dr David Kelly told of 'many dark actors playing games' in an e-mail to a journalist hours before his suicide, it was reported on Saturday. The words appeared to refer to officials at the Ministry of Defence and UK intelligence agencies with whom he had sparred over interpretations of weapons reports, according to the New York Times.".
Kelly warned of 'dark actors'
London Times, 19 July 2003

"As the London Times 20 June put it 'No 10 may have 'cherry-picked' the intelligence — Robin Cook’s colourful phrase — but there had to be cherries for the picking. Who grew them?' ...Indeed, there is little doubt now that somebody within the system 'sexed' things up in making the case against Iraq, albeit often in ways that have not featured strongly in the current debate. If the Prime Minister is really convinced of his own integrity, and by implication the rest of Downing St, then why is he not demanding an investigation of the intelligence services given all that we now know?.....A very close look at the operation of the intelligence services at and around the top of their command and at their interface with the political system is urgently needed."
Iraqgate 2003
'Fight Smart', Special Report, October 2003

"We will only know the truth of the matter if we have a full independent enquiry into the plot (and my other disclosures). Without that no one can say hand on heart what happened (apart from me. I was briefed on the plot at the time). Anything less sends out the wrong signal to MI6. Anything less suggests that MI6 is above the law or that MI6 can continue to carry out illegal operations without government interference. I need hardly tell you how that begins to eat away at the rule of law and also to undermine our democracy because unelected intelligence officers decide our foreign policy, not our elected representatives... Many MPs including the Intelligence and Security Committee are now looking negligent and foolhardy for not pursuing my disclosures more vigorously. They shouldn't be caught out a second time or the people will begin to think that parliament and the opposition in general has no credibility whatsoever".
Statement from David Shayler, former MI5 officer, on earlier illegal activities of MI6
15 February 2000

"That second time may now have arrived. And it is probably the most serious issue which lies at the heart of 'Iraqgate 2003'. In effect Shayler was spelling out the implications of such unaccountable subterfuge for the future of civil society in Britain at the beginning of the 21st century. A report in the Guardian 8 September throws some light on the role played by the Head of MI6 in the making of the case for the invasion of Iraq. ....  A senior minister told the Guardian that Dearlove 'was a strong supporter of pre-emptive action, anxious that the intelligence MI6 supplied produced results'. So at the highest levels has real intelligence been driving policy (which is what should happen), or has policy been driving 'intelligence' that is suspect? And if the latter then what policy, and emanating from whom?"
Iraqgate 2003
'Fight Smart', Special Report, October 2003

David Shayler on the illegal activities of Britain's intelligence services - click here

"What has already emerged - but been largely ignored - from the Hutton inquiry is the existence of a dark, almost Jacobean, cabal at the core of the Blair administration. It is a group of powerful, unelected people few would have heard of were it not for the evidence given to Hutton: Sir David Manning, the prime minister's foreign policy adviser; Sir David Omand, his security coordinator; and John Scarlett, chairman of the joint intelligence committee. Until he resigned, the group also included Alastair Campbell, Blair's communications director. Indeed, he was a prime mover in establishing this inner circle."
There is a dark cabal around Blair
Independent, 11 September 2003

"There may be something even more frightening here. What if Blair believes this stuff - if you have a leader who can be led around by the nose by a few bureaucrats with a right-wing agenda? That's what scares me... I've got all these inside documents, showing what's really going on behind the closed doors of these huge empires of finance. But instead, we get pictures of green-haired kids throwing chairs through the windows of McDonald's. That is what the press considers a discussion of globalisation".
Interview with BBC Newsnight award winning investigative reporter, American Greg Palast
Metro, 18 June 2003

"Since the end of the Cold War the work of the British intelligence services has been increasingly focused on the national economic interest. Said to be closely involved with the major City institutions, particularly banking, the Economic Sub-Committee of the Joint Intelligence Committee also includes representatives of both the Treasury and the Bank of England."
Iraqgate 2003
'Fight Smart', Special Report, October 2003

"A retired MI6 officer has been appointed to a top post at BP-Amoco, the British-based oil company..... John Gerson was director of security and public affairs at the agency and was embroiled in attempts to suppress disclosures by the former MI6 officer Richard Tomlinson. Mr Gerson took early retirement from what was effectively the post of deputy head of MI6 at the end of last year. Last month he became one of BP's vice-presidents for government and public affairs. His appointment was approved by the cabinet secretary, Sir Richard Wilson. MI6 has close links with oil companies, the 'revolving door' syndrome, in the same way as armed forces officers have close links with defence companies. Rolls-Royce has employed former MI6 officers to help win contracts in the Middle East, and merchant banks have taken some on. During the first reading of the intelligence services bill, Lord Mackay, the conservative lord chancellor, told peers in 1994 that MI6 protected the 'economic wellbeing' of the country by keeping 'a particular eye on Britain's access to key commodities, like oil...'"
Former MI6 officer gets top post at BP
Guardian, 8 May 2000

"The woman seen as Prime Minister Tony Blair's closest and most trusted aide is to leave the government for a job at oil giant BP.... [Anji Hunter] has been a permanent fixture at the prime minister's side since he first became Labour leader in 1994 ...[and] is widely seen as the prime minister's door keeper..."
Blair's closest aide resigns
BBC Online, 8 November 2001

"Hunter, along with Alastair Campbell and Sir David Manning, had accompanied Blair on his trips to set up the coalition for the invasion of Afghanistan after 911. The Foreign Secretary was left at home. The links between oil, Downing St, the intelligence services, and war could hardly be more intimate."
Iraqgate 2003
'Fight Smart', Special Report, October 2003

"Following the war in Afghanistan BP are now opening up the Caspian Sea region (which will also feed the post 911 trans-Afghan pipeline to the east) from the western side. This involves the construction of a new pipeline to the Mediterranean via Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. It follows the build-up of US troops in most of the Asian Islamic 'Stan' countries and Georgia for such purposes following 911. Needless to say Islamic militants are unlikely to be too pleased about this. When the Prime Minister says al Qaeda attacks on the UK are now inevitable, this is a key reason why. It is now well documented that the US led attack on Afghanistan was planned well before 911 as a result of the collapse of US negotiations with the Taliban to build a new gas pipeline through the country.   This was part of a broader White House strategy to open up the Caspian Sea region with western oil companies, including BP and Enron (it was Enron who paid a 'modest' $300,000 towards the inauguration ceremony of President Bush at the beginning of 2001)."
What Is Happening To Britain And America?
'Fight Smart', 9 Feb 2003

"There is a saying that for evil to triumph it is only necessary for good men to stay silent. In one of London's most prestigious dining rooms on November 13 2002 I listened, along with some 200 of the 'great and the good', to a very senior American politician close to the Bush administration tell us that it did not matter what happened in the UN or what the weapons inspectors said. The decision to invade had already been taken. I was appalled... Let us be clear as to why our troops are in Iraq. Do not for a moment be fooled about the case for regime change. The west has long since learned to live and work with regimes that would be difficult to square with a moral foreign policy.... In the absence of the evidence that could give credibility to our actions this government can restore trust only by opening the record for the public scrutiny of a judicial inquiry."
Lord Heseltine, British Deputy prime minister, 1995-97, and defence minister, 1983-86
Guardian, 1 September 2003

"I would simply point out to the hon.Gentleman that, in respect of that dossier and the first dossier, not a single fact in them is actually disputed."
British Prime Minister, House of Commons, 25 June 2003

"The 20th September draft still includes a number of statements which are not supported by the evidence available to me. I acknowledge that in this statement the Prime Minister [in the dossier] will be expressing his own ‘belief’ about what the assessed intelligence has established. What I wish to record is that based on the intelligence available to me it has NOT established beyond doubt that Saddam has continued to produce chemical and bioligical weapons. ... [Also the 45 minute claim] is based on a single source. The judgment is too strong considering the intelligence on which it was based.'”
Memo from an intelligence analyst working for the Defence Intelligence Staff to Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence, September 2002
Hutton Inquiry/London Times, 16 September 2003

"A crucial claim in the British Government's case for the Iraq war - that Saddam Hussein could threaten the West within 45 minutes with chemical and biological weapons - was seriously undermined at the Hutton inquiry yesterday. John Scarlett, chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, which was in charge of compiling the Iraq weapons dossier, revealed that the alleged threat related not to long-range missiles but 'battlefield mortar shells or small-calibre weaponry' that did not threaten Britain or even Iraq's neighbours. In last September's dossier, the 45-minute claim was made alongside details of Iraq's alleged possession of al-Hussain missiles that could strike British bases in Cyprus. .... The disclosure by Prime Minister Tony Blair's most senior intelligence adviser is the first official statement on the exact nature of the threat. Weapons experts said yesterday that the normal definition of an international weapons of mass destruction threat would exclude battlefield mortar shells, even if they had chemical or biological stocks attached. Such arms represented no threat to Britain, they said."
Spy chief weakens Blair's case
New Zealand Herald, 28 August 2003

"The Ministry of Defence wanted to stop two senior members of its intelligence staff who had expressed concerns about the government dossier on Iraq from appearing as witnesses before a parliamentary committee, according to written evidence at the Hutton inquiry. An internal MoD memo, written by Martin Howard, deputy chief of Defence Intelligence, recommended that 'we should resist any calls from the ISC (Intelligence and Security Committee) to disclose the identities of the individuals concerned, call them as witnesses or have access to their written comments to line management'..."
MoD moved to stop witness call on staff
London Times, 15 August 2003

"An explosive letter, revealed in full as Downing Street officials prepare to give evidence to Lord Hutton's inquiry this week, makes it clear that the officer, whose name has not been revealed, felt 'very uneasy' about claims made to MPs by Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary. Mr Straw said that the intelligence community had no complaints about the dossier but the intelligence officer had formally registered his concerns last September. The officer, who described himself as 'the most senior and experienced intelligence community official working on WMD', said on 8 July he feared that he 'might be judged culpable' if he didn't come forward to correct Mr Straw's remarks to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, and asked for advice on whether to do so. However, after David Kelly was found dead, Martin Howard, deputy chief of Defence Intelligence, wrote to the official to suggest that he should not take the matter any further....The officer had formally complained on 19 September that he was unhappy with its use of intelligence. He wrote to the Defence Intelligence Staff technical department and Tony Cragg, the then deputy chief of Defence Intelligence. However, what was not revealed during the hearing was that the officer's letter had referred explicitly to Mr Straw's failure to tell MPs the full truth of such concerns."
Intelligence officer's 'unease' at Straw's Iraq claims
Independent 18 August 2003

"We conclude that it is very odd indeed that the Government asserts that it was not relying on the evidence which has since been shown to have been forged, but that eight months later it is still reviewing the other evidence.....We recommend that the Government explain on what evidence it relied for its judgment in September 2002 that Iraq had recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa. We further recommend that in its response to this Report the Government set out whether it still considers the September dossier to be accurate in what it states about Iraq’s attempts to procure uranium from Africa, in the light of subsequent events."
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee
The Decision to go to War in Iraq
Ninth Report of Session 2002 –03, Volume I, 3 July 2003

"Mr Straw not only denied that the forged documents came from British sources, but said Britain's allegations about Iraq's quest for uranium in Africa came from 'quite separate sources'. He said he would give further details of these sources for the uranium allegation in a closed session on Friday, during which he was fiercely cross-questioned by Sir John Stanley, the committee's chief sceptic. After hearing what the Foreign Secretary had to say, the Tory MP is reported to have told Mr Straw he did not believe him...."
Ministers knew war papers were forged, says diplomat
Independent, 29 June 2003

"The [Italian] newspaper quotes a source from Sismi, the Italian military intelligence agency, as saying that the documents were passed to MI6 in 2002. Six documents referring to Niger, possibly the same as those given to the Italians, were also passed to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) by Washington. Mohammed ElBaradei, the head of the IAEA, told the UN Security Council in March that they were crude forgeries."
MI6 was 'duped by forgeries'
London Times, 17 July 2003

"Italy may have passed on to the United States and Britain disputed claims that Saddam Hussein had been seeking uranium in Africa to make nuclear weapons, the head of a parliamentary intelligence committee said Wednesday. Premier Silvio Berlusconi's government has denied that Italy's intelligence services passed on 'documents' about the matter. But committee chief Enzo Bianco speaking after a top government official addressed the commission in secret, did not deny that the information may have been passed on informally. 'This is possible,' he said. 'I don't rule it out.' Cabinet undersecretary and top Berlusconi aide Gianni Letta, who briefed the intelligence commission Wednesday afternoon, refused to comment on the hearing.... Critics have been pressuring U.S. President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair over the disputed uranium intelligence. U.S. intelligence agencies had raised questions previously about assertions of the claimed activity by the Iraqi president. Underlying documents to support the contention proved to have been forged....The report in Rome's La Repubblica quoted a source from Sismi, the Italian military intelligence service, as saying in late 2001 or early 2002, the MI6 British intelligence unit obtained the documents. The source implied that Italian colleagues provided the information to the British intelligence officials. 'There were several meetings, at a higher level, almost always in London,' the source was quoted as saying. 'Despite this positive climate, we don't know if it were the English who passed on that stuff to the CIA. It's rather probable.'"
Italy May Be Source on Uranium Story
Fox News, 16 July 2003

"The three agencies [CIA, National Security Council and State Department] were also kept in the dark about a mission undertaken immediately afterward by former CIA director and DPB [Defense Policy Board] member James Woolsey to London to gather intelligence about possible links between Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda, as if the CIA or the Pentagon's own Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) could not be trusted."
  Iran-Contra, Amplified
Inter Press Service News Agency 9 August

"And did this report of a trip to London by Woolsey represent a brief public surfacing of a transatlantic link between Operation Rockingham (the subversive British intelligence massaging exercise alleged by former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter) and the Office of Special Plans at the Pentagon, a new US bureaucracy established by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to fulfil a similar purpose?... it would be interesting to learn whether or not Woolsey had a hand in the promotion of the Niger uranium forgeries. This is particularly so taking into account the length of the overseas errand Woolsey was sent on post-911, not long after which the Niger forgeries first emerged. Did Woolsey make any visits, for example, to Italy in addition to London and Prague?"
Iraqgate 2003
'Fight Smart', Special Report, October 2003

"Forged documents and false accusations have been an element in U.S. and British policy toward Iraq at least since the fall of 1997, after an impasse over U.N. inspections....A former Clinton Administration official told me that London had resorted to, among other things, spreading false information about Iraq. The British propaganda program—part of its Information Operations, or I/Ops—was known to a few senior officials in Washington.... dozens of unverified and unverifiable intelligence reports and tips—data known as inactionable intelligence—[were] to be funnelled to MI6 operatives and quietly passed along to newspapers in London and elsewhere. 'It was intelligence that was crap, and that we couldn’t move on, but the Brits wanted to plant stories in England and around the world,' the former officer said. There was a series of clandestine meetings with MI6, at which documents were provided, as well as quiet meetings, usually at safe houses in the Washington area..... None of the past and present officials I spoke with were able to categorically state that the fake Niger documents were created or instigated by the same propaganda office in MI6 that had been part of the anti-Iraq propaganda wars in the late nineteen-nineties (An MI6 intelligence source declined to comment.)....[However] What is generally agreed upon, a congressional intelligence-committee staff member told me, is that the Niger documents were initially circulated by the British—President Bush said as much in his State of the Union speech—and that 'the Brits placed more stock in them than we did.' It is also clear, as the former high-level intelligence official told me, that 'something as bizarre as Niger raises suspicions everywhere.'... "
WHO LIED TO WHOM?
New Yorker, 24 March 2003

"Within the Defence Intelligence Services I liaise with the Rockingham cell..."
Evidence given by Dr David Kelly, in closed session 16 July 2003
To The British Intelligence and Security Committee

"Britain ran a covert 'dirty tricks' operation designed specifically to produce misleading intelligence that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction to give the UK a justifiable excuse to wage war on Iraq. Operation Rockingham, established by the Defence Intelligence Staff within the Ministry of Defence in 1991, was set up to 'cherry-pick' intelligence proving an active Iraqi WMD programme and to ignore and quash intelligence which indicated that Saddam's stockpiles had been destroyed or wound down. The existence of Operation Rockingham has been confirmed by Scott Ritter, the former UN chief weapons inspector, and a US military intelligence officer. He knew members of the Operation Rockingham team and described the unit as 'dangerous', but insisted they were not 'rogue agents' acting without government backing. 'This policy was coming from the very highest levels,' he added.... Ritter and other intelligence sources say Operation Rockingham and MI6 were supplying skewed information to the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) which, Tony Blair has told the Commons, was behind the intelligence dossiers that the government published to convince the parliament and the people of the necessity of war against Iraq. Sources in both the British and US intelligence community are now equating the JIC with the Office of Special Plans (OSP) in the US Pentagon. The OSP was set up by Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to gather intelligence which would prove the case for war..... Ritter has also offered to give evidence to [the British] parliament."
Revealed: the secret cabal which spun for Blair
Sunday Herald, 8 June 2003

"According to former Bush officials, all defence and intelligence sources, senior administration figures created a shadow agency of Pentagon analysts staffed mainly by ideological amateurs to compete with the CIA and its military counterpart, the Defence Intelligence Agency. The agency, called the Office of Special Plans (OSP), was set up by the defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, to second-guess CIA information and operated under the patronage of hardline conservatives in the top rungs of the administration, the Pentagon and at the White House, including Vice-President Dick Cheney.  The ideologically driven network functioned like a shadow government, much of it off the official payroll and beyond congressional oversight....In the days after September 11, Mr Rumsfeld and his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, mounted an attempt to include Iraq in the war against terror. When the established agencies came up with nothing concrete to link Iraq and al-Qaida, the OSP was given the task of looking more carefully....The OSP was an open and largely unfiltered conduit to the White House.... The OSP absorbed this heady brew of raw intelligence, rumour and plain disinformation and made it a 'product', a prodigious stream of reports with a guaranteed readership in the White House. The primary customers were Mr Cheney, Mr Libby and their closest ideological ally on the national security council, Stephen Hadley, Condoleezza Rice's deputy."
The spies who pushed for war
Guardian 17 July 2003

'Selective Intelligence' - Office of Special Plans - New Yorker, 5 May 2003

"Tenet and Cheney's office said the vice president was never briefed on the results of Wilson's trip, or even of the CIA's doubts about the [Niger-Iraq uranium] claim.... Some outside the administration find it hard to believe Cheney could be so deeply enmeshed in intelligence issues but be left out of the loop regarding the uranium claim, especially because it was a subject in which Cheney took interest."
Prewar statements by Cheney under scrutiny
Chicago Tribune, 2 August 2003

"They may have finally found the smoking gun that nails the culprit responsible for the Iraq war. Unfortunately, the incriminating evidence wasn't left in one of Saddam Hussein's palaces but rather in Vice President Dick Cheney's office.... Former Ambassador Joseph C. Wilson publicly revealed over the weekend that he was the mysterious envoy whom the CIA, under pressure from Cheney, sent to Niger to investigate a document - now known to be a crude forgery - that allegedly showed Iraq was trying to acquire enriched uranium that might be used to build a nuclear bomb. Wilson found no basis for the story, and nobody else has either... In order to believe that our president was not lying to us, we must believe that this information did not find its way through Cheney's office to the Oval Office."
A Diplomat's Undiplomatic Truth: They Lied
The Los Angeles Times, 8 July 2003

"...what Hutton has exposed is that neither the dossier nor the intelligence assessment was designed to inform government decisions on Iraq. The real assessment had already been made by the government, and the intelligence community was asked to provide evidence to support it... Instead of setting out the real reasons for these decisions, the government wanted us to believe it all stemmed from the intelligence assessment. Of course it didn't..."
John Denham, Home Office Minister until he resigned in March over the Iraq war
Guardian, 28 August 2003

"[Blair] has dropped more bombs on civilians than any British ruler since the Second World War."
The untimely death of a liberal generation
London Times, 24 September 2003

"The world's oil reserves are up to 80 percent less than predicted, a team from Sweden's University of Uppsala says. Production levels will peak in about 10 years' time, they say.... Oil production levels will hit their maximum soon after 2010 with gas supplies peaking not long afterwards, the Swedish geologists say.....Alekett said that his team had examined data on oil and gas reserves from all over the world and we were 'facing a very critical situation globally.' The conclusions of the Uppsala team were revealed in the magazine New Scientist Thursday".
World oil and gas 'running out'
CNN, 2 October 2003

"The foreign secretary, Jack Straw, yesterday pinpointed for the first time security of energy sources as a key priority of British foreign policy. Mr Straw listed energy as one of seven foreign policy priorities when he addressed a meeting of 150 British ambassadors in London. The US and British governments officially deny that oil is a factor in the looming war with Iraq, but some ministers and officials in Whitehall say privately that oil is more important in the calculation than weapons of mass destruction.... Mr Straw told ambassadors that, following a review he ordered last year, the Foreign Office drew up a list of seven medium to long-term strategic priorities, including 'to bolster the security of British and global energy supplies'".
Straw admits oil is key priority
Guardian 7 January 2003

AFTER THE INVASION OF IRAQ
"The UK is a net exporter of oil, so we have no need of the Iraqi oil."
British Prime Minister, House of Commons, 14 April 2003

BEFORE THE INVASION OF IRAQ
".... our energy system faces new challenges.... Our energy supplies will increasingly depend on imported gas and oil..... we need access to a wide range of energy sources."
British Prime Minister, Foreword to DTI Energy White Paper, February 2003

"Fuel is our economic lifeblood. The price of oil can be the difference between recession and recovery. The western world is import dependent. ....So: who develops oil and gas, what the new potential sources of supply are, is a vital strategic question...The Middle East, we focus on naturally."
Prime Minister's speech at the George Bush Senior Presidential Library
10 Downing St, Press Release, 7 April 2002

"At a NATO conference in Prague last November, [former CIA Director James] Woolsey declared 'Iraq can be seen as the first battle of the fourth world war,' in rhetoric that he has practiced and honed virtually since the 9/11 attacks on New York and the Pentagon. 'After two hot world wars and one cold one that all began and were centered in Europe,' he said, 'the fourth world war is going to be for the Middle East.' ....."
Woolsey's Role Crucial to Impact of Occupation
'Foreign Policy in Focus', 8 April 2003

THE REALITY BEHIND WHY BRITAIN AND THE US WENT TO WAR

United Kingdom Oil Production Curve (with discovery as a bar graph)
Association for the Study of Peak Oil, Newsletter 20, August 2002

"I do not care under what system we keep the oil. But I am quite clear it is all-important for us that this oil should be available."
Sir Arthur Balfour, British foreign secretary
1918, three years before creation of the Kingdom of Iraq under a British mandate

"By 2020, the country could be dependent on imported energy for 80 per cent of its needs"
Blowin' in the wind: the answer to Britain's looming energy crisis
Independent, 15 July 2003

"The offshore wind farms announced today will provide [a mere] 5 per cent of total UK electricity supply... The Government has not yet given a firm commitment to a renewables market after 2010."
London Times, 15 July 2003

"[Getting rid of a murderous regime in Iraq] was not the reason why we went to war.  My view is that we went to war because America wanted to establish a political and military platform in the Middle East, it saw a need for oil and of course it wished to support Israel. Weapons of mass destruction, if they existed, even on the most threatening predictions, were certainly not going to put Europe or the US at risk.”
Michael Meacher, UK Government Environment Minister sacked by Tony Blair June 2003
London Times, 20 June 2003

"Was this invasion because of weapons of mass destruction, as we so often have heard? If so, where are they? Did we invade to dispose of a leader and his regime because they were closely associated with Osama bin Laden? If so, where is the proof? Or is it that our incursion is a result of our own economic advantage? Iraq's oil can be refined at the lowest cost of any in the world. Coincidence?  This looks like a modern-day crusade not to free an oppressed people or to rid the world of a demonic dictator relentless in his pursuit of conquest and domination but a crusade to control another nation's natural resource. At least to me, oil seems to be the reason for our presence."
(US soldier serving in Iraq)
Los Angeles Times, 17 September 2003

1998 - THE YEAR THAT UN WEAPON'S INSPECTORS WERE FORCED OUT OF IRAQ BY LONDON AND WASHINGTON'S 'OPERATION DESERT FOX'

"... let's remember Saddam Hussein didn't kick the inspectors out [in 1998]. The U.S. ordered the inspectors out 48 hours before they initiated Operation Desert Fox -- military action that didn't have the support of the U.N. Security Council and which used information gathered by the inspectors, to target Iraq... As of December 1998 we had accounted for 90 to 95 percent of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capability -'we' being the weapons inspectors. We destroyed all the factories, all of the means of production and we couldn't account for some of the weaponry, but chemical weapons have a shelf-life of five years. Biological weapons have a shelf-life of three years. To have weapons today, they would have had to rebuild the factories and start the process of producing these weapons since December 1998."
Scott Ritter [former UN weapons inspector]: Facts needed before Iraq attack
CNN, 17 June 2002

"Industrialized world and US [will] become steadily more dependent on imports... Asia will become the dominant consuming region by 2010...The growing domestic demand for oil in other developing regions will become a major factor and will steadily limit the export capabilities of the Middle East, Africa, and FSU.... Pipeline, port, and tanker geopolitics will change fundamentally during 1998-2020... Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Russia represent 'high risk' oil suppliers with major potential geopolitical impacts."
The Changing Geopolitics of Energy – Part I
Key Global Trends in Supply and Demand: 1990-2020
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, 12 August 1998

"My forecast is that between 2000 and 2005 the world will be reaching peak production from our known fields."
Franco Bernabe, chief executive of the [30% government owned] Italian oil company Eni SpA
Energy apocalypse looms as the world runs out of oil
Observer, 26 July 1998

Iraq And The Bogus War Against Terrorism

A British television report 22 September by award winning investigative journalist John Pilger revealed that US Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice had confirmed in early 2001 that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein had been disarmed and was no threat. Pilger uncovered video footage of Powell in Cairo on February 24, 2001 where he stated "He [Saddam Hussein] has not developed any significant capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction. He is unable to project conventional power against his neighbours."

Powell's remarks were posted on the US State Department's web site at the time. Two months later Rice reportedly said "We are able to keep his arms from him. His military forces have not been rebuilt."

Writing in the Daily Mirror Pilger himself states "An investigation of files and archive film for my TV documentary Breaking The Silence, together with interviews with former intelligence officers and senior Bush officials have revealed that Bush and Blair knew all along that Saddam Hussein was effectively disarmed." His article is entitled "The Big Lie".

Pilger adds "Contrary to Blair's denials at the time, the decision to attack Iraq was set in motion on September 17 2001, just six days after the attacks on New York and Washington. On that day, Bush signed a top-secret directive, ordering the Pentagon to begin planning 'military options' for an invasion of Iraq. In July 2002, Condoleezza Rice told another Bush official who had voiced doubts about invading Iraq: 'A decision has been made. Don't waste your breath.'..... By setting up an inquiry solely into the death of the weapons expert David Kelly, Blair has ensured there will be no official public investigation into the real reasons he and Bush attacked Iraq. The sheer scale of this cover-up makes almost laughable the forensic cross-examination of the BBC reporter Andrew Gilligan about 'anomalies' in the notes of his interview with David Kelly - when the story Gilligan told of government hypocrisy and deception was basically true."

It now transpires that three out of five people believe that Tony Blair lied over the threat posed by Iraqi weapons in the run-up to war according to an NOP poll for The Independent published 30 September. Meanwhile John Reid, the Secretary of State for Health, felt it necessary to tell Labour Party conference delegates at the end of September that "Our Prime Minister is not a liar".

Across the Atlantic USA Today ran an article 15 September which reported that "CNN's top war correspondent, Christiane Amanpour, says that the press muzzled itself during the Iraq war. And, she says CNN 'was intimidated' by the Bush administration and Fox News, which 'put a climate of fear and self-censorship'. As criticism of the war and its aftermath intensifies, Amanpour joins a chorus of journalists and pundits who charge that the media largely toed the Bush administration line in covering the war and, by doing so, failed to aggressively question the motives behind the invasion".

The role of networks like Fox News (owned by Rupert Murdoch) in pumping propaganda should not be underestimated. On 2 October the Washington based Program on International Policy Attitudes produced a commentary on this situation. It advised that "A new study based on a series of seven nationwide polls conducted from January through September of this year reveals that before and after the Iraq war, a majority of Americans have had significant misperceptions and these are highly related to support for the war with Iraq.  The polling, conducted by the Program on International Policy (PIPA) at the University of Maryland and Knowledge Networks, also reveals that the frequency of these misperceptions varies significantly according to individuals' primary source of news. Those who primarily watch Fox News are significantly more likely to have misperceptions, while those who primarily listen to NPR or watch PBS are significantly less likely".

In the study 80% of Fox viewers held one or more basic misconceptions about the war (for example related to claims that evidence of links between Iraq and al Qaeda have been found), whilst in the case of PBS only 23% did. The commentary adds that "Such misperceptions are highly related to support for the war.... Variations in misperceptions according to news source cannot simply be explained as a result of differences in the demographics of each audience, because these variations can also be found when comparing the rate of misperceptions within demographic subgroups of each audience... While it would seem that misperceptions are derived from a failure to pay attention to the news, in fact, overall, those who pay greater attention to the news are no less likely to have misperceptions. Among those who primarily watch Fox, those who pay more attention are more likely to have misperceptions. Only those who mostly get their news from print media have fewer misperceptions as they pay more attention".

Brain washing by TV in other words. With impact like this it is little wonder that Rupert Murdoch has been urging the British government to restrict the reach of the BBC, and to a relax commercial media ownership rules in the UK (this the government has promoted through its Communications Act which received Royal Assent in July despite a failed rear-guard effort in the House of Lords to stop media magnates being able to buy broadcasters such as Five, formerly Channel 5, which Murdoch is said to be interested in acquiring).

Even Ted Turner, founder of CNN has accused Murdoch of helping to start the American-led war by using his News Corporation media outlets to advocate an invasion. News Corporation has described itself as "the only vertically integrated media company on a global scale". It includes Fox TV in the US and the Sun newspaper in the UK.

In a speech in San Francisco in April Turner stated "I call it Murdoch's War" and complained that the biggest media companies "don't have the public's interest at heart".

The incestuous relationships now prevalent at the political-media-commerce interface is truly alarming, particularly in the US. According to a report in the Guardian 7 April "Political donations by US television and radio stations have almost doubled in the last year, research has shown. And the Bush family's association with many media organisations runs deep and is reflected by the hefty handouts from the likes of NBC network owner General Electric and Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation, both trenchant supporters of the war. The amount of money ploughed into party coffers by Rupert Murdoch's Fox TV, NBC and radio giant Clear Channel among others has gone up to £7.56m in 2001/2002, compared with just £4.6m in 2000, the latest figures reveal. Media companies have shown that they have deep pockets when it comes to politics, with the level of contributions made over the last decade growing ninefold, according to the Centre for Responsive Politics, a US research group that tracks money and politics. The support President Bush has received from the corporate sector is evidenced by the unprecedented $100m he raised when he decided to run for president... Figures show that NBC network owner General Electric and News Corporation, owner of the Fox and Sky television networks and the New York Post, tipped the bulk of their soft money funds into Republican coffers in 2001-02. The two media giants are among the most prolific donors, according the data reported to the US federal electoral commission... Murdoch's media empire still has close ties with the Bush family. The relationship was recently put under the spotlight when it was revealed that Fox News Channel chairman Roger Ailes, a former Republican party strategist, secretly acted as an advisor to the president in the days after the September 11 terrorist strikes.".

However, even in the US there are still limits to how far public opinion can be manipulated by commercial TV networks. Now that it is becoming unavoidably clear the degree to which the public were deceived over Iraq, open discussion about the motives for the war is becoming increasingly frank. Amanpour is quoted by USA Today as saying "it looks like this was disinformation at the highest levels."

A week or so earlier, on 6 September, the British newspaper the Guardian had published an article by Michael Meacher. Meacher had been Environment Minister in Tony Blair's Labour government up until only three months before. His article was entitled "This war on terrorism is bogus - The 9/11 attacks gave the US an ideal pretext to use force to secure its global domination".

Meacher's argument was that the actions of the Bush administration prior-to and following the attacks on America on 11 September 2001 are better explained by pre-existing US plans to attack Afghanistan and Iraq, than they are by claims that they were part of a 'war against terrorism'. His long article was heavily referenced to media reports and other publicly available sources. It claimed that 911 had been used a convenient pretext to implement those plans. The real focus of the Bush administration was offence not defence.

The specifics of Meacher's case included an examination of a pre-911 strategic policy report prepared by a group called "Project for The New American Century" (PNAC). This group is backed by people who are now key members of the Bush administration,

The strategy is a blueprint for US military expansionism and global geo-political domination. Amongst many other objectives the document targets US control of the Persian Gulf  as a key task for which "the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the immediate justification". It states that "the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein." In other words control of the oil rich Gulf, not regime change in Iraq, is the real goal - even though it is Saddam's rogue status which is able to provide the initial excuse for intervention.

After setting out his extensive and detailed case Meacher concludes that "None of this assembled evidence, all of which comes from sources already in the public domain, is compatible with the idea of a real, determined war on terrorism.... The overriding motivation for this political smokescreen is that the US and the UK are beginning to run out of secure hydrocarbon energy supplies. By 2010 the Muslim world will control as much as 60% of the world's oil production and, even more importantly, 95% of remaining global oil export capacity. As demand is increasing, so supply is decreasing, continually since the 1960s.... The conclusion of all this analysis must surely be that the 'global war on terrorism' has the hallmarks of a political myth propagated to pave the way for a wholly different agenda - the US goal of world hegemony, built around securing by force command over the oil supplies required to drive the whole project".

When Meacher homes in on the oil dimension he is in surprisingly broad company.

On 12 August an article appeared in the Financial Times written by Jeffrey Sachs. Professor Sachs is one of the world's most high profile post-Cold War economists, responsible amongst other matters for promoting radical economic reform in Bolivia, Poland and Russia. Also director of the Center for International Development and professor of international trade at Harvard University, Sachs served as the chief economic advisor to Russia's President Boris Yeltsin from 1991 to 1994, where he advocated 'shock therapy' to create market capitalism in Russia.

If Meacher's political pedigree has its roots in the left the same cannot be said of Sachs.

Sachs opens his article bluntly stating "The crucial question regarding Iraq is not whether the motives for war were disguised, but why. The argument that Iraq posed a grave and imminent threat was absurd to anybody not under the spell of round-the-clock White House and 10 Downing Street spin." These are troubling words coming as they do from a someone of Sachs' standing.

Sachs' FT article was entitled "Saudi Arabia Was Real Target in Iraq War". The article identifies Iraq as a target of US foreign policy because of concerns over US dependency on oil from Saudi Arabia. It continues with "Two truths have long governed US energy security. The first is that Saudi Arabia is the key to world oil stability, the accommodating supplier when markets get too tight. It would be a potential threat to the world economy if Saudi oil flows were disrupted. In 1973-74, with the Arab oil embargo, the Ford presidency was brought down by the disruption of the US economy, a point not lost on two young senior officials at the time, Donald Rumsfeld and Richard Cheney, respectively Gerald Ford's defence secretary and White House chief of staff. Pentagon and academic planners began making contingency plans for the military seizure of the Middle East oilfields.... 15 out of the 19 [911] terrorists were from Saudi Arabia..... A new book by former CIA agent Robert Baer, Sleeping with the Devil, details how the US government had systematically turned away from the growing evidence of Saudi complicity in fundamentalist terrorism, thereby frustrating the kind of investigations that might have headed off September 11.... September 11 was a dramatic confirmation that the stability of Saudi oil was in jeopardy. The regime was unstable and perhaps even a lethal threat to the US. The only quantitatively significant alternative to Saudi oil was Iraqi oil, but that option was barred as long as Saddam Hussein remained in power. The long-standing contingency plans to seize Middle Eastern oil were probably rolled out within days of September 11..... But if the Iraq war was an opportunistic response to September 11, it is crucially important that we know it. Thousands of lives and perhaps $100bn have gone into this war, with little to show for it except an enraged Iraqi public and enormous costs of occupation extending into the future. The US media have so far shown little interest in connecting the dots".

It is not easy to dismiss such remarks when they come from someone of Sachs' background and when they are published in a paper like the Financial Times.

Meacher's article followed within a month, although almost immediately following his dismissal by Prime Minister Blair in June Meacher had publicly identified the oil motive lying behind the invasion of Iraq.   This he expressed in an interview published by the London Times 20 June, whose report stated "World peace and the future of the planet are threatened by the overwhelming power of an 'aggressive and unilateralist America' run by a right-wing President with close connections to the oil industry. Such is the view of Michael Meacher, who until being sacked, or 'liberated' as he put it, in last week’s reshuffle had spent six years as Environment Minister."

However, Meacher's September article in the Guardian was much more explicit and widely referenced than his original salvo in the Times. As it happens his Guardian article had been preceded earlier that same week by another in the same paper from former British deputy Prime Minister Michael Heseltine.

Lord Heseltine, a Conservative, stated "There is a saying that for evil to triumph it is only necessary for good men to stay silent.... In one of London's most prestigious dining rooms on November 13 2002 I listened, along with some 200 of the 'great and the good', to a very senior American politician close to the Bush administration tell us that it did not matter what happened in the UN or what the weapons inspectors said. The decision to invade had already been taken. I was appalled. But I was appalled by the idea without being convinced that what we had just been told was true.....  Let us be clear as to why our troops are in Iraq. Do not for a moment be fooled about the case for regime change. The west has long since learned to live and work with regimes that would be difficult to square with a moral foreign policy. If Saddam were ever brought to trial his lawyers would have some uncomfortable fun with our relationship with him in the early 1980s, when he was all that stood between western interests and Iran.... British troops are dying. Their professionalism and their bravery must make strong men humble. They act in our name. That puts upon our shoulders the responsibility to ask this of them only if the case is proven. Until now I have stayed silent. I will be the first to salute the courage of the prime minister and President Bush if they are proved right, but that needs more than rhetoric and it certainly does not permit a change in the original case from WMD to regime change. But suppose they are not."

Heseltine called for a full judicial inquiry into why Britain had gone to war with Iraq.

A few days later many other media outlets across the globe, although noticeably not in the US, found themselves running coverage on Meacher's subsequent analysis in the Guardian which in effect put Heseltine's telling comments into a broader context. In the UK the tone of the coverage varied from "Outrage at Meacher's 9/11 claim" (Sunday People, 6 September) to "Serious questions on Sep 11" (ITV News, 6 September). The Daily Mail group (via Northcliffe Electronic Publishing) ran the story widely across its local media internet sites under the headline "Terror used as smokescreen: Meacher".

Not surprisingly Meacher's article received a frosty reception from the British Government. Quoting a spokesman for 10 Downing St the BBC reported 6 September "He is obviously no longer a member of the government. His views are obviously not ones that the prime minister would share.... Earlier, another spokesman for Tony Blair pointed out that profits from Iraqi oil were being put in a trust fund for the country's reconstruction".

The Iraqi trust fund is, of course, simply camouflage.

Sir Arthur Balfour was British Foreign secretary 1916-1919. In a piece in the New York Times 6 April he is quoted in a way which exposes the lie behind this 21 century fig-leaf and which demonstrates why Meacher's analysis has cut very close to the bone. Prior to the creation of the Kingdom of Iraq under a British Mandate Balfour said "I do not care under what system we keep the oil. But I am quite clear it is all-important for us that this oil should be available." Balfour's view was that Britain needed to be the 'guiding spirit' in Mesopotamia (now Iraq), so as to provide a key resource that the British Empire lacked - namely oil.

Within a week of its publication Meacher's 'smokescreen' thesis gained further support from an unexpected source. On the second anniversary of the 911 attacks the British Intelligence and Security Committee produced its report on the UK's pre-war Iraqi intelligence assessment. The report had been prepared following the failure of coalition forces to quickly find weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in Iraq after their invasion. The committee provides parliamentary oversight of Britain's intelligence services. Its members are appointed by the Prime Minister and it reports directly to him.

The report contained two particularly remarkable paragraphs which became the focus of the main headlines in much of the British media the next day. The situation was especially significant in context of the earlier words of the Prime Minister to the House of Commons on 18 March as MPs had prepared to vote on whether to go to war: "The possibility of the two coming together - of terrorist groups in possession of weapons of mass destruction or even of a so-called dirty radiological bomb - is now, in my judgement, a real and present danger to Britain and its national security."

The London Times 12 September described as follows the awkward perspective which was suddenly thrown on those words by the two paragraphs in the Intelligence and Security Committee's report: "Tony Blair was facing fresh questions over the Iraq war last night after it was revealed that intelligence chiefs had told him that military action would increase the risk of terrorist attacks. Mr Blair took Britain to war in spite of a warning that the collapse of the Iraqi regime would make it easier for terrorist groups to obtain chemical and biological weapons, and that the threat from al-Qaeda would be heightened by action to depose Saddam. The advice from the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which Mr Blair did not disclose before the war, was given in an assessment on February 10,  five weeks before the action started. Its release, by the parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee yesterday, immediately sparked attacks from critics who had said that war would intensify the terrorism risk.... The top-secret assessment, International Terrorism: War with Iraq, stated that there was no intelligence that Iraq had provided chemical and biological materials to al-Qaeda, but judged that in the event of an imminent regime collapse, 'there would be a risk of transfer of such material', to al-Qaeda or another terrorist group".

One implication of this circumstance was that perhaps the real motivation for the war was driven by factors other than efforts to reduce the alleged threat of terrorism from Iraq. By this stage Meacher and Heseltine were looking distinctly on track.

As if that were not bad enough on 14 September another damaging story broke. The BBC reported that the political editor of the Spectator magazine "[in a new book due to be released] alleges Mr Blair secretly agreed to go to war as early as April 2002, when he had a summit with George W Bush at the president's ranch in Texas. He also claims Mr Blair himself had doubts about the intelligence over Iraqi weapons of mass destruction which formed the basis of his justification for war, and had received evidence that Saddam Hussein's chemical and biological capability was actually diminishing".

The same day the Independent published a survey which confirmed that only thirty-seven per cent of Labour Party constituencies thought they had been told the truth about the reasons Britain went to war (23 per cent said they had not, 13 per cent said opinions were split and 27 per cent declined to comment).

By the 'end' of the Iraq war in the spring of 2003 international trust in the British and American governments had already fallen so precipitously that it was widely believed that if coalition forces failed to find weapons of mass destruction they would attempt to plant them. So strong was this belief that British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw was forced to issue a refutation in April rather than just simply ignore the issue. It was, after all, a view that had been expressed by President Putin of Russia according to the Israeli newspaper Haaretz 15 April.

It is also one which has been more quietly held by some officials at the UN. It was even implied in a submission 30 June to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the British parliament made by Air Marshal Sir John Walker, former chief of Defence Intelligence, who concluded his letter by asking "If the US Major-General cries 'Eureka' and finds evidence now, after so long, who is going to be sure of the origin of his evidence?"

MSNBC openly discussed the issue in an article published 10 October entitled 'Creating WMD facts on the ground?'

By the time the difficulties in finding WMDs in Iraq had blown up into a major post-war political row even cartoons run in the London Times 4th and 5th June portrayed the planting of such weapons by the American and British governments. The concept of using faked evidence to justify war is hardly a new one. And already we know that the US submitted forged documents to the UN in support of its pre-war claims concerning Iraq's alleged nuclear programme. 

Indeed, faked evidence was a hallmark of post-World War II US covert operations in Latin America according to former senior CIA officer Ray McGovern. In an article he co-authored in April 2003 on the WMD situation in Iraq McGovern states that "In 1954, for example, it was instrumental in overthrowing the Arbenz government in Guatemala. Arbenz, who was suspected of having Communist leanings, had tried to make the United Fruit Company comply with Guatemalan law. At President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s direction, the CIA organized and armed a force of malcontent Guatemalans living in Nicaragua to invade their home country. The invasion was explained and 'justified' when a cache of Soviet-made weapons planted by the CIA was 'discovered' on Nicaragua’s Atlantic coast. Washington alleged that the weapons were intended to support an attempt by Arbenz to overthrow the Nicaraguan government". McGovern and his co-author do, however, consider that the planting of evidence in Iraq would be a high risk exercise.

The current picture for the invading coalition in Iraq does not look good. According to the New York Times 26 September "A draft of an interim report by David Kay, the American leading the hunt for banned arms in Iraq, says the team has not found any such weapons after nearly four months of intensively searching and interviewing top Iraqi scientists. There is some evidence of chemicals and equipment that could have been put to illicit use. But, to the chagrin of Mr. Bush's top lieutenants, there is nothing more. It remains remotely possible, of course, that something will be found. But Mr. Kay's draft suggests that the weapons are simply not there... it was the fear of weapons of mass destruction placed in the hands of enemy terrorists that made doing something about Iraq seem urgent. If it had seemed unlikely that Mr. Hussein had them, we doubt that Congress or the American people would have endorsed the war. This is clearly an uncomfortable question for the Bush administration. Yesterday, Secretary of State Colin Powell met with Times editors. Asked whether Americans would have supported this war if weapons of mass destruction had not been at issue, Mr. Powell said the question was too hypothetical to answer. Asked if he, personally, would have supported it, he smiled, thrust his hand out and said, 'It was good to meet you.'".

On 2 October Mr Kay published his report. No WMDs had been found despite a search lasting three months, involving 1200 inspectors and costing $300 million. The Foreign Editor of the London Times 3 October was blunt in her analysis of the report's findings: "There is one astounding judgment in yesterday's report from the Iraq Survey Group. That is that Iraq almost certainly did not have a serious chemicals weapons programme after 1991. US attacks and United Nations sanctions and inspections had made it impossible, it seems, for Iraq to rebuild what Desert Storm had destroyed. That conclusion — although provisional — is damaging to Tony Blair. It is a profound contradiction of the September 2002 dossier, Blair's formal case for war, and in particular, of the claim that Saddam posed an imminent threat. It undermines that position more thoroughly than does the dispute about the now-notorious but narrow claim that Iraq could launch weapons in 45 minutes. It also implies a much wider failure of intelligence".

But does it imply a failure of intelligence, or a wilful misrepresentation of intelligence? Or even the cooking of intelligence? Meanwhile the Bush administration is now seeking a further $600m to continue the 'search'.

Dr Kelly And 'Operation Rockingham'

The post invasion search for WMDs has been carried out by the Iraq Survey Group. It's joint head, David Kay, was appointed to the post by the Director of the CIA. One of the people due to have joined this group was Dr David Kelly.

David Kelly is the British scientist who was recently found dead in a wood near his Oxfordshire home. He was the British government's leading expert on Iraq's non-nuclear 'weapons of mass destruction'. He is believed to have committed suicide following his appearance before the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee on 15 July, and the Intelligence and Security Committee on 16 July. Following his death it was revealed that Dr Kelly had been the source for a controversial radio report from BBC defence correspondent Andrew Gilligan.

The report said that there was unhappiness within the intelligence services concerning the content of the British government's 2002 'September dossier' in which it had presented its pre-war assessment of the threat from Iraq. Gilligan claimed that the government had 'sexed up' the document in order to bolster its case against Iraq.

Following the failure to quickly find weapons of mass destruction after the invasion of Iraq the Foreign Affairs Committee had been convened to examine the government's decision to go to war. Prior to his death the committee had wanted to establish if Dr Kelly was the source of Gilligan's story. Dr Kelly told the committee that he did not think he was, even though he confirmed that he had met with Gilligan.

The sudden death of Dr Kelly on 17 July generated further intense controversy. This lead to the setting up of an official inquiry under the jurisdiction of Lord Hutton whose remit was to investigate "the circumstances surrounding the death of Dr David Kelly". From the outset the inquiry spent a great deal of time examining matters relating to the veracity of the allegations made in Mr Gilligan's original report covering the government's September dossier.

The dossier had included a claim that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons which "are deployable within 45 minutes of an order to use them".

Gilligan stated in his unscripted radio report of 29 May that "our source says that the dossier, as it was finally published, made the intelligence services unhappy, because, to quote the source, he said, there was basically....unhappiness because it didn't reflect the considered view they were putting forward - that's a quote from our source - and essentially, the 45 minute point was, was probably the most important thing that was added. What this person says is that a week before the publication date of the dossier, it was actually rather a bland production. It didn't - the draft prepared for Mr Blair by the intelligence agencies actually - didn't say very much more than was public knowledge already and Downing Street, our source says, ordered a week before publication, ordered it to be 'sexed up', to be made more exciting and ordered more facts to be, to be discovered." In a later article in the Mail on Sunday Gilligan named the Prime Minister's Director of Communications, Alastair Campbell, in relation to the allegations.

Gilligan was not the only BBC journalist that Dr Kelly had been unofficially speaking to about WMD issues in Iraq following the invasion. He had also spoken to Gavin Hewitt, and to Susan Watts, science editor of BBC Newsnight.

On 30 May, according her recording of their telephone conversation, Dr Kelly told Susan Watts of his view that there was only a 40% chance of some vehicles that had been found since the invasion being mobile biological weapons laboratories or fermentors. Commenting on the tension between the UN and coalition forces in the context of post-invasion WMD inspections Dr Kelly stated that "we've seen it on the mobile labs the politics is so strong that it deflects all practical objectivity" and that "whatever it is it's certainly a very unusual fermentor".

Despite this view from the country's top expert Prime Minister Blair had previously stated on 28 May, according to the Independent that "We have already found two trailers that both our and the American security services believe were used for the manufacture of chemical and biological weapons."

But that was clearly not the view of Dr Kelly who was still waiting to see information from the team doing the investigation. How had Blair reached his view and who was briefing him?

Taken at face value the words of the Prime Minister indicate that British intelligence services were jumping to conclusions without seeking the opinion of the government's own leading expert on Iraq's biological weapons. It appears to have been a clear case of politics taking precedence over objective assessment. This did not promote confidence that attempts to make a retrospective case for the war were being made in complete good faith. It also raised questions as to whether similar manipulation of intelligence took place before the war.

According to her conversation with Dr Kelly on 30 May the CIA had produced a report on the alleged mobile laboratories, and Dr Kelly confirmed to her that he had read it. Their interchange on the subject went as follows:

Dr Kelly: That was a funny report to me it looked like it had just been pushed out at a whim overnight....

Susan Watts: Well yes that would be interesting to coincide with what Rumsfeld had said

Dr Kelly: Well if you look at it it's not well edited - the same thing is said in different paragraphs - there's been some cutting and pasting going on and things have got left around the place

The previous day US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld caused consternation after stating in a speech in New York that Iraq's weapons may have been destroyed before the war. In which case the rushed CIA report on the alleged laboratories, now widely discredited, may have been intended to deflect at least some of the attention away from Rumsfeld's embarrassing admission.

What will history eventually record was found in Iraq? Will it be evidence of the chemical and biological weapons deployable within 45 minutes as claimed by the British dossier of September 2002? Or will it be evidence of the "reconstituted nuclear weapons" that US Vice President Dick Cheney claimed just two days before the British parliament voted for war on 18 March 2003.

In her evidence to the Hutton Inquiry 13 August Susan Watts states that "...there had been a lot of comment about whether the correct use of language in regard to the unaccounted for quantities of VX and other materials, anthrax, and whether that could correctly be interpreted as missing or rather as unaccounted for.... he [Dr Kelly] thought that the fact that they were unaccounted for or missing did not necessarily mean that they existed."

Nonetheless the Economist 9 August (print edition p26) reported on the post war CIA led search for WMDs and stated that "Whitehall sources say that several new bits of information will emerge including evidence based on interviews with Iraqi scientists that biological weapons had been produced in quantity".

But in fact there is nothing new about this. Iraq officially admitted so in 1995, as did Iraq's most senior defector to the west General Hussein Kamel. But Kamel also claimed that such weapons had been destroyed on his orders after the first Gulf war. Even if that was untrue any biological weapons manufactured more than three years ago would now be too old to be functional.

A report in the Los Angeles Times 28 August stated that "With the Iraq Survey Group still at work, CIA and Pentagon officials declined to make Kay or Dayton, its leaders, available for interviews. But other survey group members, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of security clearances they are required to sign, said the evidence reviewed so far — including more than 30 million pages of documents — still doesn't support charges that Hussein secretly built chemical and biological weapons after U.N. inspectors were forced out of Iraq in 1998, as the Bush administration repeatedly warned. .... The issue of timing is critical because a formal U.S. intelligence estimate sent to the White House and Congress in October starkly warned that Iraq had 'begun renewed production' of mustard, sarin, cyclosarin and VX nerve gases and had 100 to 500 tons of chemical agents, 'much of it added in the last year.' The report also said that 'most of the key aspects' of Iraq's bioweapons program 'were more advanced' than before the 1991 war. "

This is a very awkward circumstance for the Bush administration because it now appears such conclusions were drawn despite the lack of robust up to date intelligence. According to a report in the Financial Times 28 September 2003 "The US launched its war with Iraq despite having no fresh intelligence evidence that the regime of Saddam Hussein was developing mass destruction weapons or forging ties with terrorists, the leaders of the House of Representatives intelligence committee have concluded. The findings by the Republican and Democratic heads of the committee have again forced the US administration to defend its decision to go to war.... Condoleezza Rice, White House national security adviser, said on Sunday on Fox News that there was 'enrichment of intelligence' between 1998 and 2003 and that 'nothing pointed to a reversal of Saddam Hussein's very active efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction'. But the heads of the House intelligence committee - normally strong backers of the Central Intelligence Agency, said in a letter to George Tenet, CIA director, that the agency's conclusions about Iraq's weapons programmes were based largely on outdated assessments. 'The absence of proof that chemical and biological weapons and their related development programs had been destroyed was considered proof that they continued to exist,' said the letter, sent last Thursday and published at the weekend by Reuters and the Washington Post. It said the US had little specific intelligence after 1998, when United Nations weapons inspectors left Iraq, nor did it have better information about Iraq's ties to terrorists. This inadequate intelligence was passed on to CIA analysts who prepared assessments for policymakers, 'providing ample room for vagary to intrude'. The conclusions, based on a four-month assessment of classified documents by the committee, have increased pressure on the administration to demonstrate that the threat from Iraq justified the decision to go to war".

In other words they didn't have any significant evidence, and it seems the previous "much of it added in the last year" claim regarding chemical agents was bogus. So who let that all go through?

On 6 June News 24 had earlier confirmed that "The Defense Intelligence Agency reported before the war with Iraq it had 'no reliable information' that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons, a US defense official confirmed on Friday... The latest twist relates to a September 2002 DIA intelligence assessment disclosed by US New and World Report in its June 9 edition. The defense official said the report was classified, but the Pentagon was considering whether to make it public".

The claim made by the Prime Minister in the British government's September 2002 dossier was that there was "a current and serious threat to the UK national interest" from Iraq. This claim was made despite the fact that even in the worst case scenario Iraq's missile systems were not capable of delivering warheads beyond the eastern Mediterranean.

Moreover a draft of the dossier dated 16 September, according to the London Times 25 August (print edition p25, graphic), included the following statement intended to be made by the Prime Minister "The case I make is not that Saddam could launch a nuclear attack on London or the UK (He could not)....". Indeed, he could not. This truthful statement had the potential to generate media headlines of a kind unhelpful to those seeking war - perhaps one along the lines of "Blair admits Saddam can't nuke Britain".

The wording was removed in the next draft. Did that count as 'sexing up'?

In its report 11 September 2003 on the government's pre-war intelligence assessment of the Iraqi threat the British Intelligence and Security Committee concluded that the dossier had not been 'sexed up' by anyone. Yet it commented that "It was unfortunate that this point was removed from the published version of the foreword and not highlighted elsewhere".

The problem of the lack of a credible nuclear threat was recognised in an email from one of the Prime Minister's official spokesmen produced during the Hutton Inquiry. In the week before the dossier was published Mr Tom Kelly commented that "The weakness, obviously, is our inability to say that he could pull the nuclear trigger any time soon."

Meanwhile the 45 minute claim on chemical and biological weapons remained in one form or other in the subsequent draft and through to final publication. It eventually resulted in a more helpful headline in the pro-war tabloid newspaper, the Sun, the country's highest circulation newspaper by far published by Rupert Murdoch. The headline was "Brits 45 mins from doom". However, the public were not informed that the government's own leading expert, Dr David Kelly, did not agree with the claim (Dr Kelly's views are discussed in more detail below).

Following the difficulties in finding WMDs after the war such claims started to be watered down.

Referring to the claim in the British September dossier that Iraq had been trying to acquire uranium for its alleged nuclear programme from Africa the BBC reported 9 July that "President Bush, asked about the Niger issue at a news conference during his visit to South Africa, did not answer directly but said that he was 'certain that Saddam Hussein had a weapons of mass destruction programme'. Like Mr Blair, he has dropped the assertion that Iraq actually had weapons. Both now say that it had a 'programme.' "

Even though the British and American governments have been retrospectively downgrading their public justification for the war in this way, the controversy over their original claims has shown little sign of abating.

The row which exploded during the summer between Alastair Campbell and the BBC over his alleged role in the exaggerated presentation of intelligence assessments in the September dossier was truly extraordinary. The controversial involvement and sudden death of British government weapons expert Dr David Kelly has also ensured that the subject was not going to go away quietly.

Dr Kelly was not a fringe figure. His obituary in the Times describes him "the man closest to the facts on Iraq’s biological warfare capability... Kelly led the first team of United Nations biological weapons investigators to Iraq in 1991, following the end of the first Gulf War ... When not in Iraq, Kelly worked closely with the intelligence agencies in London, interviewing Iraqi defectors and debriefing British officials returning from the country...[in 1994]  he became the senior adviser on biological warfare for the UN in Iraq...." The Times also reports that "In private life, he was interested in movements seeking conciliation between religions and was a member of the Baha’i Faith, which aspires to the unification of humanity in one global society... David Kelly had a great affection for the culture and history of Iraq and spent the time when he and other inspectors were being denied access to sites they wished to visit trawling old book shops in Baghdad seeking material for his historical research ".

The Observer reported 20 July that "David Kelly was about to lead the British hunt for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and had contacted former UN inspectors as recently as two weeks ago to sound them out about a new mission... He was acting as the senior British scientific adviser to the Iraq Survey Group, the body set up by the US Government at the end of May to replace the United Nations weapons inspection regime".

The Independent 3 August quotes Ewen Buchanan, spokesman for Unmovic (United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission) on the level of Dr Kelly's expertise. Buchanan states that Dr Kelly "was intimately aware of all the ins and outs of Iraq's bio-warfare programme. No one else in the UK can match that knowledge." The paper comments that "The most immediate impact of Dr Kelly's death is the loss of his unparalleled expertise on Iraq's bio-warfare programme. The other world-leading authority on Iraq's bio-warfare programme, Richard Spertzel, is now in his seventies and retired."

So it appears that there is only one other person on earth who had a comparable level of knowledge in the field. Such status represented a considerable problem for the British government as post-war doubts about the veracity of its case for the conflict grew.

According to an article in the Independent 4 August "Downing Street will seek to defend itself over the death of David Kelly by portraying the scientist as a Walter Mitty character who exaggerated his role in the Government's intelligence case against Iraq.... the scientist's family and friends are sure to be appalled at the Walter Mitty description of a man who was nominated for the Nobel prize and who was about to join the US-led Iraq survey group's hunt for weapons in Baghdad. MoD sources have also revealed that Dr Kelly was being investigated for his contacts with journalists long before the dispute over Mr Gilligan's broadcast began."

The Walter Mitty 'fantasist' smear was initially denied by Downing St which stated that it was "absolutely clear that no one would say such a thing with the approval of the Prime Minister - or indeed anyone else within Downing Street." Within a day, however, it was revealed that the source of the remarks was one of the Prime Minister's own official spokesmen. A report in the Independent 5 August stated that "Richard Butler, the Australian who led the United Nations weapons inspection team in Iraq that included Dr Kelly, also said the description of him as a fantasist was wholly inaccurate. 'This was a man who was welded to the truth and had a deep experience in Iraq,' Mr Butler told the programme. 'He was an expert in biology and biological weapons. Any attempt to paint him in other colours, I think, is distasteful. That is not a description of David Kelly as I knew him'. "

The official spokesman concerned, Mr Tom Kelly, was previously an aide to former Northern Ireland Minister Labour spinmeister-in-chief Peter Mandelson, dubbed by the press the so-called 'Prince of Darkness'.  Democratic Unionist Party leader Ian Paisley once described Tom Kelly as making "Machiavelli look like a rank amateur".

However, the nature of Dr David Kelly's unhelpful expert views on the threat posed by Saddam's alleged WMDs were not the only problem for the government that had been emanating from within the Ministry of Defence during the on-going Iraq controversy. There had been embarrassing criticism of the government from a selection of eminent serving and retired British military officers. These included General Sir Michael Rose (UN Commander in Bosnia, whose office was bugged by the US during its illegal arms running campaign to Islamic combatants and terrorists during the Balkans crisis);  Major General Patrick Cordingley (Commander of the Desert Rats in the first Gulf War); and Chief of the Defence Staff Admiral Sir Michael Boyce.

As Iraq started coming into the firing line following the Anglo-American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 Sir Michael Boyce told the Royal United Services Institute December 2001 that terrorism could only be defeated by winning "hearts and minds". 

Just before his 'retirement' in the spring of 2003 Sir Michael Boyce also observed that "In 1991 we were liberating Kuwait. In the Falklands we relieved the Falkland islanders. I would have some difficulty saying the same thing for Iraq. If you are an Iraqi person, is that how you see it?". According to a BBC report 23 April "Admiral Boyce, 60, has spent only two years in the job and there had been reports he did not get on with defence secretary Geoff Hoon."

Prior to the war Defence Intelligence Staff had also leaked a report in February 2002 which confirmed, according to the BBC, that "There are no current links between the Iraqi regime and the al-Qaeda network". This report was seen by Andrew Gilligan who confirmed that the classified document had been sent to the British Prime Minister and other senior members of the government. The BBC reported that "Gilligan says that in recent days intelligence sources have told the BBC there is growing disquiet at the way their work is being politicised to support the case for war on Iraq."

The day the BBC ran this story Blair was forced to defend the Iraqi al Qaeda link claim. This was an allegation which has since been widely discredited. The New York Times 27 June confirmed that a report of a UN monitoring group published in June could find no evidence of a link between Saddam's administration and al Qaeda. This is a circumstance now apparently even acknowledged by US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz according to Online Journal 7 August.

In these circumstances it is little wonder that 10 Downing St is looking for Gilligan's scalp, even if by now most people have forgotten the February leak to him from the Ministry of Defence. Since the war, however, Gilligan's interaction with Dr Kelly has proved far more damaging to the government.

Gilligan's report of 29 May led to an enormous row between the BBC and Campbell. Much of this row has served as a diversion from bigger issues. However, it did lead to Gilligan being called before the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee to explain his allegations in more detail in June. The Committee had already been convened to examine "The Decision to go to War in Iraq" following the failure to quickly find WMDs after the invasion. Gilligan was not willing to disclose his source to the committee.

However, Downing St and the Ministry of Defence believed Gilligan's source to be Dr Kelly once the scientist had privately disclosed to his line manager that he had met with Gilligan. Eventually the government leaked Dr Kelly's identity to the press. This in turn led to Dr Kelly himself being called as a witness to the Foreign Affairs Committee. Dr Kelly did not necessarily know that he was Gilligan's source, although Gilligan (as subsequently disclosed) did.

Without revealing Dr Kelly as his source Andrew Gilligan used Greg Simpson, the Liberal Democrat’s deputy head of press, as a conduit to David Chidgey. Chidgey was a Liberal Democrat member of the committee. In an email to Simpson dated 14 July Gilligan stated "Above all he [Dr Kelly] should be asked to say what kind of a threat Iraq was in September 2002 ... If he is able to answer frankly it should be devastating."

This email was disclosed during the process of the Hutton Inquiry which was convened after the death of Dr Kelly on 17 July.

Gilligan has been heavily criticised for trying to influence the Committee in this way. However, its clear that Gilligan was hot on the scent in the way that the committee's previous sittings had never been.

Gilligan also recited Dr Kelly's pedigree in his email to Simpson: "He is described in one of the standard reference works.... as 'the senior adviser on biological warfare to the MoD... the West's leading biological warfare inspector' with 'world expertise in every aspect of biological warfare [whose] knowledge cannot be overtrumped... He was one of the three officials who accompanied Jack Straw when Straw gave evidence to the FAC about Iraq's WMD programme on September 25 2002, one day after publication of the Blair dossier. He said hardly anything, however; Straw did all the talking. We believe he is currently the chief British inspector on the Iraq Survey Group..."

In addition to his public appearance before the Foreign Affairs Select Committee on 15 July  Dr Kelly was subject to a private cross-examination by the Intelligence and Security Committee the next day. Although this is a body which meets in secret and reports confidentially to the Prime Minister it has since made available the testimony Dr Kelly gave to it.

The following day Dr Kelly went for a walk from his Oxfordshire home and never returned. His body was found on 18 July.

Whether in the longer term Dr Kelly's death ultimately serves to draw greater attention to some of the biggest outstanding questions relating to 'Iraqgate 2003' beyond the initial Downing St-BBC tussle, or merely acts as another diversion away from them, remains to be seen.

However, some key issues have already surfaced from this disturbing episode, particularly from Dr Kelly's own evidence given to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee. Although some of the most crucial elements of Dr Kelly's testimony do not seem to have captured the proper interest of the press they include the following matters:

• In private conversation with a friend Dr Kelly had scoffed at the claim that weapons of mass destruction could be deployed in 45 minutes as claimed in the dossier according to a report in the Observer 20 July. At the Foreign Affairs Select Committee hearing on 15 July he specifically stated that "Basically it would be very difficult to see how Iraq could deploy in 45 minutes".
• Although Dr Kelly defended the dossier at the hearing he acknowledged his own view that there was only a 30 per cent chance that Iraq still had chemical weapons at the beginning of the war (in the transcript of his recorded telephone conversation with Susan Watts of the BBC at the end of May Dr Kelly states his opinion of the likelihood of vehicles found after the invasion being mobile WMD laboratories. This is also expressed in percentage terms). As biological weapons have a much shorter shelf life Dr Kelly's lack of reference to these would seem to suggest that in comparison he thought that there was little or no likelihood of their continuing viable existence in Iraq (at the closed meeting of the Intelligence and Security committee on 16 July Dr Kelly repeated his view that there was only a 30% probability that Iraq had chemical weapons. He told the committee that "this is what I have been saying all the way through.... I said that to many people... it was a statement that I would have probably made for the last six months...". Dr Kelly also criticised the inclusion of the 45 minute claim).
• Dr Kelly confirmed to the Foreign Affairs Committee that he had access to the intelligence relating to Iraqi chemical and biological weapons.
• Dr Kelly indicated that the 45 minute claim was based on intelligence that was ten years old stating that it "makes a number of assumptions, that the weapons were all ready to go in the right place with whatever system was being used with the right tracking to attack, and that is very unlikely. We are talking in terms of Iraq, in terms of what we knew ten years ago..." (an 'intelligence source' has also leaked information on the dated nature of such intelligence to the Glasgow Sunday Herald which it published on 29 June, and which is discussed more below)
• Dr Kelly stated that at the time of the September dossier he had "no idea whether there were weapons or not at that time... It is possible it was not the case...". Unfortunately following this striking admission the chairman of the hearing intervened and said "I think we are getting close to being outside the terms of reference".  It now seems fairly clear why the chairman diverted the questioning at this point. According to the BBC, reporting from the Hutton Inquiry 21 August, "Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon pressed the foreign affairs committee to question Dr Kelly for only 45 minutes and not on wider weapons issues or the Iraq dossier, the inquiry heard. Committee chairman Donald Anderson agreed to limit scope of questioning for fear of losing the chance to interview Dr Kelly - a substantial minority of the committee was unhappy at the deal".
• When questioned on the Iraqi threat Dr Kelly also states "I think it [Iraq] was a threat to its neighbours and to the interests of the UK." In effect this wording is a subtle acknowledgement that Iraq was not a threat to the UK itself, but only to its interests in the Middle East (which are primarily access to oil, although the British presence in Cyprus is used as a fig-leaf concern in the dossier). As is well known Iraq did not have missile systems capable of delivery beyond the eastern Mediterranean.

So with these personal views it is little wonder that Dr Kelly was asked only to write a historical background report for the dossier despite being the government's most expert professional on the subject. And there is some indication that at least part of the government was aware of those 'unhelpful' views. According to the BBC 20 August the Hutton Inquiry heard that "Sir Kevin Tebbit [MoD permanent secretary] warned Downing Street that Dr Kelly's emergence as the suspected mole was not some 'windfall bonus' in the row because he could have some awkward views".

Sir Kevin Tebbit was previously director of GCHQ, the government's intelligence surveillance agency which works closely with MI5 and MI6.   According to the Guardian 20 August"Sir Kevin Tebbit's Whitehall career has consisted entirely of dealing with the defence of the realm and the protection of Britain's interests abroad". In addition to long standing service at the Ministry of Defence Sir Kevin has also been head of the Foreign Office's economic relations department. He is a member of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) which was responsible for drafting the September dossier.

The same BBC report confirms that Sir Kevin advised the Defence Secretary not to allow Dr Kelly to give evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee. This advice proved well founded given what is now known Dr Kelly told the committee, even though the press has failed to adequately focus on the significance of this.

In the end Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon was only prepared to allow Dr Kelly to go before the committee if its Chairman agreed to limit the questioning put to him. Hoon, later claimed at the Hutton Inquiry that this was to protect Dr Kelly because "he is not used to this degree of public exposure".

Nonetheless Hoon admitted that "I knew from the outset, for example, that Dr Kelly had some distinctive views about whether Saddam Hussein's regime was still manufacturing weapons of mass destruction. He judged there was only a 35 per cent likelihood that was the case. That was a distinctive view that had been recognised by a colleague, which prompted him to come forward in the first place. Yes, I was aware that his views were not entirely consistent with those that, for example, had appeared in the dossier that had been published in September."

Presumably Secretary Sir Kevin Tebbit, or some other senior civil servant, had informed Hoon of this difficulty.

In reality once Dr Kelly's name was out in the open it was going to be impossible to stop the Foreign Affairs Select Committee requesting him to appear before them. Little wonder then that Hoon was only prepared to concede to this on the basis of restricting the type of questioning Dr Kelly would be subjected to. As confirmed at the Hutton Inquiry Hoon wrote to the Chairman of the committee stating "Although the FAC has now completed its own inquiry, I can understand why you also wish to see Dr Kelly. I am prepared to agree to this on the clear understanding that Dr Kelly will be questioned only on those matters which are directly relevant to the evidence that you were given by Andrew Gilligan, and not on the wider issue of Iraqi WMD and the preparation of the dossier".

Although expressing support for the war as a means to bringing certainty to the disarmament process Dr Kelly had in fact written an unpublished pre-war article, since also produced at the Hutton Inquiry, which stated that "the current threat presented by Iraq militarily is modest".

According to the Observer 31 August the article was finalised in March 2003 just shortly before the war. It is clear from the article that Dr Kelly's professional view was that the threat from Iraq was not "serious and current" as presented in the September dossier, although he believed it could become so in the future. He states "The long-term threat, however, remains Iraq's development to military maturity of weapons of mass destruction".  Dr Kelly does not indicate that there was any such 'maturity' at the time of his writing.

Indeed his article is as significant for what it doesn't say as for what it does. In contrast to the September dossier the article does not unequivocally say that Iraq had viable weapons of mass destruction at that time. It does not say they were deployable in 45 minutes. And it does not say that Iraq was trying to obtain uranium from Africa. Without those claims the dossier becomes a very different document.

The unpublished article was originally written by Dr Kelly at the request of journalist and Middle East expert Julie Flint for a major report on Iraq. Dr Kelly had agreed to write on the condition that he contributed anonymously. According to Flint "In his statement to Parliament on 24 September, Blair indulged in a soundbite David would not have tolerated. It was imprecise and potentially, if not wilfully, misleading. 'At some point, in a future not too distant,' Blair said, 'the threat [of Saddam's weapons] will turn into reality.' Then, 18 words later: 'The history and the present threat are real.' Future threat, or present? David believed Saddam's tattered weapons programme was most significantly just that - a programme, a future threat that required present action. He had, regretfully, come to the belief that war was probably the only way 'of finally and conclusively disarming Iraq'."

Nonetheless the threat assessed by Dr Kelly was not the one presented in the dossier. Flint confirms that "In David's opinion, Saddam was less of a threat in 2003 than he had been in 1991".

Although Dr Kelly may have felt that war was unavoidable in order prevent the eventual resurrection of WMD programmes by Saddam, this does not disguise the reality that his views on the current threat, as the government's own leading expert, were kept from the nation and not incorporated in the dossier.

In practice the decision to go to war was influenced by a government dossier which lead both the public and parliament to falsely believe (or at least those prepared to be so lead) that Iraq had more than just a programme. It was a dossier which explicitly claimed a "serious and current" threat from chemical and biological weapons "deployable within 45 minutes". This was not the view of Dr David Kelly, the man with the most knowledge on the subject in the country and a man who was paid by the taxpayer to advise the government. Why was his expertise being ignored?

Given that a vote on the matter was to take place in Parliament it was neither for the Prime Minister nor any government adviser to take the nation to war. That responsibility rested with Members of Parliament armed with all the necessary facts - including access, directly or indirectly, to the threat assessments of the relevant experts advising the government such as Dr Kelly. If Parliament had known Dr Kelly's view just before the war that Iraq only had programmes for WMDs it is more than a possibility that political sentiment would have swung away from the necessity for immediate war.

As is clear from his unpublished article Dr Kelly was of the view that Iraq had no WMDs at "military maturity". And clearly his views are a far cry from the contention in the September dossier that "Iraq has a useable chemical and biological weapons capability... Iraq’s military forces are able to use chemical and biological weapons, with command, control and logistical arrangements in place. The Iraqi military are able to deploy these weapons within 45 minutes of a decision to do so...." The dossier did not present this as a speculation or a probability. It was stated to be "beyond doubt" by the Prime Minister himself in the foreword.

It is also apparent from Dr Kelly's article why he was unable to identify specific evidence supporting the dossier's weapons claims. The only hard information he is able to refer to relates to the situation in 1991, and post 1991 he is only able to refer to "programmes". In respect of the latter he states:"Less easy to determine is the extent of activity undertaken since 1991. In its 12,000-page 'disclosure' submitted to the inspectors in December 2002, Iraq failed to declare any proscribed activities. Today the truly important issues are declaring the extent and scope of the programmes in 1991 and the personalities, 'committees' and organisations involved. There are indications that the programmes continue". Dr Kelly makes no reference to clear knowledge of actual weapons likely to be viable.

As many are now aware chemical and biological weapons produced back in 1991 are well beyond their usable shelf-life. All that was left in terms of evidence of Iraqi WMD developments since then were "indications" that "programmes continue" according to Dr Kelly. The only chemical and biological weapons which are referred to by Dr Kelly are those described as "available" from the 1991 era. These are clearly not "deployable" in any meaningful sense of the word as claimed in the September dossier. The shelf life of chemical weapons is around five years, and biological weapons three.

It is worth re-emphasising that the only known facts relating to weapons (as opposed to programmes) that Dr Kelly cites in his article concern chemical and biological weapons held in 1991. Yet he also acknowledges that "all known weapons and capability" from this era have since been destroyed or rendered harmless by UNSCOM and the IAEA.

We know separately, as regularly referred to by former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter for example, that there was a  proportion of the original arsenal of chemical and biological weapons from this era which remained unaccounted for and therefore 'unknown'. Ritter's view is that only 5-10% remained unaccounted for. These original weapons are referred to by Dr Kelly in his article as being "from activities up to 1991" and it is only these weapons that Dr Kelly claims knowledge of.

It must have been the case that Dr Kelly knew that those weapons were largely or wholly time expired, although he does not say so in his article. We now know he had access to relevant intelligence and that the article was produced just shortly before the war, as confirmed by Julie Flint. We also know from her that Dr Kelly's view was that simply because some pre-1991 weapons were unaccounted for did not necessarily mean they still existed.

Ultimately these circumstances lead Dr Kelly to his conclusion of that the threat posed by Iraq was "modest".

After the war Dr Kelly admitted to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee that he had "no idea" whether Iraq had had weapons of mass destruction at the time of the September 2002 dossier. From Dr Kelly's unpublished March 2003 article we know that his concern was with an anticipated long-term threat, not a current one.

It is also apparent from Dr Kelly's pre-war text that he had concerns about the real reasons for going to war: "The proportionality and intensity of the conflict will depend on whether regime change or disarmament is the true objective. The US, and whoever willingly assists it, should ensure that the force, strength and strategy used is appropriate to the modest threat that Iraq now poses." At the time that Dr Kelly wrote these words he, like much of the country, will have realised that the war was already a done deal with the US and nothing was likely to stop it.

Dr Kelly's main purpose in the article seems to have been to encourage a military campaign which would do as little damage to Iraq as possible. It may have been the most he dared say at that point given the loud beating of the war drums which was drowning out all alternative perspectives. He was after all a government employee and by now it was clear that Bush and Blair had already made up their minds.

Nonetheless after the war Dr Kelly embarked on a course of passing more information to the press concerning his reservations about the compilation of the September dossier and other claims that had been made about Iraq. This is apparent from the transcript of his telephone conversation with Susan Watts of the BBC discussed below. Doubtless his confidence to pass critical comment grew as the post-war public mood began to change and became retrospectively more questioning.

Indeed, we now know from the evidence he gave to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee that Dr Kelly's actual opinions on the threat to the UK, as the country's leading scientific expert on Iraqi WMDs, were in reality directly contrary to the case made by the government. His professional judgement immediately preceding the war (as we also now know from the further evidence he gave to the Intelligence and Security Committee) was that there was only a 30% chance that Iraq had chemical weapons - the most likely of the three WMD categories about which there was concern. At the time of the September dossier he actually had "no idea", according to the evidence he gave to the Foreign Affairs Committee the previous day.

The British legal case for war was based solely on the issue of weapons of mass destruction. It was not based on regime change. Taking into account what is now known about Dr Kelly's comments made both before and after the invasion of Iraq, it is clear that his analysis comprised a risk assessment which sat in stark contrast to the claim made by the Prime Minister on 5 February. The Prime Minister stated then that "I believe our case on weapons of mass destruction is very, very clear indeed."

Indeed if the country's leading expert simply had "no idea" whether Iraq had chemical weapons, the most likely category of WMD, at the time of the publication of the September dossier then how was it that Downing St had produced documentation stating with certainty that Iraq did?

How did both reach drastically different conclusions? According to the Sunday Times 10 August Dr Kelly "was shown MI6 documents throughout the process of compiling the dossier and asked to comment on them by the joint intelligence committee".

The dossier itself claimed Saddam had actual WMDs and did so expressing no doubt. The claims were made on an unqualified basis - not on the basis of possibility or probability. The dossier explicitly states that:

    "As a result of the intelligence we judge that Iraq has:

• continued to produce chemical and biological agents;
• military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, including against its own Shia population. Some of these weapons are deployable within 45 minutes of an order to use them..."

These claims are reinforced by the words of the British Prime Minister in his own foreword to the dossier which states as follows: "What I believe the assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt is that Saddam has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons, that he continues in his efforts to develop nuclear weapons.... I am in no doubt that the threat is serious and current.... the document discloses that his military planning allows for some of the WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them.... The threat posed to international peace and security, when WMD are in the hands of a brutal and aggressive regime like Saddam’s, is real.... We must ensure that he does not get to use the weapons he has....". 

The words used are "the weapons he has".

In contradiction to Dr Kelly, the government's leading expert with access to the underlying intelligence, the foreword to the document comprises an unqualified assertion by the Prime Minister that at the time of the production of the September dossier Saddam Hussein had chemical and biological weapons. This was stated to be "beyond doubt" based on "assessed intelligence". The Prime Minister was certain, whilst the country's leading expert had "no idea".

On the basis of this dossier, and the follow-on one in February - itself based in large part on material copied from a ten year old student thesis - Members of Parliament voted for war.

Would MPs have voted for war had they known that the government's leading expert who had access to the necessary intelligence considered the only current risk to be a 30 per cent chance that Iraq had chemical weapons. And would they have voted for war had they realised that the principal documents submitted to the UN as evidence of Iraq's nuclear ambitions were exposed as forgeries barely 10 days earlier? Unfortunately thanks to an uncourageous or inattentive press most MPs had not picked up on this scandal at the time.

Despite his pre-eminent technical knowledge Dr Kelly informed the Foreign Affairs Select Committee that he was not consulted on the ability of Iraq to deploy chemical and biological weapons within 45 minutes.

Dr Kelly's assertion that the intelligence base for the dossier was ten years old has since been unexpectedly supported in large part by a new damage limitation 'explanation' from US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld as the bogus nature of much of the pre-war 'evidence' becomes increasingly apparent.

The London Times 10 July reports on Rumsfeld's new post-war rationalisation of the failure to find WMDs as follows: "The Bush Administration conceded yesterday that it had no 'dramatic new evidence' about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction before the war — an admission in stark contrast to claims it made earlier this year to justify the invasion. ...The statement, made by Donald Rumsfeld, the US Defence Secretary, came amid growing anger on Capitol Hill about prewar intelligence. It followed a White House admission on Monday that President Bush used bogus evidence when he claimed in the State of the Union address in January that Iraq had tried to buy uranium from Africa. The rapidly gathering political storm in Washington threatened to overshadow Mr Bush’s five-nation African tour. Mr Bush was forced to defend himself and his Administration over the use of prewar intelligence at a press conference in Pretoria with President Mbeki of South Africa. Mr Rumsfeld, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, said that the US-led coalition 'did not act in Iraq because we had discovered dramatic new evidence of Iraq’s pursuit of weapons of mass murder'. Rather, he said, the United States acted because the Administration saw 'existing evidence in a new light, through the prism of our experience on September 11'. That claim appeared to shift significantly from the Administration’s stance before the war, most notably from assertions made by Colin Powell, the Secretary of State, in an address to the UN Security Council in February."

Indeed before the war the Bush Administration, like the Blair Government, was expressing certainty. At a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee hearing in March  2001 the Chairman of the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board Richard Perle, a Rumsfeld appointee and extreme hawk, pronounced on the matter. According to a report by the New Yorker's Seymour Hersh 5 May Perle stated “Does Saddam now have weapons of mass destruction? Sure he does. We know he has chemical weapons. We know he has biological weapons. . . . ".

Moreover, the 'moderate' Colin Powell also comes under attack in a report from Associated Press 10 August.   The report goes through, point by point, Powell's address to the UN Security Council in February and compares the content with what the reality on the ground is now known to be. The implication is that either American intelligence was appallingly inaccurate or people were lied to.

Little of Powell's address to the Security Council stands up to scrutiny including the relevance of the claim that Iraq had produced four tons of the nerve agent VX. Associated Press states that "Powell did not note that most of that four tons was destroyed in the 1990s under U.N. supervision.... Experts at Britain's International Institute of Strategic Studies said any pre-1991 VX most likely would have degraded anyway".

Powell also misled the same meeting of the Security Council with a false claim of Saddam's link to al Qaeda which French intelligence experts knew to be untrue. According to a report in Time magazine 3 March French officials belatedly raised objections stating "When we heard Powell citing our Chechen network suspects as the [Iraqi] terror link directly to al-Zarqawi everyone's mouth dropped open.... Al-Zarqawi hasn't been connected to these networks through material evidence or testimony. He doesn't even seem to lurking at the boundaries.... Frankly, no one wanted to risk creating trouble by saying anything about Powell's report [to the UN Security Council on 5th February] at that time. Today, relations between [the US and France] couldn't get any worse - so why not [raise objections now]?". All claims of Iraqi state links to al Qaeda have since been completely discredited.

But whatever may eventually be found in Iraq, in effect the most senior government WMD scientist in the country had confirmed his view to a British parliamentary committee that the government did not have the evidence it claimed at the time of the September dossier. In practical terms that is what Dr Kelly's appearance before the Foreign Affairs Select Committee revealed. What are the political implications of that? And why is the press not giving it more attention?

Clearly, as the most knowledgeable person on the subject in the country and as someone who had regular interaction with the intelligence services on such matters, Dr Kelly had been emerging since the invasion as a potentially dangerous witness against those who had massaged 'evidence' on Iraq in order to take Britain to war.

However, Dr Kelly may have given things away at the hearing which he hadn't intended. Following his death one of Dr Kelly's daughters is reported in the Sunday Times (London) 20 July as confirming that "her father was not a depressive but had realised he had not controlled his performance in front of the committee".

Perhaps during the hearing Dr Kelly was torn between his obligations to the government as a civil servant (including the requirements of the Official Secrets Act) and his conscience as a moral citizen and follower of the Baha'i faith. Although he denied at the hearing that there was anything in particular that he had wanted to convey to Gilligan, it is possible that in his interchanges with journalists at the BBC (of which there were two others besides) he saw an opportunity and a moral obligation to try to ensure that the general public were not deceived again on matters of such immense gravity.

The question arises as to whether by unofficially briefing journalists in this way Dr Kelly was consciously going beyond his permitted remit. Richard Hatfield, the MoD's director of personnel did not feel it was an innocent blunder on Dr Kelly's part. Hatfield is quoted from the Hutton Inquiry by the London Times 12 August as saying “He appears to have had, on his own account, two meetings with Mr Gilligan, which took place off MoD premises, with nobody having any knowledge of them and even on Dr Kelly’s account of what took place at that interview, he clearly had strayed beyond providing technical information. My interpretation, I’m afraid, of thinking back over his history is that he could not have done that without realising he had gone outside the scope of his discretion.”

Time magazine's account of the episode 28 July gives a sense of Dr Kelly's probable internal conflict reporting that "He would certainly have heard rumblings in Whitehall that the intelligence services were unhappy about the way their work was used as part of Blair's effort to make the case for war.... During the hearing, he chose to slalom through the questions: without trashing Gilligan, he tried to back the government.... many of his answers plead memory lapse or were oddly vague."

Indeed why was Dr Kelly willing to risk his own career by giving unauthorised briefings on such a controversial subject to members of the press, including speaking four or five times to Susan Watts, the BBC Newsnight science editor?

Dr Kelly's statement made before the Foreign Affairs Committee that he had access to the WMD intelligence relevant to his expertise would also seem to be supported by evidence given to the Hutton inquiry by Susan Watts. Dr Kelly had spoken to her two weeks before Andrew Gilligan - who had met him 22 May.

At that time Dr Kelly had told Ms Watts that the 45 minute claim came from a "single source, not corroborated". According to the London Times 13 August Ms Watts "had realised how good his information was only when Adam Ingram, the Armed Forces Minister, confirmed that the intelligence had come from a single source following the Today report on May 29. 'With hindsight, he (Dr Kelly) was passing on that information [to me] three weeks before it became public, which does indicate that he had extraordinary access to the information in that dossier'”. As the dossier doesn't state that the claim was based on a single source (the latter being a circumstance also disclosed to Gilligan by Dr Kelly on 22 May) clearly Dr Kelly had access to detailed intelligence knowledge.

It now appears that the source for the 45 minute claim, apart from being uncorroborated, was not even a direct one.  According to the Guardian 16 August "The revelation that the 45 minute claim is second hand is contained in an internal Foreign Office document released by the Hutton inquiry. It had been thought the basis for the claim came from an Iraqi officer high in Saddam Hussein's command structure. In fact it came through an informant, who passed it on to MI6.... The irony is that the government launched a furious attack on the BBC for broadcasting allegations that the dossier was 'sexed up' based on a single, anonymous, uncorroborated source. That source was Dr Kelly. Mr Campbell told the foreign affairs select committee: 'I find it incredible ... that people can report based on one single anonymous uncorroborated source.' In fact, the foundation for the government's claim was even shakier, according to the document: a single anonymous uncorroborated source quoting another single anonymous uncorroborated source". It would appear, therefore, that the dossier did not meet Mr Campbell's own criteria for the sourcing of allegations despite the fact that, as the Foreign Affairs Committee was to learn, he had chaired intelligence meetings dealing with the matter.

This aspect of the dossier has also been heavily criticised by Air Marshal Sir John Walker, a former chief of Defence Intelligence, who has suggested the Government's claims about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction were "not the reason to go to war, but the excuse to go to war" according to the Independent 25 August. In a letter to the Foreign Affairs Committee produced during the Hutton inquiry Sir John states "As an ex-deputy chairman of the JIC and chief of Defence Intelligence, I cannot credit that an assessment on which such an awesome decision rested should be based on a single source. I find that inconceivable. I also find it unacceptable".

The Independent also adds that "In his note to the committee, written on 2 July, Sir John suggests that the change in the no-fly zone operations from defensive to offensive tactics last autumn was because the US and UK had already decided to 'prepare the battlefield' by removing threats such as Iraq's Silkworm missiles. 'It points to a question that needs to be posed,' he wrote. 'When was the decision taken to go to war? If this thesis bears examination, then the nation was committed to war in the late summer, early autumn of 2002.' "

At the Hutton inquiry on 13 August Susan Watts played a tape of her earlier telephone conversation with Dr Kelly on 30 May. A transcript of the tape includes the following excerpts:

Dr Kelly: .... I mean I reviewed the whole thing [dossier], I was involved with the whole process.... it was very difficult to get comments in because people at the top of the ladder didn't want to hear some of the things.

Susan Watts:  so you expressed your unease about it? Put it that way.

Dr Kelly: errr well     yes yep yes

So although Dr Kelly didn't write the main dossier (only a background section) it would appear that he was involved in reviewing it. It appears that even he, as the government's acknowledged leading expert on Iraq's non-nuclear weapons, was not finding it easy being listened to by 'people at the top' who it would seem didn't want to hear his views.

Did Dr Kelly mean people at the top politically, or people at the top bureaucratically, or both? According to a BBC report from the Hutton Inquiry 19 August "Mr Blair was 'very hands on' with the compilation of the foreword of the September dossier, said Mr Campbell.  Mr Campbell said a number of changes to the foreword were suggested by Mr Scarlett and were then incorporated." Mr Scarlett is the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee.

Whatever was the case it would appear that part of the government machine was stonewalling its own expert.

One witness from the MoD's Defence Intelligence Staff gave evidence in this direction at the Hutton Inquiry 3 September. The next day the London Times reported that the witness, a member of the Counter-proliferation and Arms Control Department, "had discussed with Dr Kelly that they should have had more involvement in the document. 'We felt that the UK Government was missing a trick by not including us in the loop.'”

So David Kelly, the country's most knowledgeable man, was out of the loop. Why?

That may not be too difficult to understand. Later it emerged that at the highest levels within the Ministry of Defence there was awareness that Dr Kelly's views might not be helpful. Referring to the Permanent Secretary at the MoD the BBC reported 20 August 2003 that after Dr Kelly's name became public "Sir Kevin Tebbit warned Downing Street that Dr Kelly's emergence as the suspected mole was not some 'windfall bonus' in the row because he could have some awkward views". Sir Kevin sits on the Joint Intelligence Committee which wrote the dossier. 

According to the BBC 14 August the Hutton Inquiry "heard that Mr Tebbit had told Mr Hoon that if Dr Kelly appeared before the committee it would attach 'disproportionate importance' to his evidence".  Given what that evidence eventually proved to be, even if its significance appears to have eluded most of the media, it is not difficult to see why Tebbit was twitchy.

It is certainly clear that Dr Kelly never had a chance to brief the Prime Minister himself. Mr Blair's chief of staff Jonathan Powell told the Hutton inquiry 18 August "The Prime Minister wanted to know what we knew of Kelly's views on weapons of mass destruction... and what he would say if he appeared before the Intelligence and Security Committee or Foreign Affairs Committee."

So clearly the Prime Minister did not know the views of the country's most informed expert before he took the decision to go to war.

And, incredibly, neither did the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee if his own evidence is to be believed. Asked at the Hutton Inquiry on 26 August "Did you know, at the time, of any involvement Dr Kelly may have had in commenting on in particular biological and chemical weapons?" Mr Scarlett responded "No, I did not."

Yet Dr Kelly was hardly on the periphery of things. He had in fact accompanied Foreign Secretary Jack Straw the day after the publication the September dossier to a give evidence to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee on the WMD situation in Iraq (as confirmed by Andrew Gilligan of the BBC and in evidence given by Dr Kelly's wife and sister at the Hutton Inquiry).

So just get to get this straight - John Scarlett, the man at the top of the intelligence tree in the United Kingdom was asked by 10 Downing St to prepare a dossier setting out the intelligence community's views on the nature and extent of the current threat from Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. In so doing this man claims he did not know the views of the one person - a person on the government's own pay roll - who knew more about such matters then anyone else in the country.

Think about that. How could Scarlett make an assessment of what was going on in Iraq if his own testimony indicates he wasn't even able to find out what was going on the UK in the areas most relevant to the issue at hand? This scenario is clearly absurd.

Downing St's own statement of 8 July, when the government advised that it was aware of an official whom it believed was Gilligan's source, confirms that “The individual is an expert on WMD, who has advised ministers on WMD..." according to the London Times 19 September.

We are therefore asked to accept that the chairman of the JIC was adopting 'intelligence' on the 45 minute claim that had been derived from an Iraqi national whose evidence, as we now know as a result of the Hutton Inquiry, was regarded as doubtful by experts in the Defence Intelligence Staff.  Yet he failed to consult the country's own expert on WMDs, part of whose role was to advise Ministers.

What kind of an intelligence service is that?

On 27 August the London Times reported that "the inquiry heard, Dr Kelly was at a meeting of the Defence Intelligence Staff considering the draft dossier five days before it was published. James Dingemans, QC, counsel to the inquiry, pointed to a line in the original Ministry of Defence statement announcing that a potential source for Mr Gilligan’s story had come forward. It said that the official had explained to Mr Gilligan 'that he was not involved in the process of drawing up the intelligence parts of the dossier'. Mr Scarlett explained: 'At that stage, I and the others involved did not know that he had had any involvement, even of a minimal kind, in drafting the intelligence parts of the September dossier.' "

So what did the man who is supposed to know more about British intelligence than anyone else in the country actually know? It seems he didn't know Britain's own experts were, paid for at great expense by the taxpayer, and he didn't know how to contact them. Or so one must conclude from Mr Scarlett's own statements.

At the very least it seems clear that Dr Kelly's views were being filtered and kicked into the long grass from somewhere within the system. Referring back to Dr Kelly's own conversation with BBC reporter Susan Watts suggests that he knew this. He told her that "I reviewed the whole thing [dossier], I was involved with the whole process.... it was very difficult to get comments in because people at the top of the ladder didn't want to hear some of the things".

No wonder Dr Kelly may have felt obliged to speak more frankly to the press after the war. And no wonder former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter has offered to give evidence to the British Parliament about 'Operation Rockingham', the alleged British behind-the-scenes intelligence cherry-picking operation whose existence he confirmed to the press at the beginning of June.

It is of course another absurdity that a person such as Alastair Campbell should have had a hand in the final shaping the dossier in preference to a professional expert such as Dr Kelly.

In one email released by the Hutton Inquiry Campbell says "I had many discussions with the chairman of the JIC on presentational issues arising from the dossier and, in common with other officials, made drafting suggestions as the document evolved through various drafts.” This makes an interesting comparison with Campbell's claim elsewhere during the inquiry that he had had “no input, output or influence” on the dossier at any stage.

Dr Kelly also stated in his conversation with Susan Watts his opinion that a system of inspection "forms a real deterrence".

A later part of the interchange includes the following:

Dr Kelly: .... I think one of the problems with the dossier... is that it was presented in a very black and white way without any sort of quantitative aspects of it. The only quantitative aspects were figures essentially derived from UNSCOM figures, which in turn are Iraq's figures.... there was nothing else in there that was quantitative or even remotely qualitative.... I think that was the real concern that everyone had, it was not so much what they have now but what they would have in the future. But that unfortunately wasn't expressed strongly in the dossier because that takes away the case for war to a certain extent

Susan Watts: A clear and present, imminent threat?

Dr Kelly: Yes

It is clear that Dr Kelly was unhappy with the stated urgency of the threat as presented to the British public. Later in the conversation Dr Kelly indicates that he cannot say that Alastair Campbell specifically was responsible for this exaggeration but that "All I can say is the Number Ten press office". He doesn't rule Campbell out, however, adding "I think Alastair Campbell is synonymous with that press office because he's responsible for it".

It is also clear that there were concerns within the Foreign Office, in addition to the Ministry of Defence, that Kelly might say too much when appearing before the Foreign Affairs Select Committee. During the first week of the Hutton Inquiry various documents were produced . One of these was an E-mail dated 14 July 2003 from Colin Smith, of the Foreign Office's counter-proliferation department. The email confirms that the deputy chief of defence intelligence at the Ministry of Defence, Martin Howard "is to brief David Kelly this afternoon for his appearances tomorrow before the FAC [Foreign Affairs Committee[ and ISC [Intelligence and Security Committee], and will strongly recommend that Kelly is not drawn on his assessment of the dossier (but stick to what he told Gilligan)". As presented to the inquiry the email had sections blanked out as secret.

There was also concern about what other government employees might say if called before the Intelligence and Security Committee. The London Times 15 August confirms, in its article entitled 'MoD moved to stop witness call on staff', the existence of a memo written by Martin Howard and discussed at the Hutton Inquiry.

The memo recommends that “we should resist any calls from the ISC (Intelligence and Security Committee) to disclose the identities of the individuals concerned, call them as witnesses or have access to their written comments to line management”. According to the Times the memo related to the fact that "The Ministry of Defence wanted to stop two senior members of its intelligence staff who had expressed concerns about the government dossier on Iraq from appearing as witnesses before a parliamentary committee". The views of these officers were overruled by the Joint Intelligence Committee during the process of preparing the dossier according to earlier evidence given to the inquiry by Mr Howard.

So it seems a number of experts within the Ministry of Defence were unhappy with the 'spinning' of the contents of the dossier, not just Dr Kelly.

The Independent reported 13 August that the inquiry had revealed that Alastair Campbell chaired his first meeting on a key dossier on Iraq on 5 September.  This was a meeting of the so-called Iraq Communications Group, a body of senior officials tasked with the presentation of the dossier.

On the same day a draft report on 'Iraq's WMD programmes' was produced.  The report did not contain the 45-minutes claim according to the Independent 12 August.

Peter Ricketts, political director at the Foreign Office, had previously told the Foreign Affairs Select Committee in June that the 45-minute claim appeared in the 'first draft' - the implication being that if it had been there from the start there was no process of 'sexing up' in later editions.

However, the Independent 15 August reported that the Hutton inquiry produced evidence that the 45-minute claim arose 5 or 6 days after the draft document of 5 September. A later draft read: "The Iraqi military may be able to deploy chemical or biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so."

However, by the final version this "may be able to deploy" had become "these weapons are deployable within 45 minutes of an order to use them". There appears to have been no new intelligence relating to this matter between the date of the two versions. The Guardian reported 12 August that "Mr Howard said the intelligence about Iraq being able to use WMD within 45 minutes was received on August 30 2002".

The Government had previously maintained that Mr Campbell had become involved on 9 September when he chaired a meeting to discuss the publication of intelligence about Saddam's regime. It now looks as if Mr Campbell was involved from 5 September when there was no 45-minute claim in the text. On 18 August the BBC reported from the inquiry that "Documents showed it had been decided by 5 September to restructure the dossier 'as per TB's discussion' - an apparent reference to the prime minister".

The London Times 15 August summarises this 'strengthening' process as follows: "Martin Howard, deputy chief of Defence Intelligence, was shown a document dated September 10 in which the 45-minute claim first appeared. It stated that recent intelligence had 'suggested' that Iraq could deploy weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes. By September 16 a draft said that Iraq 'may be able to deploy' weapons in this time. When the dossier was published, it said that Iraq’s 'military planning allows for some WMD to be deployed within 45 minutes'. Mr Howard said that the difference between the first two drafts was 'fine shading', but accepted the language was harder in the final version."

Without the apparent arrival of any new intelligence the claim of a 45 minute deployment ability had developed during the month first from a suggestion, then onto a possibility, to be finally transformed into an actuality in the final publication. Was this 'sexing up' or not?

The Independent of 30 August clearly thought it was: "The Hutton documents show that Mr Campbell may have misled Parliament as well as the inquiry. After giving his testimony to the Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee examining the Government's case for war, in June, Mr Campbell admitted asking Mr Scarlett for 11 changes. The letter, leaked to a national newspaper by a Labour MP on the committee, showed that Mr Campbell had not referred to the '45 minutes' threat. Lord Hutton, however, published the original letter Mr Campbell sent to the JIC chairman. It showed that he had, in fact, asked for changes to the supposed '45 minutes threat', and obtained his demand. The draft dossier had stated that Iraq 'may be able to deploy chemical or biological weapons within 45 minutes'. Mr Campbell complained in his letter that the word 'may' was too weak. Mr Scarlett replied that 'the language you queried ... had been tightened'. The published dossier read: 'The Iraqi military are able to deploy these weapons within 45 minutes of a decision to do so.' The Hutton documents also revealed that Mr Campbell had prevailed upon the JIC chairman to include a claim in the dossier that Saddam could have a nuclear arsenal within two years..... Mr Campbell's enthusiasm for exaggerating Iraq's nuclear threat could explain why Downing Street was keen to maintain the allegation that Saddam was trying to buy uranium from Niger, despite the claim being widely dismissed, even by the US administration."

Interest from the US media in the Hutton Inquiry has been limited. But Time magazine 1 September also appeared less than impressed with Downing St's defence of its 'dodgy dossier'. Time comments that "Downing Street does appear to have hardened the case for war. Last September, Blair's chief of staff Jonathan Powell argued to Campbell and Joint Intelligence Committee chairman John Scarlett that the government's dossier 'does nothing to demonstrate a threat, let alone an imminent threat from Saddam.' Campbell played down the significance of that e-mail and said he had not read others — such as one from Philip Bassett, a special Downing Street adviser, that fretted the government would be 'in a lot of trouble' with the dossier as it stood. And despite his denials, Campbell, citing a need for consistency, apparently persuaded Scarlett to toughen the wording of the 45-minute claim. Scarlett changed 'may be able' to 'are able' so that the sentence read: 'Iraq's military forces are able to deploy these weapons within 45 minutes of a decision to do so.' So much for no influence, although Campbell insisted he made observations only, and that Scarlett had 'ownership of the dossier.'"

Andrew Gilligan has claimed at the inquiry that Dr Kelly told him Iraq did not have "usable weapons". It appears Dr Kelly was not alone in such views.

Reporting on the Hutton Inquiry the Independent 17 August states "A member of the defence intelligence staff, who identified himself as 'probably the most senior and experienced intelligence community official working on WMD', wrote just before the dossier's release to Tony Cragg, then the deputy chief of defence intelligence, to express formal reservations about the dossier. According to Martin Howard, Mr Cragg's successor, the reservation was partly that 'the language was too strong on the continued production of chemical and biological agents'".

If there were intelligence doubts about even the continued production of such agents how could the Prime Minister state with such certainty that WMDs based on them were deployable in 45 minutes?

On 19 August Alastair Campbell himself gave evidence to the inquiry. The BBC reported that Campbell "told the inquiry he had first become aware of the specific dossier in August and had first seen a draft of it on 5 September at a meeting he had chaired on the proposed dossier. He said he did not know whether that draft contained the claim about Iraq being able to launch weapons within 45 minutes - saying the first time he saw it was in the draft on 10 September."

However, the London Times 20 August gives a somewhat different account stating "Mr Campbell said that he had not seen a draft of the dossier before September 10, despite another e-mail shown to the inquiry, in which he had written five days earlier: 'Re dossier, substantial rewrite, with JS (John Scarlett) and Julian M (Julian Miller, a JIC official) in charge.' This, he said, referred to the latest in a series of papers about different countries’ weapons of mass destruction programmes which had been in preparation for about six months. Asked by Lord Hutton if the material which his e-mail mentioned was in fact a 'fairly detailed draft dossier', he said that it was 'redundant' material, and said the position by that date was 'there is a new dossier to be done by John Scarlett and for him to take all of this material and turn this into a new dossier' ”. It would seem there are some dossiers that count as dossiers, and some dossiers that don't.

Campbell was adamant that the insertion of the 45 minute claim was down to the intelligence services and that John Scarlett, the Chairman of Joint Intelligence Committee had told him "There may well be people down the ranks who are unhappy with this but you have to know this is not the view of people at the top."

Scarlett's suggestion was certainly consistent with earlier evidence given to the inquiry concerning one intelligence officer and reported by the Independent 18 August. In an account which suggested a government cover-up of such concerns the Independent confirmed that "An explosive letter, revealed in full as Downing Street officials prepare to give evidence to Lord Hutton's inquiry this week, makes it clear that the officer, whose name has not been revealed, felt 'very uneasy' about claims made to MPs by Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary. Mr Straw said that the intelligence community had no complaints about the dossier but the intelligence officer had formally registered his concerns last September. The officer, who described himself as 'the most senior and experienced intelligence community official working on WMD', said on 8 July he feared that he 'might be judged culpable' if he didn't come forward to correct Mr Straw's remarks to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, and asked for advice on whether to do so. However, after David Kelly was found dead, Martin Howard, deputy chief of Defence Intelligence, wrote to the official to suggest that he should not take the matter any further....The officer had formally complained on 19 September that he was unhappy with its use of intelligence. He wrote to the Defence Intelligence Staff technical department and Tony Cragg, the then deputy chief of Defence Intelligence. However, what was not revealed during the hearing was that the officer's letter had referred explicitly to Mr Straw's failure to tell MPs the full truth of such concerns."

In another article the Independent 17 August also reported that "Scrutiny of documents released by the Hutton inquiry into the death of the weapons expert Dr David Kelly reveals that not only were key claims about the nature and extent of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction strengthened in the two weeks before the dossier's publication in September 2002 but that a crucial change was made to the title. Right up until the publication of the final draft, and as late as 19 September, the document was entitled 'Iraq's programme for weapons of mass destruction'. But on 24 September, when the Government published the finished version, it left out the words 'programme for'. According to Dr Glen Rangwala, the Cambridge academic who exposed the Government's February dossier as having been plagiarised from a student thesis on the internet, that change is important because the inclusion of the word 'programme' does not assume that such weapons existed.... The revelations give further support to Dr Kelly's concerns, which formed the basis of BBC Radio 4's defence correspondent Andrew Gilligan's claim that the dossier had been 'sexed up' ".

On 18 August the Prime Minister's chief of staff Jonathan Powell gave evidence to the Hutton Inquiry. Part of the evidence confirmed that the email Powell had written a week before the publication of the September dossier which stated that "The document does nothing to demonstrate a threat, let alone an imminent threat from Saddam" had been circulated to the key players - the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, John Scarlett, Mr Blair's communications chief, Alastair Campbell, and Blair's then foreign affairs adviser Sir David Manning. The email added that the dossier "does not demonstrate he has the motive to attack his neighbours let alone the west. We will need to make it clear in launching the document that we do not claim that we have evidence that he is an imminent threat."

The email was one of a number from Tony Blair's closest aides that has come to light during the inquiry which the London Times 19 August considered "threatened to blow a hole yesterday in Downing Street’s insistence that it had not 'sexed up' last September’s Iraq weapons dossier, nor 'turned the screw' on David Kelly".

It is also now known, as reported in the Guardian 28 August, that Ann Taylor (the former cabinet minister who was handpicked by the Prime Minister to chair the Intelligence and Security committee after the last election) told the Hutton Inquiry that the dossier had failed to provide enough evidence to justify action against Saddam Hussein. She had outlined her reservations in an email to Downing Street six days before the dossier was published.

In the event the dossier ultimately claimed a "serious and current" threat rather than an "imminent" one, although in most people's minds the 45 minutes claim gave the impression of imminence - and doubtless it was intended to.

The day after the publication of the dossier the mass circulation tabloid newspaper the Sun, owned by Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation, ran the headline"Brits 45 mins from doom" and on the day itself the London Evening Standard managed "45 minutes from attack" (Jonathan Powell had earlier sent an email to Campbell asking "What will be the headline in the Standard on the day of publication?")

Crucially the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, John Scarlett, confirmed at the Hutton inquiry 26 August that the 45 minute claim was not only single source, but that it did not relate to missiles at all. Rather it related to "munitions, battle shields, mortar shells or similar weapons".

In its 11 September report on the government's pre-war intelligence assessment of the Iraqi threat the Intelligence and Security Committee demurely commented on this new explanation as follows: "The dossier was for public consumption and not for experienced readers of intelligence material. The 45 minutes claim, included four times, was always likely to attract attention because it was arresting detail that the public had not seen before. As the 45 minutes claim was new to its readers, the context of the intelligence and any assessment needed to be explained. The fact that it was assessed to refer to battlefield chemical and biological munitions and their movement on the battlefield, not to any other form of chemical or biological attack, should have been highlighted in the dossier. The omission of the context and assessment allowed speculation as to its exact meaning. This was unhelpful to an understanding of this issue." In other words it was spin.

Assuming that the 45 minute claim was not just simply made up (the government has after all yet to fully explain itself in relation to the Niger forgeries discussed more below) these limited delivery systems could hardly be described as a "serious and current" threat to anyone in the UK or even Cyprus. But the dossier conveniently avoided mentioning that.

This 'little' revelation therefore portrays what must rank very close to the top in the contest for the finest piece of public opinion manipulation produced during the Blair era. It is one which the BBC, remaining most polite given the implications, summed up on 26 August as follows: "The fact that the dossier was full of references to chemical and biological agents, sharing space with a detailed discussion of Iraq's ballistic missile capabilities, led some observers to conclude that forty five minutes referred to a non-conventional missile strike. Apparently, it didn't. Speaking to the Hutton inquiry, John Scarlett said it related to rather less menacing weapons: 'battlefield mortar shells or small calibre weaponry.... If the 45-minute claim was really so important, why didn't the government's dossier explain what it meant in the first place?'"

You don't need to be a genius to answer that question. What is harder to answer is who spun the presentation of this information. Was it Scarlett or someone else in 10 Downing St - or both together?

Commenting on the report of the Iraq Survey Group published the day before the London Times 3 October confirms that "not one ballistic missile was located, nor any solid evidence that Iraq intended to use the delivery systems it might have had for chemical or biological weapons".

Moreover the information relating to the 45 minute deployment claim, according to the Guardian 27 August, indicated there was "no specific intelligence of their plans as to how/when/with what they would do so". In addition the BBC report had confirmed that the single source information was second hand: "John Scarlett admitted to the inquiry the intelligence was not first hand, but said it was from 'an established and reliable line of reporting... quoting a senior Iraqi military officer in a position to know this information.'"

Reliance on such a single source had already been described as "unacceptable" by Air Marshal Sir John Walker, a former chief of Defence Intelligence and ex-deputy chairman of the JIC, in his earlier letter to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee.

The Independent had also previously expressed its criticism of the type of justification offered by Scarlett to the inquiry. Writing on the 27 July the paper states that "There is doubt whether the source had first-hand knowledge. It has been suggested he was told it by a senior Iraqi officer. So why is he being hidden? MI6 is believed to have 'exfiltrated' him immediately after the war. He might be in a safe house in Baghdad or even in leafy Virginia Water by now. The question also arises as to whether this source was involved in joint CIA/MI6 operations to bribe senior Iraqi officers not to fight during the invasion. Was he being paid for information? Or was he supplying it because of revulsion for the Saddam regime? Or was he settling a score with Saddam's regime? Why did he take such an enormous risk? Whatever the source's motives, it would have been important in assessing the quality of his information and therefore how right the Government was to give it such prominence. Word in intelligence circles is that he was paid. So were our intelligence services rooked? Should the source be asked to appear at the Hutton inquiry or in front of Parliament's Intelligence and Security Committee? Or do he and MI6 have something to hide?"

But if the claim really wasn't just fabricated by the intelligence services themselves, then what is the betting that this 'information' came from a source connected to the highly dubious Iraqi National Congress associated with the CIA backed Ahmad Chalabi which had also been pumping dubious information into the Office of Special Plans in Washington?

If so, then who is Chalabi, and what is his relationship with the Bush administration and the US media?

Commenting on Bush's speech to the post-war meeting of the UN general assembly on 23 September William Rivers Pitt (co-author, with former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter, of the best selling book 'War on Iraq' ) answers such questions as follows: "...the Iraqi seat was filled at the United Nations by none other than the crawling kingsnake himself, Ahmad Chalabi. Chalabi has been cheerleading for war in Iraq for years, and became a boon companion of Donald Rumsfeld and the other neocon hawks who cobbled the war together with a tapestry of lies and fear-mongering. He was, in fact, Rumsfeld's hand-picked leader-in-waiting of Iraq as early as 1997. Chalabi was convicted of 32 counts of bank fraud and sentenced to 22 years imprisonment by a Jordanian court in 1992, and yet this hand-picked sock puppet was George W. Bush's chosen exemplar of a free and democratic Iraq. If you want to know one big reason why the mainstream media reported so long and so erroneously about Iraq's weapons capabilities, look to Chalabi, who was the main source for New York Times reporter Judy Miller's horribly inaccurate reporting on the matter. Where the Times goes, the others will follow."

Or as more restrained Susan Watts put it during one BBC Newsnight piece broadcast 3 June, "The problem is that the 45 minutes point was not corroborated. For sceptics it highlights the dangers of relying too heavily on information from defectors. Journalists in America are being accused of running propaganda from the Iraqi National Congress".

However, it is beginning to look as if Chalabi may now aiming be to outsmart Rumsfeld and Co for his own purposes if an article in the London Times 17 September is anything to go by. The Times states "While thanking the US for getting rid of Saddam, he made a long list of demands [at the UN] that clash at every point with American policy. He wants the UN General Assembly to give his US-appointed 25-member body sovereign status. He wants the council to have at least partial control of finance and security. And he does not want any more foreign troops in the country. This is a blow, for the Pentagon had groomed Chalabi to be its man in Baghdad".

If Cheney, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz managed to sucker Congress and the British parliament into the war ably assisted with the help of Chalabi and Downing St's 'dodgy dossiers', ironically will Chalabi eventually end up suckering them?

The Sydney Morning Herald 14 June had previously been blunt in its assessment of Chalabi's incestuous relationship with the US government. It stated that "We now know that much of the American 'intelligence' has come from Ahmed Chalabi, that convicted swindler scheming to rule Iraq and its oil wealth as the Pentagon's satrap after 40 years in exile". According to another report in the same paper 23 July a recently published book describes how the formation of the Iraqi National Congress was assisted by US public relations firm Rendon, whose clients include the Pentagon and the CIA. The Herald reported that "Chalabi, who has been convicted in Jordan of fraud and embezzlement, remains the US choice to head a new Iraqi administration".

The Independent explicitly relayed allegations of Chalabi's role in the surfacing of the 45 minute claim in its report of 1 June, stating that "Tony Blair's sensational pre-war claim that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction 'could be activated within 45 minutes' was based on information from a single Iraqi defector of dubious reliability... British intelligence sources said the defector, recruited by Ahmed Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress, told his story to American officials. It was passed on to London as part of regular information-sharing with Washington, but British intelligence chiefs considered the '45 minutes' claim to be unreliable and uncorroborated by any other evidence. How it came to be included as the most dramatic element in the Government's 'intelligence dossier' last September, making the case for war, is now the subject of a furious row in Whitehall and abroad".

If the Independent's report proves to be accurate then the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, Mr Scarlett, has a lot of explaining left to do.

A further development reported by the London Times 29 September can only increase the intensity of questioning in this area. The Times confirmed that "The White House came under separate pressure over its use of prewar intelligence after Pentagon officials conceded yesterday that most of the information provided by Iraqi exiles was useless. Several defectors, whose claims about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction formed a significant part of Washington’s case for war, invented or exaggerated their knowledge of Saddam’s weapons programmes, according to defence officials. Some of the most prominent defectors, who were paid up to $1 million of taxpayers’ money for their information, were introduced to US intelligence by Ahmad Chalabi, the leader of the Iraqi National Congress. Mr Chalabi, who now sits on the Iraqi Governing Council, had powerful support before the war from Dick Cheney, the Vice- President, and the Pentagon’s civilian leadership. The Pentagon’s assessment of his organisation’s prewar claims raises questions about the Administration’s wisdom in relying so heavily on the advice of an exile with a vested interest in seeing Saddam overthrown. An internal investigation into the quality and reliability of the exiles’ claims, conducted by the Defence Intelligence Agency, concluded that some information was useful, but efforts to pursue leads arising as a result had, for the most part, led nowhere. Much of the information provided about the Iraqi Government also proved to be wrong, defence officials said. The Pentagon report, leaked yesterday to The New York Times, comes the day after a dire assessment of pre-war intelligence by the House Intelligence Committee. After a four-month investigation, the bipartisan panel concluded that the intelligence was outdated and unreliable, even though it cost millions of dollars to gather it".

A more than likely scenario is that, massaged by Rumsfeld's 'Office of Special Plans' (discussed more below), Chalabi's sources were encouraged to give the answers that those within the British and American governments promoting war most wanted to hear at the time. It was a time when they had almost nothing to pin on Saddam Hussein. It is notable in particular that the critical so-called 'intelligence' on the 45 minute claim came in remarkably conveniently just before work on the preparation of the September dossier began.

In these circumstances it is unlikely that the warmongers in London and Washington would have wanted to spend too much time testing the veracity of such claims, either by looking for additional corroborative evidence, or by listening to internal critics who considered the nature of the evidence not credible in the context of other intelligence.

On 26 August the London Times reported that "the inquiry into Dr Kelly’s death on July 17 also heard that members of the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS), who analyse material for the JIC, prepared a six-page document of changes that they wanted after reading a late draft. Mr Scarlett accepted some of these but a DIS appeal for the wording of the 45-minute claim to be softened appears to have been overruled."

Another report in the same edition elaborates further on the JIC chairman's evidence to the Hutton Inquiry. It states "Mr Scarlett disclosed that, at a drafting meeting a week before the dossier was published, intelligence staff had suggested changes to soften the 45-minute claim. These did not appear in the final document. He said it was acceptable to rely on the 45-minute intelligence, although it was based on a single source, because the informant had proved reliable in the past. Mr Scarlett was so eager to deny that there had been any rows between Alastair Campbell and intelligence chiefs that he was mildly rebuked for interrupting counsel before the question was finished". Was this a case of 'Me thinks he does protest too much'? And what informant for any of the alleged claims about Iraq in the dossier has proved to be reliable?

Indeed later at the Hutton Inquiry Dr Brian Jones, a recently retired official from a section of the MoD's Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) that had been dealing with certain aspects of the Iraqi threat assessment, stated "The way in which the information was reported did not give us any real feel that the... primary source - knew very much about the subject he was reporting... We even wondered in discussing the issue whether he might even have been trying to influence rather than inform."

A report in the London Times 4 September states that "Dr Jones explained how he had written to his superiors, complaining about the use of the 45-minute claim in the dossier, a course of action he had taken only once or twice before.... Dr Jones said that his staff’s concerns over the 45-minute item were based upon its source, its contents, and the lack of any other supporting intelligence. The intelligence was said to have come from a reliable source, who had in turn heard about it from another individual in Iraq 'who was in a position to know such things'.... Such fears were underlined by the lack of any detail in the intelligence, he said, although the intelligence agency which passed on the item had not raised any such concerns." That agency was MI6.

The Times also reported that Dr Jones had told the inquiry that he and his team had been “worried” about the lack of any “collateral intelligence” to support the 45-minute claim. He said “We hadn’t seen weapons being produced. We hadn’t seen any evidence of field trials.” He said that “significant” changes suggested by his team of scientists had not been acted upon, something which made his expert on chemical weapons “very concerned”.

Dr Jones cited a chemical weapons expert at the MoD who had been worried about claims relating to the more general question of the production of weapons and chemical warfare agents since United Nations inspectors left Iraq in 1998. Dr Jones said "He was concerned that he could not point to any solid evidence of such production... He did not have good evidence that it had happened." 

The dossier itself states "Parts of the al-Qa ’qa ’chemical complex damaged in the Gulf War have also been repaired and are operational. Of particular concern are elements of the phosgene production plant at al-Qa ’qa ’...While phosgene does have industrial uses it can also be used by itself as a chemical agent or as a precursor for nerve agent".

The Hutton Inquiry heard from one Ministry of Defence expert who was a member of the Counter-proliferation and Arms Control Department at the MoD who had advised that such suggestions should not be included in the dossier. Anonymously referred to at the inquiry simply as 'Mr A' the London Times reported 4 September on part of his evidence which stated that "To state that it was of particular concern against a backdrop in which the Iraqi armed forces had never weaponised phosgene, nor shown any intention of doing so, was, for me, the wrong emphasis. As I sadly predicted, Iraq invited journalists to go to al-Qa Qaa and see for themselves”.

In an email to Dr Kelly 'Mr A' had stated that “All-in-all, I am with the manager of al-Qa Qaa . . . Another example supporting our view that you and I should have been more involved in this than the spin-merchants of our administration.”

It seems from this that both 'Mr A' and Dr Kelly were of the view that a spinning exercise was going on. 'Mr A' told the inquiry that his remarks were "really a general comment from the working level in the DIS (Defence Intelligence Staff) about perceived interference. The perception was that the dossier had been round the houses several times in order to try and find a form of words that would strengthen certain political objectives.”

A report in the London Times 26 August had shed some light on that process stating that "Mr Campbell chaired a meeting on September 5. No formal notes were kept but, Mr Scarlett said that the purpose was to consider the dossier’s structure. A draft in June that did not mention the 45-minute claim was abandoned. Meanwhile, new intelligence emerged in late August. The 45-minute claim came via MI6, from a single, established and reliable source, quoting a senior Iraqi military officer 'in a position to know this information', Mr Scarlett said. Mr Scarlett said that people were 'not at all' unhappy that this came from a single source. The process of assessing intelligence involved considering other available information, previous assessments and the reliability of the source. Mr Campbell had a private meeting with Mr Scarlett on September 9, before Mr Campbell held a meeting in his office attended by MI6 officers. Mr Scarlett was back in Mr Campbell’s office on September 11. He had no record of that meeting 'but my memory is that the advice from the presentational side' was to have less assertion, less rhetoric and more detail".

Not everyone will feel comfortable with the idea that Scarlett was having private meetings with Campbell of which there is no record. Not everyone is going to be happy with the allegation that the 45 minute claim came from an Iraqi source 'in a position to know this information' particularly given that a major conduit for 'information' out of Iraq had been people associated with Pentagon sponsored Iraqi exile Ahmed Chalabi.

Nonetheless, Jonathan Powell's pre-publication statement still indicated that in his mind no threat of any kind had been demonstrated by the contents of the dossier. In particular Powell was concerned that the dossier had not demonstrated that Saddam had "the motive to attack his neighbors, let alone the West" and that "You need to make it clear that Saddam could not attack us at the moment". Is that what MPs understood when they voted for the war?

Much of the dossier preparation process has been made remarkably open to view during the process of the Hutton Inquiry. One of the simplest summaries of what had been revealed during the first part of the inquiry was provided by columnist Libby Purves in the London Times 26 of August. She quipped “Hang on, if we’re having trouble putting this war message across, maybe the fault lies with the facts, not the language”.

Despite the inevitable media focus on his own personal tragedy the principle issue raised by the actions and comments of Dr Kelly is the question as to who was responsible for deceiving the nation over the nature of the alleged 'threat' from Iraq, and not just in relation to the 45 minute claim. If Alastair Campbell and Downing St are eventually found to be out of the frame by Lord Hutton (a prospect by no means certain) then the search must move elsewhere. It is clear that in a number of respects the threat was exaggerated in the dossier. The question is by whom?

Indeed, who are those "many dark actors playing games" that Dr Kelly alarmingly referred to shortly before his death? Was Dr Kelly referring directly or indirectly to 'Operation Rockingham', a clandestine British intelligence spinning exercise on Iraq similar in purpose to the 'Office of Special Plans' in the US?

The existence of Rockingham war recently alleged by former weapons inspector and US intelligence officer Scott Ritter. Ritter, an American, was UN chief weapons inspector for Iraq until his resignation in 1998. If Ritter's allegations (discussed in more detail below) are sound then the post war surfacing of Dr Kelly's 'awkward' expert opinions may have become the single greatest threat to the work of those involved in Rockingham and the Office of Special Plans.

Prior to Dr Kelly's death Ritter himself had offered to give evidence on Rockingham to the British parliament according to a report in the Glasgow Sunday Herald 8 June. Indeed, given what has already been exposed by the Hutton Inquiry an investigation of Britain's largely unaccountable intelligence services would seem to be essential.

Not everyone is confident that the Hutton process will precipitate such probing. Some even feel its effect will be to prevent the most important questions being pursued too thoroughly.

Commenting in the Guardian 1 September former Deputy Prime Minister in the Major government, Michael Heseltine, states "Dr Kelly's death gave a new urgency to the demand for an inquiry but it also provided a lifeline.... There could be uncomfortable revelations. But all this would be as nothing to the dangers that could arise from the alternative and far-reaching inquiry that the government was so determined to avoid.....There can be no case for a second look at all those issues at great cost to the taxpayer.  It will be left to parliament - in effect to Labour MPs. My guess is that the majority of them are deeply ashamed of what they have supported in the name of party loyalty.... In the absence of the evidence that could give credibility to our actions this government can restore trust only by opening the record for the public scrutiny of a judicial inquiry."

The London Times 1 August comments on Lord Hutton's own closeness to the British intelligence services stating that "Lord Hutton's long involvement with the secret services make him well placed to probe the world of intelligence and political intrigue surrounding David Kelly’s death.... His time in Northern Ireland gave him considerable insight into the workings of the Secret Intelligence Service and attuned him to the political sensitivities of cases involving state security...."

We will only know if this proves to have been an advantage or a disadvantage when Lord Hutton provides his final report. Will he be bold enough to recommend, for example, a separate investigation of the intelligence services where his existing terms of reference do not give him sufficient latitude? Lord Hutton has protected the intelligence services in the past. The Times points out that "The Oxford-educated judge, aged 72, was one of the law lords who decided that a public interest defence was not available to David Shayler, the former MI5 agent who disclosed secrets alleging incompetence in the security services".

Shayler's concerns have in fact been much more than simply about professional incompetence, however.

Last November the Observer reported on Shayler's follow-on trial. At that time Shayler was claiming that MI6 had "paid large sums of money to an al-Qaeda cell in Libya in a doomed attempt to assassinate Colonel Gaddafi in 1996" and that one of the members of the cell had been granted political asylum in Britain, living in Manchester until 2000.  Shayler named the MI6 officer involved in the British payments to al Qaeda.

The Observer pointed out that "During the Shayler trial, Home Secretary David Blunkett and Foreign Secretary Jack Straw signed Public Interest Immunity certificates to protect national security. [As a result] Reporters were not able to report allegations about the Gaddafi plot during the course of the trial.... These restrictions have led to a row between the Attorney General and the so-called D-Notice Committee, which advises the press on national security issues..... Members of the committee, who include senior national newspaper executives, are said to be horrified at the unprecedented attempt to censor the media during the trial."

Once again 'national security' excuses appear to have been used as a fig leaf for covering up illicit activity by the British government - in that case the actuality was no less than British sponsorship of international terrorism.

Not surprisingly public alarm about the activities of the intelligence services is growing. As an official in France's intelligence community put it in Time magazine 28 July in relation to the current controversy over Iraq "American and British politicians have used the covert nature of intelligence gathering as cover to pass all kinds of arguments to the public. There's a limit to that. Patience runs out. People demand accountability..."

On 10 August the London Times reached the view on the Hutton Inquiry that "No one should try to read the judge’s mind [at the Hutton Inquiry] but his interventions suggest he has narrowed the lines of useful inquiry."

At this stage it is difficult to anticipate whether Lord Hutton's inquiry "into the circumstances surrounding the death of Dr Kelly" will lead to anywhere genuinely useful. There are some influential voices who seem to hope it will not.  In its edition of 2 August the London Times editorial team (one generally regarded, unlike some of the paper's columnists, to be pro-war as is common in publications owned by Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation) states "Lord Hutton has wisely decided to focus narrowly on the circumstances leading to Dr Kelly’s suicide, and not to try to answer the many very broad questions about intelligence and its presentation that arise from it."

The public are of course deeply interested in those broader questions, to which the death of Dr Kelly is directly connected - and indeed much in relation to these has spilled out during the course of the Hutton inquiry. But in the words of MP Michael Mates, a member of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee responsible for investigating the questionable circumstances surrounding the British government's advocacy of war against Iraq, "There must be more to this than we had thought. I do not know what that means, I just think there is".

At the very least the crude public exposure of Dr Kelly suggests there was an unusually high level of concern by elements within the British government to flush out the source of the BBC's story on the alleged exaggeration of intelligence in the September dossier. Defence Minister Geoff Hoon in fact confirmed this at the Hutton Inquiry. According to the BBC 27 August "Lord Hutton asked if Mr Hoon was saying the MoD statement was issued solely to get the BBC to reveal its source. Mr Hoon said that was partly its purpose, but he was also 'very conscious that we risked being accused of a cover-up'".

Deterrence of other leakers would doubtless have been a major objective. The BBC also reported 27 August that "Mr Hoon said  that the MoD had 'something of a reputation' for leaking information to journalists and he thought this could be a chance to show unauthorised media contacts would be 'looked at seriously' ". A report in the Independent 20 July makes it clear that the Armed Forces minister Adam Ingram considered Dr Kelly to be in danger of losing his job if discovered to be the source of the BBC's allegations.

Although the MoD denies such pressures were placed on Dr Kelly, the London Times 5 September reports that at the Hutton Inquiry former UN weapons inspector Olivia Bosch "said he had confided that the MoD had cautioned that he could lose his pension and his security clearance over the affair".

Indeed behind the official line on the government's treatment of the scientist seems to rest something less reassuring. Reporting from the Hutton Inquiry the Guardian 22 August states that "Sunday Times reporter Nick Rufford said he drove to Dr Kelly's home on July 9, the day after the MoD statement. Dr Kelly said the MoD had rung to say newspapers had got hold of his name and that he thought his name would not be made public. Rufford told the inquiry: 'He said, for the record, he said they had been pretty good about it. He said he had not been reprimanded. Then he said off the record, 'I have been through the wringer'."

If stopping future leakers by publicly 'outing' David Kelly was the aim then the exercise seems to have been a success. The Independent 3 August reported that "His colleagues fear the shock of Dr Kelly's death will lead many intelligence and defence officials to suspend contacts with experts outside the Government, or be much more cautious about discussing arms-control issues".

The main focus of the initial dispute between the British government and the BBC related to public concern as to who was responsible for inserting the clearly false '45 minute' threat which is cited in the September dossier four times.

In relation to these claims Glasgow's Sunday Herald ran an article 29 June in which it quoted a 'senior intelligence source' who said "We are talking about information relating to the first Gulf war and afterwards. We told the government when this information was handed over that it was old and they ignored that fact. These were mobile missiles. A good Iraqi team would take about 20 minutes to get them active, an average team would take 45 minutes -- that is where the government claim comes from. The government elected to use this to say Saddam Hussein could deploy chemical weapons in 45 minutes. But it's total rubbish. Saddam's capabilities were destroyed. Iraq simply wouldn't have had this ability when we invaded. There was only the very remotest possibility that he had Scuds or chemical weapons left. It can't be denied that Saddam did once have this capability, but when intelligence handed this information to the government, the 45 minute claim was extracted in isolation and misrepresented. You can't use 10-year-old intelligence as the basis for anything. Alastair Campbell is able to fall back on the fact that Saddam once had the ability to deploy in 45 minutes, but there is a fear within intelligence that he can turn around and blame us for passing old intelligence."

This is an interesting accusation. If correct, then the question remains as to how the 45 minute claim got into the dossier particularly if Campbell has now been exonerated on the issue by the Foreign Affairs Committee, if not yet by the Hutton Inquiry. As it happens the White House also made such unsubstantiated claims according to the Washington Post 20 July, although the Observer 3 August states that "Reports last week said MI6 was warned explicitly by the CIA that it would not be wise to publish the 45-minute claim".

The accusation is also interesting from the point of view of the oral evidence given by Foreign Secretary Jack Straw to the Foreign Affairs Committee 27 June which asked him "..did anybody in the SIS [Secret Intelligence Service] or the JIC [Joint Intelligence Committee] object to the 45 minute claim". The Foreign Secretary replied "no".

This we now know from the Hutton Inquiry to be a statement which does not reflect the truth. At the very least we know there were complaints coming from within the Defence Intelligence Staff.

An article in the Independent 6 July even claims that the use of old material on its pre-1991 weapons capabilities was introduced into the case against Iraq at the request of the British Foreign Secretary. The article is written by Cambridge academic Dr Glen Rangwala who states that "Weapons experts say it is highly unlikely that, 12 years on, with the poor maintenance of Iraqi weaponry, they would have continued to pose a serious problem. So Jack Straw's intervention in this was a quite deliberate step to raise the perception of danger."

Moreover the Intelligence and Security Committee has since confirmed that there was no change in the threat assessment between the September dossier, the February one, and the vote for war in Parliament in March.  In its report of 11 September 2003 it confirms that "The JIC produced eight assessments on Iraq-related matters during the period October 2002 to March 2003. The assessment of Iraq’s WMD capability remained constant....".

Joseph Wilson And The Trail To Vice President Dick Cheney

The personalised nature of the row between the BBC and Campbell was suspected by some to have been a fracas generated by the government to distract attention away from other more important issues related to the Iraq debacle. In the London Times 26 July regular columnist, and former MP, Mathew Paris wrote "... it is very much the Blair-Campbell tactic to start a tremendous row over something which is not the point. In whose hand the 45-minute warning was inserted is almost immaterial: the material allegation — the claim which should concern us citizens — is that there was pressure on experts such as Dr Kelly to override their better judgment...."

In particular the Foreign Affairs Select Committee had begun focusing very closely on such secondary matters in the period leading up to the death of Dr Kelly, rather than on greater matters of substance relating to the making of the government's original case for war.

If a diversion away from such issues was the intention then this worked well up until the end of June when an angry Mr Campbell even burst uninvited into a Channel 4 TV studio during a live broadcast. It was certainly the story of the moment.

Later the Mail on Sunday 27 July reflected on this episode but was not impressed by Campbell's fierce indignation: "Two weeks after the supposedly outrageous item [Andrew Gilligan's report] was broadcast, BBC chiefs went to Downing Street for a lengthy meeting with Mr Blair and Mr Campbell. But nothing at all was said about Mr Gilligan. Not a word. Yet within a fortnight, Mr Campbell was boiling with indignation about it, in front of MPs and then later when he stormed on to the set of Channel 4 News, jabbing his finger and giving a good impression of a man at the end of his tether. But those who were there claim Mr Campbell ended his performance with a huge stage wink, once the cameras turned away. As all Fleet Street knows, Mr Campbell has a well tried technique for trying to stamp out inconvenient true stories. He finds a tiny fault in them, concentrates on that to the exclusion of all else, and hopes to discredit the story and its author by doing so. It often works. Did Mr Campbell hope to undermine the true story that the Government had lied, by finding and magnifying a small and unimportant flaw in the Gilligan report? It would fit with his past performance."

A week or so after Campbell's impromptu storming of Channel 4 a major storm broke in the New York Times. On 6 July an article exposed more information about a major deception that arose in the making of the case for war by the Anglo-American alliance. Following earlier rumblings particularly in March and May, the new revelations had in fact been a storm-cloud gathering with increasing strength throughout June as Campbell took centre stage in the UK. As the cloud began to burst so it threatened to badly implicate both Britain and the United States.

The tempest it heralded first surfaced at the UN on 7 March when, in the case of the reporting provided by the BBC, a few modest lines in a much longer piece confirmed that "In his report, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohammed ElBaradei, said there was no evidence that Iraq had restarted the nuclear weapons programme it was forced to abandon after the Gulf War. He challenged US and UK allegations on two key issues. [The first was that] Reports that Iraq had tried to purchase uranium from Niger were based on documents that were 'not authentic'..". In other words, they were forgeries.

Despite the fact that such a revelation should have had precisely the opposite effect, the supposedly anti-war BBC entitled its report "Pressure mounts on Iraq" and made no further comment. That was it.

Professor Justin Lewis, the deputy head of Cardiff University’s school of journalism, has carried out an examination of the coverage of the Iraq war by the four main UK news broadcasters, the BBC, ITN, Channel 4 and Sky. He states that “far from revealing an anti-war BBC, our findings tend to give credence to those who criticised the BBC for being too sympathetic to the government in its war coverage. Either way, it is clear that the accusation of BBC anti-war bias fails to stand up to any serious or sustained analysis.”

Indeed, despite huge international resistance to a UN second resolution which would give authority to the use of force against Iraq, the announcement that forged documents had been submitted to the UN by the US was followed by general media silence. Regretfully this was by no means the only serious example of timid reporting by the media in the build up to the war, as we shall see later.

At this point there were, however, still one or two honourable journalistic exceptions. To his great credit the Niger forgeries exposure at the UN was subsequently analysed in damning detail by the much respected investigative journalist Seymour Hersh in the New Yorker magazine 24 March. Hersh also identified a damning British dimension. His article - entitled "Who Lied To Whom" - also appeared on a variety of web sites at the time.

But by then the war had already begun. Neither the wider press nor the general public paid much attention to Hersh's investigation, so mesmerised had they become by the firework display in the Persian Gulf that followed the successful completion of the Anglo-American conjuror's trick. By now the air was thick with the cry 'we must support the troops', and the press and public cowered accordingly. In reality both had been duped into supporting a political case backed by a fraud, and British and American soldiers were sent to Iraq to risk their lives accordingly.

However, following the invasion of Iraq and the failure to quickly discover evidence of the 'serious and current' threat that had been touted by the British Prime Minister, more people did notice the revelatory article published in the New York Times 6 July. It was written by former US Ambassador, Joseph Wilson.

Wilson's account raised fundamental questions about why a case for war against Iraq had been allowed to be built partly on the basis of false claims that Iraq was trying to acquire uranium from Africa for its alleged nuclear weapons programme. Wilson had been dispatched by the US government to Africa in early 2002 to investigate such claims in relation to Niger. He found them to be bogus.

The dubious nature of such claims was certainly known by elements of the Bush administration at the time the President made reference to them in his State of the Union address 28 January 2003. It may also have been known by London, even though a reference to alleged Iraqi efforts to acquire African uranium was included in Britain's dossier of 24 September 2002. A letter to the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee from Foreign Secretary Jack Straw released 12 July confirmed that Britain had been warned by the CIA not to include the claim, although it denies Britain was informed of Wilson's trip to Africa.

Without naming him at that stage the Independent 13 June had already reported on Wilson's mission. It also stated that "The CIA warned Britain that claims Iraq had tried to get uranium from Niger were false, months before the Government published the allegation in an intelligence dossier justifying military action against Iraq".

In a surprise move on 11 July Director of the CIA, George Tenet, issued an official statement confirming that the US had indeed given a general warning to London not to include the African uranium claim in its September 2002 dossier. Tenet had been forced into this admission in order to give Washington some political cover as the effects of the Wilson article in the New York Times 6 July ricocheted out of control.

Once that article made clear that it had been a former US Ambassador and special envoy on the subject who was the source for the claim that the US had known since early 2002 that the uranium claim was false, the accusation gained a weighty degree of credibility that could not be ignored. It was no longer possible to sweep the issue under the carpet.

Big questions were now being openly asked.

Why had the claim about uranium from Africa been allowed into the President's State of the Union address in January 2003 if nearly a year earlier Wilson has already established on behalf of the US government that the principal evidence in relation to Niger was false?

The fault either lay with the White House or with the CIA. As a result a row broke out between the two, with National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice attempting to lay the blame at the door of the CIA.  Eventually Tenet was forced to 'fall on his sword'. He took responsibility for the claim's inclusion in the President's speech, but whilst doing so he also confirmed the CIA's earlier warning to Britain.

Tenet did not resign.

At this stage those at fault were portrayed as being the CIA and London. Some believe, however, that Tenet's 'confession' may have been delivered simply to provide protection to the White House from the political fall-out arising from Wilson's whistleblowing.

If so Vice President Cheney seemed likely to be the one who needed the most protection. It was Cheney's interest in the Niger uranium claims which had launched the Wilson investigation in the first place, and it was an investigation which reported back to the CIA. Time magazine 13 July stated that the CIA itself reported back on Wilson's findings to the White House: "When he returned to Washington in early March, Wilson gave an oral report about his trip to both CIA and State Department officials. On March 9 of last year, the CIA circulated a memo on the yellowcake story that was sent to the White House, summarizing Wilson's assessment".

Despite this account Cheney says he never got to hear about Wilson's findings. Yet Cheney is known to have spent an exceptional amount of time on working visits to the CIA in order to build a case against Iraq before the war.

This ice was surely very thin and by now the heat of public scrutiny appeared to be burning stronger as each day passed.

A July letter to Cheney from Democrat Presidential candidate Dennis Kucinich and two other congressmen challenged the Vice President on the issue. The letter states "These visits were unprecedented. Normally, vice presidents, yourself included, receive regular briefings from CIA in your office ... there is no reason for the vice president to make personal visits to CIA analysts.... Did you or a member of your staff at any time direct or encourage CIA analysts to disseminate unreliable intelligence?" A further letter with more key questions was sent to the Vice President by the congressmen 17 September.

So given that some are now taking a close interest in his role in the Iraq affair how does Cheney fit into the White House scene? The New York Times 26 November 2001 described his role like this: "The more invisible [Cheney] becomes, the more powerful he seems... He participates by videophone in the daily national security meeting held in the White House situation room with the president .... friends and advisers say the relationship between the two men is as crucial as ever, and still refer to Mr. Cheney as the president's consigliere...."

'Consigliere' is a Mafia term for 'adviser' as Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi will doubtless confirm, and we shall come to the Italian dimension to the Niger forgeries saga a little later.

In fact the New York Times goes even further in relation to Cheney's role. Shortly before the start of the Iraq war on 19 March 2003 the paper stated "The Wall Street Journal reported on Monday that even though Mr. Cheney receded into the background for months, he was choreographing events like Pluto, lord of the underground. In his undisclosed locations, he had dinner parties with anti-Saddam intellectuals and reached out to Iraqi dissidents and plotted the war with his old pal Rummy, letting Colin Powell vainly spend his prestige at the mealy-mouthed U.N. We'll never know from the ultrasecretive vice president whether he also touched base with oil industry types, since Halliburton [of which Cheney was Chief Executive before becoming Vice President] and other big construction companies that give to Republicans now stand to make millions in contracts for reconstructing Iraq and reviving its oil industry."

More specifically in relation to the bogus Niger uranium claim, however, an article entitled 'Was war based on a lie? Ask Cheney' was published in the Madison Capital Times 10 July 2003. It raises a blunt question: "If intelligence information was manipulated by the Bush administration in an apparent attempt to strengthen the argument for war, which members of the administration were involved in the manipulation? Wilson's statements suggest that a good place for the Senate to start looking for answers is in the office of Vice President Dick Cheney."

But if the Director of the CIA was forced to be the fall guy in order to take some of the heat off the man who really steers decision making at the White House, then it would seem from parts of his official 'mea culpa' on 11 July that Tenet had also tried to take some of the heat off himself. This he did by disclosing that the CIA had asked the British government to drop the claim from their September dossier.

However, it looks like the CIA didn't try very hard. The Observer reports 13 July that in his emergency letter to the Foreign Affairs Committee Foreign Secretary Jack Straw wrote that "The media have reported that the CIA expressed reservations to us about the [uranium] element of the September dossier. This is correct. However, the US comment was unsupported."

Despite this less than reassuring excuse the British government has as many questions to answer now as the Bush administration. And both know it.

The resulting buck-passing that quickly ensued on and between both sides of the Atlantic following Tenet's statement increasingly suggested complicity by multiple elements - American and British; politicians and intelligence agencies. Throughout the summer the rush to save necks by pushing the blame onto others became a spectacular cascading waterfall of accusation and counter-accusation which may eventually serve to take a variety of participants down together.

As the frenzied Washington damage limitation exercise unfolded in July, London was forced to introduce a new explanation for part of its justification for the war. The new line revolved around the claim that London had separate evidence of its own relating to the African uranium allegation. It was evidence it said it had not disclosed to the US, but in which it had complete confidence.

Suspiciously, however, Britain had not disclosed that information to the IAEA in accordance with UN Resolutions 1441 and 1051.

So who is going to believe the government on this? Certainly not Sir John Stanley, a member of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee. According to the  Independent, 29 June 2003 "[Foreign Secretary] Mr Straw not only denied that the forged documents came from British sources, but said Britain's allegations about Iraq's quest for uranium in Africa came from 'quite separate sources'. He said he would give further details of these sources for the uranium allegation in a closed session on Friday, during which he was fiercely cross-questioned by Sir John Stanley, the committee's chief sceptic. After hearing what the Foreign Secretary had to say, the Tory MP is reported to have told Mr Straw he did not believe him...."

It is worth remembering that this latest face saving claim from the Foreign Office comes from a government which highlighted a now discredited '45 minute' claim in the foreword to a dossier which was presented by its Prime Minister as being "beyond doubt" based on "assessed intelligence". It is also from a government which produced a follow-up dossier later discovered to be based in large part on a plagiarised student thesis.

In particular the London Sunday Times 13 July also reported that the separate intelligence was 'non-documentary' (a report of the Intelligence and Security Committee later stated that the government had also being relying on some additional documentary evidence whose authenticity MI6 has since been forced to reinvestigate following the discovery of the forgeries submitted to the UN shortly before the war. As at 11 September 2003, the date of the committee's report, MI6 had not verified the authenticity of this additional documentary evidence despite having allowed it to be used to support the government's dossier a year earlier, and despite the UN's public disclosure of the existence of the forged documents in March).

The Sunday Times states that "Britain by September last year had still not seen the disputed documents relating to Niger, but its own sources were giving it information. Intelligence that was 'non-documentary' but came from 'more than one source' was enough for the British to conclude independently that Iraq had indeed tried to obtain uranium from Africa."

In these circumstances the evidence now proffered to protect the government from further claims of exaggeration (or worse) was intensely controversial, particularly because its remaining 'non-documentary' nature increased the scope for avoiding unwelcome further scrutiny.

As has proved to be the case with the Niger forgeries the management of manufactured documentary 'evidence' can be particularly problematical. Nonetheless dissemination of bogus information by the British government for political purposes is not a new phenomenon.

A report in the London Times, 25 July 2003 entitled 'Planners of 1941 dodgy dossier tangled with BBC'  highlights one example of the previous involvement of the British Foreign Office in such an exercise. The article states that "Documents released by the National Archives yesterday show that Anthony Eden, Churchill’s wartime Foreign Secretary, sanctioned a whispering campaign to destabilise the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, in a shady episode with present-day parallels. Late in 1940, after a failed Arab rising in Palestine, the Mufti, a Palestinian named Haj Amin El Hussein, took refuge with Rashid Ali, the pro-Nazi Prime Minister of Iraq. British leaders, worried that the Mufti could cause trouble for the struggling 8th Army in North Africa, planned to create a dodgy dossier by claiming he was in the pay of Italy, a country with which Britain was then at war. False documents backing this claim were to be planted all over the Western Desert. But Whitehall backed out of the plot because it knew that it could not create the paper trail to support the claims. In December 1940 a Colonial Office official said in a memo to his superiors....'We must avoid any propaganda reference to documents that do not exist and cannot be produced... I feel that we must stick to our original plan of setting the ball rolling by a whispering campaign.'”

In short non-documentary evidence is a much safer bet if you want to spread false claims.

However, in the circumstances of the modern day controversy over the belligerent Anglo-American invasion of Iraq, is the latest fig-leaf approach of the British government going to be good enough?  Is British and world opinion going to satisfied with the inclusion of a claim relating to Iraq's alleged nuclear weapons activities in the Downing St dossier when the Foreign Office is evasive about the intelligence that is supposed to support it?

Equally how impressed are Australians going to be with the report in the Independent 13 July that "prime minister, John Howard, said his decision to send troops to Iraq was not based on the discredited US intelligence but rather the additional intelligence held by Britain, which he had not seen".

Many remain convinced that the Africa uranium claim in the September dossier was based on the same information now widely believed to have been derived from forged documents sourced from Italy and exposed at the UN in March.

According to a report in the Independent 29 June the senior US official (Ambassador Joseph Wilson, but still unnamed at that date) who uncovered the bogus nature of the claims considered it "all but impossible" that Washington did not share his discovery with London. A headline in the Independent reads "Ministers knew war papers were forged, says diplomat".

Although the British government now unconvincingly claims it had relied on separate intelligence on the matter, accusations don't get much more serious than that.

Wider claims about Iraq's nuclear programmes have also proved vacuous. According to the Washington Post 16 July "In recent days, as the Bush administration has defended its assertion in the president’s State of the Union address that Iraq had tried to buy African uranium, officials have said it was only one bit of intelligence that indicated former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein was reconstituting his nuclear weapons program. But a review of speeches and reports, plus interviews with present and former administration officials and intelligence analysts, suggests that between Oct. 7, when President Bush made a speech laying out the case for military action against Hussein, and Jan. 28, when he gave his State of the Union address, almost all the other evidence had either been undercut or disproved by U.N. inspectors in Iraq."

Back in Britain it is clear that at the time MPs voted for war none were aware that the CIA had tried to get Britain to remove its Africa uranium claims from the September dossier, as now acknowledged by London itself. Most MPs would have also been unaware that related evidence submitted to the UN by the US had been exposed as forgeries only shortly before the vote in the House of Commons. The British government appears to have known for significantly longer. One diplomat told the Glasgow Sunday Herald 14 July that "I know that the IAEA told Britain and America, two weeks before El Baradei made his statement to the UN in March, that the documents were forgeries...."

How do British MPs feel about that now?

But first some history about Saddam Hussein's rise to power and those who helped him.

In Pursuit of Oil
How Bush Snr And Rumsfeld Supported And Armed Saddam Hussein
Before The First Gulf War

According to a Reuters report 21 April "Roger Morris, a former State Department foreign service officer who was on the NSC staff during the Johnson and Nixon administrations, says the CIA had a hand in two coups in Iraq during the darkest days of the Cold War, including a 1968 putsch that set Saddam Hussein firmly on the path to power... At the time, Morris continues, Saddam was a Baath operative studying law in Cairo, one of the venues the CIA chose to plan the coup. In fact, he claims the former Iraqi president castigated by President George W. Bush as one of history's most 'brutal dictators' was actually on the CIA payroll in those days... In 1968, Morris says, the CIA encouraged a palace revolt among Baath party elements led by long-time Saddam mentor Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, who would turn over the reins of power to his ambitious protégé in 1979. 'It's a regime that was unquestionably midwived by the United States, and the (CIA's) involvement there was really primary,' Morris says."

Whilst this account is dismissed by the CIA, it is well known that the agency had toppled the democratically elected government of Mohammad Mosaddeq in Iran in 1953 and replaced it with the dictatorship of the Shah. As has become commonplace with US activity in the Middle East over the decades a major motivation was to ensure that Iran's oil was in hands favourable to the west.

According to the Guardian 20 August the coup was backed by the British and is described in detail in a newly released book. The Guardian states "The British government tried to enlist the Americans in planning a coup... The crushing of Iran's first democratic government ushered in more than two decades of dictatorship under the Shah... The author of All the Shah's Men, New York Times reporter Stephen Kinzer, argues that the coup planted the seeds of resentment against the US in the Middle East, ultimately leading to the events of September 11."

As you sow, so shall you reap? And who says that securing access to oil is not a bigger priority than promoting democracy when it comes to the implementation of Anglo-American foreign policy in the Persian Gulf?

Donald Rumsfeld's visit to Baghdad to embrace Saddam Hussein on behalf of the Reagan-Bush government in December 1983 was driven by similar motives. In particular they included preserving access to Gulf oil as Iran became a threat to US supplies following Tehran's Islamic revolution of 1979 which ousted the Shah, and led to the ensuing Iran-Iraq war. 

One of Rumsfeld's specific goals during his 1983 visit, according to the New York Times 14 April, was to do a deal with Iraq over the building of an oil pipeline from Iraq to the Jordanian Port of Aqaba. The project was to be built by Bechtel, a company previously led by George Shultz who had become Secretary of State by the time of Rumsfeld's courtship of Saddam as special representative of the US government. According to the National Security Archive at George Washington University "The U.S. promoted the Aqaba pipeline project strenuously for several years during the early to mid 1980s. It would have carried oil from northern Iraq to the Gulf of Aqaba in Jordan, alleviating the disruptive effect on Iraq's oil output that resulted from Iran's attacks on oil transshipment facilities in the Persian Gulf and from Syria's closing of a pipeline that had transported Iraqi oil. The proposed project reflected the U.S.'s extreme nervousness about threats to the world oil supply resulting from the Iran-Iraq war."

In the end Saddam would not play ball with the US on the pipeline, but in the meantime the US offered some 'interesting' assistance to Iraq.

In an article entitled 'Who Armed Iraq ' 17 April the highly respected and authoritative Jane's Defence News wrote "An investigation of US corporate sales to Iraq, headed by Republican Congressman Donald Riegle and published in May 1994, listed some of the biological agents exported by US corporations with George Bush's approval as head of the CIA and later as vice-president under Ronald Reagan. The Iraqis are reported to have acquired stocks of anthrax, brucellosis, gas gangrene, E. coli and salmonella bacteria from US companies."

The New York Times also passed comment on this 17 August 2002 stating that "..... Richard L. Armitage, a senior defense official at the time, used an expletive relayed through a spokesman to indicate his denial that the United States acquiesced in the use of chemical weapons [when the US assisted Iraq in its war against Iran in the 1980s] ..... Vice President George Bush and senior national security aides never withdrew their support for the highly classified program...."

Even after the first Gulf war and the international sanctions imposed against Iraq, Vice President Dick Cheney also seems to have had few personal qualms about giving Saddam Hussein an economic helping hand when it suited him personally.

The Austin Chronicle in Texas drew attention to this fact in its 'Axis of Money' article of 22 March 2002. The article caustically states "By Gollies, Dick Cheney is nothing if not tough on terrorists..... But, wait a minute, is it possible that Dick is a Hussein hypocrite, that while he postures politically, he has previously profited from playing corporate footsie with the country that he now brands a terrorist state? Yes. In fact, did Cheney, the former oil equipment executive, help rebuild Saddam's economic machine that now stands accused of sponsoring terrorism? Yes.... He lied. Indeed, just before election day 2000, the estimable Financial Times of London discovered that two Halliburton-owned subsidiaries sold more oil field technologies and equipment to Ol' Mr. Evil Saddam than any other U.S. corporation, pocketing some $24 million in sales. These deals helped Hussein restore his oil-production capabilities, which are used to finance the militaristic adventures that Cheney now labels 'evil.'...." One American group has even run a radio advertisement drawing attention to this hypocrisy under the strap line "Saddam Hussein: America's Worst Enemy... or Cheney's Best Customer?"

So the Bush family and others members of the current American administration, it seems, played their full part in arming and supporting 'evil-doer' Saddam Hussein over the years. They did so even at the very height of the power of his murderous and repressive rule.  They also did so at a time when Saddam was actively using chemical weapons.

As confirmed in US government papers released in February 2003, and now available from the National Security Archives at George Washington University, the Reagan-Bush administration knew all these things. But that did not stop them supplying Saddam with materials for making biological weapons.

ABC News Nightline 9 June 1992 summed up the situation as follows: "It is becoming increasingly clear that George Bush, operating largely behind the scenes throughout the 1980s, initiated and supported much of the financing, intelligence, and military help that built Saddam's Iraq into the aggressive power that the United States ultimately had to destroy."

More specifically, and amongst other matters, the Centre for Non-proliferation Studies, Monterey, California has reported that "Between 1985-89, US firms exported Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), Clostridium botulinum, Histoplasma capsulatam, Brucella melitensis, Clostridium perfringens (gas gangrene), Clostridium tetani (tentanus), Escherichia coli, and 'dozens of other pathogenic biological agents,' to Iraq." The New Yorker, Vol 14, Issue 41 (Oct 2001) also reports that "Under that same program, 19 containers of anthrax bacteria were supplied to Iraq in 1988 by the American Type Culture Collection company, located near Fort Detrick, MD, the site of the U.S. Army’s high-security germ warfare division."

According to MSNBC 10 October "most of Iraq’s supply of biological weaponry actually came from the United States: ordered and delivered to the Iraqis over the course of a decade starting in 1985 by the U.S. Army’s main biological laboratory in Frederick, Md., as easily as if Saddam Hussein were merely ordering a new mattress from Sears. Over about a decade between the mid-1980s and 1996, when this unfathomable security flaw was discovered, Iraq ordered and received 24 different strains of biological samples from the Army, including the military-grade 'Fort Detrick strain' of anthrax. The vast majority of biological agents found and destroyed after the first Gulf War by U.N. inspectors were 'grown' from these American seeds."

There are also 10,000 pages of documentation kept on microfiche by the US National Security Archive at George Washington University on this earlier 'Iraqgate' scandal covering the period between 1980 and 1994. Obtained under the US Freedom of Information Act the papers have been described by Alan Friedman, author of   'Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq', as "the most comprehensive collection of documentation on recent U.S.-Iraq relations available to the public, providing invaluable insights into decision-making at the highest levels during the Reagan and Bush administrations.". Friedman is an American who began covering the Reagan-Bush Iraqgate scandal while serving as the Milan correspondent for the Financial Times, London.

An affidavit of former National Security Council Officer Howard Teicher dated 31 January 1995 also provides a further account. Teicher had accompanied Rumsfeld on another trip to Baghdad in 1984.

When Iraq provided the 12,000 page statement of its weapons history to the UN in December 2002, the US government seized the only copy held by the UN in New York in order to censor parts from the non-permanent member states of the Security Council. According to the Financial Times 19 December 2002 "the U.S. broke an agreement of the Security Council and blackmailed Colombia, which at the time was presiding over the Council, to take possession of the UN's only copy. The U.S. then proceeded to make copies of the report for the other four permanent Security Council nations, Britain, France, Russia and China. Only yesterday did the remaining members of the Security Council receive their copies. By then, all references to foreign companies had been removed".

Subsequently the German Newspaper Tageszeitung obtained a copy of the censored pages. These showed that Hewlett Packard, Dupont, Honeywell and other major U.S. corporations, as well as governmental agencies including the Department of Defense and government nuclear laboratories, all illegally helped Iraq to develop its biological, chemical and nuclear weapons programmes. The list also includes Bechtel, the company formerly run by George Shultz, Secretary of State at the time the Reagan-Bush administration was arming Saddam. Bechtel is now the beneficiary of some of the largest non-competitive contracts for the post war rebuilding of Iraqi infrastructure in 2003.

Not surprisingly the current Bush administration has been discussing whether it would be better to kill Saddam Hussein when found (as happened with his two sons), rather than capture him, for fear that a trial might end up publicising further embarrassing details of the US's historic support for his repressive regime.

Mr Shultz continued as a board member of Bechtel in 2003.

Having reminded his readers of this fact, one writer in the New York Times 21 April reported that "Under the headline 'Act Now; The Danger Is Immediate,' Mr. Shultz, in an op-ed article in The Washington Post last September, wrote: 'A strong foundation exists for immediate military action against Hussein and for a multilateral effort to rebuild Iraq after he is gone.' Gee, I wonder which company he thought might lead that effort. Last week Mr. Shultz's Bechtel Group was able to demonstrate exactly what wars are good for. The Bush administration gave it the first big Iraqi reconstruction contract, a prized $680 million deal over 18 months that puts Bechtel in the driver's seat for the long-term reconstruction of the country, which could cost $100 billion or more.... The blatant war-mongering followed immediately by profiteering inevitably raise questions about the real reasons American men and women have been fighting and dying in Iraq. President Bush told us the war was about weapons of mass destruction and the need to get rid of the degenerate Saddam. There was also talk about democracy taking root in Iraq and spreading like spring flowers throughout the Arab world. The two things that were never openly discussed, that never became part of the national conversation, were oil and money. Those crucial topics were left to the major behind-the-scenes operators, many of whom are now cashing in."

911 And The War That Rumsfeld Wanted Regardless Of The Evidence

As partly examined in a Polish edition of Newsweek magazine in May the Bush family has a long history of involvement with dictatorial regimes, including the operation of Nazi banking and shipping operations both before and during the second world war.

Whatever George Bush Snr may have supplied to Saddam Hussein in the 1980s, however, biological and chemical weapons only have a limited period of usefulness before their functionality expires.

Former British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook gave an interview for Newsweek 30 May following his pre-war resignation from the British cabinet. Cook told Newsweek that "Chemical and biological weapons have a limited shelf life. All the materials that Saddam had in 1991 (at the end of the gulf war) would have degraded to the point of being useless long before 2003, whether or not he had destroyed them".

This was a view shared by many others before the war including former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter, and no expert seriously considers that Iraq has ever had a nuclear capability at any stage despite the claims of the US Vice President.

Ritter has been a long time critic of US manipulation of the Iraq situation. As the BBC reported 19 July 2001 "A former United Nations weapons inspector has accused the United States of deliberately provoking confrontations with Iraq, which, he says, was almost fully disarmed by 1995. Scott Ritter says the United States undermined the work of UNSCOM, the United Nations weapons inspection team in Iraq, and used the issue to push Iraq towards conflict with the West. Mr Ritter has been an outspoken critic of US policy towards Iraq since he resigned from UNSCOM in 1998. In his new documentary film, In Shifting Sands: The Truth About UNSCOM and the Disarming of Iraq, the UN and UNSCOM in particular are portrayed as American pawns in its dealings with Saddam Hussein. Mr Ritter says his team was satisfied Iraq had destroyed 98% of its weapons by 1995. But, he says, the US Government deliberately set new standards of disarmament criteria to maintain UN sanctions against Baghdad and justify bombing raids. In the film, which was premiered at the United Nations, Mr Ritter said UNSCOM chief Richard Butler told his inspectors: 'You have to provoke a confrontation...so the US can start bombing' before 15 March, a Muslim holy period...'...Mr Ritter called for an end to sanctions imposed on Iraq after it invaded Kuwait in August, 1990, saying he did not feel the country posed a danger any longer. 'Iraq is a defanged tiger', he said."

Ritter's interest in the lifting of sanctions is pertinent. It is often pointed out that Saddam was a ruthless dictator who killed many of his own people. But he was outdone by the West whose UN delivered sanctions against Iraq were responsible for the death of 500,000 Iraqi children.

In May 1996 a CBS interviewer said to America's Ambassador to the UN, Madeline Albright, "We have heard that a half million children have died [because of sanctions against Iraq]. I mean, that's more children than died in Hiroshima and you know, is the price worth it?" Her response was "I think this is a very hard choice, but the price - we think the price is worth it."

Saddam Hussein did not have a monopoly on evil and the Iraqi people know that.

More recently Ritter told CNN 17 June 2002 "... let's remember Saddam Hussein didn't kick the inspectors out [in 1998]. The U.S. ordered the inspectors out 48 hours before they initiated Operation Desert Fox -- military action that didn't have the support of the U.N. Security Council and which used information gathered by the inspectors, to target Iraq... As of December 1998 we had accounted for 90 to 95 percent of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capability -'we' being the weapons inspectors. We destroyed all the factories, all of the means of production and we couldn't account for some of the weaponry, but chemical weapons have a shelf-life of five years. Biological weapons have a shelf-life of three years. To have weapons today, they would have had to rebuild the factories and start the process of producing these weapons since December 1998."

Operation Desert Fox began on 16 December 1998. At the time there was a particular story that the White House wanted removed from the top of the news headlines. According to the BBC at that time, "[on 18 December] with bombs and missiles still raining down on Baghdad, the House began its historic debate - the first for 130 years - on whether to impeach the president [over the Monica Lewinsky affair]".

These days, of course, talk of impeaching the President at a time of war has become considered highly 'unpatriotic' such has been the success so far of the Bush propaganda effort since 911.

Indeed how that traumatic event has conveniently served to neuter the critical scrutiny that the American public would normally apply to their President. For the Republican Party, now in power, a private relationship between consenting adults during the Clinton era would seem to be a more important subject for official investigation than the death of thousands of innocent people at home and abroad during the Bush administration - those who have died directly or subsequently as a result of the attacks of 911.

Since those attacks millions of people in America have been falsely led to believe in Saddam's complicity in 911 as part of an effort to win support for an invasion of Iraq. A recent Congressional investigation has found that Saddam had nothing to do with those attacks.

Despite this absence of any credible supporting evidence one poll in February revealed that 72% of Americans believed it was likely that Saddam was personally involved in the 911 attacks. The fact that such unfounded perceptions can prevail so widely amongst a supposedly educated population represents a massive indictment of the US media whose own general silence on the issue during this brainwashing process makes most of it shamefully complicit.

Despite the wide exposure elsewhere in the world few media outlets in the US have given significant coverage to Bush's recent post-war admission that there was no connection between Saddam and 911, even though Vice President Cheney on 14 September was still describing Iraq as "the geographic base of the terrorists who have had us under assault for many years, but most especially on 9/11" according to the Washington Post 29 September.

Yet Bush himself cited 911 when authorising war against Iraq. In his letter 21 March to Congressional leaders informing them that coalition military operations to 'disarm' Iraq had commenced he stated "I have ... determined that the use of armed force against Iraq is consistent with the United States and other countries continuing to take the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001".

The Washington Post 6 September also reported on another more recent but similar post-war poll result: "The poll's findings are significant because they help to explain why the public continues to support operations in Iraq despite the setbacks and bloodshed there. Americans have more tolerance for war when it is provoked by an attack, particularly one by an all-purpose villain such as Hussein." A report in the London Times 2 July confirmed the results of an opinion poll indicating that 24% even thought Saddam had used weapons of mass destruction in the ensuing Gulf war.

But that was far from the end of it.

In an article written by Paul Sperry entitled 'Yes, Bush lied'  Worldnetdaily reported 6 October that "A year ago, on Oct. 1, one of the most important documents in U.S. history was published and couriered over to the White House. The 90-page, top-secret report, drafted by the National Intelligence Council at Langley, included an executive summary for President Bush known as the 'key judgments.' It summed up the findings of the U.S. intelligence community regarding the threat posed by Iraq, findings the president says formed the foundation for his decision to preemptively invade Iraq without provocation. The report 'was good, sound intelligence,' Bush has remarked. Most of it deals with alleged weapons of mass destruction. But page 4 of the report, called the National Intelligence Estimate, deals with terrorism, and draws conclusions that would come as a shock to most Americans, judging from recent polls on Iraq. The CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency and the other U.S. spy agencies unanimously agreed that Baghdad:

• had not sponsored past terrorist attacks against America,
• was not operating in concert with al-Qaida,
• and was not a terrorist threat to America.

'We have no specific intelligence information that Saddam's regime has directed attacks against U.S. territory,' the report stated..... According to the consensus of Bush's intelligence services, there was 'low confidence' before the war in the views that 'Saddam would engage in clandestine attacks against the U.S. Homeland' or 'share chemical or biological weapons with al-Qaida.' Their message to the president was clear: Saddam wouldn't help al-Qaida unless we put his back against the wall, and even then it was a big maybe. If anything, the report was a flashing yellow light against attacking Iraq. Bush saw the warning, yet completely ignored it and barreled ahead with the war plans he'd approved a month earlier (Aug. 29), telling a completely different version of the intelligence consensus to the American people. Less than a week after the NIE was published, he warned that 'on any given day' – provoked by attack or not, sufficiently desperate or not – Saddam could team up with Osama and conduct a joint terrorist operation against America using weapons of mass destruction.... By telling Americans that Saddam could 'on any given day' slip unconventional weapons to al-Qaida if America didn't disarm him, the president misrepresented the conclusions of his own secret intelligence report, which warned that Saddam wouldn't even try to reach out to al-Qaida unless he were attacked and had nothing to lose – and might even find that hard to do since he had no history of conducting joint terrorist operations with al-Qaida, and certainly none against the U.S. If that's not lying, I don't know what is".

The London Times 12 September had already reported that "... advice from the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which Mr Blair did not disclose before the war, was given in an assessment on February 10,  five weeks before the action started. Its release, by the parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee yesterday, immediately sparked attacks from critics who had said that war would intensify the terrorism risk.... The top-secret assessment, International Terrorism: War with Iraq, stated that there was no intelligence that Iraq had provided chemical and biological materials to al-Qaeda, but judged that in the event of an imminent regime collapse, 'there would be a risk of transfer of such material', to al-Qaeda or another terrorist group".

Should anyone be minded to pursue the issue these revelations place Blair and Bush in deep trouble. The attack on Iraq had nothing to do with fighting terrorism and both knew it. In the words of Michael Meacher's September article in the Guardian "This war on terrorism is bogus ".

And in the words of Congressman Jose Serrano "One president said `I did not have sex with that woman' and he got impeached. Another president lied to the American people, to Congress, and to the United Nations about weapons of mass destruction, bombed a country and killed many people, [and] in the process we lost some of our own brave folks. And he's some sort of hero. What gives?''  Indeed.

ABC News reported 25 April that "To build its case for war with Iraq, the Bush administration argued that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, but some officials now privately acknowledge the White House had another reason for war — a global show of American power and democracy." Democracy?

A small fraction of the $40 million spent on investigating the Lewinsky affair (in which no one was physically or financially injured, and where the circumstances were not particularly complex) is being spent on investigating the biggest 'security lapse' in US history that is represented by the attacks on 11 September 2001.

The White House continues to obstruct the official 911 investigation in the hope that it will not come up with anything too damaging before voting begins in the November 2004 Presidential election. Senator Joseph Lieberman is quoted in the San Francisco Chronicle 9 July as saying "This administration has opposed at every turn the creation of an independent commission to investigate the tragedy of Sept. 11th. By delaying its response to the commission's information requests, the administration may now be hoping to run out the clock."

The same day the New York Times stated that "The Bush administration, long allergic to the idea of investigating the government's failure to prevent the Sept. 11 terror attacks, is now doing its best to bury the national commission that was created to review Washington's conduct". The paper accused the Bush Administration of "Acting more like the Soviet Kremlin than the American government" with (in a second article) "the commission's chairman suggesting today that the situation amounted to 'intimidation' of the witnesses".

The Bush administration has more recently provided $50 million to the Columbia shuttle disaster probe, whose board was formed 90 minutes after the accident. By the end of August it had already produced its final report. The Columbia incident took place 1st February.

More than a year after the event the 911 investigation was still struggling to open its New York City office.

One widower of a 911 victim told Salon.com 18 June in a piece entitled 'Bush's 9/11 Coverup?' "There's a very, very small window to effect changes. And unfortunately, that window is closing." The final report is due May 2004 and families of 911 victims are unhappy about the way the process is being stalled. Many otherwise feel that the subject has the potential to be Bush's own 'Watergate'.

One of the first signs that talk of Presidential impeachment might be surfacing in 'respectable' political circles came with a report from Reuters 17 July. It quoted Senator Robert Graham speaking about the Iraq war who said "If in fact we went to war under false pretenses that is a very serious charge. If the standard of impeachment is the one the House Republicans used against Bill Clinton, this clearly comes within that standard". Graham stopped short of calling for impeachment, however.

There is little doubt that the Bush administration was looking to use 911 as an excuse for a premeditated attack on Iraq. The Glasgow Sunday Herald reported 6 October 2002 that "President Bush's Cabinet agreed in April 2001 that 'Iraq remains a destabilising influence to the flow of oil to international markets from the Middle East' and because this is an unacceptable risk to the US 'military intervention' is necessary. Vice-president Dick Cheney, who chairs the White House Energy Policy Development Group, commissioned a report [on which this policy was built] from the Baker Institute for Public Policy, a think-tank set up by James Baker, the former US secretary of state under George Bush Snr....".

A second article in the same edition of the Herald entitled 'The West's Battle For Oil' quotes the Baker report as follows: "...The United States remains a prisoner of its energy dilemma..... the American people continue to demand plentiful and cheap energy without sacrifice or inconvenience... [with the] energy sector in critical condition, a crisis could erupt at any time..."

Without making reference to the Institute's recommendation for 'military intervention' a UPI newswire 13 April 2001 also commented on the Baker report at the time it was submitted to the White House. UPI states "The United States is entering a period of relative shortages of energy that will require an overhaul of U.S. foreign policy, including possibly revamping sanctions against Iraq, an independent task force of energy and foreign policy experts told the White House in a report released Thursday. The report, drafted by a panel assembled by the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University and the Council on Foreign Relations, was submitted this week to the White House energy task force headed by Vice President Dick Cheney. In its comprehensive look at the United States' energy situation, the panel warned that increasing domestic energy supplies and reducing consumption would not be enough to insulate the United States from the ups and downs of world oil markets... 'Tight markets have increased U.S. and global vulnerability to disruption and provided adversaries undue potential influence over the price of oil,' the report said. 'Iraq has become a key 'swing' producer, posing a difficult situation for the U.S. government.' Political turmoil in the Middle East, including the Arab-Israeli conflict and potential internal unrest in the Persian Gulf states, gives Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein greater leverage in using his vast oil reserves as an economic and diplomatic weapon. 'Like it or not, Iraqi reserves represent a major asset that can quickly add capacity to world oil markets and inject a more competitive tenor to oil trade,' the report said."

The Washington Post also produced an interesting report 19 April which stated "An influential energy task force headed by Vice President Cheney has broached the possibility of lifting some economic sanctions against Iran, Libya and Iraq as part of a plan to increase America's oil supply. According to a draft of the task force report, the United States should review the sanctions against the three countries because of the importance of their oil production to meeting domestic and global energy needs. The April 10 draft acknowledges that sanctions can 'advance' important national security and diplomatic goals. But it adds that United Nations sanctions on Iraq and U.S. restrictions on energy investments in Libya and Iran 'affect some of the most important existing and prospective petroleum producing countries in the world.'.... A cross-section of the energy industry, including oil companies such as Exxon Mobil Corp. and production services companies such as Halliburton, have been pressing Congress and administration policy-makers under Bush and former president Bill Clinton to give them access to Libya, Iran and Iraq. Cheney was chief executive of Halliburton before Bush tapped him to be his running mate last year... a key conclusion of the energy task force will be the need to diversify the nation's sources of energy supplies as widely as possible, administration officials have said. 'Growing levels of conventional and heavy oil production and exports from the western hemisphere, the Caspian and Africa are important factors that can lessen the impact of a supply disruption on the U.S. and world economies,' the task force draft said."

Anyone who claims that British and American foreign policy towards Iraq, Iran and Libya is not underpinned by their interest in those countries' oil and gas reserves is simply not paying attention.

To the disgust of the uncompensated relatives of those killed or maimed by Libyan arms supplied to the IRA in the 1980s and 1990s, the lifting of the UN sanctions route was eventually taken in respect of Libya in September 2003. For the moment bilateral US sanctions against Libya remain, but it can be expected that the Bush administration will try to lift these in turn if it thinks it can get away with it.

In a piece entitled "Why no-one's reading the Libya dossier" the BBC reported 11 September 2003 that "the [UK's] Joint Intelligence Committee has no intention of compiling a dossier documenting the Libyan [terrorism] threat.... Instead of preparing for retribution, the UK's diplomats at the UN are championing the lifting of sanctions against Libya. The matter will go to a vote on Friday.... Instead of holding out for compensation for the IRA victims, on Friday Britain's UN ambassador will push ahead with the move to lift sanctions [against Libya]".

Given that it was Britain who introduced the sanctions-lifting resolution to the UN Security Council, it is hardly conceivable that it would have done so without the tacit consent of the US. Indeed come the day America declined to use its veto against the resolution. Moreover the deal with Gaddafi restricts the amount of compensation paid to families of the Lockerbie bombing unless the US removes it own sanctions within 6 months of the lifting of those of the UN. As the Lockerbie case involves a large number of American families it is not difficult to see how the idea can be sold to Congress following this initial 'warm up' process.

According to the Observer 17 September "There is a strong suspicion among British relatives [of those killed in the Lockerbie bombing] that the deal was brokered to allow Libya back into the international community and open its markets to Western companies".

Libya's main exports are crude oil, petroleum products, and natural gas. And Britain faces gas shortages, according to the DTI, as soon as 2005.

According to the US Energy Administration September 2003 "Libya is a major oil exporter, particularly to Europe. With the suspension of U. N. sanctions against Libya following its extradition of two men suspected in the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, oil companies are eager to resume and/or expand operations in Libya... Overall, Libya would like foreign company help to increase the country's oil production capacity from 1.4 million bbl/d at present to 2 million bbl/d over the next five years, at a cost of perhaps $6 billion.  This would restore Libya's oil production capacity to the level of the early 1970s.... Libya produces high-quality, low-sulphur ('sweet') crude oil at very low cost (as low as $1 per barrel at some fields)... Libya's oilfields are connected to Mediterranean terminals by an extensive network of pipelines... Libya has vast natural gas reserves and is looking to increase its gas exports, particularly to Europe.  Libya's proven natural gas reserves in 2003 are estimated at 46.4 Tcf [trillion cubic feet], but the country's actual gas reserves are largely unexploited (and unexplored), and thought by Libyan experts to be considerably larger, possibly 50-70 Tcf... Potential exists for a large increase in Libyan gas exports to Europe... Agip-ENI is set to develop huge Libyan gas reserves in offshore Block NC-41 in the Gulf of Gabes, as well as in the Wafa onshore gas (and oil) field on the Algerian border. Feasibility studies have been completed on Wafa and NC-41, and gas is expected to begin flowing by mid-2004...".

Making a bogus WMD case to justify an attack on Libya was a much harder task, and so was making a claim of a link between Libya and al Qaeda. The latter would have simply risked drawing attention to the British government's own previous sponsorship of al Qaeda in a failed attempt to assassinate Gaddafi in 1996.

The lifting of sanctions was therefore the only realistic way of gaining greater access to Libyan hydrocarbons and a fudged deal with Gaddafi over compensation for families of the victims of the 1988 bombing of New York bound Pan Am Flight 103 was done.

And a fudge it was. According to the BBC Libya had to make an acknowledgement of guilt in relation to Flight 103 as part of the deal, but "it did so by 'accepting responsibility for the actions of its officials,' which is not quite same thing but near enough and importantly it did not mention the colonel himself".

In effect it was a cheap deal for Gaddafi in return for the prospect of a huge increase in Libya's hydrocarbon exports. According to a BBC report 12 September "Colonel Gaddafi claimed recently that Libya had in effect bought off the US and Britain".

However, a different approach was applied to Iraq where there was more scope for the successful application of hostile propaganda, despite the fact that Iraq had (unlike Libya) never sponsored the IRA or carried out a terrorist attack against Britain or America (Iraq is now believed to have disarmed in 1991, according to former UN chief weapons inspector Hans Blix - this is the same year that the IRA carried out a mortar attack on No 10 Downing St using Libyan Semtex explosives).

The Washington Post report of 19 April 2001 on US Vice President Cheney's energy task force reveals that "draft recommendations come amid a brewing battle over whether Congress should reauthorize the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act for five more years when it expires in August [2001]. White House officials, who have sought to keep the task force's work quiet, cautioned that the recommendations are not final. 'There have been many drafts of the energy proposals and many changes made,' said Juleanna Glover Weiss, a spokeswoman for Cheney. 'We're still quite a while out from a final product to be presented to the president. Until the president makes final decisions on that product, everything is subject to change.'"

We know now that the military route advocated to the task force by the Baker Policy Institute was the option that was eventually chosen for Iraq. With the White House refusing to release documents in relation to the work of the task force debate continues as to when that choice was made.

Indeed so sensitive is the work of the task force that Cheney is trying to get the Supreme Court to overturn a legal judgement requiring the release of its papers from the White House.

A four page article by American writer Gore Vidal published in the Observer 27 October 2002 went as far as to suggest that the Bush administration had foreknowledge of the 911 attacks, but allowed them to go ahead so that it could capitalise on the ensuing public outrage in order to implement pre-existing military plans related to America's overseas energy interests. The BBC in fact reported 18 September 2001 that a multilateral meeting had taken place in Berlin July 2001 where it was confirmed the US was planning a strike against Afghanistan by the middle of October 2001. A later report by Inter Press Service 15 November 2001 confirmed how this related to the US's energy strategy for the Central Asia.

This is a view held by millions of people around the world. It is held particularly strongly given the total lack of effective response from the US airforce during the whole of the period of the 911 hijackings on the day itself. It is a view which is reinforced by the steadfast avoidance by the Bush administration to make any serious effort to explain itself in this respect or to have the matter openly investigated - two of the most important officers concerned with US air defences on the day, General Richard Myers and General Ralph Eberhart, have both since been promoted.

Moreover Reuters reported 16 October that "The independent commission studying the Sept. 11 attacks has voted to subpoena the Federal Aviation Administration, ordering the agency to hand over documents for the investigation. The 10-member commission said it had learned through interviews that the agency had not turned over tapes, statements, reports and other documents 'highly material to our inquiry.' One commission member said the documents relate in part to lingering questions over how, and how quickly, the FAA notified U.S. air defenses about hijacked planes on Sept. 11, 2001.... The subpoena is the first issued by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. For months, some relatives of Sept. 11 victims have urged the commission to use its subpoena power to demand important documents.... The commission's report is due May 27, 2004. For the first time, the panel suggested that fights over documents might make it unable to meet that deadline".

Questions have arisen not only as to when the FAA notified US air defences, but also about where key fighters were scrambled from on the day and why they flew at subsonic speeds.

Some people's views on this subject are even stronger. Reuters reported 23 July that "Almost one in three Germans below the age of 30 believes the U.S. government may have sponsored the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington... And about 20 percent of Germans in all age groups hold this view....68 percent of all Germans felt the media had not reported the full truth behind the attacks". Indeed, the day after the attacks the head of the Russian airforce gave an interview with Pravda in which he stated that "Generally it is impossible to carry out an act of terror on the scenario which was used in the USA yesterday. We had such facts too.   As soon as something like that happens here, I am reported about that right away and in a minute we are all up.”

The Russian General didn't elaborate on what facts he was referring to, but the same day the Russian Newspaper Izvestia reported that "Yesterday at the headquarters of Central Intelligence Service in Langley a confidential meeting between one of the Deputy Directors of CIA and a special messenger of Russian Intelligence Service took place. According to NewsRu sources he delivered to his American colleagues some documents including audio tapes with telephone conversations directly relating to terrorist attacks on Washington and New York last Tuesday. According to these sources, Russian Intelligence agents know the organizers and executors of these terrorist attacks. More than that, Moscow warned Washington about preparation to these actions a couple of weeks before they happened.... according to Russian Intelligence Service agents had been planning an operation against the USA more than a year and a half."

It is now known that countries which provided advance warning of the 911 attacks to America included Afghanistan, Argentina, Britain, Egypt, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Morocco, and Russia itself.

More recently the Washington Post commented 25 July 2003 on a freshly released congressional report examining the 'intelligence failures' surrounding the attacks. The Post states "President Bush was warned in a more specific way than previously known about intelligence suggesting that al Qaeda terrorists were seeking to attack the United States, a report on the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks indicated yesterday....These revelations are not the subject of the congressional report's narratives or findings, but are among the nuggets embedded in a story focused largely on the mid-level workings of the CIA, FBI and U.S. military ...... the congressional panel indicated that it tried to determine 'to what extent the President received threat-specific warnings during this period' - but obtained only limited information. Among the only clues cited in the report about Bush's knowledge of al Qaeda's intentions against the United States is an Aug. 6, 2001, President's Daily Briefing (PDB) - described in the report only as a 'closely-held intelligence report' - that included information 'acquired in May 2001 that indicated a group of [Osama] Bin Laden supporters was planning attacks in the United States with explosives.'  The PDB also said 'that Bin Laden had wanted to conduct attacks in the United States for years and that the group apparently maintained a support base here.' It cited 'FBI judgments about patterns of activity consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks,' according to the report... The CIA declined to declassify the PDB, and the White House, which had the authority to release it, declined to do so, citing 'executive privilege.' "

Commenting on details emerging from the same report the London Times 25 July states ".... the intelligence community had information in 1998 that al-Qaeda was planning attacks in Washington and New York. In August that year, an Arab plot to fly explosives-laden aircraft into the World Trade Centre from a foreign country was dismissed. The notion that it could have been launched on US soil was also downplayed on the assumption that the flight would have been intercepted...."

Despite this assumption, there were no intercepts on 911 during at least an hour and three quarters of continuos hijackings. These were not successfully executed even to take a look in the cockpit window of any of the troubled aircraft despite perfect weather conditions.

Why? According to a Newsday report 18 May 2002 Richard Clarke, the Bush administration's top counter-terrorism official, told key US agencies on 5 July 2001 that "Something really spectacular is going to happen here, and it's going to happen soon".

Come the day of 911, however, if the Bush administration had not prepared the US airforce for intercepting hijackings arising from what appear to be suspected preparations cited by the FBI in the President's intelligence brief only a month before, some of its most senior representatives were certainly well prepared to make an immediate and illogical lunge at Iraq in response.

On 4 September 2002 CBS News reported that "barely five hours after American Airlines Flight 77 plowed into the Pentagon, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld was telling his aides to come up with plans for striking Iraq — even though there was no evidence linking Saddam Hussein to the attacks".

As recently as 16 June 2003 former US General Wesley Clark told NBC's 'Meet the Press' "There was a concerted effort during the fall of 2001, starting immediately after 9/11, to pin 9/11 and the terrorism problem on Saddam Hussein.... it came from the White House, it came from people around the White House.   It came from all over.  I got a call on 9/11. I was on CNN, and I got a call at my home saying, 'You got to say this is connected. This is state-sponsored terrorism.   This has to be connected to Saddam Hussein.'  I said, 'But--I'm willing to say it, but what's your evidence?' And I never got any evidence."

According to Time magazine 13 May 2002 "[Defense Secretary] Rumsfeld has been so determined to find a rationale for an attack [on Iraq] that on 10 separate occasions he asked the CIA to find evidence linking Iraq to the terror attacks of Sept 11. The intelligence agency repeatedly came back empty handed."

Because there was no such evidence, eventually the White House had to settle for the weapons of mass destruction gambit. At least there was evidence that Saddam used to have them, even if it was a long time ago.

Coming up with more current evidence ultimately proved problematical for all concerned within the Anglo-American alliance. At least one of the infamous Downing St dossiers even stooped to relying on information which was later discovered to have been plagiarised from a 1992 student thesis - information over a decade old.

Meanwhile, former British foreign secretary Robin Cook and others have reminded the public that the British Attorney General based his legal justification for the war against Iraq solely on matters related to the necessity to disarm Saddam Hussein, and not on any humanitarian grounds or falsely alleged Iraqi links with al Qaeda.

Moreover the London Times reported 14 October that "Lord Alexander, chairman of Justice, the all-party law reform group, and a former Bar chairman, attacks Lord Goldsmith’s reliance on UN Resolution 678, passed in 1990 to liberate Kuwait, as 'risible'. He also calls for the Attorney-General’s legal advice to be fully disclosed, so that courts can rule on the legality of the invasion. The attack is contained in an article in The Times Law supplement, which draws on the annual Justice Tom Sargant Memorial Lecture he will give tonight. Lord Alexander says: 'Every conceivable argument was deployed to try to justify the war. Yet none of these political arguments could be used to justify invasion under international law.' To date Lord Goldsmith has declined to disclose his advice on the ground that there is a convention that law officers do not release their advice or even say if they have given such advice.'Why the public, for whose benefit the advice is given and who pay for it, can be kept in the dark has not been explained,' Lord Alexander says. Law, he adds, 'cannot be the fragile handmaiden of realpolitik'. If the courts were able to scrutinise the legal basis for the Government’s action, the outcome 'would almost certainly be recognition that we cannot wage war except in self-defence or under the clear authority of the UN'. ”

More Anglo-American Deception - The Case of General Hussein Kamel

But the Downing St dossiers were hardly the end of the extraordinary deception generated by the Anglo-American alliance.  One of the key pieces of evidence relied upon by the Bush administration in making the case against Saddam was testimony provided by an Iraqi defector in August 1995. This was General Hussein Kamel, Saddam Hussein's son-in-law who had run Iraq's WMD programmes prior to the first Gulf war. He was the highest ranking Iraqi official ever to have defected to the west. Kamel's testimony has been regularly promoted as evidence that Iraq had not disarmed.

In his February 5 presentation to the UN Security Council, Secretary of State Colin Powell said: "It took years for Iraq to finally admit that it had produced four tons of the deadly nerve agent VX. A single drop of VX on the skin will kill in minutes. Four tons. The admission only came out after inspectors collected documentation as a result of the defection of Hussein Kamel, Saddam Hussein's late son-in-law."

Kamel was not in a position to comment on Powell's statement before the war because by then he was dead. He had originally hoped his defection to the West would trigger Saddam’s overthrow. But after six months in exile in Jordan, Kamel realised the United States would not support his hope of becoming Iraq’s ruler after Saddam’s demise. He chose to return to Iraq, where he was promptly killed.

However, in a surprise development a few weeks after Powell's February presentation to the UN Newsweek magazine obtained details of Kamel's IAEA and UNSCOM debriefing interview. Newsweek also confirmed that Kamel had given the same testimony to both the CIA and MI6.

Newsweek published the story at the end of February 2003 and confirmed that it had verified the debrief document's authenticity.  With one or two honourable exceptions, notably John Pilger in the Daily Mirror, the rest of the war obsessed media largely ignored the Newsweek story, although the information was freely circulating on the internet. 'Fight Smart' distributed details 28 February in its bulletin entitled 'How many lies in 'Pax Americana'?.

The full Kamel interview reveals exactly the opposite of the subsequent Anglo-American claim that Iraq had not destroyed its weapons of mass destruction following the first Gulf war. Although Iraq had retained technical information from its earlier programmes Kamel's debrief explains how, when and why Saddam Hussein had disarmed.

The content of his debrief can be summed up in the following words that Kamel uses after having gone through the details: "All chemical weapons were destroyed. I ordered destruction of all chemical weapons. All weapons - biological, chemical, missile, nuclear were destroyed".

Once source present at the debrief is reported by Newsweek as saying that the information provided by Kamel was "almost embarrassing, it was so extensive" (the actual transcript reveals, for example, that some of the testing for Iraq's pre-1991 anthrax programme had been carried out in England).

Many might prefer not to trust what Kamel had to say prior to his death. But one thing is clear. The outcome of his debrief given in private was the opposite to that which the Bush administration has led people to believe when selectively citing Kamel's undisclosed testimony in public. Unfortunately for Bush and Blair by February 2003 the public could now read about the complete testimony for themselves. Fortunately for Bush and Blair, however, few took the opportunity.

Not surprisingly the CIA issued vigorous denials following publication of the disastrous piece in Newsweek. Unfortunately for them, however, the credibility of their denial was short lived. A few days later a full transcript of the 1995 Kamel debrief  was made available on the internet by Cambridge University academic Glen Rangwala.

It would appear that the British government is also implicated in this deception. It too joined in the US denials of the Newsweek story shortly before the full transcript of the Kamel debrief was released by Dr Rangwala. According to an ABC News report 24 February "...'We've checked back and he didn't say this,' a British government source told Reuters. 'He said just the opposite, that the WMD program was alive and kicking.' " That was simply a lie.

It was just too bad for them that the CIA and the British government didn't realise that the debrief transcript itself was going to be available over the internet. The full extent of the deception was finally out in the public domain even if few had noticed.

Shortly before the Newsweek revelations even Blair himself had traded on selective reference to Kamel's testimony. On the 25 February 2003 Blair told the House of Commons that "It was only four years later after the defection of Saddam's son-in-law to Jordan, that the offensive biological weapons and the full extent of the nuclear programme were discovered."

According to an analysis of the subject that he has since prepared Glen Rangwala states "Kamel's defection has been cited repeatedly by President Bush and leading officials in both the UK and US as evidence that (1) Iraq has not disarmed; (2) inspections cannot disarm it; and (3) defectors such as Kamel are the most reliable source of information on Iraq's weapons... The above quotes from President Bush, Prime Minister Blair and Secretary Powell refer to material produced by Iraq before the 1991 Gulf War. The administration has cited various quantities of chemical and biological weapons on many other occasions -- weapons that Iraq produced but which remain unaccounted for. All of these claims refer to weapons produced before 1991. According to Kamel's transcript, Iraq destroyed all of these weapons in 1991. Kamel's statement casts into new light the claims made by the Iraqi government that it destroyed its non-conventional weapons in the period immediately after the end of the Gulf War. This topic remains highly potent, with Hans Blix declaring that '[o]ne of three important questions before us today is how much might remain undeclared and intact from before 1991' (statement of 27 January 2003 to the Security Council). If Kamel is to be taken as seriously as the UK and US administrations have previously held him to be, then his claim that "[a]ll weapons - biological, chemical, missile, nuclear were destroyed" should be taken seriously".

It was Rangwala who had previously revealed that large parts of Blair’s February 'intelligence dossier' had been plagiarised from a dated student thesis. At that time US Secretary of State Colin Powell claimed to be impressed by this dossier despite in reality it being based largely on information which was more than ten years old. Powell told the UN Security Council in February "I would call my colleagues' attention to the fine paper that the United Kingdom distributed... which describes in exquisite detail Iraqi deception activities."

Rangwala has also since provided an analysis of Jack Straw's testimony given to the Foreign Affairs Committee. In an article in the Independent 29 June entitled "How could Iraq attack in 45 minutes with weapons it had taken apart?" Rangwala concludes that ministers have provided no clear answers to challenges about the integrity of the evidence of Iraq's WMDs at the time the evidence was offered.

But Rangwala's comments on the misrepresentation of the testimony given by Kamel are especially illuminating. From these it would seem reasonable to conclude that because they believed the details of his debrief could be kept secret London and Washington felt able to deceive the public about the full nature of the intelligence they had obtained from Kamel. In principle the Newsweek article holed this strategy below the water line, albeit too late in the day to stop the war.

This was not a case of claiming to have evidence that didn't exist as in the case of the Niger uranium. This was a case of privately holding the relevant intelligence but selectively reporting on it in public in a fashion which gave the opposite impression to that revealed when considered in its totality.

It is difficult not to conclude from these circumstances that protecting the 'interests of national security' is not the only reason why Britain and America may often be unwilling to disclose full details of their alleged 'intelligence'.

The inability of the coalition forces in Iraq to quickly find WMDs, previously claimed to be deployable in 45 minutes, has generously been described as an 'intelligence failure'. The acknowledgement of the sheer scale of this 'failure' by at least one former Director of the CIA can only serve to fuel allegations of the execution of a political scam.

According to the Washington Post 25 July "Former CIA director John M. Deutch told Congress yesterday that failure to find chemical or biological weapons in Iraq would represent 'an intelligence failure . . . of massive proportions.' 'It means that . . . leaders of the American public based [their] support for the most serious foreign policy judgments -- the decision to go to war -- on an incorrect intelligence judgment,' Deutch said during testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.  Deutch said 'it seems increasingly likely' that Iraq may have not continued its chemical and biological weapons programs after the 1991 Persian Gulf War."

On 2 October the interim report of its post-invasion search for Iraqi WMDs was published by the coalition's Iraq Survey Group. No such weapons had been found. The report in fact supports the evidence given by General Kamel in 1995 so maliciously misrepresented in the build up to the war.

The next day the London Times included the following in its account of the report's findings "...the September dossier chose to describe all the weapons unaccounted for in thousands of tonnes and litres, a more dramatic choice of units, but a misleading one, implying that the quantities would be hard to miss. The sheer scale of the task, [Iraq Survey Group leader David] Kay points out, is why he may yet find chemical weapons, which Saddam generally stored unmarked among other weapons.... But 'multiple sources' have already told him, he notes, that 'Iraq did not have a large, ongoing, centrally controlled chemical weapons programme after 1991'. Even in so cautious a report, he does allow himself this damning judgment: 'Information found to date suggests that Iraq's large-scale capability to develop, produce and fill new CW munitions was reduced — if not entirely destroyed — during Operations Desert Storm and Desert Fox, 13 years of UN sanctions and UN inspections.' That does directly contradict the September dossier's assertion that 'Iraq has a useable chemical and biological weapons capability . . . which has included recent production of chemical and biological agents.'..."

Another article in the same edition entitled "No programme since 1991" stated that "The failure to find any chemical weapons and the admission [in the report] that the programme was destroyed years ago is a devastating blow to the coalition".

However, even if actual 'weapons of mass destruction' are eventually discovered in post-invasion Iraq it is now clear that neither the US nor Britain had the evidence of the 'serious and current' threat that had been claimed by the British Prime Minister at the time the case for war with Iraq was made. It is clear that the public were deceived on the basis of exaggeration, misrepresentation and even documents known to be forgeries.

As the BBC put it in a point by point analysis of the September dossier 13 July "Of the nine main conclusions in the British government document 'Iraq's weapons of mass destruction', not one has been shown to be conclusively true".

In short, the public were presented with lies. The main unresolved question is simply: ' Who and how many did the lying?'

Who And How Many Did The Lying?

The scene looks grim on both sides of the Atlantic. The foreign editor of the London Times produced as scathing commentary 23 May on the African uranium claim in the British September dossier. The article was entitled "The Forged Papers Chase That is Bound to Run and Run".

Referring to the Niger documents the report states that "Gary Samore, author of an earlier dossier published by the International Institute of Strategic Studies, the London-based think-tank, says the claim 'was wrong in a very embarrassing way. I understand (the documents) were crude forgeries . . . pretty crude cutting and pasting of letterheads. I don’t know how it’s possible that the CIA and MI6 (the intelligence services) did not do obvious checks to make sure they were authentic.' Hans Blix, the UN chief weapons inspector, has called that failure 'very, very disturbing'. Downing Street said yesterday 'of course we stand by it (the claim)' and that 'we had more than one source' for the claim. A spokesman adds that 'I wouldn’t draw the extrapolation' that the claims about Iraq’s attempt to get African uranium were based on the documents in contention".

The Times is less than impressed by this. It continues with "Really? Then what were they based on? This is an ambitious piece of stonewalling which Downing Street may yet be called on to justify, and it will be all the more embarrassing if there are no credible other sources. In the foreword to the dossier, amid a lavish tribute to the intelligence agencies, Blair got away with saying that to protect agents from Saddam’s regime 'we cannot, of course, publish the detailed raw Intelligence'. With Saddam’s regime gone, and few weapons found, that answer now looks blithe. It certainly would not satisfy a Senate committee."

This was an issue that London will have hoped had sunk without trace. But such caustic comments coming out of one of the more editorially pro-war broadsheet newspapers in Britain was a serious matter. It may well have set alarm bells ringing in 10 Downing St more than at any other point up until that time.

Less than a week later, however, on 29 May, the BBC produced its subsequently much contested radio report from Andrew Gilligan. This suggested that Downing St had deliberately exaggerated claimed intelligence in the September dossier. The BBC-Downing St-Campbell-Kelly affair had begun, and Downing St was beginning to move into panic mode.

After all, from the point of view of public accountability which was worse - allegations of exaggeration in relation to the 45 minute claim, or suggestions of the blatant use of forged documents? Yet might a row over the former serve to distract attention away from the latter?

The following month Sir John Stanley, a member of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee investigating the reasons Britain went to war, was reported to have told Foreign Secretary Jack Straw that he did not believe him after hearing his testimony in closed session. Straw was maintaining to the committee that Britain had relied on intelligence relating to the Africa uranium claim other than the forged documents.

If that is the line of the Foreign Secretary then who was responsible for acquiring, analysing and presenting that intelligence? And what can they tell us - particularly now that post-war investigations have revealed no significant evidence of a nuclear programme in Iraq?

During one session of the committee senior Foreign Office official William Ehrman confirmed that the  chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) worked not only with “assessment staff but also there were people from other departments who came to a mass of meetings throughout that month producing that [September 2002 dossier] document.”

Who were those people, which government departments did they come from, and to whom were they answerable? Were any connected to Operation Rockingham in the UK or to the 'Office of Special Plans' in the US as part of the transatlantic 'special relationship'?'

According to evidence given to the Hutton Inquiry 23 September by the Chairman of the JIC, John Scarlett, "... there were three key mechanisms [by which other members of the JIC had input into the dossier]. The first was the drafting group, senior drafting group, an interdepartmental drafting group which I set up -- well  I arranged for it to be called together, on 5th September it actually met, and on 9th September.  This was chaired at the very senior level of Chief of Assessment Staff, Mr Miller.... on that drafting group there were representatives of SIS, DIS, MoD, FCO, GCHQ.  The drafting group had two meetings, but very importantly it was in constant contact with itself, as it were virtually, through e-mail and by telephone".

Later Scarlet added "On 11th September, a draft had been circulated to JIC members first thing that morning. I invited comment on the content.  The JIC responded with several important points. One was that it wanted the instructions of the -- instructions of the -- one was that it wanted the drafters to convey the rising level of concern on which the JIC took its view about Iraq's programmes and development of weapons of mass destruction". Why did Scarlett change direction mid sentence there? Whose instructions? The Cabinet Office?

Was Scarlett on the verge of making a gaff and letting a large cat out of the bag? Was the JIC in fact operating on political instructions as claimed by intelligence sources quoted by the Glasgow Sunday Herald 8 June concerning Operation Rockingham?

In addition to those involved in the basic construction of the dossier, there were also those participating in Alastair Campbell's meetings on its 'presentation'.

According to Campbell's evidence given to the Hutton Inquiry 22 September 2003 "... the meetings I was chairing had intelligence officials present, both from SIS and DIS; and I think I gave evidence when I first appeared at the Inquiry about another meeting that I had with the Prime Minister, had with the head of the SIS and a serving SIS officer.... [At the meeting of 9 September 2002] I could not tell you exactly who was there. Certainly myself, John Scarlett, I recall David Manning being there for a part of the meeting, Jim Poston who was then the head of the CIC. There were two or three representatives of the Foreign Office. There were representatives of the MoD and DIS and there were representatives of the Security Service...."(as Blair's personal diplomatic adviser, now British Ambassador to Washington, Sir David Manning has been a key custodian of the Anglo-American 'special relationship'. Manning was in Washington on the day of 911 itself, a circumstance which has lead to some searching discussion about how much Britain knew about 911 in advance - see Fight Smart bulletin 28 August 2002 'What Did Britain Know About 911?').

Campbell also reports that "I had a separate meeting prior to this with John Scarlett and three SIS officers. Again, I would have to check with their memories as well, but I think only one of them stayed or two maybe stayed for the whole meeting."

When asked about the purpose of this meeting Campbell responded with "What was the purpose of that first meeting? As I explained when I first gave evidence, there had been a number of reports, specifically one in the Daily Telegraph and one in the Financial Times, and the SIS [MI6] officers, one wanted to convey to me and I think through me to the Prime Minister that these reports did not reflect their views or the views in their view of the agencies".

We now know (thanks in large part to the Hutton Inquiry) about the suppression of dissent within the intelligence services at the time of the preparation of the September dossier. Did the lobbying of Campbell by this particular MI6 officer represent a glimpse of the hand of 'Rockingham' in action at the highest levels of government as described by Scott Ritter?

One member of the intelligence services who issued a formal complaint about the wording of the draft dossier was Dr Brian Jones of the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) at the MoD. At the Hutton Inquiry Mr Scarlett is asked "what was the role of the DIS and Dr Jones in particular in relation to the preparation of the dossier?". His response was "Well, the DIS of course played a key role in the formulation of the dossier. They are a major source of military expertise, advice and input and also scientific and technical expertise with a military angle to it. Dr Jones was the head of one of three of the -- he was assistant director in one of the directorates at DIS. He was there responsible for three branches within DIS which the assessment staff consulted during the process of putting together the dossier. Altogether assessment staff consulted ten branches in three different directorates... the role of his staff was advising on the capability of Iraq to produce chemical agent and to fill munitions. That was relevant, in this particular context, to his responsibility.... He and his staff, relevant staff, would have seen the intelligence....they would have seen both [the raw intelligence and the intelligence assessment].."

However, most interestingly Scarlett adds that "If I could just add there a relevant point, that I referred to the role of his branch in relation to the capability to produce agent and fill munitions. The lead branch on the 45 minutes point was not one of Dr Jones' branches, it was another branch in another directorate of DIS which took the lead in relation to doctoring, deployment, command and control and firing mechanisms, and they had the lead role on advising on the 45 minutes point".

So was that in fact a reference to what Dr Kelly reported in his evidence to the Intelligence and Security Committee on 16 July as "the Rockingham cell"? It seems quite possible. In his evidence Dr Kelly had confirmed that Rockingham was situated within DIS. So had the Glasgow Sunday Herald on 8 June following its discussions with Scott Ritter and other intelligence sources.

Scarlett's own evidence seems to suggest (when discussing the evidence for agent production of chemical weapons which had been challenged by staff within DIS) the existence of an unspecified special intelligence management exercise. Scarlett told the inquiry that there was "... additional compartmented intelligence... compartmented or especially sensitive intelligence... which was underpinning the judgment".

Scarlet uses the term "compartmented", whilst in relation to Rockingham Kelly uses the term "cell". Are these two accounts converging on the same area? Scarlett is asked "Was that compartmented intelligence available to Dr Jones?" The answer was "No, it was not."

It was on the basis of this undisclosed additional intelligence that Dr Jones's concerns were dismissed. Scarlett reported that "They arranged for the management in DIS to be briefed on the compartmented intelligence which came from SIS and I was told that that was being done".  Scarlett does not elaborate on who 'the management' are but this appears to have happened on or after 17 September. What was the net result?

According to Scarlett "The [final] draft that was circulated on 19th September retained the wording which had been there on 16th September. No comment on that point came back from DIS amongst the three pages of comments that they submitted on 19th September; and in accordance with the normal silence procedures we took that as assent". Why did no comment come back from DIS stating reservations if a year later at the Hutton Inquiry Dr Jones was still expressing them?

Was it the case that Dr Jones, and in fact the whole country, had just been 'Rockinghamed'?

As Dr Kelly had told Susan Watts in the conversation she had recorded 29 May "I mean I reviewed the whole thing [dossier], I was involved with the whole process.... it was very difficult to get comments in because people at the top of the ladder didn't want to hear some of the things".

Dr Kelly doesn't specify whether he is referring to politicians or bureaucrats when mentioning the "top of the ladder". But both deserve greater scrutiny.

Foreign Secretary Straw is in charge of a government department, one that in fact has responsibility for MI6, with a well established history of deceit. In an article entitled the 'The Lying Game' published August 2002 the Daily Mirror commented on the previous British 'Iraqgate' scandal. The Mirror stated that "The 1994 Scott Inquiry into Britain's illegal supply of arms to Saddam Hussein found that deception was widespread among senior British officials and diplomats. One of those commended by Sir Richard Scott for the honesty of his evidence was the former head of the Iraq Desk in Whitehall, Mark Higson, who described 'a culture of lying' in the Foreign Office."

With a track record of this kind perhaps it is little wonder that there have been calls from multiple-directions in Britain for a full judicial inquiry in to 'Iraqgate 2003' now that some of the depth of the scandal is obvious even to the most casual of observers.  The Prime Minister is refusing.

And why might that be, given that it was acceptable to have an inquiry after the much less controversial Falklands war?

The Guardian reported 18 June 2003 that "Senior figures in the intelligence community and across Whitehall briefed the former international development secretary Clare Short that Tony Blair had made a secret agreement last summer with George Bush to invade Iraq in February or March.... In damning evidence to the foreign affairs select committee Ms Short refused to identify the three figures, but she cited their authority for making her claim that Mr Blair had actively deceived the cabinet and the country in persuading them of the need to go to war.... She also claimed that the intelligence and diplomatic community had privately opposed the war.... Justifying her charge of deception, she said: 'Three extremely senior people in the Whitehall system said to me very clearly and specifically that the target date was mid-February.'... Both former cabinet ministers [Short and Cook] confirmed a previous Guardian story that cabinet ministers had been given private intelligence briefings by SIS, but insisted the briefings did not indicate that the world had to act immediately to stem an imminent Iraqi threat.... Ms Short also claimed there was a shocking collapse in proper government procedure, with a small unelected entourage in Downing Street making the decisions without minutes, proper options papers or any written material...The prime minister has declined to speak to the foreign affairs committee".

Short identified Alastair Campbell (the Prime Minister's director of strategy and communications), Jonathan Powell (the Prime Minister's chief of staff), and advisers Baroness Morgan and Sir David Manning as the closed group that made Iraq policy in conjunction with Blair.

Blair's own evidence to the Hutton Inquiry, presumably well rehearsed, appears to have been generally uninteresting. There were, however, a couple of disclosures which are of particular relevance to the broader question as to why Britain went to war with Iraq.

The first, as reported by the BBC 28 August, is that "Asked about a letter of complaint from a senior intelligence officer about how intelligence was used, Mr Blair said none of those sorts of complaints reached the JIC or him".

The JIC comprises, amongst others, the various heads of Britain's main intelligence services. To claim that such complaints (now known to have existed thanks to evidence produced at the inquiry) had not reached the JIC would be to imply that serious filtration or suppression of information was taking place somewhere else within the intelligence system. Were the relevant members of the JIC really ignorant of these complaints or were they simply omitting to tell the Prime Minister about them?

Neither scenario is reassuring. A report by the Guardian 12 August on evidence provided to the inquiry by the deputy chief of Defence Intelligence at the Ministry of Defence (allegedly, lest it be forgotten, the home of Operation Rockingham) states that "the dissenters' views were taken into account before the joint intelligence committee met to approve the dossier's final version".

However, evidence provided later to the Hutton Inquiry by other witnesses from within the Ministry of Defence indicated that this is disputed.

If they were being blocked, then who was stonewalling those concerns?

And why is the Prime Minister himself not prepared to question the role of certain elements within the intelligence services? As he put it himself when giving evidence to the Hutton Inquiry on Downing St's conflict with the BBC "This was an attack that went to the heart not just of the office of Prime Minister, it went to the heart of the way our intelligence services operated."?

Indeed, there is little doubt now that somebody within the system 'sexed' things up in making the case against Iraq, albeit often in ways that have not featured strongly in the current debate. If the Prime Minister is really convinced of his own integrity, and by implication the rest of Downing St, then why is he not demanding an investigation of the intelligence services given all that we now know?

Moreover, according to a BBC report 28 August "The prime minister said he decided to announce the publication of a dossier because he had a phone call with US President George Bush and they decided they had to confront the issue, devise a strategy and get on with it". It then goes on to say that "The purpose of the dossier was to respond to the call to disclose the intelligence that we knew, but at that stage, the strategy was not to use the dossier as the immediate reason for going to conflict."

Mr Blair's account is therefore that the dossier was as a result of discussion with George Bush and yet he also says his purpose was not to use the dossier as the immediate reason for going to conflict. How meaningful is that? According to the London Times 29 August the Prime Minister told the inquiry that the dossier was to be used "as the reason why we had to return to the issue of Saddam and weapons of mass destruction, preferably through the UN.”

Is our Prime Minister really so naive as to be unable to divine the intentions of the United States in relation to Iraq at that or any other stage since 911? Either the Prime Minister is not being wholly honest or his memory is short.

Perhaps the Prime Minister needs reminding that President Bush himself piggy-backed on part of the British September dossier (specifically the Africa uranium claim, now widely regarded as bogus) in his State of the Union address of 28 January 2003. This was done in order to bolster the presentation of the US's justification for what Blair now refers to as "the immediate reason for going to conflict".

Did the President dupe Blair or did Blair dupe the British people? How realistic is it to believe that Bush is smarter than Blair? Not very. But the same does not so easily apply to the US Vice President from whom Bush takes his strongest steer.

Although the Hutton Inquiry has put the Prime Minister and many of his acolytes under an unusually strong spotlight, back in the US it is the Vice President who is gradually becoming the focus of attention. During the build up to the Iraq war Dick Cheney was an exceptionally regular visitor to the CIA's headquarters. Many feel he, in collaboration with Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz, was the key driving force behind the march to war irrespective of the facts. CIA veteran Raymond McGovern, who had responsibility for regularly briefing Vice President Bush during the 1980s, reports in the Hartford Courant 27 June that Cheney's "visits were, in fact, unprecedented. During my 27-year career at the Central Intelligence Agency, no vice president ever came to us for a working visit".

Throughout the Iraq crisis, however, less senior CIA staff were intermittently briefing journalists with accusations that the Bush administration was spinning intelligence to the public in order to justify the war. There appears to have been a conflicting attitude towards the question of Iraq between those at the top of the agency and those lower down (as is now known to have been the case within British intelligence as well).

In a recent article discussing the possible impeachment of George Bush over the Iraq affair John Dean, a FindLaw columnist, and former Counsel to the President of the United States wrote that "According to the New York Times, [Senator Graham] was one of the few members of the Senate who saw the national intelligence estimate that was the basis for Bush's decisions. After reviewing it, Senator Graham requested that the Bush Administration declassify the information before the Senate voted on the Administration's resolution requesting use of the military in Iraq. But rather than do so, CIA Director Tenet merely sent Graham a letter discussing the findings. Graham then complained that Tenet's letter only addressed 'findings that supported the administration's position on Iraq,' and ignored information that raised questions about intelligence".

In relation to the African uranium reference in the President's State of the Union address in January, Time magazine 28 July states that "Tenet reportedly acknowledged when he testified last week before the Senate Intelligence Committee that the questionable line in the text had not been brought to his attention".

However, it is difficult to believe that the final decision to authorise such an element would not have rested with Tenet, especially as the President's Daily Briefing (PDB) on intelligence is edited personally by him. Moreover, the London Times 6 June also reported that "Greg Thielmann, a State Department intelligence official covering Iraq until the end of last year, said yesterday that all dissenting views had been omitted from a key CIA report presented to the President in October." If Thielman is correct then clearly elements within the CIA were co-operating in the massaging of intelligence for political purposes. Who were those people within the CIA, and what was their relationship to Tenet?

And what was Tenet's relationship with the Vice President and those members of the National Security Council who are now known to have been involved in drafting the relevant section of Mr Bush's speech?

One of the key issues here is also the claim by Seymour Hersh of the New Yorker that Tenet had addressed a highly classified meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in its secure hearing room on September 24 2002. Two of those present during Tenet's presentation claimed, in the words of Hersh's 24 March report, that "the argument that Iraq had a nuclear program under way was buttressed by a new and striking fact: the C.I.A. had recently received intelligence showing that, between 1999 and 2001, Iraq had attempted to buy five hundred tons of uranium oxide from Niger, one of the world’s largest producers".

Tenet's presentation took place the same day that Blair released his first Iraq dossier containing the claim that "there is intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa".

Yet on that date the CIA had already long since established that the Niger claim was bogus. Moreover Hersh states that "Two days later, Secretary of State Colin Powell, appearing before a closed hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, also cited Iraq’s attempt to obtain uranium from Niger as evidence of its persistent nuclear ambitions. The testimony from Tenet and Powell helped to mollify the Democrats, and two weeks later the resolution passed overwhelmingly, giving the President a congressional mandate for a military assault on Iraq..."

It would certainly be interesting to get Hersh's sources in front of a congressional investigation to compare their version of events with those of Tenet and Powell.

The Italian Connection - The Niger Forgeries

Back in the 1980's Italy became involved in the Reagan-Bush exercise to illegally arm Saddam Hussein. An important part of the under-reported scandal was the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL) affair, which came to the attention of the authorities and the public during the summer of 1989. This followed the revelation that the small Atlanta branch office of BNL, one of Italy's largest Banks whose shares were almost entirely owned by the Italian government, had provided Iraq with several billion dollars in off-book loans and credits.

Amongst other matters the bank had handled a major portion of U.S. agricultural credit guarantees for Iraq. These were used as a back door route for pumping funds into Saddam Hussein's regime and his military programmes. According to the National Security archive at George Washington University "In addition, the [BNL] managers had signed a series of agreements obligating the bank to provide some $1.155 billion in medium-term loans to Iraq’s Ministry of Industry and Military Production, a government organization that was in charge of Iraq’s efforts to obtain western technology for military research and development programs, including those involving chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and missiles."

The archive reveals that the bank was also providing loans to Matrix-Churchill Corporation in Ohio, whose sister company was at the heart of the British 'Iraqgate' episode. Three of the company's managers were put on trial in Great Britain in 1992 on charges of illegally exporting machinery with military applications to Iraq. The case was dismissed after documents and testimony showed that British government officials had approved the exports, knowing that they would be used for weapons manufacture. The collapse of the case led to the setting up of the Scott inquiry in 1994 which revealed a situation which was described by the former head of the Iraq Desk in Whitehall as a "culture of lying" at the British Foreign Office.

Banca Nazionale del Lavoro was raided by the FBI on 4 August 1989. The National Security Archive holds 147 documents in relation to the involvement of BNL.

By 2003, however, Italy was once again raising eyebrows in relation to the US's ongoing relationship with Iraq.

On 7 March the IAEA had announced that the documents passed to it by the US government on Iraq's alleged efforts to obtain uranium from Niger were 'not authentic'. So where had the documents come from and what was their history since they first emerged not long after the attacks of 911?

A journalist in the New York Times 13 June, briefly referring to an Italian connection, reported as follows: "Italy's intelligence service obtained the documents and shared them with British spooks, who passed them on to Washington. Mr. Cheney's office got wind of this and asked the C.I.A. to investigate. The agency chose a former ambassador to Africa to undertake the mission... and that person flew to Niamey, Niger, in the last week of February 2002. Immediately upon his return, in early March 2002, this senior envoy briefed the C.I.A. and State Department and reported that the documents were bogus.   My understanding is that while Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet may not have told Mr. Bush that the Niger documents were forged, lower C.I.A. officials did tell both the vice president's office and National Security Council staff members."

In early July it was disclosed that the US envoy sent to Niger was Joseph Wilson, US Ambassador to Gabon from 1992 to 1995, who had also been an official of the US National Security Council.

If Wilson's account is correct then it would appear that at the very least Tenet and Cheney knew the documents were fakes. Did they willing omit to tell Bush, or is someone lying about what Bush knew as well?

The official line is that Bush didn't know about the status of the Niger documents at the time of his State of the Union address on 28 January 2003 when he cited British evidence of the African uranium claim.

Blair had already used the accusation in his September 2002 dossier, some six months after the Bush administration had discovered the Niger claims were false. According to the Independent 13 June "That information was shared with British officials, and was reported widely within the US government, a senior intelligence official in Washington told the Associated Press. But the British government still included their information in a public statement on 24 September last year."

The British government now says it based its own dossier claims on separate intelligence and that it heard about Ambassador Wilson's discovery only recently. Nonetheless Seymour Hersh's report in the New Yorker 24 March cites a congressional staffer who claims that Britain was happy to pass the forged documents around even though only a minor investigation would have established their fraudulent nature.

Intriguingly, however, other press reports only refer to 'summaries' of the documents circulating in Washington and London and that these were provided by Italian intelligence. Reference to these 'summaries' may allow the Bush and Blair governments to maintain their subsequent claim that they had never seen the actual documents. It is possible we are now into Clinton-Lewinsky style semantics here, with a technical distinction being made between 'documents' and 'summaries' in order to permit the maintenance of an accurate but misleading denial.

Certainly it looks like it. According to a report in the Daily Mirror 9 July "Italy's intelligence service circulated reports about the Niger documents -- not the documents themselves -- to other Western intelligence services in early 2002, and that was apparently how the British and U.S. intelligence services learned of them, U.S. government sources said."

Meanwhile the British Foreign Office appears to have organised a defence of itself around the claim that not only was British intelligence not the source of the forged documents, but that indeed it had never even seen them.

William Ehrman is the Foreign Office's director of international security, also described as 'Director General Defence/Intelligence' and as a Foreign Office member of the JIC in the July report of the Foreign Affairs Committee 'The Decision to go to War in Iraq'.

Ehrman had been tasked with trying to win Chinese support for a new United Nations resolution authorising the use of 'all necessary means' against Iraq a few days after the September dossier was published. In June he told the Foreign Affairs Committee that "... my understanding was that the intelligence was passed to the IAEA in 2003. I did not say by the British Government. My understanding is that it was by the country which had that intelligence." Is he referring to Italy, which seems to have originally acquired the 'documents' from Africa, or to the US, or to some other country? He should tell us.

Italian Prime Minister and media baron Silvio Berlusconi, is a close ally of Blair despite a controversial history of corruption allegations (see Daily Telegraph article 16 February 2002 'Berlusconi, Blair and the Italian Connection'). One of Berlusconi's associates has recently been convicted in a case that an Italian judge described on 6 August as "the biggest corruption in the history of the republic in Italy."

There is also little doubt about Berlusconi's close relationship with Bush. Berlusconi was given the unusual honour of a visit both to Camp David and to Bush's Texas ranch earlier in July. The only other Europeans to have been afforded the same privilege are Tony Blair and Spain's Jose Maria Aznar, both of whom supported the Iraq war.

What does Berlusconi have to say about Italy's alleged role in the forged Niger documents affair?

The journalist who originally handed the documents to the US embassy in Rome was an employee of one of Berlusconi's companies according to Newsweek 28 July. An earlier article in Newsweek 16 July states that "The motivations of the foreign journalist are unclear". At that point the identity of the journalist involved had not been established, although this was to follow shortly.

According to the Los Angeles Times 20 July the lady journalist concerned later told Corriere della Sera, an Italian daily, that her source "in the past proved to be reliable." Who was that source?

The FBI has since been dispatched to Italy to investigate the Italian connection. Some within the FBI may have scores to settle with the CIA and the Bush administration. The FBI is currently smarting from a recent report that lays much of the blame for the 911 'intelligence failure' at its own door, even though the CIA failed to pass on important information about some of the hijackers to the FBI before the attacks.

In addition the head of counter terrorism at the FBI, John O'Neil, had also resigned during July 2001 because he said he was being blocked by the Bush administration from investigating al Qaeda. According to former Federal prosecutor John Loftus this blockage was instigated by Vice President Dick Cheney specifically to protect Enron's energy interests in Afghanistan. Enron were promoting the construction of a gas pipeline across Afghanistan that would supply its struggling gas fuelled power station in northern India.

In a press release 31 May 2002 Loftus states that "The Enron cover-up confirms that 9/11 was not an intelligence failure or a law enforcement failure (at least not entirely). Instead, it was a foreign policy failure of the highest order. If Congress ever combines its Enron investigation with 9/11, Cheney’s whole house of cards will collapse".

Concern has also come from the lower ranks of the FBI. As one whistleblowing FBI agent Robert Wright enigmatically put it just before Christmas when interviewed on ABC News concerning official efforts to stop him investigating al-Qaeda before 911: "You can't know the things I know and not go public... The supervisor who was there from [FBI] headquarters was right straight across from me and started yelling at me: 'You will not open criminal investigations. I forbid any of you. You will not open criminal investigations against any of these intelligence subjects'..... There's so much more. God, there's so much more. A lot more."  Clearly Wright is desperate to say more but is being blocked.

The top of the FBI continues to illegally refuse the release of Wright's 500 page manuscript, 'Fatal Betrayals of the Intelligence Mission', that he submitted for prepublication review in October 2001. In fact, the FBI has even refused to turn the manuscript over to Senator Shelby, Vice Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, charged with investigating America's 911 intelligence failures. Wright has now launched a lawsuit against the FBI.

So what will the FBI discover about the Niger forgeries in Italy? Or more importantly, what will be reported it has discovered? That will probably depend on who is in charge of its investigation.

According to Newsweek 16 July "The disputed documents were first provided to Italian intelligence services in late 2001, and information about them was then passed along to allied intelligence agencies, including Britain's MI6 and the CIA. But the documents themselves didn't come into the possession of the U.S. government until nearly a year later, in October 2002, sources said, when a foreign individual -- described by one source as a journalist -- turned them over to the U.S. Embassy in Rome. .... Two sources said, at one point, State Department's INR division -- which had long since concluded there was no reliable evidence that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear weapons program -- offered the documents to the CIA.  But for reasons that are unclear, the CIA never followed up on the offer. One explanation, sources said, is that the CIA had gotten a report from the Italians about the documents, including what agency officials believed was a 'verbatim text' and didn't believe it was necessary to have the primary source material themselves.  An agency official acknowledged 'there were some discussions' between the State Department and the CIA about turning the material over to the agency, but no follow up took place. 'It's unclear' why, the official said."

So the CIA was briefed by the Italian intelligence services but didn't think it necessary to see the original documents? And what was MI6 doing during all this time?

However, as some of the post-war heat started to pile up on Rome the Guardian reported 14 July that "... the Italian government denied that it had passed documents about Niger's uranium to other countries. The denial came months after it was first reported that the forged documents were fed by Italy to Britain and the US. Time magazine in the US said Italy passed on a dozen letters and other documents about the claims to Britain and the US in late 2001."

CNN reported 14 July that the denial came directly from Berlusconi's own office. The denial related to"documents of Niger or Iraqi origin" stating "The Italian information services, in fact, never provided any documents having such content and origin."

Unfortunately, Mr Berlusconi's office doesn't appear to address the question of any other documents, not of Niger or Iraqi origin, but of Italian origin such as 'summaries'. It is important to note such details when dealing with the 'Axis of Weasel'.

Photographs of the actual forged documents appeared in the Italian newspaper La Repubblica on 16 July. Things were now moving fast.

By 31 July the Guardian had reported that "An early explanation for the forgeries was that they were created by a diplomat in Niger's Rome embassy and passed or sold to the Italians, who then circulated summaries of the information. Two weeks ago the Italians finally admitted they were the source. After a closed session of the Italian parliament, it was confirmed that the allegation was being investigated by the military intelligence organisation in 2001 and that a 'reciprocal exchange of information' was made with allied secret services. Congressional and parliamentary committees, the FBI and Italian magistrates are all trying to get to the bottom of what might charitably be called wilful incompetence".

The chances of Italy's escape from indictment in this matter do not look altogether promising. It is difficult not to sense the possibility of the exposure of a major scandal in the making.

The London Times 17 July reported that "The uranium-from-Africa affair took a new twist yesterday when an Italian newspaper claimed that MI6 had been duped by forged documents given to it by Italy’s military intelligence service.... La Repubblica published photocopies of four documents which suggest Iraq reached an agreement to buy 500 tonnes of uranium 'yellowcake' from Niger. They appear to contain obvious errors: one document, dated October 10, 2000, has the signature of Allele Habibou, the Niger Foreign Affairs and Co-operation Minister who left office in 1989.... The newspaper quotes a source from Sismi, the Italian military intelligence agency, as saying that the documents were passed to MI6 in 2002."

Even Fox News reported 16 July that "Italy may have passed on to the United States and Britain disputed claims that Saddam Hussein had been seeking uranium in Africa to make nuclear weapons, the head of a parliamentary intelligence committee said Wednesday. Premier Silvio Berlusconi's government has denied that Italy's intelligence services passed on 'documents' about the matter. But committee chief Enzo Bianco speaking after a top government official addressed the commission in secret, did not deny that the information may have been passed on informally. 'This is possible,' he said. 'I don't rule it out.' Cabinet undersecretary and top Berlusconi aide Gianni Letta, who briefed the intelligence commission Wednesday afternoon, refused to comment on the hearing." Letta has refused to hand over Italian intelligence documents on the matter according to a report in the Guardian 17 July.

Fox News also quotes the SISMI source cited in the original Repubblica article. The source says "There were several meetings, at a higher level, almost always in London. Despite this positive climate, we don't know if it were the English who passed on that stuff to the CIA. It's rather probable."

The SISMI source also states that "in late 2001 or early 2002, the MI6 British intelligence unit obtained the documents". This timing is well before the publication of the September dossier in which the Africa uranium claim was made. If the allegation coming from within SISMI is correct, it contradicts the British Ambassador to the UN who had claimed that Britain had never seen the documents.

Given the unsophisticated nature of the forgeries the suggestion in the London Times 17 July that MI6 were 'duped' is hardly convincing. The Repubblica report on the apparent involvement of SISMI with the forgeries was published after Berlusconi's office had issued its apparent public denial of the involvement of the Italian 'information services'. The rather different subsequent claim coming from within SISMI itself would therefore appear to represent something of a problem for the Berlusconi government.

Is Berlusconi lying, is his government lying, or are the press reports wrong?

The US must know where the forged documents came from as it was the US that eventually handed them over to the UN. Hersh's report in the New Yorker 24 March confirmed this earlier in the year. He stated that "The I.A.E.A. had first sought the documents last fall, shortly after the British government released its dossier.  After months of pleading by the I.A.E.A., the United States turned them over to Jacques Baute, who is the director of the agency’s Iraq Nuclear Verification Office."According to Newsweek 28 July it was the State Department who passed them over to the IAEA. Newsweek also refers to the papers as 'the Italian documents'. 

However, just as significantly Hersh also states in his article that "Forged documents and false accusations have been an element in U.S. and British policy toward Iraq at least since the fall of 1997, after an impasse over U.N. inspections.... A former Clinton Administration official told me that London had resorted to, among other things, spreading false information about Iraq. The British propaganda program—part of its Information Operations, or I/Ops—was known to a few senior officials in Washington.... dozens of unverified and unverifiable intelligence reports and tips—data known as inactionable intelligence—[were] to be funnelled to MI6 operatives and quietly passed along to newspapers in London and elsewhere. 'It was intelligence that was crap, and that we couldn’t move on, but the Brits wanted to plant stories in England and around the world,' the former officer said. There was a series of clandestine meetings with MI6, at which documents were provided, as well as quiet meetings, usually at safe houses in the Washington area..... None of the past and present officials I spoke with were able to categorically state that the fake Niger documents were created or instigated by the same propaganda office in MI6 that had been part of the anti-Iraq propaganda wars in the late nineteen-nineties (An MI6 intelligence source declined to comment.)....What is generally agreed upon, a congressional intelligence-committee staff member told me, is that the Niger documents were initially circulated by the British—President Bush said as much in his State of the Union speech—and that 'the Brits placed more stock in them than we did.' ... "

A report by Inter Press Service News Agency 9 August also confirms that following the attacks on America in September 2001 the CIA, NSA (National Security Agency) and the State Department were "kept in the dark about a mission undertaken immediately afterward by former CIA director and DPB [Defense Policy Board] member James Woolsey to London to gather intelligence about possible links between Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda, as if the CIA or the Pentagon's own Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) could not be trusted."

Isn't it interesting how London keeps featuring in clandestine attempts to manufacture or massage 'evidence' on Iraq?

And did this report of a trip to London by Woolsey represent a brief public surfacing of a transatlantic link between Operation Rockingham (the subversive British intelligence massaging exercise alleged by former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter) and the Office of Special Plans at the Pentagon, a new US bureaucracy established by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to fulfil a similar purpose?

Woolsey is a key largely unnoticed behind-the-scenes actor in 'Iraqgate 2003'. Here's what an article in 'Foreign Policy in Focus' had to say about him 8 April 2003: "If you want to figure out whether the administration of President George W. Bush intends a crusade to 'remake the Middle East' in the wake of Washington's presumed military victory in Iraq, watch what happens with R. James Woolsey. A former director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Woolsey is being pushed hard by his fellow neoconservatives in the Pentagon to play a key role in the post-Saddam Hussein U.S. occupation.... At a NATO conference in Prague last November, Woolsey declared 'Iraq can be seen as the first battle of the fourth world war,' in rhetoric that he has practiced and honed virtually since the 9/11 attacks on New York and the Pentagon. 'After two hot world wars and one cold one that all began and were centered in Europe,' he said, 'the fourth world war is going to be for the Middle East.' .... in January 1998 [he] signed a public letter to Clinton by the newly formed Project for the New American Century (PNAC) calling for the adoption of a 'regime change' as the main U.S. policy goal toward Iraq. In that same year, he lobbied hard for passage of the Iraq Liberation Act (ILA), which not only formalized regime change as the policy but allocated up to 100 million dollars for the Iraqi opposition, mainly the Iraq National Congress (INC), headed by Ahmed Chalabi. That lobby went into high gear immediately after Sep. 11. Within just a few days, [Richard] Perle convened the DPB [Defense Policy Board] to discuss how Washington could use the incidents as justification for attacking Iraq, and Woolsey was tasked to go to Europe to collect evidence that Hussein was linked to al Qaeda".

Those al Qaeda claims have since been completely discredited. However, the same article elaborates on Woolsey's role in propagating such propaganda. It adds "He spent many weeks on that mission, emerging with the story that an unnamed informant had told Czech intelligence that he had seen the leader of the Sep. 11 skyjackers meet with an Iraqi agent in Prague in the April before the attack. Even though the report was dismissed as not credible by U.S., British, French, and Israeli intelligence agencies, it became the basis--endlessly repeated by Woolsey and other neocons on television talk shows and in op-ed pages of major newspapers--of a major propaganda campaign against Iraq, even as Washington carried out its military campaign in Afghanistan in late 2001. Woolsey even suggested that Saddam was behind the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center towers and the anthrax-bearing letters sent to various lawmakers after 9/11, and that U.S. intelligence agencies could not find the connection because they lacked sufficient imagination. The campaign largely worked: by late last year, well over half of respondents in one key poll believed that Saddam was somehow linked to the September 11 attacks".

Woolsey has the dubious distinction of featuring in a recently produced deck of playing cards available for purchase by the public. The deck profiles figures associated with Bush administration under the title 'The Bush Regime Card Deck -The 52 Most Dangerous American Dignitaries'. Woolsey's card (4 of clubs) describes him as "A former CIA director. Longing for a fight with Iraq, he accused Saddam Hussein of having orchestrated the Oklahoma City and 9/11 attacks. He discovered Ahmed Chalabi and set up the Iraqi National Congress".

The Foreign Policy in Focus article serves to place Woolsey firmly in the neo-conservative madman category. It states "Like other neoconservatives, Woolsey also appears to have somewhat ambivalent views about the democratic revolution he seeks to generate throughout the Arab world. 'Only fear will re-establish respect for the U.S.,' he told the Washington Post when asked why U.S. conquests in the Islamic world would not incite even more support for Islamist radicals and al Qaeda."

Given this degree of lunacy (amply demonstrated by the post-invasion opening up of Iraq, previously free of Islamic terrorist elements except for those parts under American protection in the northern no-fly zone, to al Qaeda as now acknowledged by US Administrator Paul Bremer) it would be interesting to learn whether or not Woolsey had a hand in the promotion of the Niger uranium forgeries. This is particularly so taking into account the length of the overseas errand Woolsey was sent on post-911, not long after which the Niger forgeries first emerged. Did Woolsey make any visits, for example, to Italy in addition to London and Prague?

Despite Hersh's earlier allegations of longstanding British and American involvement with "Forged documents and false accusations" relating to Iraq, the UK government has denied being involved in the Niger forgeries.

In an interview in the Independent 30 June Sir Jeremy Greenstock, then British Ambassador to the United Nations and former Minister in the British Embassy in Washington, told the paper "You have got that wrong. That forged document was never seen by British intelligence ... We never knew where it came from and we never examined it." So its seems it's down to Sir Jeremy Greenstock's word against that of Hersh's unnamed congressional intelligence-committee staff member and Repubblica's source within SISMI.

But who has the most facts and who is presenting them most accurately?

The Observer 3 August describes Greenstock (now UK special envoy to Iraq) as a close friend of Sir John Scarlett, Chairman of Britain's Joint Intelligence Committee. Scarlett is said to be being considered for the post of head of MI6 by Blair, following the surprise decision of Sir Richard Dearlove to retire early. The Observer reports that "Scarlett was a trusted member of Blair's inner circle throughout the Iraq crisis, and has now become a personal friend. 'Scarlett put his name to the dossier which included the 45-minute claim, and Blair has repeatedly cited his support in telling people it had the intelligence services' backing,' one source told The Observer. 'It is now uncomfortably apparent that this claim was exaggerated. He is going to be placed in a very difficult position.' ".

Having Blair's man at the top of MI6 would certainly help to keep both the British Secret Intelligence Service and 10 Downing St singing from the same hymn sheet. However, for some the close ties are little too close for comfort. The London Times reports 4 August that "Opposition parties last night demanded that the new head of MI6 continues to be genuinely independent after confirmation that Sir Richard Dearlove will step down from the post next year. With the succession process under way, and the frontrunner rumoured to be a contemporary of Tony Blair at Oxford University, the Tories said that the tradition of impartiality at the top of the intelligence agency must be maintained".

Over the years Oxford and Cambridge have provided more than their fair share of recruits to the British Intelligence services including Sir Richard Dearlove himself. Sir Richard announced his early retirement a couple of weeks after the death of Dr Kelly. According to the Observer Dearlove has told friends that after retirement he would like to be considered for a job as Master of an Oxbridge college, from where no doubt he will be able to provide a useful recruiting service.

Former MI5 officer David Shayler, who blew the whistle on MI6's provision of funds to an al Qaeda cell in Libya, has described his former employers as "Britain's arrogant and largely unaccountable, Oxbridge-dominated, self-styled intelligence elite." Shayler issued a statement on the Libya episode 15th February 2000 which read as follows: "We will only know the truth of the matter if we have a full independent enquiry into the plot (and my other disclosures). Without that no one can say hand on heart what happened (apart from me. I was briefed on the plot at the time). Anything less sends out the wrong signal to MI6. Anything less suggests that MI6 is above the law or that MI6 can continue to carry out illegal operations without government interference. I need hardly tell you how that begins to eat away at the rule of law and also to undermine our democracy because unelected intelligence officers decide our foreign policy, not our elected representatives... Many MPs including the Intelligence and Security Committee are now looking negligent and foolhardy for not pursuing my disclosures more vigorously. They shouldn't be caught out a second time or the people will begin to think that parliament and the opposition in general has no credibility whatsoever".

That second time may now have arrived. And it is probably the most serious issue which lies at the heart of 'Iraqgate 2003'. In effect Shayler was spelling out the implications of such unaccountable subterfuge for the future of civil society in Britain at the beginning of the 21st century.

A report in the Guardian 8 September throws some light on the role played by the Head of MI6 in the making of the case for the invasion of Iraq. The Guardian reported that the Intelligence and Security Committee, chaired by Ann Taylor, a former Labour cabinet minister, "has also heard from Sir Richard Dearlove, head of MI6.... that he too was satisfied with the disputed September dossier. Like Dr Kelly, Sir Richard is also said to have been in favour of military intervention in Iraq".

A senior minister told the Guardian that Dearlove "was a strong supporter of pre-emptive action, anxious that the intelligence MI6 supplied produced results". So at the highest levels has real intelligence been driving policy (which is what should happen), or has policy been driving 'intelligence' that is suspect? And if the latter then what policy, and emanating from whom?

These may be awkward questions, but given the reports from Hersh and Ritter is it really that hard to work out what has been going on?

According to a report in the Guardian 9 October 2002 "Officials in the CIA, FBI and energy department are being put under intense pressure to produce reports which back the administration's line, the Guardian has learned. In response, some are complying, some are resisting and some are choosing to remain silent. 'Basically, cooked information is working its way into high-level pronouncements and there's a lot of unhappiness about it in intelligence, especially among analysts at the CIA,' said Vincent Cannistraro, the CIA's former head of counter-intelligence... Mr Cannistraro said the flow of intelligence to the top levels of the administration had been deliberately skewed by hawks at the Pentagon. 'CIA assessments are being put aside by the defence department in favour of intelligence they are getting from various Iraqi exiles,' he said. 'Machiavelli warned princes against listening to exiles. Well, that is what is happening now.'...".

And just as has happened within the CIA, the actions of those at the top of Britain's most notorious intelligence agency, and therefore those closest to the leavers of political power, are not supported by many of the intelligence workhorses on the ground participating in the analysis of the information stream.

The Observer's report of 3 August claims that "intelligence sources are scathing about [Scarlett's] association with Blair's media adviser, Alastair Campbell, who has described him as a 'mate', and by his public endorsement of the September dossier. The fiercest criticism relates to the fact that Scarlett allowed Campbell, a political appointee with no intelligence training or expertise, to chair a meeting which discussed the dossier and the raw intelligence behind it before publication. This is being seen within the intelligence community as a historic breach of long-established constitutional principles. A retired senior officer said: 'Rather than allow that to happen, Scarlett should have resigned.... Appointing Scarlett [as the new head of MI6], a close friend of Washington ambassador Sir David Manning and Sir Jeremy Greenstock, Britain's ambassador to the UN, would be another breach of precedent, but the job of 'C' is entirely within the Prime Minister's gift."

A handover of MI6 from Dearlove to Scarlett given what is now know would be truly breathtaking.

And if Sir Jeremy Greenstock says that British intelligence never saw the Niger forgeries, are we back once again to a semantic distinction between actual 'documents' and claims based on 'summaries'?

However, if Greenstock's less than totally convincing assertion of British innocence in the matter is correct then the focus switches back to the US. It was, after all, America who finally handed over the forged documents to the IAEA.

A report by Associated Press 16 July provides further information (or disinformation) on this subject stating that "When the Bush administration issued its pre-war claims that Iraq had sought uranium in Africa, the CIA had not yet obtained the documents that served as a key foundation for the allegation and later turned out to be forged, U.S. officials say.  The CIA didn't receive the documents until February 2003, nearly a year after the agency first began investigating the alleged Iraq-Africa connection and a short time after it assented to language in President Bush's State of the Union address that alleged such a connection, the officials said.  Without the source documents, the CIA could investigate only their substance, which it had learned from a foreign government around the beginning of 2002. One of the key allegations was that Iraq was soliciting uranium from the African country of Niger".

Two days later, however, the Washington Post ran a rather different account which stated that "The documents first came into the U.S. government's hands when a journalist turned them over to U.S. Embassy officials in Rome. Other officials said previously that the Italian intelligence services had given the documents to the British, which first mentioned the Niger-Iraq claim in its published case against Iraq in September. 'We acquired the documents in October of 2002, and they were shared widely within the U.S. government, with all the appropriate agencies in various ways,' State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said yesterday. The embassy promptly informed the CIA station chief in Rome that it had the documents and, on Oct. 19, gave copies to intelligence officials... On Feb. 4, the U.N. inspectors' Iraq team was called to the U.S. mission in Vienna and verbally briefed on the contents of the documents. A day later, they received copies, according to officials familiar with the inspectors' work".

Cheney And Tenet

One explanation for the discrepancy between these two accounts is given by the New York Times 17 July. The paper reports that "....officials said today that the documents now believed to be forgeries were obtained by the State Department, which offered to have them reviewed by the C.I.A. But the C.I.A. did not do so until recently. As a result, they were not determined to be forgeries until March".  How convenient.

Clearly such an explanation does not give the CIA a pair of clean hands. Apart from inviting a serious charge of negligence, it may suggest, in a potential case of 'wilful neglect', that some within the agency wanted to continue relying on 'summaries' because they believed the documents themselves might not stand up to serious scrutiny.

Whatever the case, however, it is clear that the CIA had had some kind of information on the subject for a long time. It was after all the CIA, at the Vice President's apparent prompting, that initiated Joseph Wilson's trip to Niger in February 2002 to investigate. To hold that the CIA did not receive the 'actual' documents until February 2003, if true, is consistent with the suggestion that it was only 'summaries' from a foreign intelligence service that had been provided to the CIA prior to that.

If so then there appears to have been a long interval between the US receiving 'summaries' and finally obtaining the actual documents. The Washington Post reported 22 March 2003 that "U.S. intelligence officials said they had not even seen the actual evidence, consisting of supposed government documents from Niger, until last month [i.e. Feb 2002]. The source of their information, and their doubts, officials said, was a written summary provided more than six months ago [i.e. prior to the publication of the UK dossier] by the Italian intelligence service, which first obtained the documents... a U.N. official recently told reporters, a Niger diplomat turned the letters over to Italian intelligence, which provided summaries of the information to Washington and London."

Time magazine 13 July reported that the Italians obtained the evidence in "late 2001" and that "The Italians' evidence was shared with both Britain and the U.S."

Why was there such a delay between the Italians obtaining the evidence and providing summaries, and the final handing over of the documents?

A State Department letter 29 April confirmed to Congressman Henry Waxman that the information it held on the claimed African uranium connection to Iraq had come from two Western European allies, one of which was Britain. The identity of the second was not indicated, but it was confirmed that the information it had provided related to Niger. Whether that country was Italy or not (most likely it was), why did the US not insist on seeing the actual documents at the outset? Or if it did, why did that country not provide them? It was after all an 'ally'.

The entirety of these circumstances gives a grossly dubious impression which raises a large number of questions - in particular as to whether the whole exercise was orchestrated, and if so, by whom?

The Washington Post confirmed 12 June that "The CIA's decision to send an emissary to Niger was triggered by questions raised by an aide to Vice President Cheney during an agency briefing on intelligence circulating about the purported Iraqi efforts to acquire the uranium... The CIA's failure to share what it knew [about the falsity of the Niger-Iraq claims], which has not been disclosed previously, was one of a number of steps in the Bush administration that helped keep the uranium story alive until the eve of the war in Iraq, when the United Nations' chief nuclear inspector told the Security Council that the claim was based on fabricated evidence...." The strategy seems clear.

The Post also reports something previously claimed by Hersh. It states that "CIA Director George J. Tenet, on Sept. 24, 2002, cited the Niger evidence in a closed-door briefing to the Senate intelligence committee on a national intelligence estimate of Iraq's weapons programs, sources said. Although Tenet told the panel that some questions had been raised about the evidence, he did not mention that the agency had sent an envoy to Niger and that the former ambassador had concluded that the claims were false".   So it would seem that Tenet had also been participating in the process of being 'economical with the truth'.

Indeed, how does the claim by Tenet that the inclusion of the Africa uranium allegation in the President's State of the Union address was a simply a 'mistake' affect the situation? The Independent reports 14 July that "John Kerry, the Senator for Massachusetts and Democratic presidential candidate, said the Tenet statement 'doesn't answer the questions ... about the intelligence given to Congress before the war'...".

And what about the original involvement of the Vice President? In an article for Counterpunch 12 June former CIA officer Ray McGovern writes "Now 'senior administration officials' are telling gullible reporters that Cheney was never informed of the outcome of the investigation he ordered. I'm not making this up."

A Knight Ridder report published by the Miami Herald 13 July also raises some interesting issues. It states "A senior CIA official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said the intelligence agency informed the White House on March 9, 2002 - 10 months before Bush's nationally televised speech - that an agency source who had traveled to Niger couldn't confirm European intelligence reports that Iraq was attempting to buy uranium from the West African country. Three senior administration officials said Vice President Dick Cheney and some officials on the National Security Council staff and at the Pentagon ignored the CIA's reservations and argued that the president and others should include the allegation in their case against Saddam. The revelation of the CIA warning is the strongest evidence to date that pro-war administration officials manipulated, exaggerated or ignored intelligence information in their eagerness to make the case for invading Iraq.... Among the most vocal proponents of publicizing the alleged Niger connection, two senior officials said, were Cheney and officials in the office of Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld. The effort was led by Robert G. Joseph, the top National Security Council staff official on nuclear proliferation, the officials said. Cheney alleged in an Aug. 26, 2002, speech that Saddam 'has resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons,' and this March 16 he went much further, saying: 'We believe he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons.'..."

Time Magazine 28 July confirms that the wording of the Africa uranium section in the President's State of the Union speech was negotiated between Robert Joseph and Alan Foley of the CIA. As Time puts it "That conversation is likely to remain under scrutiny".  However, the White House is "ruling out" Joseph testifying before Congress according to Time. But as the magazine notes "Robert Joseph's war may just be beginning".

Time has this to say about Joseph: "As an academic at the National Defense University, the Pentagon's own think tank, Joseph penned hawkish monographs in obscure journals about national missile defense, one of his great passions. He served in the Reagan and first Bush administrations and under Reagan had the tongue-twisting title of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control Policy as a colleague of Richard Perle, a well-known hawk. Joseph's current post makes him the White House point man on countering nuclear proliferation. He was deeply involved in making sure the current Administration withdrew from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 with Russia — a move that defense hawks believe was a necessary prelude to building a national missile defense. Joseph is also a firm believer in the Bush doctrine of pre-emption... A former Administration official who worked with Joseph at the NSC describes him less charitably as 'an ideologue.' ...".

This description places Joseph firmly in the Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz camp. Did Cheney lean on Joseph?

Meanwhile a report in the Washington Post 27 July confirms that "The CIA official, Alan Foley, said he told a member of Rice's staff, Robert Joseph, that the CIA objected to mentioning a specific African country -- Niger -- and a specific amount of uranium in Bush's State of the Union address. Foley testified that he told Joseph of the CIA's problems with the British report and that Joseph proposed changing the claim to refer generally to uranium in Africa. White House communications director Dan Bartlett last Monday called that a 'conspiracy theory' and said Joseph did not recall being told of any concerns".

At the time Alan Foley was (he resigned at the beginning of September 2003) head of 'counter-proliferation' at the CIA and reported directly to Tenet.

If Time's account about Joseph and Foley proves to be correct then attention focuses back on the White House for attempting to skew 'intelligence' to falsely promote the case for war. And it focuses particularly on the Vice President who made the strongest claims of anyone about Iraq's alleged nuclear capability.

But attention also focuses on the CIA for letting the White House do this. If it was against the wishes of the CIA (and the direct involvement of Foley in negotiating the relevant text of the President's speech may indicate otherwise - despite the unexplained claim by Tenet that he himself had not seen the text in question) why did Tenet not resign in protest at that point? He was the man who could have put a stop to all this by doing so.

Indeed senior officials in other parts of the US intelligence apparatus have been resigning with surprising frequency where they have found the behaviour of the Bush administration unacceptable. These include John O'Neil FBI Head of Counter Terrorism (resigned July 2001), Dale Watson FBI Head of Counter Terrorism (resigned August 2002), Richard Clarke White House Head of Counter Terrorism (resigned February 2003), and Rand Beers National Security Council Head of Counter Terrorism (resigned March 2003). That's quite a list of big non-CIA intelligence fish. Why were they not comfortable swimming in the Bush sea?

Watson's reasons for resigning are not clear, although the Boston Globe reported 30 September that "questions persist about why the White House and FBI permitted 140 Saudis (including two-dozen relatives of Osama bin Laden) to leave hurriedly from the United States for Saudi Arabia. In the days immediately following Sept. 11, 2001, while the airways were still closed to all other flights, Americans couldn't fly into the country but relatives of bin Laden were able to fly out.... As Senator Charles Schumer of New York has said, it was too soon after 9/11 for the FBI even to know what questions to ask, much less to decide conclusively that each Saudi and bin Laden relative deserved an 'all clear,' never to be available for questions again.... FBI officials say that agents had interviewed the bin Laden relatives before the White House cleared them to leave the country. But Dale Watson, the former head of counter-terrorism at the FBI, has said the departing Saudis 'were not subject to serious interviews or interrogations.'"

Of the other former counter-terrorism chiefs all have challenged the genuineness of the White House's commitment to the so called 'war against terror', implying that it is being used as cover for a another agenda.

Beers resigned in March just before the start of the war. Later he explained that the Bush administration "wasn't matching its deeds to its words in the war on terrorism. They're making us less secure, not more secure.… The longer I sat and watched, the more concerned I became, until I got up and walked out.... Why was [Iraq] such a policy priority?" Beers had served the National Security Council under four Presidents.

The Washington Post reported 13 March that "Among friends, Clarke is skeptical that the coming war with Iraq is integral to the war on terrorism, as the White House maintains. He describes it as a diversion of scarce resources and a wedge between Washington and critical allies in destroying al Qaeda. Until late last year, he has said, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein would not have been among the top suspects should al Qaeda manage to acquire a weapon of mass destruction. Now, with Hussein's regime on the brink of falling, he will."

This has been confirmed by events. According to the London Times 21 August "Terrorists sympathetic to al-Qaeda have moved into Iraq since the start of the American occupation, the US administrator said yesterday. Paul Bremer said that more than 100 foreign fighters had crossed the border using travel documents and passports from countries such as Syria, Sudan and Yemen. 'We have a security problem here. The security problem has now got a terrorist dimension, which is new,' Mr Bremer said as rescue workers continued to pick over the rubble of the UN headquarters in Baghdad. Mr Bremer’s comments offered a damning assessment of the US occupation of Iraq so far, conceding that a terrorist force that had no muscle under Saddam Hussein was now threatening to flourish under American control."

Coupled with the claims from former federal prosecutor John Loftus, as already discussed above, O'Neil's reasons for resigning are much more disconcerting. They expose alarming actions to block FBI attempts to deal with al Qaeda before 911 - actions which appear to place the Vice President at the very heart of the Bush administration's ongoing misdemeanours.

Meanwhile, there is not much doubt about the unusual closeness of the Director of the CIA to the Bush White House. According to the New York Times 27 July "Current and former intelligence officials say the main complaint about him [Tenet] within the agency over the last year has been that he is too close to Mr. Bush and has not done enough to protect the agency from political pressure. C.I.A. analysts complained before the war in Iraq that Mr. Tenet and other top officials of the agency did not stand up for them in the face of pressure to tailor intelligence reports to fit the Bush administration's agenda. There is no doubt that Mr. Tenet has developed a much closer relationship with Mr. Bush — whom he sees almost daily and who appreciates his plain-spoken and sometimes jocular manner — than he ever had with Mr. Clinton, with whom he met much less frequently." Indeed, the 11 March 2002 edition of Time Magazine had previously asserted that Tenet survived the transition from Clinton to Bush administrations "because he is close to Bush".

Ray McGovern is a former intelligence analyst who chaired National Intelligence Estimates and prepared and briefed the President’s Daily Brief during a 27-year career at the CIA. In a piece produced for Common Dreams 29 July he states "In my day, CIA analysts were generally given the necessary insulation from pressure from policymakers—and career protection when it was necessary to face them down. Here the buck stops with CIA Director George Tenet. And fresh light was thrown on his remarkable malleability when Newt Gingrich (also a frequent visitor to CIA over recent months) made this gratuitous comment to ABC on July 27: 'Tenet is so grateful and loyal that he will do anything he can to help President Bush.'”

A Cheney-Tenet double act also appears implicit in an analysis of the way claims of alleged al Qaeda links with Saddam were presented. The Boston Globe reports 3 August that "Unconfirmed reports -- such as a Czech assertion of a meeting in Prague between Sept. 11 terrorist Mohamed Atta and an Iraqi agent, as well as a captured Al Qaeda member's assertion that Iraq had provided chemical weapons training to Al Qaeda members -- were presented as facts at various points by Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney. 'I know this,' Cheney said on Nov. 14, 2001, when asked on the television news show '60 Minutes II' about the alleged Atta meeting with a Hussein aide. 'In Prague in April of this year, as well as earlier . . .' ....Last week, congressional investigators declared in their major report on the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, that after tracing Atta's movements for two years, including trips made under all known aliases, there was no evidence of the Prague meeting. A former intelligence official in the Bush administration told the Globe the CIA obtained evidence soon after the Czech report that the Iraqi agent was elsewhere at the time of the purported meeting. 'The CIA had proof that Iraqi guy was not in Prague at the time,' said the official, who asked not to be named. 'The mystery here is why did the CIA allow that story to live when it could disprove it with hard information.'..."

As Tenet said in his statement 11 July "I am responsible for the approval process in my Agency".

The Washington Post 24 July picks up on the Tenet resignation theme stating "But Tenet had never read Bush's [January 2003] speech. Why? ......Whatever the case, he had twice warned the White House -- and his deputies had issued similar warnings. What more could a CIA director do? Well, he might have resigned. He might have spoken up. ...... It would be one thing if Tenet had proved himself to be a whiz-bang CIA director. He has not. He was the nation's premier intelligence official on Sept. 11, which can only be called a massive intelligence failure. The United States was attacked on his watch -- not because the terrorists were so awfully clever but because our intelligence agencies were so awfully inept."

'The Project For The New American Century' And The White House

The Washington Post report also attacked White House National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice stating that "The same could be said for Rice. She had been warned by the Clinton administration's outgoing NSC head, Sandy Berger, that terrorism -- specifically Osama bin Laden -- would be her number-one priority. Upon taking office, she relegated it to something less than that -- with disastrous consequences. It was her job to keep the FBI and the CIA coordinated. She failed at that, too."

However, from the point of view of certain elements of the Bush Administration 911 was not the complete disaster it seemed. Indeed, it provided precisely the opportunity which the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz backed 'Project For The New American Century' (PNAC) had been looking for some time.

Other key supporters of this right wing Washington 'think tank' include: Jeb Bush, brother of the President and governor of Florida; Libby Lewis, Cheney's Chief of Staff; and Richard Perle, former Assistant Secretary of Defence in the Reagan administration and current member of the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board (Perle recently stepped down as the Board's chair following a report by the New Yorker on a private lunch Perle had had in January with controversial Saudi-born businessman and former arms broker Adnan Khashoggi. The report suggested Perle was inappropriately mixing business with politics according to the Washington Post. Perle who had strongly opposed arms control with the Soviets was dubbed 'the Prince of Darkness' during his tenure with the Reagan administration. In relation to the 'Star Wars' Strategic Defense Initiative, he is sometimes known as 'Darth Vader', and is regarded as a key architect of the war against Iraq).

In its September 2000 publication entitled 'Rebuilding America's Defences' PNAC seeks the projection of American military might across the globe generally. Specifically it seeks control of the Persian Gulf using Saddam Hussein as "the immediate justification" for intervention. However, the document indicates that such plans would be difficult to implement without "some catastrophic and catalysing event - like a new Pearl Harbor".

911 provided that Pearl Harbor.

As has since been established through official records President Roosevelt knew in detail about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in advance. He deliberately kept the information from the US fleet, and allowed the attacks to proceed. His purpose was to generate such outrage from the American people that they would give him consent to join the second world war, a venture they were previously opposed to participating in.

It took over half a century before that particular governmental deception became public knowledge, and most people remain unaware of it still.

Meanwhile the 'Iraqgate' blame-game ping-pong continued during the summer of 2003 as the ultimate consequences of the Bush response to the 911 'Pearl Harbor' slowly began to be assimilated by the general public. The extent of the deception was gradually becoming more apparent.

On 17 July Associated Press reported the involvement of yet another figure in the promotion of false claims about the Niger uranium. It stated that "CIA Director George Tenet told members of Congress a White House official insisted that President Bush's State of the Union address include an assertion about Saddam Hussein's nuclear intentions that had not been verified, a Senate Intelligence Committee member said Thursday. Sen. Dick Durbin, who was present for a 4 1/2-hour appearance by Tenet behind closed doors with Intelligence Committee members Wednesday, said Tenet named the official. But the Illinois Democrat said that person's identity could not be revealed because of the confidentiality of the proceedings". A few days later it emerged that the person concerned was a Mr Stephen Hadley.

According to the Washington Post 24 July "Hadley is [National Security Adviser Condoleezza] Rice's top aide. He says he forgot about the warnings from Tenet -- two memos and one phone call -- and did not tell her. If that's the case, he's in the wrong job. If it's not the case -- and a reasonable man could have reasonable doubt -- is it possible Rice said nothing to Bush? Maybe not. But if not, why not? That's her job. By now it is clear that the White House was so desperate to buttress its unsupportable claims of an imminent Iraqi nuclear threat that it was willing to include the most questionable of evidence. That happened not only with the uranium reference but also with another piece of supposedly significant evidence -- those aluminum tubes that turned out to play no role in any nuclear weapons program. Who was behind this? Rice? Dick Cheney? The president himself? The uranium reference kept turning up like a bad penny. It had a sponsor -- someone awfully high up. Each time the buck passes, another level of incompetence -- or shenanigans -- is exposed. Now in the chain of supposed bumblers we have Hadley and, by extension, Rice. Either they did not do their jobs or the jobs they did were so frankly political that they both ought to move over to the Republican National Committee, where, on a given day, spin and exaggeration are the sole product. Tenet, though, gets pride of place. He has put a huge dent in the vaunted -- and valued -- independence of the CIA. It's impossible to see him now as a pillar of integrity, someone who speaks his mind no matter what and values keeping his independence over keeping his job. He's shilled for the president once too often. He's got to go."

Hadley is also ''former Pentagon aide to Vice President Cheney" according to Senator Bob Graham. As the wife of Rand Beers (the National Security Council's head of counter-terrorism who resigned just before the war) put in the Washington Post 16 June 2003 "[In the White House] It's  a very closed, small, controlled group. This is an administration that determines what it thinks and then sets about to prove it. There's almost a religious kind of certainty. There's no curiosity about opposing points of view. It's very scary. There's kind of a ghost agenda." Tenet can hardly be an outsider to this scene given his privileged access.

It is also worth remembering throughout the detail of all this that the primary reason these matters are being discussed at all in relation to Tenet and the White House, and then only now, is because of Ambassador Joseph Wilson.

Wilson had decided to emerge from the woodwork after the war and blow the whistle. He went on the record only at the beginning of July. He told the world of his previous discovery on behalf of the US government that the Niger uranium claims were false. He told the world of the involvement of the CIA in his discovery. And he told the world of the involvement of the Vice President. Since then there has been a frantic scramble for cover by both the White House and Tenet.

The claim by Tenet of simply a 'mistake' having been made on the matter rings hollow. Referring to the Africa uranium claim in the President's State of the Union speech National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice told the press 11 July that "the CIA cleared the speech in its entirety... The agency did not say they wanted that sentence out.''

At the same time are we really to believe a scenario where the Director of the CIA didn't know what was going into the President's speech during the very period which was unquestionably the most important of his career? And if that is the case why is he still in his post?

The survival of Tenet is curious. Not only did he 'blow it' on pre-911 intelligence, he did the same on Iraq. Or did he? That depends on what his goals were - or those of his patrons.

Former CIA analyst Ray McGovern is scathing about Tenet.

In an interview 26 June for the internet news service 'Truthout' McGovern states "During the 1980s I was briefing the Vice President and Secretaries of State and Defense, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. I did this every other morning. We worked in teams of two, and on any given morning depending on schedules, I would be hitting two or perhaps three of those senior officials.... So to watch what is going on now, and to see George Tenet - who has all the terrific credentials to be a staffer in Congress, credentials which are antithetical to being a good CIA Director - to see him sit behind Colin Powell at the UN, to see him give up and shade the intelligence and cave in when his analysts have been slogging through the muck for a year and a half trying to tell it like it is, that is very demoralizing, and actually very infuriating..... I think regarding Tenet the term ‘lapdog,’ unfortunately, is apt. For example, here were rather courageous CIA analysts under terrific pressure from the likes of Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz to establish a contact or connection between al Qaeda and Iraq. They resisted this ever since 9/11, not out of any unwillingness to believe it, but simply because there was no evidence to establish it. To their credit, they held the line, and were supported by Brent Scowcroft of all people, who very courageously spoke out and said that evidence is 'scant.'  Now here’s George Tenet, when push comes to shove on February 5 at the UN, sitting right behind Colin Powell like a potted plant, as if to say the CIA and all his analysts agreed with what Colin Powell was about to say about contacts between al Qaeda and Iraq. That was incredibly demoralizing for all my colleagues.....And most of the evidence was being supplied by the Vice President’s office, in the person of Scooter Libby, and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld along with Wolfowitz. That’s curious enough, but an equally important point I would make is this: I worked at senior levels up there for 27 years. Never, never once, not one time did the Vice President of the United States, the Secretary of State or the National Security Advisor come up to the CIA for a working visit....The prospect of the Secretary of State and Condoleezza Rice and Cheney convening in CIA headquarters to sit around a table and help with the analysis…give me a break! You don’t have policy-makers at the table when you’re doing analysis. That’s antithetical to the whole ethic of analysis...".

In a later interview with Reality Radio Network 21 July 2003 McGovern also states "George Tenet has no position of influence or power whatsoever other than what is derivative from his masters Bush and Cheney and Rumsfeld and those folks that he serves. He does what he’s told. He falls on the rubber sword when he needs to. He’s just too useful to them. And besides, he knows just about everything there is to know about what President Bush was told prior to 9/11. In that sense, he is a very dangerous fellow to alienate because there’s always the fear that he has a little computer disk that includes all the warnings that he gave the President – chapter and verse – including the President’s daily brief of August 6th, 2001, the title of which was 'Bin Laden Determined to Strike in the United States' and the body of which talked about hijacking. I know that only because it got leaked to the New York Times. I don’t know any more about what was in that thing , but I would suggest that the title is evocative, and knowing what I know about that publication [the President's Daily Brief] – I wrote, edited and briefed it for five years – that kind of item would not bear that kind of title if there were not some rather specific information in there".

In the same interview McGovern describes how it was necessary for him to fight for the non-politicisation of intelligence in an earlier era stating "I was sat down on more than one occasion by [CIA] Director Bill Colby to do battle with Henry Kissinger! Here I was, a GS-15, which is a senior middle-level bureaucrat, and I’m leaving the office and Colby says, 'Look Ray, don’t vote my stock cheap!' So I go down there, I do battle with Kissinger, I get all bloodied up, and I come back and I tell Colby the results and he said, 'All right. You did exactly what I wanted.' A little footnote to that: Colby, of course, was fired by Kissinger – and that’s really an important thing to mention because to be a good Director of Central Intelligence, you have to not need the job. You have to be a self-made person and you have to be ready to quit or to be fired if you insist on telling the truth to power. And that’s exactly what happened to Colby". (Colby was later found dead in 1996 following a mysterious 'boating accident' - see 'Fight Smart' 6 August 2002, 'Drugs And The Bogus 'War Against Terrorism'. According to a CNN report at the time of his death Colby "was dismissed by Ford because of a growing feeling in the White House that he was cooperating too freely with congressional investigators looking into allegations of CIA wrongdoing.")

But in his 'Truthout' interview McGovern reserves his key focus for Cheney. Referring to the bogus uranium claim episode McGovern states "I have done a good bit of research here, and one of the conclusions I have come to is that Vice President Cheney was not only interested in 'helping out' with the analysis, let us say, that CIA was producing on Iraq. He was interested also in fashioning evidence that he could use as proof that, as he said, 'The Iraqis had reconstituted their nuclear program,' which demonstrably they had not. What I’m saying is that this needs to be investigated. We know that it was Dick Cheney who sent the former US ambassador to Niger to investigate. We know he was told in early March of last year that the documents were forgeries. And yet these same documents were used in that application. That is something that needs to be uncovered. We need to pursue why the Vice President allowed that to happen".

In addition to the views of the now retired McGovern there have been reports of other former and current CIA officers who have also been deeply unhappy about the spinning of intelligence by the Bush administration during the Iraq crisis. Tenet's subservience to the White House has been baffling to many.

But what if Cheney and Tenet were in partnership as part of a strategy to push the implementation of PNAC objectives into high gear following the attacks of 911? Cheney had after all been an exceptionally frequent visitor to the CIA during this time.

In addition the Washington Post reports 8 August that "in the days before and after the president's State of the Union address, the [uranium] allegation was repeated by national security adviser Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz and in at least two documents sent out by the White House". The inclusion of the claim in the President's speech does not look like being simply 'a mistake' as Tenet had claimed in his statement of 11 July.

So far Cheney and Tenet have been singing from the same hymn sheet as far as the Niger Uranium episode is concerned. This they seem to have achieved at a time when Condoleezza Rice had already been forced into what amounted to an embarrassing 'not me, sir' self-defence. This she attempted during her trip to Africa with Bush in July when she blamed the CIA on the uranium issue.

According to the Chicago Tribune 2 August "Tenet and Cheney's office said the vice president was never briefed on the results of Wilson's trip, or even of the CIA's doubts about the claim.... Some outside the administration find it hard to believe Cheney could be so deeply enmeshed in intelligence issues but be left out of the loop regarding the uranium claim, especially because it was a subject in which Cheney took interest."

There is some talk already that Tenet may be forced to quit in any case. According to the Washington Post 4 August "Tenet's role in the Iraq weapons controversy has led to calls on Capitol Hill for his dismissal, fueling speculation he will quit soon" (some are tipping Paul Wolfowitz or Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage for the post, neither of which possibility can be considered cause for reassurance amongst those concerned about the grossly destructive developments in US foreign policy and the politicisation of intelligence).

For the moment, however, very much in the frame are Vice President Cheney and the National Security Council. As the Knight Ridder report relayed by the Miami Herald 13 June stated "Three senior administration officials said Vice President Dick Cheney and some officials on the National Security Council staff and at the Pentagon ignored the CIA's reservations and argued that the president and others should include the allegation in their case against Saddam....The use of the false evidence despite the CIA warning raises questions about why some officials chose to believe the story despite the widespread skepticism in the intelligence community. One possibility, one senior official suggested Thursday, is that some officials at the Pentagon and in the vice president's office were getting their own intelligence from Iraqi exiles who the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency warned couldn't be trusted".

By the second half of July the blame picture was changing on an almost daily basis. As we now know, shortly after he 'fell on his sword' Tenet then pointed in the direction of an official at the White House during a session at the Senate Intelligence Committee.

The next week, with some Senators now knowing the name of the person concerned, the White House then stepped forward in the form of an admission from Stephen Hadley.

The Washington Post 23 July reported that "The new information amounted to an on-the-record mea culpa for a White House that had pointed fingers at the CIA for vetting the speech, prompting an earlier acceptance of responsibility by Tenet. But that abruptly changed yesterday after the CIA furnished evidence that it had fought the inclusion of the charge. The disclosures punctured claims made by Rice and others in the past two weeks. Rice and other officials had asserted that nobody in the White House knew of CIA objections, and that the CIA supported the Africa accusation generally, making only technical objections about location and quantity. On Friday, a White House official mischaracterized the CIA's objections, saying repeatedly that Tenet opposed the inclusion in Bush's [earlier] Oct. 7 speech 'because it was single source, not because it was flawed.'..."

In addition to Hadley himself this development was especially embarrassing for his principal, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. On the day that Tenet had announced his own responsibility for the inclusion of the uranium claim in the President's State of the Union address the BBC reported that "George Bush's national security adviser has said the CIA approved a speech the US president made in January, including a sentence that claimed Iraq was trying to buy uranium from Niger. The CIA cleared the speech in its entirety,' Condoleezza Rice told reporters on Air Force One, en route from South Africa to Uganda. US media reported on Thursday that the White House had ignored a CIA request to remove the accusation from Mr Bush's State of the Union address on 28 January".

On CBS's 'Face The Nation' 13 July Rice had claimed that "had there been even a peep that the agency did not want that sentence in or that George Tenet did not want that sentence in, that the director of Central Intelligence did not want it in, it would have been gone."

So this red hot buck was being passed around very quickly. In another bulletin on the same day the BBC reported that "If anyone had any doubts about the uranium claim, 'those doubts were not communicated to the president,' Ms Rice told reporters..."

As the second anniversary of the 911 attacks approached some of the deceptions used to drive the implementation of the PNAC strategy in relation to Iraq were starting to come home to roost with a vengeance.

The 911 attacks had been blatantly exploited by the Bush administration as the pretext for war with Saddam. Yet most of the 911 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia, and none from Iraq. In July a congressional report on 911 held back as confidential 28 pages widely understood to be related (although not exclusively so) to the role of Saudi Arabia in those attacks, thereby adding a seemingly remarkable dimension of cover-up to the exercise.

This aspect of the wider PNAC driven fraud was not overlooked by the New York Times 23 July which published an unusual mock letter as an 'op-ed' article. The 'letter' was presented as if being from Vice President Cheney to an Ambassador of an unnamed foreign government, but in fact obviously Saudi Arabia. It concludes with some comments on the general approach to the public deception being deployed. It states "When the 9/11 commission report comes out tomorrow, I think you will be well satisfied with our efforts to keep you guys out of it..... Rest assured that the F.B.I.'s taking the heat for 9/11 in the report tomorrow, not you..... Here in the [White] House, we've mastered the art of moving beyond what people once thought was important to look for. First, we switched from looking for Osama to looking for Saddam. Then we switched from looking for 'weapons' to looking for 'weapons programs.' Now Wolfie has informed the public that we need to worry less about finding weapons in Iraq than building democracy. The trick is to keep moving. Just yesterday, we shifted the blame for the uranium debacle in the president's State of the [Union] speech from George Tenet at the C.I.A. to Stephen Hadley at the N.S.C."

Vermont Governor Howard Dean is quoted by Associated Press 22 July. Commenting on such chicanery the Governor says ''I call on all who misled the president to resign immediately.... The story line continues to change from day to day on this matter.''

Eventually Bush himself attempted to absorb some of the ricocheting flack. Alongside a photograph of a particularly unconfident looking President the London Times 31 July reported that "Staging a hastily arranged, end-of-term news conference in the White House Rose Garden, Mr Bush also tried to end the rancorous finger-pointing about who was responsible for erroneous claims in his pre-war State of the Union address. 'I take personal responsibility for everything I say,' he said. The remark was designed to take the heat off George Tenet, the CIA Director, and Condoleezza Rice, the President’s National Security Adviser. Both had been accused of negligence or manipulation in allowing claims that Iraq had tried to obtain uranium from Niger into the most important speech of the presidential year."

A report in Newsweek 28 July also states that "last week the Bush administration was forced to reveal declassified excerpts of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, a consensus summary from the nation's various intelligence agencies. The document makes clear that the CIA strongly believed that Iraq 'has chemical and biological weapons,' and 'if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade.' Some old hands at the CIA charged that the hard-liners in the Defense Department and vice president's office had 'pressured' agency analysts to paint a dire picture of Saddam's capabilities and intentions".

The disclosure of the contents of a confidential National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) was an interesting move, but even Rumsfeld himself had admitted since the invasion that the intelligence basis for such claims was based on old information.

If disclosure of the contents of the NIE was an attempt to absolve the White House, it does not absolve Tenet.

The same Newsweek article also states that "The report from Italy's SISME--that Iraq was trying to buy 500 tons of pure yellowcake uranium from Niger--made it into the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate. But the CIA did not bother to first examine the documents. An Italian journalist turned the papers over to the American Embassy in Rome that same month, but the CIA station chief in Rome apparently tossed them out, rather than send them to analysts at Langley. At a congressional hearing last week, the CIA's Tenet was unable to explain why."

So it would seem we have a NIE where the CIA stated that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction and where the Niger claim is referred to. And yet it now transpires that the head of the CIA had not seen the relevant documents, and he is unable to explain why.

So damning is this situation that it is interesting to compare the current 'Irrigate 2003' episode with the Iran-Contra scandal of the 1980s which took place largely under the tenure of Bush Snr as Vice President to Ronald Reagan who, like Vice President Cheney today, was the real person driving US strategy.

A report by Inter Press Service News Agency 9 August provides the following comparison of the two sagas: "Even some of the people and countries are the same. And the methods -- particularly the pursuit by a network of well-placed individuals of a covert, parallel foreign policy that is at odds with official policy -- are definitely the same.   Boiled down to its essentials, the Iran-Contra affair was about a small group of officials based in the National Security Agency (NSC) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that ran an 'off-the-books' operation to secretly sell arms to Iran in exchange for hostages.  They used the proceeds to sustain the Nicaraguan contras -- U.S.-sponsored rebels fighting Managua's left-wing government -- in defiance of both a congressional ban and of official U.S. policy as enunciated by the State Department and President Ronald Reagan. It was never clear whether Reagan understood, let alone approved, the operation.   The picture emerging from the latest reports about the manipulation of intelligence in the drive to war with Iraq, as well as efforts by administration hawks to deliberately aggravate tensions with Syria, Iran, and North Korea in defiance of official State Department and U.S. policy, suggest a similar but much more ambitious scheme at work. There was some hint of a parallel policy apparatus dating back just after the terrorist attacks of Sep. 11, 2001......Taken collectively, what [certain] officials describe and what is already on the public record suggest the existence of a disciplined network of zealous, like-minded individuals centred in Feith's office and around Perle in the DPB [Defense Policy Board] and operating with the approval of Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Pentagon chief Donald Rumsfeld, and Vice President Dick Cheney. This network includes high-level political appointees, such as Bolton, who are scattered around several other key bureaucracies, notably in the State Department, the NSC staff, and, most importantly, in Cheney's office. Cheney, of course, has a direct link to Bush (and all the heads of agencies) independent of Rice, while his powerful chief of staff and national security adviser, I. Lewis 'Scooter' Libby, also enjoys exceptional access and influence. Newsday's disclosure that Feith's office has been used for secret contacts with [Iran-Contra arms dealer] Ghorbanifar suggests that its work goes well beyond assessing intelligence and making policy recommendations.... [According to] Lt. Col. Karen Kwiatkowsky 'What these people are doing now makes Iran-Contra look like amateur hour. I think it's time for a serious investigation (of Feith's office)...I just hope Congress will take it on."

Iran-Contra was in fact reportedly preceded by the even more appalling 'October Surprise'. This was a deal allegedly struck by members of the 1980 Reagan-Bush Presidential election team with the fundamentalist regime in Tehran. The plan was to keep detained American hostages held in Iran until after voting day in the US. Otherwise the early return of the hostages would almost certainly have given the American election to the incumbent President, Jimmy Carter, who was trying to negotiate their release at the time. The alleged secret deal was done in return for illegal arms supplies to Iran.

The Guardian also summarised Iran-Contra 7 August as follows: "In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas had overthrown the US-backed Somosa dictatorship and had gone on to consolidate their power by winning an election. The problem was that Congress had voted the Boland amendment, which banned the administration from funding their favourite Nicaraguan terrorists, the Contras, who had been engaged to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. Poindexter, by then national security adviser, proved his worth with a breathtakingly simple scheme. The administration would sell arms to Iran and divert the proceeds to the Contras. Since both ends of the operation were highly illegal - Iran was also under a US arms embargo - it had to be secret.... But ...later the Nicaraguans shot down a CIA supply plane. A month after that, a Lebanese newspaper reported Reagan's arms deals with Iran. A frenzy of shredding and the destruction of emails broke out, and it took a congressional investigation - during which Poindexter, Elliott Abrams, Caspar Weinberger, Colin Powell (now secretary of state) and Richard Armitage (now deputy secretary of state) lied - and a specially appointed independent counsel to get the full story. By then, though, as the independent counsel reported, the administration's web of deceit had achieved its objectives - to protect Reagan, vice-president George Bush and the rest from the consequences of their conspiracy. As the independent counsel put it, Poindexter and North were made 'the scapegoats whose sacrifice would protect the Reagan administration in its final two years'....Poindexter, North and two others were indicted on 23 counts of conspiracy to defraud the US and Poindexter was convicted on five felony counts of conspiracy, false statements, destruction and removal of records and obstruction of Congress".

We may yet see something similar unfold in relation to Iraqgate 2003.

But it would be a mistake to underestimate the ability of such people to survive within the system. Although recently forced to resign following controversy over a number of his proposals Poindexter had been appointed under President Bush Jnr as Director of the Pentagon's Information Awareness Office (under the cover of the so-called 'war against terror' this is a secretive intelligence bureau whose Orwellian mission is to gather and centralise as much information as possible about US citizens and to unify all private databases about them into one central system run by the government).

However, for the most part at this stage in the 'Iraqgate 2003' exercise, the blame appears to have been successfully distributed sufficiently widely, and therefore sufficient thinly, that no one might have to take a tumble for the episode - or at least that is no doubt the hope. Important questions remain unavoidable, however.

Senator Richard Durbin, a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, is quoted in the New York Times 18 July regarding the inclusion of the uranium claim in the President's State of the Union speech. Durbin states "It was clear to me that there were people in the White House who were in the process of negotiating with the C.I.A. The president has within his ranks on staff some person who was willing to spin and hype and exaggerate and cut corners on the most important speech the president delivers in any given year".

Someone in the White House is clearly culpable, but they are unlikely to be alone. The accusation by Durbin, for example, doesn't explain why Tenet (via Folley) allowed the inclusion to go ahead in the first place.

The various inconsitencies in the official line that has emerged over the forged Iraq-Niger documents would be a source of unrestrained mirth were their implications not so serious. It is difficult to overstate these. Congressman Henry Waxman has reached the following pertinent conclusion: "We must find out whether the CIA deceived the President as he was developing his Iraq policy or whether it is deceiving the public now to protect the President and the Vice President."

Wolfowitz And 'The Office of Special Plans'

A report in Online Journal 16 July examines wider influences beyond the CIA and the White House. It states "A Pentagon committee led by Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, advised George W. Bush to include a reference in his January State of the Union address about Iraq trying to purchase 500 tons of uranium from Niger to bolster the case for war in Iraq, despite the fact that the CIA warned Wolfowitz's committee that the information was unreliable, according to a CIA intelligence official and four members of the Senate's intelligence committee who have been investigating the issue. The senators and the CIA official said they could be forced out of government and brought up on criminal charges for leaking the information to this reporter and as a result requested anonymity. The senators said they plan to question CIA Director George Tenet in a closed-door hearing to find out whether Wolfowitz and members of a committee he headed misled Bush and if Bush knew about the erroneous information prior to his State of the Union address. Spokespeople for Wolfowitz and Tenet vehemently denied the accusations. Dan Bartlett, the White House communications director, would not return repeated calls for comment."

Wolfowitz's role at the Office of Special Plans (OSP) within the Pentagon is an interesting one. A report in the Guardian 17 July describes the OSP as follows: "According to former Bush officials, all defence and intelligence sources, senior administration figures created a shadow agency of Pentagon analysts staffed mainly by ideological amateurs to compete with the CIA and its military counterpart, the Defence Intelligence Agency. The agency, called the Office of Special Plans (OSP), was set up by the defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, to second-guess CIA information and operated under the patronage of hardline conservatives in the top rungs of the administration, the Pentagon and at the White House, including Vice-President Dick Cheney.  The ideologically driven network functioned like a shadow government, much of it off the official payroll and beyond congressional oversight. But it proved powerful enough to prevail in a struggle with the State Department and the CIA by establishing a justification for war. Mr Tenet has officially taken responsibility for the president's unsubstantiated claim in January that Saddam Hussein's regime had been trying to buy uranium in Africa, but he also said his agency was under pressure to justify a war that the administration had already decided on. How much Mr Tenet reveals of where that pressure was coming from could have lasting political fallout for Mr Bush and his re-election prospects. In the days after September 11, Mr Rumsfeld and his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, mounted an attempt to include Iraq in the war against terror. When the established agencies came up with nothing concrete to link Iraq and al-Qaida, the OSP was given the task of looking more carefully....The OSP was an open and largely unfiltered conduit to the White House.... The OSP absorbed this heady brew of raw intelligence, rumour and plain disinformation and made it a 'product', a prodigious stream of reports with a guaranteed readership in the White House. The primary customers were Mr Cheney, Mr Libby and their closest ideological ally on the national security council, Stephen Hadley, Condoleezza Rice's deputy."

An earlier report in the Guardian 31 May states "The office of special plans was created by the deputy secretary of defence, Paul Wolfowitz, late last year in what was seen as an effort to justify the war. Led by Abram Shulsky, the office had a small staff charged with exploring intelligence from 'outside the box'. The intelligence, based largely on that from Iraqi exiles, went directly to George Bush, who used some of it to justify war. Mr Wolfowitz became frustrated that the CIA and the defence intelligence agency were failing to uncover any evidence of a link between al-Qaida and Saddam Hussein. Seymour Hersh, writing in the New Yorker magazine, said that most intelligence experts derided the office's information."

One article in the Nation 19 June elaborates further confirming that "According to current and former US intelligence analysts and government officials, the Pentagon's Office of Special Plans funneled information, unchallenged, from Ahmad Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress (INC) to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, who in turn passed it on to the White House, suggesting that Iraqis would welcome the American invaders. The Office of Special Plans is led by Abram Shulsky, a hawkish neoconservative ideologue who got his start in politics working alongside Elliott Abrams in Senator Henry 'Scoop' Jackson's office in the 1970s. It was set up in fall 2001 as a two-man shop, but it burgeoned into an eighteen-member nerve center of the Pentagon's effort to distort intelligence about Iraq's WMDs and terrorist connections. A great deal of the bad information produced by Shulsky's office, which found its way into speeches by Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney and George W. Bush, came from Chalabi's INC. According to the former official, also feeding information to the Office of Special Plans was a secret, rump unit established last year in the office of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of Israel. This unit, which paralleled Shulsky's -- and which has not previously been reported -- prepared intelligence reports on Iraq in English (not Hebrew) and forwarded them to the Office of Special Plans."

Wolfowitz, the Jerusalem Post's current 'Man of the Year', is widely regarded as a leading ally of Israel within the Bush administration.

According to an Inter Press Service report 7 August "An ad hoc office under U.S. Undersecretary of Defence for Policy Douglas Feith appears to have acted as the key base for an informal network of mostly neo-conservative political appointees that circumvented normal inter-agency channels to lead the push for war against Iraq. The Office of Special Plans (OSP), which worked alongside the Near East and South Asia (NESA) bureau in Feith's domain, was originally created by Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz to review raw information collected by the official U.S. intelligence agencies for connections between Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda.... key personnel who worked in both NESA and OSP were part of a broader network of neo-conservative ideologues and activists who worked with other Bush political appointees scattered around the national-security bureaucracy to move the country to war, according to retired Lt Col Karen Kwiatkowski, who was assigned to NESA from May 2002 through February 2003. The heads of NESA and OSP were Deputy Undersecretary William Luti and Abram Shulsky, respectively. Other appointees who worked with them in both offices included Michael Rubin, a Middle East specialist previously with the neo-conservative American Enterprise Institute (AEI); David Schenker, previously with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP); Michael Makovsky; an expert on neo-con icon Winston Churchill and the younger brother of David Makovsky, a senior WINEP fellow and former executive editor of pro-Likud 'Jerusalem Post'; and Chris Lehman, the brother of the John Lehman, a prominent neo-conservative who served as secretary of the navy under Ronald Reagan, according to Kwiatkowski. Along with Feith, all of the political appointees have in common a close identification with the views of the right-wing Likud Party in Israel. Feith, whose law partner is a spokesman for the settlement movement in Israel, has long been a fierce opponent of the Oslo peace process, while WINEP has acted as the think tank for the most powerful pro-Israel lobby in Washington, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which generally follows a Likud line".

Wolfowitz is also generally regarded as the principal political acolyte of Cheney and Rumsfeld. Along with others, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz had already written to President Clinton in 1998 pleading for an attack on Iraq. 10 of the 18 signatories to that letter are now members of the Bush administration. It was Wolfowitz, more than anyone else, who pushed the President at Camp David for a strike against Iraq immediately after 911.

The London Times reported 29 August 2002 that "The case was made [15 September 2001] for an attack against Iraq by Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Defence Secretary and one of the more hawkish members of the Administration. He argued that September 11 provided a perfect pretext to hit Baghdad." The Times also reported 2 February 2002 that "Mr Rumsfeld and Mr Wolfowitz had been examining military options for Iraq for months [before 911]."

In an article entitled "Paul Wolfowitz: A man to keep a close eye on" a US journalist writing in the Asia Times issued the following warning about this man as early as 21 March 2001: "In his new position of deputy secretary, Wolfowitz will have day-to-day control over the Pentagon and a perch to play out his hard-line views... Americans concerned about what is being done abroad in their names need to watch Wolfowitz's every move, from Korea to Iraq to Colombia".

A report in the Independent, 30 May 2003 highlighted the cynical use of propaganda by the Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz cabal in order to manipulate public opinion in the direction of their aggressive intentions. The paper states that "The Bush administration focused on alleged weapons of mass destruction as the primary justification for toppling Saddam Hussein by force because it was politically convenient, a top-level official at the Pentagon has acknowledged.  The extraordinary admission comes in an interview with Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Defence Secretary, in the July issue of the magazine Vanity Fair. ...'For bureaucratic reasons we settled on one issue, weapons of mass destruction, because it was the one reason everyone could agree on,' Mr Wolfowitz tells the magazine. The comments suggest that, even for the US administration, the logic that was presented for going to war may have been an empty shell. They come to light, moreover, just two days after Mr Wolfowitz's immediate boss, Donald Rumsfeld, the Defence Secretary, conceded for the first time that the arms might never be found.... The magazine article reveals that Mr Wolfowitz was even pushing Mr Bush to attack Iraq immediately after the 11 September attacks in the US, instead of invading Afghanistan. There have long been suspicions that Mr Wolfowitz has essentially been running a shadow administration out of his Pentagon office, ensuring that the right-wing views of himself and his followers find their way into the practice of American foreign policy. He is best known as the author of the policy of first-strike pre-emption in world affairs that was adopted by Mr Bush shortly after the al-Qa'ida attacks."

However, more than two years after 911 it is now clear that a degree of panic is setting in within such hawkish circles. The pressure is on following increasing domestic concern in the US about the post-invasion situation in Iraq as American soldiers continue to be killed on a daily basis, and to a lesser degree the failure to quickly find the weapons of mass destruction which had been presented as the urgent justification for the war. 

British Complicity - The Special Relationship

Concern about the country having been sold the war in Iraq under false pretences has also grown with increasing intensity in the UK where there has been unprecedented tension between politicians, parliamentary committees, intelligence agencies, intelligence 'sources', journalists and the public.

As the BBC itself put it 7 July in relation to the September dossier and the 45 minutes claim: "So if Number Ten didn't sex it up, who did? The only answer can be the intelligence services themselves, almost as uncomfortable a conclusion". 

The audio recording of her conversation with WMD scientist Dr David Kelly presented by BBC journalist Susan Watts to the Hutton Inquiry does, however, confirm his expert view that 10 Downing St had exaggerated the threat from Iraq in the dossier - particularly in relation to the claim that WMDs were deployable in 45 minutes.

Nonetheless the 45 minute claim is only one of a number of issues concerning the false presentation of 'evidence' on both sides of the Atlantic, of which the case of the alleged Niger uranium is now the most visible.

Seymour Hersh had already reported in detail on the fraudulent Niger documents back in March. At that point he confirmed that one IAEA official had “confronted the United States with the forgery: ‘What do you have to say?’ They had nothing to say.” In his account Hersh states that "ElBaradei’s disclosure [of the forgery on behalf of the IAEA] has not been disputed by any government or intelligence official in Washington or London".

Hersh's simultaneous claim that British intelligence, in the form of MI6, has had a long standing role in disseminating false information about Iraq has since been followed by an interesting article in the Glasgow Sunday Herald. On 8 June it reported on the existence of 'Operation Rockingham' which is alleged to have been set up by the British government "to 'cherry-pick' intelligence proving an active Iraqi WMD programme and to ignore and quash intelligence which indicated that Saddam's stockpiles had been destroyed or wound down".

The existence of this 'operation' is confirmed in the Herald's article by former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter. Ritter says that Rockingham is not a 'rogue' operation within the intelligence services, but one acting on political instructions "from the very highest levels". According to the Herald "Ritter and other intelligence sources say Operation Rockingham and MI6 were supplying skewed information to the Joint Intelligence Committee". It adds that "Many in British intelligence believe the planned parliamentary inquiry by MPs on the Intelligence and Security Committee will pass the blame for the use of selective intelligence to the JIC, which includes senior intelligence figures. Intelligence sources say this would be unfair as they claim the JIC was following political instructions".

Remarkably one witnesses called to the Hutton Inquiry actually gave evidence which was strongly suggestive of the allegations made by Hersh's sources and by Ritter. On 3 September the BBC reported that Dr Brian Jones, a recently retired official from a section of Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) at the MoD that had been dealing with certain aspects of the Iraqi assessment, had come forward. Dr Jones and members of his team had not been happy with some of the language used in the draft dossier.

The London Times 4 September reported in more detail on its front page. Commenting on the implications it stated "Senior intelligence officials told yesterday of their grave doubts about key claims in the Government’s dossier on the threat from Iraq. In evidence that dealt a blow to Downing Street’s insistence that it made no attempt to 'sex up' the document, one leading expert on chemical weapons said he believed that it had been 'overegged' and another felt that 'spin merchants' had interfered with the dossier in pursuit of political objectives. He hoped the document would soon be 'tomorrow’s chip wrappers'. Their main concern was over the controversial '45-minute' claim, which was described as 'nebulous', 'second-hand' and which, some officials feared, may have been a piece of Iraqi disinformation. Moreover, Lord Hutton’s inquiry into the death of David Kelly heard that some analysts at the Defence Intelligence Staff — the intelligence wing of the Ministry of Defence — had made it clear that they were unhappy with 'all the detail' in the controversial dossier, but that the 'shutters had come down' before their concerns could be addressed". Who was bringing those shutters down?

According to the BBC's report 3 September "[Dr Jones] suggested final changes to the dossier had been made, slightly unusually, without them going to a full meeting of the JIC. There had also been an impression that there was an influence on the dossier from outside the intelligence community, he added. The Defence Intelligence Service does not gather intelligence like MI5 or MI6 but instead is a military assessment service inside the Ministry of Defence. Whitehall officials say it does not represent a consensus in the intelligence community and stress that MI6 was the lead 'producing' agency for the dossier."

The London Times 4 September reported that "Dr Jones said that his staff’s concerns over the 45-minute item were based upon its source, its contents, and the lack of any other supporting intelligence.... Such fears were underlined by the lack of any detail in the intelligence, he said, although the intelligence agency which passed on the item had not raised any such concerns." Another report in the London Times 1 August confirms that the agency concerned was MI6.

This press reporting suggests that some form of unofficial intelligence massaging was going on at a level just below the JIC, and that the exercise may have been closely associated with MI6. Both Ritter and Hersh's accounts indicate that MI6 (within the Foreign Office) and Operation Rockingham (within DIS at the MoD) were spinning intelligence on political instructions. Dr Jones' suggestion of influence beyond the intelligence community begs even more questions in this direction.

Such circumstances would implicate not either the political apparatus or the intelligence services, but both simultaneously. As the London Times 20 June put it "No 10 may have 'cherry-picked' the intelligence — Robin Cook’s colourful phrase — but there had to be cherries for the picking. Who grew them?"

There was even such an implication of the complicity of both in the report of Susan Watts for BBC Newsnight 4 June when  she commented on the September dossier. Quoting a source which is now known to have been Dr Kelly she states “Our source was not disputing that the 45-minute assessment was included in the dossier by the intelligence services, although he did say he felt that to have been a mistake. His point was that the emphasis placed on that element of the intelligence in the foreword to the dossier went too far.” The foreword in that document is written by Alastair Campbell and signed by the Prime Minister.

According to the London Times 4 September two intelligence figures at the Ministry of Defence disclosed to the Hutton Inquiry that "Dr Kelly had known of concerns within the intelligence community over the 45-minute claim that ignited the dispute".

But it was not just the 45 minute claim that was considered to be suspect within such expert circles. The Times reports on the evidence given by Brian Jones, the recently retired head of the team providing technical analysis of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons at the Defence Intelligence Staff. It states that "Dr Jones, who described himself as 'probably the most experienced intelligence official working on WMD', added that some of his staff had said they were unhappy and felt that their reservations were not properly considered. 'The shutters were coming down on that particular paper,' he said. 'the discussion and argument had been concluded'...'[The concerns] were really about a tendency in certain areas . . . to, shall we say, overegg certain assessments in relation particularly to chemical agents and weapons,' he said. His leading chemical weapons expert was concerned that he could not point to any solid evidence of production.”

What? But that was the main contention of the dossier.

A very close look at the operation of the intelligence services at and around the top of their command and at their interface with the political system is urgently needed.

Let's go back to the words of the Prime Minister's foreword in the dossier. In that Mr Blair stated "What I believe the assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt is that Saddam has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons". Yes, the Prime Minister said "beyond doubt". Just how bad does this have to get before parliamentarians develop some spine and insist on a full inquiry?

Not even the Intelligence and Security Committee (which has meekly concluded that "The dossier was not 'sexed up' by Alastair Campbell or anyone else") is willing to go along with this completely. It states in its report of 11 September 2003 that "The use of the phrase 'continued to produce chemical and biological weapons' in the foreword and the absence of detail on amounts of agents produced in the executive summary and main text could give the impression that Saddam was actively producing both chemical and biological weapons and significant amounts of agents. However, the JIC did not know what had been produced and in what quantities – it had assessed, based on intelligence, that production had taken place. We believe that this uncertainty should have been highlighted to give a balanced view of Saddam’s chemical and biological capacity."

However, the committee does not mention that the foreword to the dossier had stated that such production had taken place "beyond doubt" - in other words it was not a case of the foreword simply requiring elaboration, the foreword was actually in direct contradiction to the uncertainty in the assessed intelligence as identified by the committee itself.

For reasons best known to itself the committee chooses to ignore this most serious discrepancy.

The discrepancy is let go despite the fact that the committee confirms that "In its assessment of 9 September the JIC judged that Iraq had, either from pre-1991 or from more recent production, both chemical and biological agents and weapons."

Not "and" but "or". This is hardly very specific. In other words, at best they were probably guessing. If Dr Jones' testimony is anything to go by they, or their sources, may even have been simply making it up despite Scarlett's claim at the Hutton Inquiry of separate "compartmented" intelligence.

Sir Peter Heap was British ambassador in Brazil between 1992 and 1995. Writing in the Guardian 2 October he made some interesting observations on the British intelligence services based on his own experience: "As a diplomat who worked in nine overseas posts over 36 years, I saw quite a lot of MI6 at work....The role of MI6 officers was to develop contacts - often, but not exclusively, in the local government machine - who would feed them information. This intelligence was usually paid for in cash. The MI6 station within an embassy operates on a budget that is quite separate from and kept secret from the rest of the diplomatic staff, including the ambassador. But the sums appeared to be generous and in cash. I certainly heard more than one reference to the payment of fees at a British boarding school directly by MI6 for the children of regular informants. Those agents, dependent on that money, inevitably had a strong temptation to embellish their reports to make them more valuable. And since those informants were being disloyal to their own country or employers, their trustworthiness and credibility in pursuing our interests was not always obvious.  The local MI6 officers also had an incentive to play up the importance or reliability of the sources on which they based their dispatches... it was common to see MI6 reports on their channel that amounted to little more than gossip and tittle-tattle that the political and economic sections of the embassy would not have thought worth reporting. These 'intelligence facts' were frequently so at variance with known facts that we knew them to have little or no credibility.... Therefore, to base major policy decisions which could cost lives upon their reporting is very high risk. A report dressed up in a CX [a report describing raw intelligence] jacket and bearing a high-security classification can easily take on an importance and a gravitas that it does not deserve. I doubt whether anyone at 10 Downing Street, on first seeing the intelligence report of the capability of Saddam Hussein to launch weapons of mass destruction in 45 minutes, asked the following questions: 'Who exactly reported that claim? What had he been paid for that information? What was his rank or access? And what precisely had he revealed before that made him such a reliable source?' And if the replies were plausible, it would still have been prudent for Mr Blair to demand further supporting evidence before the information was used".

But what is the incentive to do that if the original report is giving you the answer you want?

A report in the Observer 14 September based on material submitted to the Hutton Inquiry confirms that intelligence for the '45 minutes' claim in the September dossier was only 'single source'. The Observer stated that single-source claims are not usually considered reliable by the intelligence services, a situation the head of MI6 sought to deny when giving evidence at the inquiry the next day.

This denial flew in the face of an earlier submission provided to the Foreign Affairs Committee by Air Marshal Sir John Walker, himself a former chief of Defence Intelligence and ex-deputy chairman of the JIC.

The denial also hardly seems credible given the description by Sir Peter Heap of the potential unreliability of intelligence. This must be particularly so where it is uncorroborated. Heap comments that "among the wheat there is usually a lot of chaff, and the working methods of the intelligence agencies make it very difficult to know one from the other. Therefore, to base major policy decisions which could cost lives upon their reporting is very high risk. A report dressed up in a CX jacket and bearing a high-security classification can easily take on an importance and a gravitas that it does not deserve".

Within Heap's description of MI6 working methods there would also seem to be an implied acknowledgement of the scope for deliberate 'sexing up' of even the 'raw intelligence' if someone so chooses or is so instructed. The importance of corroboration would seem to be absolutely clear.

The London Times reports 12 September that "Michael Mates, a Tory member of the ISC, told the press conference that the intelligence on the 45-minute issue was so sensitive that only the heads of MI6 and the DIS were party to it before it was handed over to the Joint Intelligence Committee for inclusion in the dossier. The intelligence was not passed on to officials lower down, such as Dr Kelly, one of the MoD’s experts on Iraqi weapons".

You bet it wasn't, because they would in all probability have destroyed it. There is now little doubt about that.

In his own evidence to the Hutton Inquiry even the head of MI6 himself was forced to admit that the 45 minute claim was misleading because it did not mention that the allegation "referred to battlefield munitions, not longer-range missiles", according to the London Times 16 September.

And weren't we told by Alastair Campbell during the inquiry that the JIC, which includes the head of MI6, "took ownership" of the dossier? Following a Downing St meeting on 9 September 2002 concerning the dossier, according to the report of the Intelligence and Security committee 11 September 2003, "Alastair Campbell wrote to confirm that John Scarlett had been given full editorial control". Campbell also told the Hutton Inquiry on 22 September that "John Scarlett was in control of the content of the dossier - he had asked me for advice on presentation."

Yet according to the Guardian 4 September "A memo of a meeting chaired by John Scarlett, the chairman of the JIC, last September - seven days before the dossier was published - states that 'ownership lay with No 10'". That indicates a date of 17 September 2002.

An earlier Guardian report from the Hutton Inquiry stated that "on September 17, Mr Scarlett wrote to Mr Campbell with a new version based on amendments he [Campbell] had proposed: 'Strengthened language on current concerns and plans, including in the executive summary. The summary also brings out the point on sanctions and containment as you proposed.' .... Mr Campbell's testimony gave an insight into his extraordinarily close relationship with Mr Scarlett. The prime minister's communications chief described one-to-one meetings with the committee chairman as they prepared the government's dossier on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programme. Mr Campbell described the senior former MI6 officer as an 'equal', but the two men had different roles. At one point in his diary Mr Campbell noted that Mr Scarlett had described him as the 'brutal political hatchet man' and himself as the 'dry intelligence officer'.... He insisted yesterday that despite his relationship with Mr Scarlett - whom he has previously described as a 'mate' - he had distanced himself from the drawing up of the dossier. Mr Scarlett, he said, wanted 'ownership' of it: 'The word he used was ownership. John Scarlett felt he had to have ownership of the dossier.' Mr Campbell added: 'I emphasised that the credibility of this document depended fundamentally on it being the work of the JIC [joint intelligence committee]. That was the touchstone of our approach from the very first moment.' Nothing should be published, Mr Campbell told Mr Scarlett, which the intelligence agencies were not '100% happy with".

This account in fact describes an interesting process - Campbell making proposals for amendments to the dossier and Scarlett, his 'mate', executing them. The Independent 21 September is fairly blunt about the implications of this stating "It is beginning to appear that Mr Campbell did not need to 'sex up' the document, as the WMD expert, Dr David Kelly, is alleged to have told Mr Gilligan: he could rely on the JIC chairman to do it for him".

The London Times reporting from the Hutton Inquiry 23 September adds more: "The inquiry heard that Jonathan Powell, the No 10 chief of staff, warned on the eve of publication that the dossier's wording suggested that Saddam Hussein would only use chemical and biological weapons (CBW) if he was actually attacked. In an e-mail to John Scarlett, the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, he said that the passage was 'a bit of a problem' as it could play into the hands of critics of military action. He urged him to re-write it. Giving evidence to the inquiry, Mr Scarlett acknowledged that Mr Powell's intervention had 'prompted' him to look again at the intelligence and to re-draft the passage concerned".

So who had control of the final content? According to the same report Scarlett "insisted throughout his appearance that he had retained control of the production of the dossier and that there had been no improper political interference".

Cyprus represented the fig-leaf justification for the claim of a "current and serious threat to the UK national interest" in the bogus equation presented by the dossier. But there was never any 45 minute WMD threat to Cyprus, despite what sections of the press claimed following the publication of the dossier, and the intelligence services knew it.

Yet Scarlett let that highly misleading impression go through (Campbell eventually confirmed at the Hutton Inquiry 22 September that Scarlett "personally signed off the proofs page by page" at the printers). There was no attempt in the dossier to explain what kind of munitions the 45 minute claim related to and the public were left to deduce a far larger threat than provided for by the underlying intelligence assessments.

Immediately preceded by explicit discussion of 'weapons of mass destruction' the executive summary of the dossier tells us that "Iraq possesses extended-range versions of the SCUD ballistic missile in breach of UNSCR 687 which are capable of reaching Cyprus". Yet now the head of MI6 admits that the 45 minute claim did not relate to such missiles.

Moreover, just two paragraphs earlier the dossier had stated that "Iraq can deliver chemical and biological agents using an extensive range of artillery shells, free-fall bombs, sprayers and ballistic missiles". Ballistic missiles. For the delivery of chemical and biological agents.

As reported by the BBC there were two points in particular in relation to these matters that came out of the cross-examination of Alastair Campbell and Geoff Hoon at the Hutton inquiry on 22 September 2003:

• Campbell confirmed that the reference to the 45-minute claim was included at the request of the prime minister
• Hoon confirmed that he knew that the 45 minute claim related only to short range battlefield munitions

So did the JIC, and therefore the heads of the various intelligence agencies, approve the executive summary or not? According to the dossier itself a few lines later "These judgements reflect the views of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)".

What was the division of responsibility between Scarlett, Campbell and Blair? According to Campbell's own testimony at the Hutton Inquiry Scarlett was responsible for the main text and executive summary (a JIC official called Julian Miller was responsible for the drafting on Scarlett's behalf), whilst Campbell wrote the foreword.

In fact Campbell was drafting the foreword before the main text and summary had been completed according to his own evidence. At the Hutton Inquiry he stated "I had a discussion with the Prime Minister, I think with David Manning, with Jonathan Powell, certainly with John Scarlett, and I based -- I started a draft based upon what the Prime Minister wanted to say." This statement by Campbell was in response to Counsel for the BBC who had asked "Why were you as it were formulating an account of the 45 minutes point before the text had been finalised in the dossier itself?"

However, it seems that it was specifically the Prime Minister, according to Campbell, who wanted the 45 minute claim included in the foreword. Campbell told the inquiry "I drafted a foreword based on a discussion with the Prime Minister and my colleagues". He is asked by Counsel for the BBC: "This [dossier] is not a very long document. You plainly had selected 45 minutes as a message worth including in the Prime Minister's foreword?" To which Campbell replied "Well, more to the point the Prime Minister had".

These are important issues, because on the strength of the 45 minute claim Rupert Murdoch's Sun newspaper was able to write on 25 September 2002 that "British servicemen and tourists in Cyprus could be annihilated by germ warfare missiles launched by Iraq, it was revealed yesterday. 'They could thud into the Mediterranean island within 45 MINUTES of tyrant Saddam Hussein ordering an attack. And they could spread death and destruction through warheads carrying anthrax, mustard gas, sarin or ricin. The terrifying prospect was raised in Downing Street's dossier on Saddam's arsenal...'"

Job done it seemed.

Referring to the drafting process that he was engaged in with Scarlett Campbell himself tells the inquiry that "Both of us were conscious of the fact that this was a - the expectations surrounding this publication were huge; that the media and Parliamentarians were likely to pore over every word".

Yet there was no effort by the government to correct the false post-publication impression relayed in the Sun, the country's most widely read newspaper, that the 45 minutes claim related to long range missiles rather than short range battlefield munitions of no threat to British citizens, even on the island of Cyprus. As Scarlett himself told the inquiry "it is not my immediate responsibility to correct headlines".

Moreover there does not seem to have been any reporting of Mr Hoon having clarified the point in subsequent sessions in the House of Commons before the war. But then perhaps he forgot - after all he was only the Minister of Defence.

Hoon knew. Did he forget to tell the Prime Minister; or did the Prime Minister forget to tell the House of Commons?

It is not as if Hoon lacked ample opportunity to tell the Prime Minister. According to the report of the Foreign Affairs Committee 3 July (released 7 July) on 'The Decision to go to War in Iraq' Alastair Campbell stated that "in relation to that whole period [leading up to the war] he [the Prime Minister] had meetings every single day with the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary in particular..."

Yet incredibly, according to Mr Scarlett's evidence at the Hutton Inquiry, the Prime Minister wasn't told about the limited nature of the threat: "There was no discussion with the Prime Minister that I can recall about the 45 minutes point in connection with battlefield or strategic systems. Indeed I do not remember a discussion with the Prime Minister about the 45 minutes point at all".

If having to rely on the power of Mr Scarlett's memory may not be an entirely appealing prospect given that it is just a single source, is there any other 'intelligence' on this matter that could help in producing an 'assessment' of the situation? Fortunately former Foreign Secretary Robin Cook is able to throw some light on the subject because he keeps a diary. Some of it was reproduced in the London Sunday Times 5 October.

At a time when he was no longer Foreign Secretary, but leader of the House of Commons, Cook wrote for the day of Thursday February 20: "I spent the afternoon in private meetings at our flat. An old friend from the Foreign Office called first. He observed that since the Blix report, Jack [Straw] has been talking even faster than usual, always a sign with him that he knows he is under pressure. I shepherded my friend down the lift, while I myself used the stairs in order that John Scarlett, chairman of the JIC, who had come to brief me, would not see my visitor. The presentation was impressive in its integrity and shorn of the political slant with which No 10 encumbers any intelligence assessment. My conclusion at the end of an hour is that Saddam probably does not have weapons of mass destruction in the sense of weapons that could be used against large-scale civilian targets".

Given his grave concerns on the issue, and given his detailed knowledge of previous intelligence on the Iraqi situation stemming from his time as Foreign Secretary, Cook is likely to have pressed Scarlett for a technically robust exposition. It sounds like he may have got one.

But why was Scarlett briefing the leader of the House on such matters but not the Prime Minister? Who of the two needed to be most fully in the picture?

Not to worry, however, because Cook took it upon himself to tell Blair. His diary entry for Wednesday March 5 states "Prime minister's questions was notable for the confidence Tony expressed about getting a second UN resolution. I don't know whether this is calculated bravado to keep Saddam wary, or whether he is in a state of denial. I saw Tony privately shortly after we left the chamber.... I expressed my concern about the hard-line rightwingers around Bush and warned him that many of them would regard it as a bonus in the present crisis if we were driven from office and replaced by a Conservative government. He laughed and said, 'Regime change is for Baghdad. It is not for here.'"

Regime change? Wasn't the issue WMDs?

But more importantly the diary adds: "The most revealing exchange came when we talked about Saddam’s arsenal. I told him, 'It’s clear from the private briefing I have had [with Scarlett] that Saddam has no weapons of mass destruction in a sense of weapons that could strike at strategic cities... There were two distinct elements to this exchange that sent me away deeply troubled. The first was that the timetable to war was plainly not driven by the progress of the UN weapons inspections. Tony made no attempt to pretend that what Hans Blix might report would make any difference to the countdown to invasion. The second troubling element to our conversation was that Tony did not try to argue me out of the view that Saddam did not have real weapons of mass destruction that were designed for strategic use against city populations and capable of being delivered with reliability over long distances. I had now expressed that view to both the chairman of the JIC and to the prime minister and both had assented in it".

So if Mr Cook is to be believed, Blair now knew (if he didn't before) what Scarlett knew. At best Saddam only had short range capability. Cyprus was out of reach. So what was in reach?

Reporting on Scarlett's evidence the London Times 24 September 2003 (as it happens the first anniversary of the dossier's publication) confirmed that "The toughest questioning came over the issue of the 45-minutes intelligence. Mr Caldecott asked Mr Scarlett whether he had made clear to the Prime Minister that this deployment timetable for Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons referred to battlefield munitions, not strategic (long-range) missiles. He acknowledged that the intelligence about Iraq’s ability to deploy weapons of mass destruction did not specify which systems. But the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) had assessed that it was most likely a reference to multiple rocket launchers with a range of 20 kilometres, or artillery with a range of 40 kilometres".

Yes, just 20 to 40 Kilometres. Assuming they had such warheads in the first place.

Whether he knew it or not, that was the actual basis for the 45 minute WMD allegation referred to four times in the dossier in order to support the Prime Minister's claim of a "serious and current" threat. Even if Iraq could have launched them in seconds all the warheads concerned could barely get out of the country, let alone reach Cyprus. But as Campbell's own evidence confirms the content of the dossier was later signed off by Scarlett at the printers.

Indeed at the Hutton inquiry on 15 September an extract from the report of the Foreign Affairs Committee was cited. The extract stated "We have been told that the entire document, including the executive summary, was prepared by the Chairman of the JIC, except for the foreword, which he approved." So although Campbell wrote it, the foreword was approved by Scarlett.

In his own words at the Hutton inquiry Scarlett confirms "I should add that I had been made responsible for or I had made myself responsible for the proofreading [of the text of the final dossier], even though the production and the ownership point passed to No. 10. The proofreading was so intimately linked to the text that clearly I needed to stay in charge of it".

But in giving this evidence was the man at the top of the British intelligence tree (as also appears to have been the case with Tenet in the US with his admission of 11 July concerning the use of the false African uranium claim in Bush's pre-war State of the Union speech) simply trying to protect Downing St? After all, if he didn't protect it what would be his ultimate fate? Given their unusually close interaction during the process the various players from the two institutions would most likely sink or swim together on this one.

Certainly Hoon knew of the limited application of the 45 minute claim, as well as Scarlett. Hoon's cross examination on this issue at the Hutton Inquiry on 22 September is especially telling:

Barrister: ....Did you know, in fact, that it was not known even what weapons were referred to in relation to this quote [in the dossier] about the 45 minute claim?

Hoon: Sorry, I do not understand your question.

Barrister: Did you know that the 45 minute claim in the dossier was taken from a JIC assessment which does not in fact identify any particular weapon?

Hoon: Well, I recall at the time having some discussion in the Ministry of Defence about the kinds of weapons that could be deployable within 45 minutes; and I think the assumption was made that they would be, for example, chemical shells, which were clearly capable of being deployed, as I think Mr Scarlett has indicated to the Inquiry, in a time even less than 45 minutes; I think he suggested 20 minutes.

Barrister: So you knew, did you, that the munitions referred to were only battlefield munitions?

Hoon: I was certainly aware that that was one suggestion, yes.

Barrister: Was there any other suggestion that they were not battlefield munitions but strategic munitions?

Hoon: I recall asking what kind of weapons would be deployable within 45 minutes; and the answer is the answer that I have just given to you.

Barrister: Which was shells, battlefield mortars, tactical weapons of that kind?

Hoon: Yes.

Barrister: Would your Department be responsible for correcting any false impression given by the press on an issue of this importance?

Hoon: I think on an issue of this importance it would not simply have been the Ministry of Defence that was solely responsible. There would have been an effort across Government.

Barrister: Are you aware that on 25th September a number of newspapers had banner headlines suggesting that this related to strategic missiles or bombs?

Hoon: I can recall, yes.

Barrister: Why was no corrective statement issued for the benefit of the public in relation to those media reports?

Hoon: I do not know.

Barrister: It must have been considered by someone, must it not?

Hoon: I have spent many years trying to persuade newspapers and journalists to correct their stories. I have to say it is an extraordinarily time consuming and generally frustrating process.

This, of course, overlooks the fact that in reality the main purpose of the dossier, as far as 10 Downing St was concerned, was to generate suitable newspaper headlines. The London Times 24 September 2003 (print edition, p8) displayed an email from Mr Blair's chief of Staff, Jonathan Powell, to Scarlett and Campbell (also copied to Sir David Manning) on 19 September 2002. In suggesting a further significant change to the dossier Powell states "Alastair - what will be the headline in the Standard on day of publication? What do we want it to be?".

But if Hoon was not interested in correcting misleading newspaper headlines, did he also find it "an extraordinarily time consuming and generally frustrating process" making a subsequent statement of clarification in the House of Commons? Because none seems to have been made.

Blair may be Bush's poodle, but Hoon is Blair's.

The same could not be said of Dr David Kelly.

In its front page report of 23 September the London Times refers to "the cabal within No 10 and the Ministry of Defence, which was orchestrating the whole Kelly affair". Hoon and Campbell were itching to 'out' Dr Kelly as the presumed source of Andrew Gilligan's original story according to press reports that day derived from further evidence given to the Hutton Inquiry on 22 September.

However, evidence produced as to the approach of the Prime Minister, Sir David Omand (head of security and intelligence at the Cabinet Office) and Sir Kevin Tebbit (Permanent Secretary at the MoD) is more interesting, if less headline grabbing.

It is possible that once Blair had understood from Tebbit, and also possibly from Omand (Omand told the Hutton inquiry that he had not heard of Dr Kelly until July 4 when Sir Kevin Tebbit contacted him), that outing Kelly might risk exposing his "awkward views" on the threat posed by Iraq, his enthusiasm for the idea waned.

The London Times reports in a further article 23 September that "The diary [of Alastair Campbell] shows that it was Mr Blair who repeatedly slammed on the brakes. Although on July 6 the Prime Minister was initially 'fine' about disclosing Dr Kelly’s name, 'he backed off after speaking to (Sir David Omand, the Government’s intelligence co-ordinator) who felt the guy had to be properly treated'”.

But was that the principal concern? The Times provides scanned images of two pages from Campbell's diary 6 July which provide further insights. The 6 July was in fact the day that Ambassador Wilson had broken cover in the New York Times over the bogus uranium claim, a story which threatened to badly damage both the Bush and Blair governments.

The first of the diary pages provided by the Times states "GH [Geoff Hoon], like me, wanted to get it out that the source had broken cover to claim that AG [Andrew Gilligan] misrepresented him [Dr Kelly]. TB [Tony Blair] and I had a long chat about it and TB was worried that we (TB or GH ) ought to tell FAC [Foreign Affairs Committee]) about it. His worry was that it could lead to them re-opening the inquiry [into 'The Decision to go to war with Iraq']".

That is exactly what happened. Why was Blair worried about that?

Campbell's diary entry for 6 July continues with "GH and I both wanted to get the source up but TB was nervous about it. Felt that we should not push K Tebbit/Omand too hard, and could maybe bring it out tomorrow if we needed it. TB also feeling that we had to have something for the ISC [Intelligence and Security Committee] to go for and that could be this."

The difference between the 'ISC' and the 'FAC', of course, is that in the former any evidence is given behind closed doors and the committee reports not to parliament but to the Prime Minister who has control over what is published.

Clearly at this point Blair was backing the approach of Tebbit and Omand. With the uranium story rumbling in the background on the other side of the Atlantic Campbell states in his diary entry for 7 July that "TB felt we had to leave it to Omand/Tebbitt judgement and they didn't want to do it. Had to go for natural justice. GH said there was a problem that he [Dr Kelly] once gave evidence alongside Jack Straw".

The principal difficulty with Dr Kelly was not the need to deliver him natural justice, however. Rather it was the fact that his previous appearance with Jack Straw (in fact to make a presentation to the Foreign Affairs Committee at the time of the launch of the September dossier in 2002) made him a credible witness, and (to make things considerably worse) his own expert views did not in fact neatly coincide (as subsequently acknowledged by Mr Hoon at the Hutton Inquiry) with what was in the dossier.

Far from it in fact.

Hoon was clearly worried about this, and it looks like the Foreign Secretary may have been too. In his evidence to the Hutton Inquiry Campbell states "I think that is a question for him [Hoon]. I think the point he was concerned about was that -- and I -- once I knew this, I had always thought that the BBC, when it came to defending Dr Kelly as a credible source for the allegations that they made, would say: the reason why we can say that he is so credible is because he once sat alongside the Foreign Secretary at a Select Committee.... I think the Defence Secretary was saying to me: did you know by that time -- which I did by that time, because the Foreign Secretary had told me in the morning -- did you know that this man had once sat alongside Jack Straw at a Select Committee? Yes, I did. I think Mr Hoon thought that was a bigger problem than I did".

Once Dr Kelly indeed appeared before the Foreign Affairs Committee on 15 July he confirmed that, as a government expert on Iraq's non-nuclear WMDs (we now know he was in fact the most experienced expert), he had "no idea" whether it possessed them at the time of the dossier's publication. This was a complete disaster for the government even if the press didn't seem to pounce on it.

Campbell's diary of 15 July acknowledges this stating "Looking forward to Kelly giving evidence, but GS [Godric Smith], CR [?] and I all predicted it would be a disaster and so it proved".

Until then somehow Dr Kelly's views, based as they were on his unrivalled expertise paid for at the taxpayer's expense, had been successfully kept out of the dossier and the public eye. And even by the time Dr Kelly spilled the beans to the Foreign Affairs Committee, so transfixed had the media become by the BBC-Campbell feud that few journalists focused on the enormous importance of what Dr Kelly had actually revealed on the main issue that the committee had supposedly met to consider in the first place - namely 'The Decision to go to War in Iraq'.

At best Dr Kelly felt there was only a 30% chance of Iraq having chemical weapons, a judgement completely at odds with the certainty expressed by the Prime Minister in the dossier.

But for Gilligan's radio report on 29 May, whatever its peripheral imperfections, and but for Campbell's reaction to it, this crucial information would probably never have come to light - unless, that is, Dr Kelly had continued to expand the liberal nature of his unauthorised post-war briefings to journalists, which is probably what Downing St feared most of all.

However, Campbell clearly hadn't anticipated the ultimate consequences of the pursuit of his high profile war against the BBC. After all the pre-war propaganda exercise had run like a dream.

But it is unlikely that the astounding hoodwinking of the public prior to the war was solely down to Downing St. The London Times of 12 September 2003 reports that "The ISC [Intelligence and Security Committee] said it had been told by the assessment staff of the JIC that the 45-minute claim was consistent with experts’ understanding of 'the Iraqi military and its capability to use weapons' ”.

What experts? Who were the experts with greater knowledge than Dr Kelly, who was not consulted? It seems suspiciously like Dr Kelly was deliberately left out of the loop in order to push through the case for war with Iraq and that the stench of 'Rockingham' type intelligence manipulation had been odiously wafting through the corridors of power.

In this respect the Independent 12 September is considerably more penetrating than the Times in its analysis of the ISC report. The Independent states that "The [Intelligence and Security] committee claimed yesterday that the single source was suddenly supported by fresh intelligence so rare that only the heads of the services were allowed to see it. This has now been disclosed to the MPs in the committee, but not senior officials in the intelligence community. The very fact that the ISC has in effect dismissed the 45-minutes claim indicates that this second piece of intelligence was also less than credible".

The Independent also attacks the committee for its feeble acceptance of the government line on the Niger uranium claim stating "The ISC ignores the fact that the CIA warned the UK that the Niger claim was not credible. It gives the Government and MI6 the benefit of the doubt about the mystery source for the claim. The committee appears weak in taking at face value such claims, particularly when they caused such embarrassment to President George Bush".

But to return to chemical and biological weapons, let's just get the situation straight here, based on what the ISC report tells us. The JIC had allowed definite claims about such weapons to go ahead in the dossier when it didn't know:

• What had been produced
• When it had been produced
• How much had been produced
• And, by implication given that it has had such trouble locating any post-invasion, where it had been produced

So what precisely did the JIC know? That the ISC report does not make clear.

But we do know that at the time of the dossier's publication Dr Kelly himself had "no idea" whether such weapons existed (later, during the six month period prior to his death, he was to regularly express the view of there being only a 30% probability).

With the leading expert on chemical weapons in the Defence Intelligence Staff also concerned that he didn't have any have any evidence of Iraqi production at the time of the September dossier, squeezing a "without doubt" claim from the Prime Minister out of all of this is pretty impressive.

Overall it looks suspiciously like the JIC didn't have any real evidence other than supposition, and that what it did produce was then spun into false certainty in the Prime Minister's foreword. So who was responsible for that?

Under questioning by Counsel at the Hutton Inquiry Alastair Campbell's gives his side of the story as follows:

Barrister: ...Because after 18th September we know that some changes were still made to the dossier.

Campbell:  That is true.

Barrister: Were those all to be cleared with Mr Scarlett as opposed to No. 10?

Campbell: They were. Any points to do with the text had to be cleared with Mr Scarlett. Indeed, Mr Scarlett spent the weekend prior to publication at the printers and personally signed off the proofs page by page.

The London Times 4 September reported from the inquiry that a "second official, a chemical weapons expert referred to as Mr A, said that DIS staff thought that 'political objectives' were behind repeated changes to the dossier. In an e-mail to Dr Kelly after publication, he wrote of 'our view you and I should have been more involved in this than the spin-merchants of our administration. Let’s hope it turns into tomorrow’s chip wrappers.'”

If it were to become sufficiently clear to the public that such a spin exercise had been going on then the situation would also raise questions about the political independence of the intelligence services and their failure to stand in the way of such manipulation. That is what is now happening following the failure to transform Iraq after the invasion.

Had the post-invasion transformation proceeded more effectively, and had coalition troops received a wholesome reception rather than being attacked on a daily basis, much of the pre-war fraud could have been swept under the carpet. Plenty of partisan people will always be happy to back a 'winner' even where the winning involves cheating - the Maradona 'hand of God' syndrome. As one infamous 20th century Austrian once put it "The victor will never be asked if he told the truth".

In the case of the illegal invasion of Iraq many so-called 'patriotic' Americans and Britons would probably have been prepared to overlook the subsequent failure to quickly find WMDs had it been followed by a suitable period of glory rather than humiliation.

In the case of Blair himself former Foreign Secretary Robin Cook provided some interesting observations in this respect in the Sunday Times 5 October. Cook states that "I believe Tony genuinely expected that delivering victory in Baghdad would wipe the slate clean on the political controversy over whether the war was justified. Perhaps his own political experience had led him to assume that victory would be all.... I have often wondered in recent years whether that formative experience [during Margaret Thatcher's war in the Falklands when Blair was the Labour Party candidate for the Beaconsfield by-election] of being turned over at the polls by a governing party led by a war hero has not left Tony Blair too inclined to associate military victory with political popularity".

Unfortunately for both Blair and Bush the circumstances on the ground in Iraq have turned out to be very different from that presented to the coalition by Iraqi defectors prior to the war. Iraq has become a giant mess, and the US has had to go begging for assistance to the very institution it had contemptuously defaced only months earlier - the United Nations.

Coalition forces are now seen by much of the population of Iraq as occupiers rather than liberators, whilst 'stage left' al Qaeda and other jihadis have started pouring into a country they previously had little or no access to. Far from stemming it, the exercise has served to facilitate the spread of terrorism into a new arena.

Meanwhile Bush has continued to develop his extraordinary pantomime style performance in self-delusion stating at a fund-raiser in September, according to the New York Times 3 October, that "One thing is for certain. Terrorist groups will not ever be able to get weapons of mass destruction in Iraq because Saddam Hussein is no more". No one has opened up Iraq to terrorists more than George Bush and his acolytes. If Bush is so convinced that WMDs were there, but the Iraq Survey Group can't find them, then who does he think has taken them?

The overall outcome has proved to be a strategic miscalculation of massive proportions and people are not happy. It is causing them to question what the real motives for the war were given that the stated reasons do not stand up to serious scrutiny any more - not, of course, that they ever did.

Had the post-war phase run smoothly the pre-war deceptions would most likely have been successfully buried in the graveyard of political pragmatism and expediency. But it hasn't, and now the public are demanding the corpse of pre-war intelligence be exhumed, whilst those who were involved in its assessment and presentation are running for cover. What the ultimate consequences will be is not yet clear.

According to the Observer 6 July "The head of MI6, Sir Richard Dearlove, secretly briefed senior BBC executives on Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction before the Today programme claimed Number 10 had 'sexed up' part of the evidence. In a remarkable revelation that goes to the heart of the increasingly bitter row between the Government and the BBC, broadcasting sources have told The Observer that Dearlove suggested that Syria and Iran posed a greater threat to world security than Iraq... One meeting, over lunch, was attended by Dearlove, Kevin Marsh, the editor of the Today programme, and John Humphrys, its leading presenter".

This was certainly a highly unusual move. Was it an attempt to cover tracks and gain elements of MI6 some protection from accusations that the agency was complicit in the misleading of the nation as the post-war situation in Iraq deteriorated on a daily basis? 

It certainly looked suspiciously like an effort by Dearlove to transfer blame, fairly or unfairly, to Downing St. At this point he could not have know that the Hutton Inquiry was just over the horizon at which the Chairman of the JIC was to confirm his approval of the government's September dossier.

So to what degree was Dearlove party to Rockingham? Was even Dearlove himself outside the Rockingham loop, even though Ritter claims MI6 officers were involved in it? We certainly won't know the answers to such questions this side of a full investigation.

However, a curious item in relation to MI6 subsequently cropped up during evidence to the Hutton Inquiry on 15 September. It was produced by the Director General of the BBC and concerns information provided to him by the chairman of the BBC as follows:

Barrister: After the Foreign Affairs Committee report, were you getting any other information which supported the stand you were taking?

Dyke: On the day the Foreign Affairs Committee reported, the Chairman told me he had been telephoned by a Member of Parliament who he knew quite well and he related the substance of his telephone conversation to me and I think this --

Barrister: Can I take you to BBC/6/136? Is this a redacted copy of  the note?

Dyke: Yes. It is very redacted on my screen.

Barrister: It is not much better on mine.

Dyke: Yes. Yes, yes, that is the --

Barrister: We did not do the redacting.

Dyke: I apologise then. According to the Chairman, he had had a phone call from an MP who had told him that an MI6 official had given -- he had had dinner with an MI6 official who had given him -- had a different view of what had happened in terms of the dossier.

Barrister: And what was the effect on your approach of receiving that sort of correspondence?

Dyke: Well, I mean this was obviously -- by the time it reached me, this was third or fourth hand. My reaction was to first of all say to the Chairman: you must make a note of this; and, secondly: could you ring the Member of Parliament back and ask him is he willing to talk to me? That he did. I then discussed it with the Member of Parliament and said: would your MI6 source be willing to talk to me?

Barrister: And was he?

Dyke: Well, I got an e-mail at a later stage saying possibly but he would need to check it, and of course then events moved on because come the death of Dr Kelly and the almost immediate establishment of this Inquiry, I did not think it was my role to start chasing up leads of that sort.

Well, it may not be a matter for Mr Dyke to investigate but it would certainly be a matter for a full public inquiry commissioned to pursue 'Iraqgate 2003', including Operation Rockingham. Who is that MP and where is his MI6 dissenting source?

The note kept by the Chairman of the BBC makes interesting reading, although it again throws blame back at 10 Downing St rather than at MI6.

The note (with some text redacted - i.e blanked out) says: "I received a phone call at noon from ***** MP whom I know quite well and trust. He said that ****on**** with a senior MI6 official ****  He said that the MI6 official had given him a specific piece of information about the 45 minute claim in the September dossier. According to the MI6 official, the 45 minute claim was sourced from a reliable Iraqi. This Iraqi person reported to MI6 a conversation he had had with a brigadier in the Iraqi army. The brigadier said that, if certain steps were taken, then the chances were high that Iraq could launch a major attack, probably involving chemical weapons, within 45 minutes . This was hedged with a large number of provisos about what would need to be done in order to make the weapons useable within that time. The MI6 official said that the provisos which related to the 45 minute claim were removed from the original intelligence reports before the September dossier was published. He said that this had been done by Alastair Campbell".

Campbell again. This time from an alleged MI6 source.

Why isn't Campbell screaming about this additional accusation now that it has been released as a public document? Could it be simply because few have noticed it, and that by now the BBC is too intimidated to re-ignite its row with Downing St by drawing further attention to it (according to the Daily Telegraph 26 July "The Government yesterday threatened to use the outcome of the Hutton inquiry into the death of David Kelly to force through a 'radical' review of the BBC's charter")?

There are three people apparently involved in this new allegation against Campbell - a senior MI6 officer, an MP and the Chairman of the BBC. This is potentially much more serious than a charge made by Andrew Gilligan. It is also more specific.

To make matters even worse the same note dated 7 July also reports that "At 12.30 I received a call from **** peer. The peer said that a close personal friend had recently reported in a private conversation that the Attorney General's original opinion on the legality of the war was not sufficiently strong, and that he had come under strong pressure to make it more robust . 'The Attorney General was told to strengthen his opinion.'''

But none of this alleged political interference gets Dearlove and Scarlett off the hook, because it was they who approved the dossier, including the foreword.

In his evidence to the Hutton Inquiry 15 September Dearlove said "I reported to my directors I think on 19th September that we had had full visibility of the process of preparing the dossier and that the whole process had gone extremely well.... At the JIC meeting, I think on 25th September ... I proposed a vote of thanks to the Chairman on behalf of the JIC members for the way in which he and the assessment staff had conducted a difficult exercise and the integrity with which it had been done..."

If the additional allegation about the 45 minute claim produced by the Chairman of the BBC is found to be true (should it ever be investigated) then a partnership in the exercise between the top of the intelligence services and their political masters must be assumed - just as the functioning of Rockingham had been described by Ritter.

The Deputy Head of the Defence Intelligence Staff at the time of the dossier, Mr Antony Cragg, also appeared before the inquiry 15 September. In his evidence he acknowledged that Scarlett was giving precedence to changes in the dossier suggested by Campbell over those requested by Defence Intelligence Staff. Part of his evidence was as follows:

Barrister: Your response on 17th September, from the DIS, is to point out that the executive summary is too strong.

Cragg: Hmm.

Barrister: In fact, there was also another response on 17th September, which pointed out that perhaps the dossier was too weak. Can I take you to CAB/11/66? This is a memo dated 17th September from Mr Campbell...... If you then go on to page 70 you can see the response, which is dated 18th September 2002. This is from Mr Scarlett. If you go over to 71 at 10 you we can see: "The language you queried on the old page 17 has been tightened", which picks up the point in the dossier.

Cragg: Hmm.

Barrister: It seems, therefore, that Mr Scarlett was taking on-board the comment from Mr Campbell but not necessarily taking on-board the comment from the Defence Intelligence Staff.

Cragg: Yes.

Nonetheless Mr Cragg (a member of the JIC himself) told Lord Hutton that "bearing in mind the views expressed by SIS and supported by the assessment staff, that their concerns had been dealt with satisfactorily. That was my judgment". So it appears M16 and the JIC assessment staff prevailed.

According to the London Times 15 September MI6 chief Sir Richard Dearlove "in defending the 45-minute claim ... told the [Hutton] inquiry that there was no dissent within MI6 or anywhere else that he was aware about". So this is probably a key test for Dearlove - is his claim of ignorance true? Because we now know there was dissent - not only within the Defence Intelligence Staff but now, if the account from Chairman of the BBC proves reliable, also potentially from within the ranks of MI6 itself.

A report from the inquiry the next day by the London Times states that "Serious concerns about the Iraq weapons dossier were expressed by an intelligence official on the day the final draft was being signed off, it emerged yesterday. An analyst working for the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) wrote to Tony Cragg, former deputy chief of defence intelligence, on September 20 claiming that many of the statements in the dossier were 'too strong' given the available intelligence. He was particularly concerned about claims in the foreword and the summary concerning Saddam Hussein’s continued production of chemical and biological weapons and that weapons of mass destruction could be fired within 45 minutes of an order. The analyst’s identity was protected in documents published by the Hutton inquiry. He raised similar concerns with Brian Jones, a senior official in the DIS, who wrote to Mr Cragg setting them out on September 19. Mr Cragg, who retired this year, told James Dingemans, QC, yesterday that he did not see the second memo because he went on holiday on September 19. The analyst’s letter referred to the final September 20 draft of the dossier, but there is no evidence that his memo was seen by anyone before the dossier went to the printers. In his memo the analyst said: 'The 20th September draft still includes a number of statements which are not supported by the evidence available to me.' He refers to the Prime Minister’s foreword, where he stated that intelligence had established 'beyond doubt' that Saddam had continued to produce chemical and biological weapons. 'I acknowledge that in this statement the Prime Minister will be expressing his own ‘belief’ about what the assessed intelligence has established. What I wish to record is that based on the intelligence available to me it has NOT established beyond doubt that Saddam has continued to produce chemical and bioligical weapons.' He was also concerned that the dossier’s executive summary stated that some weapons of mass destruction 'are deployable within 45 minutes of an order to use them'. He said: 'This is based on a single source. The judgment is too strong considering the intelligence on which it was based.'”

If Dearlove wasn't aware of such dissent, both as head of MI6 and as a member of the JIC, then the focus switches to whoever might have been responsible for preventing it reaching his attention. Rockingham was based within the DIS where the above complainant was also situated.

A report from the Hutton Inquiry by the London Times 16 September states "Earlier, the two most senior members of the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS), the Ministry of Defence branch of the intelligence service, explained why they decided not to pass on concerns of their own staff about the draft dossier. Dr Brian Jones, a manager in the technical wing of the DIS, said that he and some staff felt the 45-minute point was too strong and the dossier should not imply that chemical weapons were in production. Air Marshal Sir Joe French, Chief of Defence Intelligence, said the written concerns of Dr Jones and one of his staff were counteracted by other intelligence information". This is a description uncomfortably close to Ritter's portrayal of Operation Rockingham as an intelligence 'cherry picking' exercise.

The Times then continued with "Tony Cragg, Sir Joe’s deputy at the time of the dossier and a fellow member of the Joint Intelligence Committee, said he received Dr Jones’s letter of concerns on September 19 but 'I took the view that since all of the issues had either been discussed with the Cabinet Office or were well within the general thrust of known intelligence, it was not necessary to raise the issues with the JIC.'”

Now are we getting close to it? Was the situation being manipulated from both ends given that Ritter claims Rockingham was operating on political instructions from the highest level? What was the role of the Cabinet Office mentioned here?

Tucked away at the bottom of its report the Times also goes on to say that "An internal BBC note made by Gavyn Davies, the BBC Chairman, states that he received a phone call from an MP who claimed that he had discussed the September dossier with an MI6 official. 'The MI6 official said that the provisos which related to the 45-minute claim were removed from the original intelligence reports before the September dossier was published. He said that this had been done by Alastair Campbell,' says the memo". Somehow that claim didn't make it into a Times headline, although it did in the Daily Telegraph the same day. However, it doesn't seem to have gone much further.

It would certainly be interesting to interview that MI6 official.

A little-noticed earlier report from a BBC World Service journalist on 5 June also stated that "A well-informed source close to British intelligence told me that Downing Street had sent drafts of the document back to the Intelligence Committee six or eight times with a request that the language should be strengthened. Mr Blair himself was said to have been involved in this process at one point." Such matters have since been looked at in more detail by the Hutton Inquiry but still not in nearly enough depth. No mention has been made of Rockingham, except by Dr Kelly in front of the Intelligence and Security Committee the day before his death.

Interestingly prior to the Hutton Inquiry Foreign Secretary Jack Straw had also told the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee in June that officials had to his knowledge not complained to the government about its September 2002 dossier on Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction. Despite this, evidence produced at the Hutton inquiry during August and September demonstrated that in fact some intelligence officials had done precisely that.

Nonetheless Straw "said he had no doubts over the accuracy of anything in the September [2002] dossier" according to the BBC 24 June. In addition the BBC reports that "He also said British sources had not been involved in information, later found to be based on forged documents, about Iraq trying to buy uranium in Africa".

But what does 'involved' mean here?

Britain may not have been involved in the creation of the documents, but it is alleged to have received them, or at least summaries of them, as has been confirmed to reporters by a UN official according to the Washington Post 22 March.

If so, what did the British do with them? Did they make an attempt to check their validity before passing them over to the US, if that is what really happened? And if not, why not? It took the UN only a few hours to check them out and establish that they were forgeries. Unfortunately by then, in early 2003, the media was largely focused on how the war was going to happen, not on whether or not there was sufficient justification for it.

A report in the print edition of the London Times 28 June (p13) implies further potential misconduct on behalf of the Foreign Office.  Straw made a second appearance in front of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee on 27 June when he was accompanied by two senior officials. The Times reported from the session that "Two UN Security Council resolutions require evidence on Iraq's nuclear activities to be passed on to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to assist with inspections. Sir John Stanley (Con, Tonbridge and Mailing) wanted to know when the British Government complied."

Taking a look at the relevant UN resolutions is instructive.

Resolution 1441 of 8 November 2002 "Requests all Member States to give full support to UNMOVIC and the IAEA in the discharge of their mandates, including by providing any information related to prohibited programmes or other aspects of their mandates, including on Iraqi attempts since 1998 to acquire prohibited items..."

Resolution 1051 of 27 March 1996 states that "all States shall.... Report to the joint unit, in accordance with paragraphs 13, 24, 25, 27 and 28 of the mechanism, any information they may have at their disposal ... of attempts to circumvent the mechanism or to supply Iraq with items prohibited to Iraq under the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification approved by resolution 715 (1991)...."

By 10 July the Independent had reported that six backbench MPs had signed a Commons motion questioning "why the UK Government has not submitted the evidence, upon which it bases its assessment, to IAEA scrutiny, in line with its obligations under Security Council resolutions".

As the Foreign Office now claims to have held such 'evidence' since at least September 2002, but which it has not disclosed, it would appear that Britain has failed to comply with these UN Security Council resolutions which seek the handing over such information.

Yet ironically a claim of  non-compliance with a Security Council resolution was the basis of Britain's own justification for invading Iraq. The one-page legal opinion of Attorney General Lord Goldsmith argued that Saddam was in material breach of Security Council resolution 1441 because he failed to co-operate with weapons inspectors. It now seems that Britain also failed to co-operate and that Iraq is not the only country who stands accused of having been in contravention of the resolution.

The African uranium saga is a difficult one for the British government. According to a piece in the Washington Post 22 March “a Niger diplomat turned the letters over to Italian intelligence, which provided summaries of the information to Washington and London.” It appears the Italians acquired the letters some time in the latter half of 2001, and at some point after that they passed along the summaries (perhaps as early as late 2001 according to a report in the Italian paper Repubblica). Yet A UN official told the Post that neither the British nor the U.S. government “ever indicated that they had any information on any other country.”

Yet, Straw now appears to be saying the British government had additional evidence to support its claims about Iraq's supposed nuclear programme. Many doubt this. When asked by the Foreign Affairs Committee to provide more information on its claims it took the Foreign Office three weeks to do so and then only in response to matters that were not formally requested according to the Guardian 31 July. The Guardian concludes that as a result "the mysteries of the Niger connection will continue to cause political embarrassment".

The Prime Minister has also been adopting a similar line. According to the BBC 9 July: "Mr Blair told a committee of MPs on Tuesday that the evidence about the Niger link 'did not come from these so-called forged documents. They came from separate intelligence.' .... The Foreign Affairs committee asked what this other intelligence was but has not been told.... Perhaps Mr Straw will tell the Intelligence and Security Committee which is also inquiring into Iraq and which works in secret."

A report in the Independent 20 July suggested France as the source of this other intelligence, although France has denied this. More controversially the paper states that "Some analysts point to Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency, arguing Britain and the US rely on Mossad for much of their information on Africa, because the Israelis have far more intelligence assets there than they do. It was possible, they added, that Britain had fallen victim to disinformation concocted by Israel to discredit Iraq."

However, if the claim by Straw and Blair regarding other intelligence is true this begs the question as to why they did not hand over such information to the IAEA as required. According to the Independent 9 July "Ministers have confirmed that they have not passed information on Niger to the IAEA, despite a commitment to co-operate with the nuclear weapons inspectorate."

The Financial Times reported the same day that "Nuclear weapons inspectors have asked the UK government to provide fresh evidence that Iraq tried to buy uranium from an African country, officials close to the inspectors said on Wednesday. The request by the International Atomic Energy Agency follows claims by the UK government, repeated on Wednesday, that its information on the purchase of uranium was based on other  intelligence, and not on the documents that were later exposed as forgeries."

In its article of 20 July the Independent also states that "The Government has refused to tell the IAEA what it knows... arguing that the information came from a third country, and that it is up to that country to disclose it. But the IAEA says there is no such exemption from Britain's obligations under UN Security Council resolutions".

If there is no such exemption then at the very least the UK should be disclosing the identity of the source country, if not the actual intelligence itself, and then letting the IAEA deal with the matter.

Could, however, the government's reluctance to disclose the identity of the third country be explained by the fact that Andrew Gilligan, the journalist at the centre of Campbell's row with the BBC, told the Foreign Affairs Committee 19 June that his source has been "quite cutting about the claim that uranium had been sought from Africa"? We now know that Gilligan's source was Dr David Kelly.

A later email dated 8 July from Jonathan Powell, Tony Blair's chief of staff, to John Scarlett, head of the Joint Intelligence Committee, was produced at the Hutton inquiry. Perhaps referring to Dr Kelly himself, or to Sir Kevin Tebbit at the Ministry of Defence, in the email Powell says "According to Gilligan's evidence the same source expressed scepticism about the uranium from Niger intelligence. Has anyone asked K about that?" Was the government worried about Dr Kelly emerging at some point to knock over the Africa uranium allegation in the dossier in addition to the 45 minutes claim?

This was a sensitive issue at a sensitive time.

Unfortunately for Downing St and the Foreign Secretary the article in the New York Times by the US official who had previously identified the Niger claims as bogus had already appeared by 6 July. The official was also interviewed by the Washington Post the same day. This was the first time the ex-US Ambassador Joseph Wilson had directly surfaced in public on the issue, although he had been briefing the press on an anonymous basis for a while before that.

The gradual emergence of the widespread debunking of the Niger uranium claims during June, eventually culminating in Wilson's article in the New York Times at the beginning of July, may explain in part the huge diversion 10 Downing St generated during this period over Andrew Gilligan's allegations regarding the insertion of the '45 minute' claim in the September dossier. It was after all an issue which had seem to have died away with little political fall out. According to the Mail on Sunday 27 July "Two weeks after the supposedly outrageous item [Andrew Gilligan's report] was broadcast, BBC chiefs went to Downing Street for a lengthy meeting with Mr Blair and Mr Campbell. But nothing at all was said about Mr Gilligan. Not a word. "

Indeed Wilson's disclosures, if they had ended up hogging the headlines, would switch the focus onto the uranium claim instead. It was a claim which constituted an even more dubious part of the dossier than the 45 minute assertion, but it had not caught popular attention in the same way.

To a limited degree the uranium issue did generate some significant headlines once Wilson finally dropped his anonymity on 6 July - but on nothing like the scale of the row between 10 Downing St and the BBC with which it overlapped.

The Wilson revelations are highly damaging to the integrity of the official case made by Washington and London for war against Iraq. Unfortunately the high level of media attention attracted by the Hutton Inquiry, combined with its narrow remit, may have served to distract attention away from these revelations once more - although the inquiry has certainly produced many more disclosures in other areas than had originally been expected.

Nonetheless Time magazine 8 September, for example, managed to do a 'timeline' of the history of the British September dossier from August 2002 through to the end of August 2003 which did not make a single mention of the uranium claim or Wilson's exposure of the bogus nature of the Niger 'evidence' in July.

Wilson's article of Sunday 6 July made clear his view that the Bush administration knew very well of his finding that the Niger uranium claims were bogus. Wilson stated that "The vice president's office asked a serious question. I was asked to help formulate the answer. I did so, and I have every confidence that the answer I provided was circulated to the appropriate officials within our government. The question now is how that answer was or was not used by our political leadership. If my information was deemed inaccurate, I understand (though I would be very interested to know why). If, however, the information was ignored because it did not fit certain preconceptions about Iraq, then a legitimate argument can be made that we went to war under false pretenses."

This 'problem' article by Wilson led to a series of 'explanations' by the White House, beginning on Monday 7 July, in which it acknowledged that the Niger claim was false. By this stage the Bush administration had little choice to do anything other than put its hands up. With a named source who was highly credible too much information was now in the public domain.

But the biggest ramifications were to be felt in London.

The BBC reported Tuesday 8 July that "A split has opened up between Britain and the United States over a claim that Iraq sought to buy uranium from the West African state of Niger. But UK Prime Minister Tony Blair has defended the assessment, telling a committee of MPs on Tuesday [8th July] that it was not a 'fantasy' and that the intelligence services themselves stood by the allegation. The Washington Post quoted White House officials as saying, in a statement authorised by the White House: 'Knowing all that we know now, the reference to Iraq's attempt to acquire uranium from Africa should not have been included in the State of the Union speech.' The White House has acknowledged for the first time that the claim might be wrong and that President Bush should not have referred to it in his State of the Union speech in January. In the speech, President Bush had said: 'The British Government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa. ' The allegation was originally contained in the British Government dossier on Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction, though not in one issued by the CIA. It was one of the most significant paragraphs, since Iraq had no civilian nuclear programme and an attempt to acquire uranium indicated that it was trying to make a nuclear bomb. The claim was undermined by the International Atomic Energy Agency which said that it was based on forged documents... Mr Blair repeated that line in his evidence to MPs, saying it was based on 'separate intelligence.' ...On Monday [7th July], the UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs committee asked the government to explain what the 'separate intelligence' was, but the prime minister did not elaborate".

Particularly awkward for the British government at this time was a statement from the White House reported by the New York Times 8 July which confirmed that "There is other reporting to suggest that Iraq tried to obtain uranium from Africa. However, the information is not detailed or specific enough for us to be certain that attempts were in fact made." In other words, said one senior official "we couldn't prove it, and it might in fact be wrong."

If the US didn't have further reliable evidence then it is difficult to believe that Britain did - it would be expected that Britain would be sharing evidence with the US even if it was illegally keeping it away from the IAEA. Nonetheless the Foreign Office now claims to hold additional evidence which it never shared with the US. This is a claim which many find scarcely credible.

Later the London Sunday Times 13 July confirmed that Britain and America "normally co-operate and share intelligence under an agreement known as UKUSA". The paper states that "Observers are puzzled as to why Britain refused to share its intelligence...... The decision is even more surprising considering that a CIA representative sits on Britain’s joint intelligence committee, albeit with limited access. The committee wrote the September dossier that includes the uranium claim".

The CIA's close relationship with Britain's Joint Intelligence Committee may also have a wider significance. Seymour Hersh in the New Yorker has already reported on an alleged joint exercise of the Anglo-American intelligence services that had been charged with pumping out disinformation, including the use of forged documents, on Iraq since at least the autumn of 1997.

Believing the British to be involved with the Niger uranium forgeries congressional Representative Henry Waxman had already written to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice on 10 June seeking an explanation. The documents had been provided to the UN by the US in February in support of its own case against Iraq. The UN quickly established that the documents were "not authentic".

In his letter to Rice Mr Waxman stated that "Since March 17, 2003, I have been trying without success to get a direct answer to one simple question: Why did President Bush cite forged evidence about Iraq's nuclear capabilities in his State of the Union address?.... It would make no sense for him to cite forged evidence obtained from the British if, in fact, the United States had other reliable evidence that he could have cited. Moreover, contrary to your assertion, there does not appear to be any other specific and credible evidence that Iraq sought to obtain uranium from an African country. The Administration has not provided any such evidence to me or my staff despite our repeated requests. To the contrary, the State Department wrote me that the ‘other source’ of this claim was another Western European ally. But as the State Department acknowledged in its letter, ‘the second Western European government had based its assessment on the evidence already available to the U.S. that was subsequently discredited.’...”.

This looked like a major problem for Blair and Straw. A letter from the State Department to Waxman in April had confirmed that "Beginning in late 2001, the United States obtained information through several channels, including U.S. intelligence sources and overt sources, reporting that Iraq had attempted to procure uranium from Africa. In addition, two Western European allies informed us of similar reporting from their own intelligence services". The letter confirmed that one of these Western allies was Britain, so clearly Britain had been sharing intelligence on the subject with the US.

The other Western government remained unnamed in the letter. Was it the same government that Britain was relying on for its own claim? After all any country willing to supply information to Britain would be likely to be willing to supply it to the US (and vice versa) given the close relationship between the two. What is the probability that in both cases we are talking about Italy?

Blair told the House of Commons Liaison Committee 8 July "The evidence that we had that the Iraqi Government had gone back to try to purchase further amounts of uranium from Niger did not come from these so-called 'forged' documents, they came from separate intelligence".  But Mr Blair did not specify what that separate intelligence was. Significantly, however, his statement had nonetheless indicated that the British claim, although supposedly based on 'separate intelligence', related to Niger. This appears to have been the first official British mention of Niger - the dossier itself had only referred to Africa.

At the same time the New York Times 8 July went as far as to describe a non-virtuous intelligence sharing circle between London and Washington stating that "While Mr. Bush cited the British report, seemingly giving the account the credibility of coming from a non-American intelligence service, Britain itself relied in part on information provided by the C.I.A., American and British officials have said." The Times does not elaborate on what that information was. But whatever it was the Americans were now admitting that they didn't consider it reliable.

Clearly no longer impressed with the line taken by the British government the New York Times continues with "But today a report from a parliamentary committee that conducted an investigation into the British assertions also questioned the credibility of what the government of Prime Minister Tony Blair had published. The committee went on to say that Mr. Blair's government had asserted it had other evidence of Iraqi attempts to procure uranium. But eight months later the government still had not told Parliament what that other information was."

On 9 July the New York Times reported on a reiteration of the Bush administration's earlier admission. Issued the previous day, this time the admission had been conveyed by a named official of the US National Security Council, Michael Anton. Ironically these admissions were spilling out just as President Bush was travelling on a whistle stop tour of Africa widely seen as part of a bid to secure oil supplies from the continent whilst masquerading as a humanitarian initiative (Le Figaro reported 7 July that "The American goal is for African oil to come to account for 25% of its imports by 2020").

The New York Times article stated that "Mr. Bush never mentioned Niger by name in his speech. But without the Niger evidence, the argument that Iraq was intent on getting uranium from Africa did not hold up. Mr. Anton noted today that 'other reporting that suggested that Iraq had tried to obtain uranium from Africa is not detailed or specific enough for us to be certain that such attempts were in fact made' ".

By now the wider press were picking up on the story. Both the BBC and CNN posted accounts to their web sites on the morning of 9 July.

Although the New York Times pointed out that Bush's State of the Union speech hadn't mentioned Niger by name Ambassador Wilson's revelations had now led to some difficult questions from the press. And it was at this point that the 'Niger' cat slipped out the bag.

American freelance writer Josh Marshall reported on 7 July (the day after Wilson's article) that Presidential Spokesman Ari Fleischer had told journalists that morning that "yes, the President's broader statement was based and predicated on the yellow cake from Niger... [The President's statement in the State of the Union speech was wrong] Because it was based on the yellow cake from Niger ". This would appear to explain Blair's unexpected, and presumably reluctant, reference to Niger on 8 July when addressing the House of Commons Liaison Committee.

The BBC 9 July also quoted Fleischer as saying "The president's statement was based on the predicate of the yellow cake [uranium] from Niger."

It is worth remembering at this point that Bush had made his State of the Union statement based on the assertion that "the British Government has learnt that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa". The implication of Fleischer's remarks, therefore, was that British claims in the September dossier about Iraq trying to acquire uranium from Africa were themselves based on information specifically related to Niger. This was bringing Britain uncomfortably close to the Niger forgeries scandal that had been unearthed at the UN.

Although by now both Fleischer and Blair had made statements linking the British uranium claim to Niger not everyone within government was comfortable with this.

The Financial Times reported 9 July that "A British government official said the US State Department was trying to play down the implications of Mr Fleischer's statement. 'Nobody had planned what happened. Mr Fleischer was ambushed by a gaggle of journalists, and he tangled things up and got in a complete muddle,' the official said on Wednesday."

But it was not just the White House that had got into a serious tangle over this.

No 10 Downing St's own press briefing on Wednesday 9 July included the following statement: "Asked why Downing Street disagreed with the White House's view that President Bush should not have referred to the Niger/uranium claim in his State of the Union Address, the PMOS [Prime Minister's Official Spokesman] said that it had been included on the basis of the US's knowledge. We had included the material in our dossier on the basis of our knowledge, which was different. Asked if our information had been based on material passed to our intelligence services by other security services - as the Prime Minister had appeared to imply to the Liaison Committee yesterday, the PMOS said no..... He was making the point that the material included in our dossier had been based on our intelligence and our intelligence assessment."

This 'explanation' again acknowledged that the uranium claim in the US President's speech, which he had stated was based on information held by Britain, also referred to Niger even though Bush had not mentioned the country by name.

The Downing St briefing also stated that "Asked if the intelligence would be passed on to the US, the PMOS said that we always shared information with the relevant people, as you would expect. The important point was that we had included it in our dossier following our own analysis and assessment."

So this crucial intelligence - on which alone the whole African uranium claim was now hanging by a thin thread - was shared with the US at the time of the September dossier then? Well, no actually, according to Downing St.

Remarkably the briefing continues with the following words: "Pressed as to why we weren't handing the information over to the US authorities to help them 'get out of a mess', the PMOS pointed out that the US was referring to the forged documents on which they had based their assessment. We, on the other hand, had been relying on other intelligence."

So even though the British government "always shared information with the relevant people, as you would expect" the "other intelligence", if any really existed, was held back from the American government. That was now the line.

At this point it is worth recalling the section of the 9 July Downing St press briefing which is of most interest when considering the African uranium saga. This states that "Asked if our information had been based on material passed to our intelligence services by other security services - as the Prime Minister had appeared to imply to the Liaison Committee yesterday, the PMOS [Prime Minister's Official Spokesman] said no.... He was making the point that the material included in our dossier had been based on our intelligence and our intelligence assessment."

In fact, this was the exact opposite of the line being presented by the Foreign Office that day whose position was that the assessment was based on foreign intelligence from a third country (the Foreign Office's position was given in a Channel 4 report on 9th July, and in other later reporting, although its position as presented to the Foreign Affairs Committee during its public sessions in June had been less than crystal clear).

This chaos had, of course, coincided with the arrival of news of the White House uranium admission which had been spreading in more media reports during that day. The news included details which specifically undermined "other reporting" of the original uranium claim.

The New York Times account of the admission is worth repeating: "Mr. Anton [a spokesman for the National Security Council] noted today that 'other reporting that suggested that Iraq had tried to obtain uranium from Africa is not detailed or specific enough for us to be certain that such attempts were in fact made' ". In effect this statement was challenging all known evidence in relation to the uranium claim.

This was not good news for the British government which had publicly formalised the claim in its September dossier.

Then, for reasons best known to itself, sometime during the same day (as indicated by the content of a Channel 4 report 9 July) Downing St changed direction on this subject fundamentally and came into line with the Foreign Office claim of reliance on intelligence from a third country.

Prior to that Downing St had been presenting a case for some time that the uranium claim was based solely on British intelligence.

Indeed Campbell himself had earlier been questioned on the evidence for the British government's uranium claim during his interview with Channel 4 News 27 June after he had stormed their studios in his now infamous finger-jabbing rage.

Challenged on the possible use by the British government of the forged documents exposed at the UN in March Campbell had snapped at interviewer Jon Snow stating that "the British intelligence put what they put in that dossier on the basis of British intelligence. Get your facts right before you make serious allegations against a government..." Snow had asked him "The Niger source has nothing to do with us?" That may have been getting very close to the bone.

In the background the Niger storm clouds had been building strongly over Britain during June.

Without naming Wilson as the diplomat concerned the Independent had reported 13 June that "The CIA warned Britain that claims Iraq had tried to get uranium from Niger were false, months before the Government published the allegation in an intelligence dossier justifying military action against on Iraq.... The US intelligence agency asked a retired diplomat to investigate reports from Britain and Italy that Saddam had sought uranium for possible use in a nuclear weapon. The diplomat went to Niger in February 2002 and spoke to officials who denied having any uranium dealings with Iraq. That information was shared with British officials, and was reported widely within the US government, a senior intelligence official in Washington told the Associated Press".

By June the principal advantage of being able to say that reliance for Blair's dossier claim was being made solely on British intelligence was that the government could dissociate itself (as Campbell's response to Snow explicitly confirms it wanted to) from the forgeries allegedly supplied to Britain by Italy and later submitted to the UN by the US in support of its case against Iraq. Any confirmation of British involvement with those documents could be potentially fatal for anyone who had participated in allowing the African uranium claim to go into the September dossier.

Snow had provided a blunt contextual introduction to this impromptu interview with Campbell stating "This is [a] row between you and the BBC. Many will see it as a diversionary tactic to prevent people from actually seeing the real issue there, which is that MPs are not getting to the root of whether in fact the intelligence we were provided with was the real intelligence provided by the intelligence services."

But the line Campbell was giving Snow on 27 June was not the one Downing St was to switch to some time after its morning press briefing on 9 July.

That change did not go down well with Channel 4 when, clearly suspicious, it reported on the uranium issue once more on 9 July. Quizzically it pondered "So what is it Britain knows [about the uranium] that we didn't tell the Americans? The Foreign Office says the UK has intelligence that reflects documents not shown to be forgeries and it has separate intelligence that is what it calls non-documentary. The line too has always been it came from more than one source - and it was from foreign agencies. But in his interview on Channel 4 News [27 June], Alastair Campbell seemed to suggest Britain had put its own intelligence in the September dossier. However the Foreign Office told us today all the intelligence came from third countries: there was no British-owned intelligence at all. Number 10 says what Mr Campbell meant was what went in was a British intelligence assessment. Not hard evidence, then, but a conclusion - a judgement - based on second-hand information."

If that is what Alastair Campbell had really meant on 27 June, unfortunately that was not the line given in the Downing St press briefing on 9 July at 11.00 am when it had stated that "the material included in our dossier had been based on our intelligence and our intelligence assessment." Quite apart from the Bush administration, it seems Downing St was having trouble singing from the same hymn sheet as the Foreign Office.

So just exactly what should we make of such inconsistent explanations particularly when Downing St had such easy access to John Scarlett, chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee?

It looked suspiciously like someone had been trying to move the goal posts following the arrival of the awkward admission from the US that "other reporting that suggested that Iraq had tried to obtain uranium from Africa is not detailed or specific enough for us to be certain that such attempts were in fact made". Intelligence which was wholly British would be expected to have been shared with the US, in which case it would now be completely sunk by these remarks from across the Atlantic.

The Downing St briefing at 11.00 am on Wednesday 9 July had explicitly stated that the intelligence had not come from foreign sources: "Asked if our information had been based on material passed to our intelligence services by other security services - as the Prime Minister had appeared to imply to the Liaison Committee yesterday, the PMOS [Prime Minister's Official Spokesman] said no.... He was making the point that the material included in our dossier had been based on our intelligence and our intelligence assessment". This corresponded with what Channel 4 had concluded Campbell had told it on 27 June.

Clearly, however, the PMOS wasn't up to speed with the latest Downing St angle. But then things were moving fast. The US had just put an unexpected spanner in the works. It was a mess.

On the same day the BBC provided a précis of events leading up to the situation on 9 July stating that "Doubts about a claim that Iraq had tried to buy uranium from the African state of Niger were aired 10 months before Mr Bush included the allegation in his key State of the Union address this year, a CIA official has told the BBC. On Tuesday [8 July], the White House for the first time officially acknowledged that the Niger claim was wrong and suggested it should not have been used in the president's State of the Union speech in January. But the CIA official has said that a former US diplomat had already established the claim was false in March 2002 - and that the information had been passed on to government departments, including the White House, well before Mr Bush mentioned it in the speech. Both President Bush and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair mentioned the claim, based on British intelligence, that Iraq was trying to get uranium from Niger as part of its attempt to build a nuclear weapons programme.... The British Government has stood by its assertion, saying the forged documents were not the only evidence used to reach its conclusion that Saddam Hussein tried to buy uranium from Africa. On Tuesday Mr Blair defended the assessment, telling a committee of MPs that it was not a 'fantasy' and that the intelligence services themselves stood by the allegation."

In short the nature of the Bush administration's admission that had emerged in the mainstream media on 8 July, and was more widely reported on 9 July, seemed to have put the whole Downing St spin machine into a serious wobble. It did so just as Ambassador Wilson's article had done to the White House a short while earlier.

Once some of the dust had settled, however, the official line was that the 'separate' intelligence which the UK now claims it had used in September 2002 to support its Africa uranium allegation has never been shared with the US and was from a third country.

The British government also claimed that it wasn't aware until 'recently' of Joseph Wilson's discovery in early 2002 of the bogus nature of such allegations in relation to Niger. It says the US never informed it.

So, if this line is to be accepted, not only was Britain not sharing intelligence with America and the IAEA, but America wasn't sharing intelligence with the IAEA and Britain. Why? Just how much loss of credibility can London and Washington withstand before someone is indicted?

The final position on the British uranium claim is in fact summarised in the report of the Intelligence and Security Committee published on 11 September. Amongst other matters the committee reports on its closed session interview of the head of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), otherwise known as MI6.  Although the date of the interview with Sir Richard Dearlove is not clear the report states:

89. The Committee questioned the Chief of the SIS about the reporting behind these statements. We were told that it came from two independent sources, one of which was based on documentary evidence. One had reported in June 2002 and the other in September that the Iraqis had expressed interest in purchasing, as it had done before, uranium from Niger. GCHQ also had some sigint concerning a visit by an Iraqi official to Niger.

90. The SIS’s two sources reported that Iraq had expressed an interest in buying uranium from Niger, but the sources were uncertain whether contracts had been signed or if uranium had actually been shipped to Iraq. In order to protect the intelligence sources and to be factually correct, the phrase 'Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa' was used. At the time of producing the dossier, nothing had challenged the accuracy of the SIS reports.

91. In February 2003 the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) received from a third party (not the UK) documents that the party had acquired in the autumn of 2002 and which purported to be evidence of Iraq’s attempts to obtain uranium from Niger. In March 2003 the IAEA identified some of the documents it had received as forgeries and called into question the authenticity of the others.

92. The third party then released its documents to the SIS. The SIS then contacted its source to check the authenticity of its documentary evidence. The SIS told us that its source was still conducting further investigations into this matter.

93. The SIS stated that the documents did not affect its judgement of its second source and consequently the SIS continues to believe that the Iraqis were attempting to negotiate the purchase of uranium from Niger. We have questioned the SIS about the basis of its judgement and conclude that it is reasonable.

From this limited description it is not possible to tell very much about the credibility of the case offered by the SIS, although the following significant points arise:

• The September dossier was based only in part on 'non-documentary' evidence.
• However, it is possible that the documentary evidence supporting the claim in the September dossier may not have been authentic (i.e. it may have comprised further forgeries, for example).
• Remarkably, long after it was received and used to support the September dossier, the SIS claims it is still trying to verify the authenticity of its documentary evidence. At the time of its publication, 11 September 2003, the ISC confirmed elsewhere in the report that "The SIS is still awaiting the clarification of the documentary evidence from one of the sources..." (i.e. a whole year after it was used to support the dossier, and 6 months after the existence of forged documents relating to the same claim was disclosed at the UN).
• If the 'documentary' evidence does not stand up to scrutiny, this will leave the SIS relying on its non-documentary source only.
• The evidence used by the SIS is stated to have related to Niger, and not any other African country. This is a further indication that some in the British government have been lying. In the midst of the summer row over the Niger forgeries from which the British government was desperately trying to distance itself Newsweek reported 28 July in relation to the alleged uranium concerned that "a British official told NEWSWEEK that it came from an East African nation, not Niger". Who was that official?
• The issue of why this 'intelligence' was shared neither with the US, nor with the UN under the relevant Security Council resolutions is not addressed in the report.

It is not possible to determine from the committee's report the precise nature of the evidence the SIS presented for its claims, or on what specific basis the committee accepted them, although the report indicates it received "written information" on "the background intelligence on the Iraqi intent to acquire uranium from Africa".

How thorough though was the committee's questioning? Did the committee, for example, ask for an explanation as to why the basis of Downing St's claims on this subject had changed so suddenly on 9 July? Why did it change from one being based on British intelligence, to one based on foreign intelligence?

Neither did the final position explain why the government was still assessing the material it claims to have used to support its case back in September 2002. This was a bizarre circumstance that the Foreign Affairs Select Committee had politely described as "very odd indeed".

Neither did it explain why such information has not been passed over to the IAEA under the provisions of UN resolutions 1051 and 1441.

But the developing situation in relation to the Niger claims had not ended on 9 July.

It is worth remembering that two days later, on 11 July, the account from the British government suddenly hit more trouble in the form of a 'mea culpa' statement issued by CIA Director George Tenet. In the statement Tenet took responsibility for the inclusion of the false uranium claim in the President's January speech, based on the British dossier, which he explained as being a 'mistake'. Tenet had been forced to make the statement following the disclosures made by Ambassador Joseph Wilson in the New York Times on 6 July.

However, in an apparent attempt to take some of the pressure off himself Tenet revealed that the CIA had warned Britain not to include such a claim in its September dossier. According to the BBC 11 July "the Washington Post newspaper reported on Friday that the CIA tried and failed to dissuade the UK Government from including the uranium claim in an intelligence dossier published last September ".

This was a further disaster as far as London was concerned - and doubtless even greater panic was now setting in at Downing St and Whitehall. People now wanted to know why - if Tenet had in effect publicly dismissed the British claim, and yet the Foreign Office claimed to hold previously undisclosed evidence - was Blair not sharing that intelligence now with the US? After all it could have helped the President and the Director of the CIA get out of a major scrape.

Weren't Britain and America supposed to be allies in a special relationship? Or was the reality that both knew the residual British held 'intelligence' was so questionable as to be of no use to anyone were it ever to be subjected to the full glare of open public scrutiny?

Despite America's own trouble on the issue the British government claimed that the intelligence couldn't be shared because of supposed protocol obligations to the unnamed third country source from whence it allegedly came. For this reason the intelligence had to be kept under wraps it was insisted. It would seem it couldn't be disclosed even to the CIA to help get the President of the United States out of trouble.

Is the US now pushing for that third country to allow its intelligence to be released so that the White House and its advisers may be vindicated? There seems to be no news of that.

On 12 July the BBC reported that "The prime minister's office said the extra intelligence had come from a foreign service and could not be disclosed. A spokesman said it was entirely different from the information the CIA had disavowed. Mr Anderson [chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee] has called on the government to reveal its source to clear up the confusion".

Meanwhile the London Times 13 July quoted a Foreign Office source as saying “We are not at liberty to share the information that we have with the Americans because it has come from sources which make that difficult under the protocols of our type of work”. Channel 4 News elaborated 17 July stating that "British ministers say they still stand by the claim, but were unable to reveal the source of the information to the Americans because it came from a third country's intelligence service and they did not 'own' the information".

The whole episode seems to have been a wriggle sufficient to make any contortionist proud.

The final line taken by Downing St raises suspicions that the government was trying to create a position where it could avoid handing over its remaining slither of 'evidence' to the IAEA. The claim that to do so would constitute a breach of protocol with the source country seemed to imply that some kind of cover-up exercise was in motion given the feeble nature of the excuse. The government conveniently omitted to mention that such a country would also be bound by resolutions 1051 and 1441 to hand over the information to the UN.

Clearly the government had encountered severe trouble in deciding what its line should be as the situation unravelled faster than it was able to adjust to, and many were deeply sceptical. One western diplomatic source told the Glasgow Sunday Herald 14 July that "Blair's claim that he has other evidence [for the uranium claim] is nonsense. These foreign intelligence agencies are basing their claims on the same forgeries as the Brits."

However, faith in the entirety of the British case was further undermined following the release of the interim findings of the Iraq Survey Group published on 2 October. These came up with evidence neither of Iraqi WMDs nor the ballistic missiles to deliver them.

Writing in the Independent 5 October Glen Rangwala reminded readers of the words delivered to Parliament on the eve of the conflict by the British Foreign Secretary. Mr Straw stated "we know that this man [Saddam Hussein] has got ... chemical weapons, biological weapons, viruses, bacilli and ... 10,000 litres of anthrax". So apparently we knew.

Following publication of the Survey Group's post-war report, however, Straw was cutting something of a lonely figure - even if he remained impressive in his dogged determination to maintain a by now wafer thin defence of his government's actions under increasingly hopeless circumstances.

By now Straw was forced to resort simply to the claim that Iraq was in breach of UN resolutions prior to the decision to take military action. According to the London Times 3 October Straw responded to the barren content of the report by stating "We all need to remember that the coalition decided to take military action to remove the regime because of our very clear assessment that Saddam Hussein was in clear material breach of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 and many preceding that...."

Aside from the basic fact that the resolution did not authorise the illegal military action that followed (it is clear that it would not have got through the Security Council if that had been its generally understood meaning), there are two technical problems with Straw's last remaining fig-leaf argument.

Firstly, in its failure to disclose to the IAEA its own claimed evidence of Iraq's nuclear programme Britain had itself failed to comply with UN resolutions 1441 and 1051. It is still in breach. Moreover the interim report of the Iraq Survey Group now confirms that there was no Iraqi nuclear programme of any significance. In summarising this aspect of the report the London Times 3 October states "No surprises. It is widely accepted the programme was destroyed or dismantled long ago. There was no mention of the claim of attempting to buy uranium from Niger".

Secondly, there are the longstanding breaches of UN resolutions by Israel. Part of the September dossier suggested that Iraq was a potential threat to its neighbours. Israel is the most powerful military force in the region and has long since been in illegal occupation of land well beyond its original borders.

There do not seem to be any proposals from London or Washington for a UN resolution to permit the invasion of Israel, however.

Rather Israel continues to enjoy large financial assistance from the United States despite widespread international concern over the aggressive behaviour of its current government. In an excerpt from his diary for Thursday February 28 published in the London Sunday Times 5 October former British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook wrote: "[At the Cabinet meeting Home Secretary David Blunkett said] 'In present circumstances Arab governments would not comprehend such obsession with Iraq. They see Sharon, not Saddam, as the problem for the Middle East.' Somewhat to my surprise this line provokes a round of 'hear hearing' from colleagues, which is the nearest I've heard to a mutiny in the cabinet."

In the end the most plausible explanation for all this duplicity is that there is another agenda at play, and both governments in London and Washington are implicated in deceiving their own populations and the international community in the course of pursuing it. Italy may be implicated too.

Until very recently few could have expected the detail of the duplicity to have become so publicly visible. But in the frantic scramble to try and hide behind each other following the disclosures from Ambassador Wilson and others in the case of the African uranium issue, the main players in this unprecedented scandal were giving too much of the game away.

In the process it has become apparent that people in positions of high public responsibility have been lying - even if it is not yet clear how many and in collaboration precisely with whom.

Nonetheless, the Washington Post has already presented one potentially revealing clue coming from within the US government itself. This suggests that both the British and the Americans may indeed have been using the same intelligence material on the uranium issue. On 8 July the Post reported that "One Bush administration official said British and U.S. intelligence agencies got their Niger documents from the intelligence service of one country that he refused to name, but that others have identified as Italy...'We both had one source reporting through some liaison service which said, 'Look what we found,' this official said. 'There were other reporting streams, but it may be that all streams are traced to the same source.'..."

'Operation Rockingham' And MI6

'Some liaison service'? This is beginning to sound like an exercise connected to the alleged MI6 Iraq disinformation office established by the British government, as discussed in Seymour Hersh's report in the New Yorker in March.

If Hersh is correct then to what degree was the unit, as is also claimed by Scott Ritter in the case of 'Operation Rockingham', acting on political instructions rather than simply on its own initiative? It is quite conceivable that the scheme Hersh's report identifies was used to deceive other sections of the British government as well as the public.

And were elements within the Italian intelligence services accomplices in this process?

According to the Glasgow Sunday Herald 8 June Operation Rockingham was "established by the Defence Intelligence Staff within the Ministry of Defence in 1991". Its purpose, was to 'cherry-pick' intelligence pointing to an active Iraqi WMD programme and to ignore and quash intelligence which indicated that Saddam's stockpiles had been destroyed or wound down. These allegations were based in part on claims made by former US weapons inspector Scott Ritter.

The Herald reports that "Ritter and other intelligence sources say Operation Rockingham and MI6 were supplying skewed information to the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) which, Tony Blair has told the Commons, was behind the intelligence dossiers that the government published to convince the parliament and the people of the necessity of war against Iraq. Sources in both the British and US intelligence community are now equating the JIC with the Office of Special Plans (OSP) in the US Pentagon. The OSP was set up by Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to gather intelligence which would prove the case for war. In a staggering attack on the OSP, former CIA officer Larry Johnson told the Sunday Herald the OSP was 'dangerous for US national security and a threat to world peace', adding that it 'lied and manipulated intelligence to further its agenda of removing Saddam'.... Johnson said that to describe Saddam as an 'imminent threat' to the West was 'laughable and idiotic'. He said many CIA officers were in 'great distress' over the way intelligence had been treated. 'We've entered the world of George Orwell,' Johnson added. 'I'm disgusted. The truth has to be told. We can't allow our leaders to use bogus information to justify war.'..."

A second article in the same edition of the Herald 8 June elaborates further. It states "Proof of Operation Rockingham came to light in a Sunday Herald investigation and its existence was backed up in a series of astonishingly frank interviews with Scott Ritter, the former chief weapons inspector in Iraq who served on the staff of General Norman Schwarzkopf -- who led the allied forces in the first Gulf war -- before joining the UN weapons inspections team, Unscom. Ritter was also a US military intelligence officer for eight years. His claims about Rockingham are supported by UK parliamentary documents and briefings with other British intelligence sources....Staff once connected to Rockingham are now thought to be involved in the new Iraqi Survey Group which has been sent to Iraq in a bid to find WMDs... To back up claims that Operation Rockingham was deliberately 'cherry-picking' intelligence and producing misleading reports, Ritter described how its staff blatantly ignored proof of Saddam's compliance. 'Britain and America were involved in a programme of joint exploitation of intelligence from Iraqi defectors. There were mountains of information coming from these defectors, and Rockingham staff were receiving it and then selectively culling reports that sustained the claims that weapons of mass destruction were in existence. They ignored the vast majority of the data which mitigated against such claims.'....'In terms of using selective intelligence,' Ritter said, 'this policy was coming from the very highest levels.' The only written reference to Operation Rockingham is found in a 1998 British parliamentary report. In it, Brigadier Richard Holmes, who was giving evidence to the defence committee, refers, in an off-the-cuff aside, to Operation Rockingham and linked it to Unscom inspections in Iraq. Some of the Rockingham staff were military officers, others came from the intelligence services, such as MI6, and others were civilian ministry of defence personnel. From 1991 to 1998 it had three chiefs, one man and two women.... Both the MoD and Downing Street refused to comment on Ritter's allegations about Operation Rockingham, saying they didn't make statements on intelligence matters. However, a number of British intelligence sources have spoken to the Sunday Herald about the operation...."

In the September dossier the British Prime Minister describes the Joint Intelligence Committee as follows: "The JIC is at the heart of the British intelligence machinery. It is chaired by the Cabinet Office and made up of the heads of the UK’s three Intelligence and Security Agencies, the Chief of Defence Intelligence, and senior officials from key government departments. For over 60 years the JIC has provided regular assessments to successive Prime Ministers and senior colleagues on a wide range of foreign policy and international security issues... The picture presented to me by the JIC in recent months has become more not less worrying.".

In relation to Operation Rockingham and the JIC the Herald also takes a look at the role of the Office of Special Plans at the Pentagon, and the London based Iraqi National Congress, long known to be backed by US Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld. The Herald states that "Both Ritter and British intelligence sources said the selective intelligence gathered by Operation Rockingham would have been passed to the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) which was behind the dossiers published by Tony Blair and his government, claiming Iraq had WMDs. The most contentious parts of the government's case for war was that Iraq could launch WMDs in just 45 minutes and that Saddam tried to buy uranium from Niger. Intelligence sources say the 45 minutes claim was inserted at Downing Street's behest to make the document 'sexier' and the International Atomic Energy Agency has said the uranium claim was based on forged documents. British intelligence sources have equated the JIC with the Office of Special Plans (OSP), an intelligence agency set up inside the Pentagon by Rumsfeld. It has been accused of gathering selective intelligence at the request of its political masters to build a misleading case for war. Ritter says Operation Rockingham was supplying the JIC with intelligence reports, together with MI6. One British intelligence source said: 'The JIC is, in my view, the mirror organisation of the OSP. They both did the same thing. The JIC was receiving information from all the intelligence agencies.'...The Intelligence sources say the Niger claim emanated from Italian Intelligence. The Italians had apparently been asked to help the US and UK make the case for war and passed the document to the British. 'I don't know whether the Italians were involved in the forgery, or if they purchased the forgery, but everyone knew it was nonsense,' an intelligence source claimed....Intelligence sources say the 45 minute claim was linked to the Iraqi National Congress (INC), the controversial Iraqi opposition-in-exile organisation. If any connection to the INC was proved, it would completely discredit the 45 minute claim as no intelligence agency could withstand allegations that the INC would have exaggerated, and possibly distorted, information in order to secure the fall of Saddam. A UK intelligence source described the 45 minute claim as 'bollocks' and Ritter said the vast majority of information stemming from the INC was 'fabricated'.....The Prime Minister has continually passed responsibility for the nature of intelligence to the JIC saying: 'The intelligence that formed the basis of what we put out last September, that intelligence came from JIC assessment.' Blair, however, has refused to grant an open, independent judicial inquiry. One British intelligence source added: 'The JIC briefed the PM. I think it will be the spooks who take the fall for this.' The JIC is composed of senior members of all the UK's intelligence services. 'They were charged to get specific intelligence on WMD and to make a case for war,' a source said. 'But they were doing that on the say-so of politicians.'"

Ritter has offered to address the British parliament on the subject of Rockingham, an offer which so far does not appear to have been taken up.

The Herald ran its story on Rockingham over a month before Dr Kelly, himself a former weapons inspector in Iraq and a longstanding chemical and biological weapons adviser to the Ministry of Defence, was questioned in secret by the Intelligence and Security Committee. This took place a day before his death.

Given his role on behalf of the Ministry of Defence in relation to information on Iraqi WMDs did the committee quiz Dr Kelly on 'Operation Rockingham'?  If not, the opportunity to do so has now passed. The committee is alleged to have extracted "nothing new" from Dr Kelly.

Yet if Dr Kelly was unhappy with the way his identity appeared to have been released to the public in order to save the skin of people in senior government circles, it is possible that he might have been motivated to talk a little more than previously?

The crucial point is this: from his evidence given to the Foreign Affairs Committee we now know that Dr Kelly considered that before the war there was only a 30% chance that Iraq had chemical weapons. We also know (as confirmed in a BBC report 23 August based on evidence subsequently given to the Hutton Inquiry) that the day before Dr Kelly died he gave the same opinion to the Intelligence and Security Committee.

There was also some indication that Dr Kelly might have been on the verge of spilling more beans judging by a number of news reports which emerged around the time of his death. A 'breaking news' report by the London Times 19 July stated that "Weapons expert Dr David Kelly told of 'many dark actors playing games' in an e-mail to a journalist hours before his suicide, it was reported on Saturday. The words appeared to refer to officials at the Ministry of Defence and UK intelligence agencies with whom he had sparred over interpretations of weapons reports, according to the New York Times".

Sending such emails to journalists, if intercepted, would surely have rung loud alarm bells within any unit akin to 'Rockingham', particularly as Dr Kelly, accompanied by other officials, had drawn attention to his interaction with Rockingham in his evidence to the Intelligence and Security Committee only the previous day.

MI5 had already organised "a top-level investigation launched to find the 'mole' who leaked a confidential memo on the Iraq weapons dossier sent to Alastair Campbell from John Scarlett" according to the London Times 30 August citing documents released to the Hutton Inquiry.

In addition the Times reports on a memo dated 9 July from the head of the Security Policy Division (whose name is blanked out) to John Scarlett, head of the Joint Intelligence Committee. It refers to Andrew Gilligan's source at the centre of the BBC's row with the government. The memo says “The source appears to be an expert on current and recent past Iraq weapons capability, sufficiently well informed to give a statistical figure on that capability.”

It would seem therefore that, even before his identity was known, there was not much doubt within the intelligence services about the expertise and knowledge credentials of Gilligan's source. Of course no such "statistical figure" on Iraq's weapons capability featured in either of Blair's public dossiers because it is increasingly apparent now that Dr Kelly was being stonewalled from within the system.

Only once Dr Kelly had started talking to journalists after the war did such a statistical figure begin to seep into the public domain, even though few have still to pay sufficient attention to this crucial fact. If the tabloid headlines the day after the publication of the September dossier had been "Blair says only 30% chance Iraq has WMDs" (which was the opinion of the government's own unrivalled expert, Dr David Kelly) instead of "Brits 45 mins from doom" (which is what came out of Rupert Murdoch's pro-war Sun newspaper) how likely is it that the House of Commons would have backed Bush's war for oil? Rarely can the use of spin have had such drastic consequences. The key question that remains is - who was responsible for the stonewalling of Dr Kelly?

In the Observer 31 August Julie Flint, a reporter and friend of the Kelly family, states "At our last meeting this year, before I returned to the Middle East at the end of February, I sensed a change in David.... He seemed to be feeling sidelined, even isolated; worried, too, that the wrong case was being made, unnecessarily, for war. In his years as a weapons inspector, he said, he had done the briefings. Every detail, every nuance, was correct. Now he briefed politicians who briefed the public - and didn't always get it right." The sidelining of the pre-eminent Dr Kelly at the crucial moment begs a lot of questions.

A piece published by the London Times 21 July entitled ''The view from abroad'' carried opinions from Italy, Canada and Russia expressing the view that Dr Kelly was murdered. Even British 'institution' Esther Ranzen criticised the press for unquestioningly reporting Kelly's death as suicide when reviewing the Sunday papers for the BBC's 'Broadcasting House' programme on Radio 4 on 20 July. Whether or not these views are supported by the reported facts (which some continue to question) they demonstrate the huge loss of trust in the integrity and accountability of government in the Anglo-Saxon world at the beginning of the 21st century.

A recent expose by the BBC Panorama documentary 'A Licence To Murder' concerning the involvement of British intelligence services in the undercover killing of innocent people in Northern Ireland suggests that such activity is not out of the question where the stakes are high enough. Likewise do David Shayler's recent revelations that MI6 sponsored al Qaeda to carry out a failed assassination attempt of Colonel Gaddafi in Libya in 1996.

Dr Kelly was not some minor backroom figure in the on-going Iraq saga. He was Britain's most senior biological weapons scientist. According to the London Times 19 July "At the age of 40 he was offered a post dealing with biological warfare at Porton Down, Britain’s chemical and biological laboratory in Wiltshire. It is impossible to exaggerate Dr Kelly’s importance throughout the long campaign to disarm Saddam of his bio-weapons arsenal. ..... Dr Kelly led the first team of United Nations biological weapons inspectors to Iraq in 1991, discovering a factory that could have produced enough anthrax to fill several Scud missiles. Highly trusted by the Ministry of Defence, he used to help with interviews of defectors, and sat in on debriefings that took place when people returned from overseas postings. He always had access to secret intelligence material."

The London Times 1 August also wrote that "In recent days newspaper reports have suggested that Dr Kelly was far more than just a middle-ranking 'technical' adviser to the MoD. It is claimed he was the Government’s leading expert on Iraq’s WMD, a key figure who had access to intelligence material and all the drafts of the September dossier.... While Dr Kelly was an expert in biological and chemical warfare, especially the former, he was not the only specialist in this field. Most of the MoD’s experts in weapons of mass destruction work for the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS). MI6, which provided the intelligence about Iraq’s ability to prepare chemical and biological weapons for launching in 45 minutes, has some of its own specialists, but would normally rely on, and work with, the DIS."

An article in the London Times 20 July entitled 'Betrayed - The torment of a man of morals' had previously described Dr Kelly's background in more personal terms. It states:"The David Kelly waiting for me in the driveway of his Oxfordshire home 10 days ago was not his normal self. Gone were the usual smile and firm handshake.... Over those years Kelly combed former bioweapons manufacturing plants and interviewed dozens of Saddam’s officials and military officers involved in Iraq’s weapons programmes. He kept meticulous notes and detailed files. He had access to the world of top secret intelligence. He knew and had spoken to all of Saddam’s senior scientific advisers.... he had come to believe in a better world and had adopted the Baha’i religion, which seeks international understanding and reconciliation. This was the complex man who was assigned early last year to help to prepare a government dossier on Iraq. He knew that Saddam Hussein had for many years pursued terrible weapons and he had had a key role in compiling one of the government’s dossiers about them. However, ever the meticulous scientist, he felt it had exaggerated some aspects in its presentation.... His careful, scientific contribution was in a dossier designed for propaganda. And when the propaganda was eventually exposed, Kelly would be the casualty."

So how much knowledge did Dr Kelly have of these intelligence relationships in general, and did he have knowledge of Operation Rockingham in particular?

As Andrew Gilligan's formal statement released following the scientists death makes clear "Dr Kelly had close connections with the intelligence community". Following the first day of the Hutton Inquiry the London Times 8 August reported that "We also learnt that Dr Kelly had worked for Box 850, which armchair spies will know is the name that insiders give to MI6" (the term 'Box 850' is referred to in the 1993 US Congressional record relating to British intelligence in the original 'Iraqgate' affair during the Reagan administration, for example).

In fact Dr Kelly himself confirmed his involvement with MI6 (also known as 'SIS') to the Intelligence and Security committee 16 July when he stated "I also liaise with SIS, they call me in if they want to discuss any raw intelligence with me or if they want any assistance in interpreting intelligence."

Although Dr Kelly worked for the MoD’s counter-proliferation and arms control department, he also worked alongside people within the Defence Intelligence Staff. If Rockingham existed few people could have been as well placed as he to have come across signs of it. This is particularly so given his involvement in WMDs, his high level security clearance, his access to related areas of the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office, and his involvement with the 'security' apparatus as a consumer of intelligence.

Dr Kelly's own evidence to the Intelligence and Security Committee confirms that this was exactly the situation. On 16 July, the day before he died, Dr Kelly told the committee of his interaction with Rockingham stating that "Within the Defence Intelligence Services I liaise with the Rockingham cell which used to service UNMOVIC and UNSCOM and now will service the Iraq Survey Group and I don't go through all the information that they have but, almost on a weekly basis I'll sit down with the principal officer there and he will alert me to anything that he thinks is of relevance to my work." (Dr Kelly's evidence was not included in the official report of the committee published 11 September 2003, nor was it commented on. It was, however, separately supplied to the Hutton Inquiry).

Not only does this confirm the existence of Rockingham, it confirms that Dr Kelly was interacting with it. It also confirms that the information passed to Dr Kelly from this "cell" could have been selective. Dr Kelly stated that he only got the intelligence that the principal officer at Rockingham "thinks is of relevance". Dr Kelly also confirmed an ongoing relationship between Rockingham and the CIA established Iraq Survey Group.

The reference to Rockingham does not elicit any specific reaction from the committee. Nobody asks "Can you tell us a bit more about Rockingham?". The chairman simply follows Dr Kelly's brief comments on his interaction with Rockingham and MI6 (SIS) with "Fine, are there any more questions?".

But why did Dr Kelly go to the trouble of mentioning Rockingham when asked about his access to intelligence by the committee? He could just as easily have referred to DIS delivered intelligence without mentioning Rockingham by name. It is possible that he might have hoped his answer would lead to more detailed questioning, particularly if he thought some members of the committee could have seen the press reports on Rockingham which cited Scott Ritter as a source at the beginning of June. However, no such questioning arose.

In addition to his explicit reference to Rockingham Dr Kelly's testimony to the committee was particularly significant in two other respects:

• he repeats his evidence given the previous day to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee that his view immediately before the war was that there was only a 30% chance of Iraq having chemical weapons. He advises that this "was a statement that I would have made probably for the last six months"
• he is unable to identify "a weapons system that could be used within forty-five minutes of deployment"

At this point Dr Kelly represented something of a major problem for the government - firstly because of his reference to 'Rockingham' (first exposed in the press at the beginning of June in a way which indicted both the government and the intelligence services), and secondly because of his view that there was only a 30% chance of Iraq having chemical weapons. However, these elements seem to have been hardly focused on at all by the press, unlike his opinions on the 45 minutes claim.

Scotland's Sunday Mail 19 July claimed that Dr Kelly "is believed to have told a colleague that the Government claim that Saddam could deploy weapons of mass destruction in 45 minutes was totally inaccurate, as it would take handlers the same time to even start filling shells with biological compounds". This report would also now seem to be corroborated by evidence since given to the Hutton Inquiry, including the recording of Susan Watts conversation with Dr Kelly on 30 May.

The Times 1 August reports that the source for the 45 minute claim was an Iraqi military contact. Moreover, it seems this contact was the only source that was relied on for the claim, and that the claim itself was misrepresented.  It would appear that the source's claim was that 45 minutes was the time needed to issue an order to fire such weapons provided they were already prepared for use, based on the situation that existed prior to the 1991 Gulf war. In other words, if there were no such weapons in a state of readiness in the first place such an order would result in nothing.

This situation is described as follows by the Times: "What MI6’s Iraqi military contact is believed to have imparted was that under a command and control system, modelled on Soviet doctrine, it would take 45 minutes to fire a chemical munition, such as an artillery shell, following authorisation from Baghdad. But for that to be realistic, the launching system would have already to be armed with its chemical warhead; in other words, ready and primed to fire".

So was the misrepresentation an error or deliberate? And who produced it? And if an error by MI6, then just how 'intelligent' are the British intelligence services?

Even the origin for the 45 minute claim appears now not only to have been single-source but also second hand according to evidence produced during the Hutton Inquiry.

Whilst some have wondered whether Dr Kelly's death may not have been suicide, the professional evidence given at the inquiry was that this was "well nigh certain". What does not require such highly specialised judgement, however, is that the words included in an email he sent just before his death - "many dark actors playing games" - come from Dr Kelly himself and nobody else. Those words will ensure that disturbing overtones continue to be associated with the affair.

If Dr Kelly's ominous remarks prove not to be directly relevant to his own death they are almost certainly relevant to the way the case for war against Iraq was fraudulently presented to the public in America, Britain and indeed the world.

The 'Axis of Weasel' - Washington, London And Rome - Politicians And Agents

So what are we to make of the 'Kelly Affair' when considered in the broader political context driving the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq?

Columnist Simon Jenkins provided some thoughtful insights in the London Times 26 September stating "The Hutton inquiry ended its hearings yesterday. It has proved the biggest self-inflicted wound in modern politics.... An inquest into the suicide of the scientist David Kelly has laid bare the tangled web that politicians weave when first they practise to deceive. It has been conducted in public. The public is the jury. We have been given the evidence. We are entitled to deliver a verdict. My verdict is simple. Dr Kelly was a shy, sensitive man who vented his professional frustration to the media. He played with fire, was burnt and proved unable to handle the consequences....". Jenkin's analysis would appear to hinge around the view that Dr Kelly provided unauthorised briefings to the press because he believed the British public had not be told the truth.

What eventually stemmed from Dr Kelly's entry into the fray has produced consequences with enormous ramifications. Jenkins continues with "To Mr Blair, Lord Hutton’s job was to pin Dr Kelly’s death on a journalist, the BBC’s Andrew Gilligan, to appease the rage of his over-mighty press aide, Alastair Campbell. This was always a squalid manoeuvre. Mr Campbell pleaded that his boss was seeking to restrain him. Mr Blair’s failure to do so shows him as putty in his assistant’s hands. I do not see how any reasonable person can find Mr Gilligan guilty. While he admitted errors in his original story, as did the BBC in handling him, they in no way damaged the story’s essence or the validity of broadcasting it. Every item of evidence presented to Lord Hutton has vindicated the claim that the September dossier was originally unhelpful to Mr Blair and had to be altered, or desperately 'over-egged', to prove Iraq’s aggressive intent. Objections to this process from within the intelligence community were suppressed....The more the inquiry burrowed into the story’s foundations, the more secure they came to seem, despite being called '100 per cent wrong' by Mr Campbell. They were confirmed in evidence from the head of MI6, Sir Richard Dearlove, and from Brian Jones, of defence intelligence. The story was clearly more or less as Dr Kelly intended and clearly in the public interest....We should have had an inquest into the reasons for the Iraq invasion. Instead we had to use a private inquest as proxy. From the moment sometime in 2002 that Mr Blair knew he was going to join George Bush in a reckless military adventure in the Middle East, some crisis like this was inevitable. He was a lawyer and he needed legal justification for what he suspected was illegal. This, he felt, had to come from intelligence of an 'imminent threat'. "

Unfortunately the process of the Hutton Inquiry has shifted a lot of public attention away from the importance of the preceding parliamentary hearings which were charged with investigating the broader issue of 'The Decision to go to war in Iraq'.

Will the work of those earlier hearings now serve any useful purpose? Certainly the level of probing by the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Intelligence and Security Committee now looks feeble compared with that which took place in relation to the death of Dr Kelly under the supervision of Lord Hutton.

Similar probing is now required on the wider picture in relation to 'Iraqgate 2003'.

The African uranium claim, and any role played by the British, American, and Italian governments in promoting false information in relation to it, is one area which still requires much deeper investigation. According to the London Times 7 July "The MPs [on the Foreign Affairs  Committee] also took issue with the 'bald claim' that Iraq had sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa. They unanimously found it 'very odd indeed' that the Government denied it was relying on documents, now known to be forged, for this and was still reviewing other evidence."

'Very odd'? The laughable understated politeness of this committee in the face of what is increasingly looking like one of the biggest scandals in British political history takes some accepting.

On 14 July the London Times confirmed that "British officials said yesterday that the intelligence had come from several sources and had been rechecked and confirmed since the row over its authenticity had erupted." This is not what was reported by the Intelligence and Security Committee when it published its findings on pre-war intelligence assessments three months later.

In its report of 11 September 2003 committee stated that "In February 2003 the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) received from a third party (not the UK) documents that the party had acquired in the autumn of 2002 and which purported to be evidence of Iraq’s attempts to obtain uranium from Niger. In March 2003 the IAEA identified some of the documents it had received as forgeries and called into question the authenticity of the others. The third party then released its documents to the SIS. The SIS then contacted its source to check the authenticity of its documentary evidence. The SIS told us that its source was still conducting further investigations into this matter". Still conducting investigations - after all this time?

If this material was used to support the September dossier then it would appear that the government of the third country supplying the information has now been withholding their permission for Britain to release it for over a year, despite the provisions of UN resolutions 1051 and 1441 under which all such information should be passed over to the IAEA. The question is why is this information being withheld?

Interviews with members of the diplomatic community reported in the Glasgow Sunday Herald 14 July provide some interesting views on this question.

One diplomat is quoted as saying "There were more than 20 anomalies in the Niger documents -- it is staggering any intelligence service could have believed they were genuine for a moment. I know that the IAEA told Britain and America, two weeks before El Baradei made his statement to the UN in March, that the documents were forgeries, that the IAEA was going to publicly state the documents were faked. At that point, the IAEA gave them a chance -- they asked the US and UK if they had any other evidence to back up the claim apart from the Niger forgeries. Britain and America should have reacted with shock and horror when they found that the documents were fake -- but they did nothing, and there was no attempt to dissuade the IAEA from its course of action. The IAEA had said it would follow up any other evidence pointing towards a Niger connection . If the UK and US had had such evidence they could have forwarded it and shut the IAEA up -- El Baradei would never have gone public if that had happened. My analysis is that Britain has no other credible evidence.... There are only two conclusions: one is that Britain has intelligence but kept it from the weapons inspectors, which they should not have done under international law, or that they don't have a thing. If they did have intelligence, then why not show it to the world now the war is over."

Quoting a second diplomat the Herald continues with "'As far as I know, the only other evidence Britain has about the Niger connection is based on intelligence coming from other western countries which saw the same forgeries. Blair's claim that he has other evidence is nonsense. These foreign intelligence agencies are basing their claims on the same forgeries as the Brits.' " The paper comments that "The diplomat's accusations tally with a letter sent in April, before the White House climbdown, by the State Department to Democrat House of Representative's member Henry Waxman, who has been demanding answers on the deception carried out against the American and British people. In it, the State Department admits that it received intelligence from the UK and another 'western European ally' -- which many believe to be Italy -- that Iraq was trying to buy Niger uranium. But it adds: 'not until March 4 did we learn that, in fact, the second western European government had based its assessment on the evidence already available to the US that was subsequently discredited'. In other words, as one intelligence source said: 'It was based on the same crap the British used'. Given the letter is dated April 29, this information invites the question: why did it take until last week for the White House to admit the Niger connection was rubbish?"

The answer to the Herald's important question is perhaps not that complicated. It was largely because former US Ambassador Joseph Wilson didn't go fully public with what he knew about the Niger situation until 6 July. If Wilson hadn't piped up at that point the media would probably not be discussing this issue now, or at least not so visibly. Prior to that Britain and the US probably thought they had got away with it, since the press mainly ignored the Niger forgeries story as it first broke in March just before the start of the war.

The first serious indication that the Prime Minister's Director of Communications, Alastair Campbell, was to be put forward by Downing St to give evidence to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee came on 23 June in what was described by the BBC as a government 'U-turn'. That was the effective start of Downing St's high profile counter-attack on allegations made against it by Andrew Gilligan concerning the veracity of its 45 minute claim in the September dossier.

However, a broader and potentially more damaging pressure had been building slowly during May, and then more forcefully during June, as press reports about Britain's alleged involvement with the forged Niger documents and what the London Times 29 May had called the government's "stonewalling" on the issue, had started to emerge in earnest.

The State Department letter 29 April referred to by the one of the diplomats interviewed by the Herald 14 July is significant in this context. The letter specifically states that "Beginning in late 2001, the United States obtained information through several channels, including U.S intelligence sources and overt sources, reporting that Iraq had attempted to procure uranium from Africa. In addition, two Western European allies informed us of similar reporting from their own intelligence services.  As you know, the UK made this information public in its September 2002 dossier on 'Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction'. The other Western European ally relayed the information to us privately...."

The US's two external sources for the uranium claim were therefore Britain and one other 'Western European' ally. The other Western European ally is now generally considered to be Italy.

To what degree Berlusconi's right wing government in Italy has also participated in this 'Axis of Weasel' is therefore an interesting question. Using Italy as a proxy source for the forged documents would certainly permit a degree of excuse making by Washington and London in the event of the material ever being questioned. Unfortunately the excuses look thin when the forgeries are of such poor quality.

Congressman Henry Waxman has written to the US President asserting that information from the International Atomic Energy Agency reveals that for over six crucial weeks last December and January the Bush Administration withheld from the agency important information about Iraq’s purported attempts to obtain nuclear materials. In fact, the Washington Post has since reported that the State Department distributed within the Bush administration copies of the now-discredited documents nearly three months before Mr Bush's State of the Union speech at the end of January.

Once in their hands, however, it took the IAEA only a few hours to establish that the Niger-Iraq documents were faked after they finally received them in February 2003. One IAEA official told Seymour Hersh “These documents are so bad that I cannot imagine that they came from a serious intelligence agency. It depresses me, given the low quality of the documents, that it was not stopped. At the level it reached, I would have expected more checking.” Hersh states that a "high-level intelligence official told me that some senior C.I.A. officials were aware that the documents weren’t trustworthy".

Unfortunately by this stage the drums of war were beating so loudly most of the public and press had become deaf to what was really going on around them 'diplomatically'. The issue of the faked documents drooped out of the news like a stone and did not loudly return until Ambassador Wilson's article in the New York Times 6 July.

Since then the controversy has become not just a problem for the British Foreign Secretary. As we now know by June 2003 the steadily unravelling issue was also developing into a rapid game of blame ping-pong between the White House and the CIA. Even a former Director of the CIA under Jimmy Carter, Stansfield Turner, joined the fray by accusing the Bush administration of 'overstretching the facts' in an interview with USA Today 17 June. 

Over 110 members of Congress have since cosponsored legislation introduced by Henry Waxman to establish an independent commission - modelled after the September 11 Commission - to examine the intelligence about Iraq and the representations made by executive branch officials about this intelligence.

In summary, therefore, the broad sequence of events in relation to the forged 'Axis of Weasel' documents appears to have been as follows:

• Britain allegedly obtains the documents via Italian intelligence and shares them with Washington (Between late 2001 and February 2002)
• Vice President Cheney asks the CIA to send a special envoy to Niger to verify claims that Iraq has been trying to procure uranium from Niger (February 2002).
• The envoy returns confirming the claims are false (Early March 2002)
• The fake status of the claims is advised to the CIA and the State Department, and allegedly the White House (Early March 2002)
• Although it later denies it London is alleged to have been advised of this ('Months before' September 2002)
• Cheney claims in a speech that Saddam Hussein had "resumed his effort to acquire nuclear weapons." (26 August 2002)
• A Blair dossier claims Iraq has been trying to obtain uranium from Africa (24 September 2002)
• The same day George Tenet confirms to a closed Senate Foreign Relations Committee meeting that Iraq has been trying to obtain uranium from Niger (24 September 2002)
• Two days later Secretary of State Colin Powell, appearing before a closed hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, also cites Iraq's attempt to obtain uranium from Niger as evidence of its persistent nuclear ambitions (26 September 2002)
• The State Department publishes a fact sheet on Iraq mentioning the Niger case (19 December 2002 - a letter 29 April 2003 from the State Department to Congressman Henry Waxman later confirms that the fact sheet was developed jointly with the CIA).
• George Bush cites the British Government as the source for the claim in his 'State of the Union' address that Iraq has been obtaining uranium from Africa (28 January 2003)
• After months of failed requests the IAEA at last obtains the Niger documents from the US government (February 2003)
• The IAEA easily establishes, and then announces to the UN Security Council, that the documents are 'not authentic' (7 March 2003)
• Senator Jay Rockefeller, the senior Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee formally asks the Director of the FBI to investigate the forged documents stating in his letter "There is a possibility that the fabrication of these documents may be part of a larger deception campaign aimed at manipulating public opinion and foreign policy regarding Iraq.” (14 March 2003)
• Two days before the vote in the British parliament on the proposed war US Vice President Dick Cheney claims Iraq has "reconstituted nuclear weapons"   (16 March).
• Intelligence and congressional sources cited by Seymour Hersh in the New Yorker confirm (March 2003) that:
  • the forged documents are considered to have been initially circulated by the British
  • MI6 has been operating a propaganda office since at least the autumn of 1997 responsible for placing false information in the press about Iraq
• Asked to respond to these matters official CIA spokesman, William Harlow, tells Seymour Hersh that the agency had not obtained the actual documents until early 2003, after the President’s State of the Union speech and after the congressional briefings, and therefore it had been unable to evaluate them in a timely manner. Harlow refuses to respond to questions about the role of Britain’s MI6 (March 2003)
• The foreign affairs editor of the London Times produces a scathing article on the African uranium issue entitled "The Forged Papers Chase That is Bound to Run and Run" referring to Downing St's explanation as an "ambitious piece of stonewalling"(23 May 2003)
• Former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter alleges the longstanding existence of 'Operation Rockingham' used by Britain to massage public information about Iraq (June 2003)
• Reports of the US special envoy's investigation which had discovered more than a year earlier that claims of Iraqi attempts to obtain uranium from Niger were false start emerging in the press (June 2003)
• Vice President Cheney's office claims it was never told the results of the envoy's investigation even though it was Cheney who had requested it (June 2003)
• Addressing the Commons Foreign Affairs  Committee UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, in the words of the London Times, "said he had no doubts over the accuracy of anything in the September [2002] dossier" and "that British sources had not been involved in information, later found to be based on forged documents, about Iraq trying to buy uranium in Africa" (June 2003)
• A British official tells the same committee a few days later that another country, not Britain, had handed over the documents to the UN (June 2003)
• The London Times reports that failure to pass on evidence of Iraq's nuclear activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to assist with inspections would be in contravention of two UN Security Council resolutions (June 2003)
• The Independent reports that it has been told by the US special envoy (still unnamed) who confirmed the bogus nature of the Niger claims that it was "all but impossible" that British intelligence had not received his report drawn up by the CIA. The official remains unnamed (June 2003)
• The next day Sir Jeremy Greenstock, British Ambassador to the United Nations and former Minister in the British Embassy in Washington, is quoted in the Independent as saying "That forged document was never seen by British intelligence" (June 2003). Greenstock, however, does not appear to make any reference to the 'summaries' of the forged documents reported by the Washington Post 22 March to have been passed to Washington and London by Italian intelligence.
• The US official who confirmed the bogus nature of the Niger claims finally reveals himself as Joseph Wilson, a former US Ambassador, in a detailed article published in the New York Times (6 July 2003)

The latter was a key event. The following political cascade then unfolded as summarised in the Independent 14 July:

• Monday 7 July: Serious doubts are raised over the Government's claim in its September dossier that Saddam Hussein tried to acquire significant quantities of uranium from Africa. The Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee declares itself puzzled by the Government's claim that it was relying on intelligence from forged documents exposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency in March. MPs declare it is "very odd indeed" that the Government was still reviewing evidence about the claim eight months after it declared it had intelligence to back it up.
• Tuesday 8 July: The White House deals Tony Blair a devastating blow by rejecting the British intelligence linking Iraq and Niger. A Bush administration official says: "Knowing all that we know now, the reference to Iraq's attempt to acquire uranium from Africa should not have been included in the State of the Union speech." Mr Blair insists that the Government stands by its story.
• Wednesday 9 July: It emerges that the allegations were disowned by US officials in Vienna as they handed the now disputed evidence to IAEA officials. The IAEA confirms that it has not received any other evidence about Niger, despite British insistence that its foreign source passed the details on.
• Thursday 10 July: Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State, says he did not mention the alleged uranium deal to the UN Security Council because he "did not think it was strong enough".
• Friday 11 July: CIA sources confirm they advised Britain to omit the Niger allegations in its dossier on Iraq's weapons which was published last September. A senior Bush administration official says: "We consulted about the paper and recommended against using that material."
• Saturday 12 July: The director of the CIA, George Tenet, admits it was wrong for the agency to allow the Niger allegation to be included in George Bush's State of the Union address in January. Jack Straw says in a letter to the Foreign Affairs Committee that Britain's information on Niger was not shared with the US.
• Sunday 13 July: Tony Blair prepares for talks with Mr Bush with a growing transatlantic rift over intelligence and the basis for the war in Iraq clouding the 'special relationship' between London and Washington.

During this period Dr David Kelly had been 'outed' by the British government as the presumed source of Andrew Gilligan's story that Downing St had illegitimately exaggerated the intelligence on which its September 2002 dossier was based. As a result Dr Kelly was called to give evidence to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee which he gave on 15 July.

Even though they do not significantly impinge on the main thrust of his allegations against the government, Gilligan has admitted to the Hutton Inquiry that he made errors of detail when reporting his original story on the 'sexing up' of the dossier. With his job at the BBC now at stake he is expected to pay a heavy personal price for those errors. But history will surely record his vital and courageous role in triggering the exposure of some of the most important hidden truths about Iraqgate 2003.

If Gilligan had not reported on what he had discovered, even with his attendant inaccuracies, Dr Kelly would never have appeared before the Foreign Affairs Committee and Intelligence and Security Committees, and the reality that the British government had no hard evidence of Iraqi WMDs before the war would in all probability not have been so directly exposed. Gilligan's work ultimately unearthed the inescapable fact that the British people were lied to by their own government on a matter of the gravest importance.

Let us remind ourselves of some of that exposure. As the country's top expert on Iraq's non-nuclear WMD programmes Dr Kelly told the Foreign Affairs Committee in an open public session that at the time of the September dossier he had "no idea" if Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. The Prime Minister had himself told the country in the September dossier that Saddam had them "beyond doubt".

Dr Kelly died in a wood in Oxfordshire two days after he had revealed this to the committee. At around the same time the Italians admitted to be being the source of the forged Niger documents brought back into the headlines by Ambassador Wilson.

This period was also accompanied by frantic efforts by the Bush administration to limit the damage from questions arising as to how the uranium claim had made it into the President's pre-war State of the Union address, and why the American government had presented forged documents on the subject to the United Nations. In was in numerous ways a pivotal period.

Ambassador Wilson has also paid something of a personal price alongside Dr Kelly and Andrew Gilligan. According to the London Times 30 September "President Bush was dragged into a potentially explosive row yesterday about the exposure of a covert CIA operative as the White House fought claims that it had used dirty tricks to discredit its Iraq war critics..... Similar to the Kelly drama, the Washington version involves the private briefing of a journalist by unnamed sources, exaggerated claims of Iraq’s weapons programmes and the ending of the career of a senior public servant. Karl Rove, Mr Bush’s top political aide and strategic guru, had to deny yesterday that he was behind the unmasking of Valerie Plame, a clandestine CIA case officer and analyst of weapons of mass destruction. Ms Plame’s name and role were made public more than two months ago by Robert Novak, the veteran conservative columnist, in The Washington Post. At the time her husband, Joe Wilson, was one of Mr Bush’s most effective critics on Iraq. Mr Wilson, the former US Ambassador to Gabon and a State Department veteran, had been sent to West Africa to investigate claims that Saddam Hussein had tried to buy uranium from Niger, claims which he reported were unfounded. He sparked controversy when he questioned why Mr Bush had nevertheless referred to the allegations in his State of the Union address. The naming of Ms Plame by Mr Novak in July caused barely a ripple, even though in effect it ended her undercover career. It also allowed foreign intelligence services to seek her former contacts, potentially putting agents at risk. But Washington went into overdrive at the weekend after two developments. First, the CIA asked the Justice Department to intervene and decide if the FBI should launch a full inquiry. It also emerged that the 'outing' of Ms Plame had been part of a drive by Bush officials to discredit Mr Wilson. Six other journalists were also contacted by two White House officials and told of Ms Plame’s job. One administration official told The Washington Post that the motive was 'simply for revenge for the trouble that Mr Wilson had caused the White House.... Democrats said that any inquiry of the White House conducted under the auspices of John Ashcroft, the Attorney-General, would be riddled with conflicts of interest."

Commenting on these matters Wilson himself is quoted in Seattle Weekly 8 October as saying “The purpose of doing this, however, was not to shut me up, because I had already said my piece. The purpose was very, very clear—to intimidate others who might step forward at the request of a congressional committee …” He continues with "My own sense is, once you have put a chink in the armor of the credibility of this administration, it is really only a matter of time before other chinks are put in it. But my Republican friends have told me on this—they have called me and said, in addition to offering me safe houses and flak jackets—they’ve said, ‘Thank you, you have given us the ammunition we need to begin to reign in this neoconservative juggernaut.’ This was not fundamentally the problem of bad intelligence, this was fundamentally the problem of how policy makers used the intelligence or didn’t use the intelligence”.

According to an article published by Salon.com 3 October one former senior CIA officer who served under President Bush's father said that "Libby is certainly suspect No. 1." Lewis Libby is Vice President Cheney's Chief of staff. The article also reported that "Republican Senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska, made a veiled reference on CNBC this week, suggesting that President Bush could better manage the current crisis by, 'sitting down with [his] vice president and asking what he knows about it.'"

The 'outing' of Wilson's wife may reveal more than just the brutish ruthlessness of the Bush White House, however.

On his own 'Truthout' web site best-selling author William Rivers Pitt wrote on 30 September that "Valerie Plame was not simply an analyst or a data cruncher. She was an operative running a network dedicated to tracking any person or nation that might try to give weapons of mass destruction to terrorists. That sentence deserves to be written twice. She was an operative running a network dedicated to tracking any person or nation that might try to give weapons of mass destruction to terrorists. The Bush administration pushed very hard the idea that America is in danger from WMDs being placed into the hands of terrorists. This was one of the central arguments behind the war in Iraq. Yet in order to protect Bush's political standing, a couple of 'administration officials' blew Valerie Plame, and by proxy her network, completely out of the water in an attempt to shut her husband up. In short, in order to protect Bush from the ramifications of using fake evidence to support his war, this White House destroyed an intelligence network that was protecting us from the threat posed by chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.... We are less safe now that Valerie Plame is no longer performing this vital task, and the members of her network are in mortal danger of being revealed and destroyed. Beyond that, we are facing a level of hypocrisy that shatters any and all previously known boundaries".

As the title to Michael Meacher's article in the Guardian at the beginning of the same month emphasised "This war against terror is bogus".

But at the end of all of this criminal skulduggery does responsibility for the furtherance of the various deceptions lie with the US or with the British, or with both? Does the responsibility lie with the politicians or with the intelligence services? Or both?

Referring to the false uranium claim exposed by Wilson one scathing columnist wrote in the Washington Post 16 July that "The president says he has not lost his confidence in CIA Director George Tenet. How sweet. If someone backed me up in a lie and then took the fall for me when it was exposed, I'd have confidence in him too."

Another in the Boston Globe the same day says "Tenet, in a minuet that was obviously rehearsed and orchestrated, then issued a statement taking responsibility and expressing regret. Then, on Saturday, the president magnanimously expressed his full confidence in Tenet. An innocent reader might have been forgiven for concluding that this 'error' was the CIA's lapse. In fact, the CIA was well aware that the Niger uranium story had been fabricated".

The paper also offers a telling opinion as to where the core problem is likely to lie as far as the US is concerned. It states that "The New York Times, recently buffeted by a news fabrication scandal and a management shake-up, has been particularly cautious about reporting the larger story of the politicization of intelligence and the role of Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld".

In an article in the Hartford Courant 27 June ex-CIA analyst Ray McGovern states: "In recent weeks, administration officials have begun spreading the word that Cheney was never told the Iraq-Niger story was based on a forgery.  I asked a senior official who recently served at the National Security Council if he thought that was possible. He pointed out that rigorous NSC procedures call for a very specific response to all vice presidential questions and added that 'the fact that Cheney's office had originally asked that the Iraq-Niger report be checked out makes it inconceivable that his office would not have been informed of the results.' Did the president himself know that the information used to secure congressional approval for war was based on a forgery? We don't know. But which would be worse - that he knew or that he didn't?"

It is difficult to see how all this could have happened without the tacit complicity of Tenet, who might otherwise be expected to have made the matter a resigning issue in protest against unacceptable political interference in the work of his agency. After all ABC Radio News White House correspondent Ann Compton had reported 12 July that "Tenet took responsibility hours after he got a phone call from here in Africa from Condoleezza Rice. The national security advisor called him and said, 'Remember, you got a copy of that speech. You didn't tell us to take that out".

Moreover a report in the Washington Post 19 July states that another "senior official, who fielded questions for 75 minutes in the White House briefing room, presented a version of events leading up to Bush's State of the Union address that contradicted testimony given to the Senate intelligence committee this week by CIA officials. The official said that while the CIA successfully removed a specific allegation from an October Bush speech, that Iraq had sought 500 tons of 'yellowcake' uranium ore in Niger, the CIA raised no objection to any statement about uranium in Africa in the State of the Union speech."

Back in Britain the intelligence services were also coming under increasing pressure to explain their role in 'Iraqgate 2003'. According to the London Times 4 July, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw had refused to allow the Foreign Affairs Committee to question John Scarlett, Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee. The JIC provides intelligence advice directly to the British Prime Minister, and it is one to which the various intelligence agencies themselves report.

In its own published report the Foreign Affairs Committee stated: "We note with disappointment that we were unable to find out why John Scarlett chose to give the 45 minutes claim such prominence, as we have been prevented from questioning him."

If the 45 minutes claim was simply a case of exaggeration, then getting to the heart of more sensitive matters is likely to be confronted with even more intense stonewalling from a variety of quarters. There can be little that is more sensitive than allegations that the government has been complicit in the circulation of crudely forged documents.

The overall result is that on both sides of the Atlantic a number of crucial questions are left to be answered by both politicians and intelligence agencies alike. As one former high level intelligence officer interviewed by Hersh put it “something as bizarre as Niger raises suspicions everywhere.”

CIA director George Tenet was quoted in the press last year as saying he had the "best job in government", but what he is reported to have told the Senate Intelligence Committee on 24 September 2004 is disconcerting. In his formal 'mistake' confession statement of 11 July Tenet advised that "In the fall of 2002, my Deputy and I briefed hundreds of members of Congress on Iraq. We did not brief the uranium acquisition story.... In September and October 2002 before Senate Committees, senior intelligence officials in response to questions told members of Congress that we differed with the British dossier on the reliability of the uranium reporting." But what does 'differed' mean here?

At this point it is worth returning to Hersh's account of 24 March. As probably the first journalist to seriously pursue the case, and with an exceptional reputation for careful investigative journalism, Hersh reported that "Last September 24th, as Congress prepared to vote on the resolution authorizing President George W. Bush to wage war in Iraq, a group of senior intelligence officials, including George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence, briefed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Iraq’s weapons capability. It was an important presentation for the Bush Administration. Some Democrats were publicly questioning the President’s claim that Iraq still possessed weapons of mass destruction which posed an immediate threat to the United States..... A few Democrats were also considering putting an alternative resolution before Congress. According to two of those present at the briefing, which was highly classified and took place in the committee’s secure hearing room, Tenet declared, as he had done before, that a shipment of high-strength aluminum tubes that was intercepted on its way to Iraq had been meant for the construction of centrifuges that could be used to produce enriched uranium. The suitability of the tubes for that purpose had been disputed, but this time the argument that Iraq had a nuclear program under way was buttressed by a new and striking fact: the C.I.A. had recently received intelligence showing that, between 1999 and 2001, Iraq had attempted to buy five hundred tons of uranium oxide from Niger, one of the world’s largest producers. The uranium, known as 'yellow cake,' can be used to make fuel for nuclear reactors; if processed differently, it can also be enriched to make weapons. Five tons can produce enough weapon-grade uranium for a bomb."

Hersh also reported that when asked for comment, CIA spokesman William Harlow denied that Tenet had briefed the Senators on Niger.

However, a subsequent report by Newsweek backs Hersh's claim that the CIA used the Niger story to support the claim made to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Iraq had a nuclear programme underway. This was even though we now know US special envoy Ambassador Wilson had established that the claim was bogus and had reported that to the CIA six months earlier.

In its edition of 23 June Newsweek states that on "Sept. 24, 2002 — just as Congress was debating an Iraq war resolution .... Robert Walpole, the CIA’s national intelligence officer for nuclear issues, was questioned by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about British assertions that Saddam was seeking 'significant' quantities of uranium from Africa. Two sources at the classified hearing tell NEWSWEEK that Walpole appeared to endorse the British report. 'He didn’t say there was anything to be doubtful about,' says one source."

A CIA spokesman insisted to Newsweek that Walpole had told the senators that “there were concerns about the accuracy” of reports from Niger. Contrary to Harlow's earlier denial to Hersh, however, the Newseek report on what Walpole had said at the committees does in fact confirm that Senators were briefed by the CIA on the Niger claim on 24 September.

So who do we believe? Do we believe spokesmen from an organisation part of whose function is to spread disinformation, or do we believe the anonymous sources from Hersh and Newsweek who presumably would be in considerable trouble for leaking confidential Senate briefings if their identities were to be disclosed?

Newsweek further reports that "Senate Intelligence vice chair Sen. Jay Rockefeller has directed his staff to get the classified transcript from Senate files—he wants a full-scale investigation into the handling of the Niger documents and other Iraq-war intelligence issues. But GOP Intelligence Committee chair Sen. Pat Roberts has appeared to rule out a formal probe, charging that Bush critics are seeking to exploit the issue for 'political gain.'"

Even if we give the CIA the benefit of the doubt in these matters, and assume that Tenet did not brief the committee on the Niger claims, Hersh then reports that "Two days later, Secretary of State Colin Powell, appearing before a closed hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, also cited Iraq’s attempt to obtain uranium from Niger as evidence of its persistent nuclear ambitions.... On December 19th, Washington, for the first time, publicly identified Niger as the alleged seller of the nuclear materials, in a State Department position paper ..."

The key point here as emphasised by Hersh is that "The testimony from Tenet and Powell helped to mollify the Democrats, and two weeks later the resolution passed overwhelmingly, giving the President a congressional mandate for a military assault on Iraq". Hersh also reports that "A former high-level intelligence official told me that the information on Niger was judged serious enough to include in the President’s Daily Brief, known as the P.D.B., one of the most sensitive intelligence documents in the American system... The P.D.B. is not made available, for example, to any members of the Senate or House Intelligence Committees."

Moreover, a letter 29 April 2003 from the State Department to Congressman Henry Waxman later confirmed that its fact sheet of 19 December "was a product developed jointly by the CIA and the State Department".

Tenet's claim that it was simply a 'mistake' when the CIA allowed the uranium claim into the President's State of the Union address the next month is scarcely credible.

Meanwhile, it is clear that the lies represented by the forged Niger documents, perhaps initially in the form of Italian 'summaries' allegedly circulated by Britain, were used as a pretext for war.

Did Tenet mislead Senators about evidence of Iraq's alleged attempts at the sourcing of uranium from Niger, or had he been deceived himself on the subject by maverick elements within his own agency? It certainly would be surprising if Tenet didn't know the results of the Niger verification mission which was launched as a result of a request from the Vice President and which is known to have reported back to the CIA in early 2002. There does not appear to be any news of Tenet disciplining anyone for such a reporting lapse if one took place.

Will we ever get to the complete truth - or at least to most of it? Perhaps not.

To suggest that matters of such fundamental importance can be properly investigated and resolved on the British side of the equation through a brief foray by a couple of parliamentary committees populated by amateur investigators is stretching credulity to its limits. In any case the Foreign Affairs Committee charged with examining 'The Decision to go to War in Iraq'  has been largely side-tracked from these bigger issues by the Campbell-BBC-Kelly saga, although there are of course strong connections between the two for anyone interested in closely examining both.

With the exception of Alastair Campbell, none of the small group at Downing St identified by former Minister Clare Short as responsible for managing the process that led to war have given evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee on these wider issues. Neither has the head of MI6. Some of the most important players have been left alone.

Although it has released testimony from Dr Kelly, the other investigation by the Intelligence and Security Committee has met entirely in secret, and the Hutton Inquiry has only a narrow remit - although it has proved much more instructive than might have been expected.

The BBC reported 7 July that "Five members of the [Foreign Affairs ] committee said that without full access to all the relevant papers and witnesses nobody could resolve the row satisfactorily" and that "The committee's inquiry is hampered by ministers' continued refusal to allow it to see intelligence papers and question intelligence personnel". 

An indicator of the committee's less than robust nature is provided by its emasculated conclusion that parts of the government's defence of its claim that Iraq imported uranium from Africa was simply "very odd indeed". 

After Britain presented its African uranium claim in the September dossier, the governments of South Africa and Niger both issued public denials that they been approached by Iraq to acquire uranium, or at least since the first Gulf war in the case of Niger. 

Moreover the Washington Post reported 11 July that "At that time, the CIA was completing its own classified national intelligence estimate on Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs. Although the CIA paper mentioned alleged Iraqi attempts to buy uranium from three African countries, it warned that State Department analysts were questioning its accuracy when it came to Niger and that CIA personnel considered reports on other African countries to be 'sketchy,' the official said."

Of course, if any such country had been developing a supply relationship with Iraq it would be no more likely to admit it, than would any intelligence agency be likely to admit to promoting forged documents on the same subject.

However, a Reuter's report 10 July states "A diplomat close to the U.N's nuclear watchdog said on Thursday Britain has never provided evidence to back up Prime Minister Tony Blair's continued insistence that Iraq tried to buy uranium from Africa....' The U.N. followed up with Britain to obtain additional evidence they said they had, backing allegations Iraq tried to buy uranium from Africa,' a diplomat familiar with the International Atomic Energy Agency told Reuters. 'It was never provided.'.... the diplomat said the IAEA had no reason to believe there was any existing evidence that Iraq tried to buy uranium from anywhere in Africa as Washington and London insist."

But before the whole thing disappears under a morass of further obfuscation it is worth recalling the real nature of four of the key items which the general public and elected representatives of the Anglo-American alliance were presented with in order to make a case for the 'serious and current' threat from Iraq. These comprise:

• Plagiarised material from a student thesis more than ten years old produced by the British and cited by Colin Powell at the UN as containing 'exquisite detail'
• 'Evidence' of Iraqi ability to deploy WMDs within 45 minutes now said by one intelligence source cited in the British press to have also been taken from ten year old material, which therefore predates years of subsequent UN weapons inspections (this evidence has also been challenged by the now-deceased British government WMD expert Dr David Kelly)
• Forged documents said to be from Niger
• 'Evidence' from an Iraqi defector whose actual complete testimony turned out, only thanks to a leak, to portray a threat scenario opposite to the one the public had been led to believe (what other cited secret intelligence, whose details Britain and America are 'unable' to disclose for reasons of 'national security', is also being misrepresented for public consumption by the highest levels of government?)

The credentials of the 'Axis of Weasel' are clearly second to none.

Most of this information, which was highly damaging to the Anglo-American case, was in the public domain before we went to war. Did the media make a serious fuss over this scandalous situation? No. Nor did most of Congress and Parliament. If WMDs are one day found in Iraq it is unlikely to be thanks to any of this so-called 'evidence' that was paraded before the war. It is now apparent, even to dozing journalists, Congressmen and MPs, that the claim that there was reliable evidence of a 'serious and current' threat at the time the case against Iraq was made was blatantly false. In the UK there have been calls from the Conservatives, Liberals, and disgruntled Labour MPs alike for a full judicial inquiry. The Prime Minister has refused.

Mr Blair will of course be hoping that the whole thing blows over. Writing in the London Times 7 August columnist Anatole Kaletsky identifies some conditions under which this might happen. He states "If the situation in Iraq is stabilised and a civilised government gives hope to the Arab world and a modicum of human dignity to the 20 million people of Iraq, then voters will be willing to forgive and forget all the controversies and even lies about WMD. But much could go wrong in the next year or two. Iraq could turn into a Vietnam-style killing field for American soldiers. It could suffer an Iranian-style Islamic revolution...."

According to an 'insider' from the Anglo-American Iraq Survey quoted in the Economist 8 August "We would hope to be able to demonstrate in the fullness of time that almost all the information in last September’s dossier was accurate.”  

In the fullness of time it will be interesting to see what evidence they come up with for the 45 minute and African uranium claims, particularly as Rumsfeld told a Senate committee in July that the US-led coalition "did not act in Iraq because we had discovered dramatic new evidence of Iraq’s pursuit of weapons of mass murder". Rather, he said, the United States acted because the Administration saw "existing evidence in a new light, through the prism of our experience on September 11".

Many people will need to be convinced that any post-war new 'evidence' produced by the Iraq Survey Group, is neither trivial, out of date, nor fabricated -  because as UN chief weapons inspector Hans Blix himself told the Council on Foreign Relations in New York in June: "It is sort of fascinating that you can have 100 per cent certainty about weapons of mass destruction and zero certainty of about where they are".

According to the London Times 28 August shortly before his death "Dr Kelly had learnt that he was about to fly to Iraq to continue his beloved weapons inspections".  He was due to join the Iraq Survey Group lead by CIA appointee David Kay. But given Dr Kelly's expertise, and by this time his own known disparaging professional views on some of the government's previous 'evidence' on Iraq's WMD programmes, Kay can hardly have been ecstatic about that.

Dr Kelly had tried to return to Iraq earlier but, according to the Times "On May 19, Dr Kelly was sent to Iraq but was refused entry to Kuwait because he did not have the right papers. Dr Kelly blamed military chiefs for failing to sort out his documentation". On this point his colleague at the Ministry of Defence, Wing Commander John Clark told the Hutton inquiry that "He rang me up the next day and he was angry and frustrated".

The post-war hunt for Saddam Hussein's WMDs has since proceeded without proper input from the most knowledgeable man in Britain, and arguably in the world. It has also been carried out without input from UN weapons inspectors in whose absence the credibility for any post-war 'discoveries' is likely to suffer. The public will need to be convinced that any witnesses brought forward, such as Iraqi scientists, have not been bribed or threatened and no further documents forged or misrepresented. 

The arm twisting of Iraqi scientists already seems to have been taking place as is illustrated in the case of Mahdi Obeidi. Obeidi has assisted the US in finding nuclear programme centrifuges buried in 1991, but at the same time he has also unhelpfully insisted that Saddam had never reconstituted his centrifuge program afterwards.  According to Newsweek 8 August Obeidi's continued incommunicado detention after expectations of a new life in the US complete with green card mean "the message being sent by the Bush administration to Iraqi scientists being interrogated in Iraq is a troublesome one: if you don’t tell us what we want to hear, you won’t be rewarded... The treatment of Obeidi has in turn raised questions about whether even fresh intelligence from Iraq is being manipulated in advance of the report being prepared by David Kay, which is intended as the definitive account of Iraq’s WMD program". 

The Washington Post 31 July has provided some interesting reporting on this area stating that "... four senior scientists and more than a dozen at lower levels who worked for the Iraqi government have been interviewed by U.S. officials under the direction of the CIA. Some scientists have been arrested and held for months, others have made deals in return for information and at least one has agreed to be interviewed outside Iraq." The Post adds that "No matter the circumstances, all of the scientists interviewed have denied that Hussein had reconstituted his nuclear weapons program or developed and hidden chemical or biological weapons since United Nations inspectors left in 1998. Several key Iraqi officials questioned the significance of evidence cited by the Bush administration to suggest that Hussein was stepping up efforts to develop new weapons of mass destruction programs".

Global Energy Crisis - The Real Agenda

Since the end of the Cold War the work of the British intelligence services has been increasingly focused on the national economic interest. Said to be closely involved with the major City institutions, particularly banking, the Economic Sub-Committee of the Joint Intelligence Committee also includes representatives of both the Treasury and the Bank of England.

According to one non-governmental report August 2003 on the British intelligence agencies the furtherance of trade interests through industrial espionage has moved into the area of 'national interest'. 

Accompanied by a picture of men operating an oil rig a BBC report 21 September 2000 had previously stated that "Lord Justice Stuart-Smith, the outgoing Intelligence Services Commissioner, has said the SIS [Secret Intelligence Service - MI6] plays a particularly vital role in safeguarding the UK's economic wellbeing.....this includes keeping tabs on the nations which supply us with vital raw materials, such as oil.... A former member of the intelligence community told BBC News Online that while the service denies involving itself in so-called 'industrial espionage' - the activity fits within the service's remit. "

The BBC puts a little more flesh on the bones by stating that "The Intelligence Services Act does not demand that SIS limit[s] itself to merely observing foreign affairs. The act states that with prior permission the service can perform covert operations abroad which would be unlawful in the UK.  Suggestions by former MI5 officer David Shayler that the SIS was behind a plot to assassinate Colonel Gaddafi, have been vigorously dismissed by Robin Cook, the foreign secretary. However, author Stephen Dorril alleged in his recent book, MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations, that SIS maintains a formidable array of military hardware on standby".

The Guardian reported 8 May 2000 that "A retired MI6 officer has been appointed to a top post at BP-Amoco, the British-based oil company..... John Gerson was director of security and public affairs at the agency and was embroiled in attempts to suppress disclosures by the former MI6 officer Richard Tomlinson. Mr Gerson took early retirement from what was effectively the post of deputy head of MI6 at the end of last year. Last month he became one of BP's vice-presidents for government and public affairs. His appointment was approved by the cabinet secretary, Sir Richard Wilson. MI6 has close links with oil companies, the 'revolving door' syndrome, in the same way as armed forces officers have close links with defence companies. Rolls-Royce has employed former MI6 officers to help win contracts in the Middle East, and merchant banks have taken some on. During the first reading of the intelligence services bill, Lord Mackay, the conservative lord chancellor, told peers in 1994 that MI6 protected the 'economic wellbeing' of the country by keeping 'a particular eye on Britain's access to key commodities, like oil or metals'...".

Furthermore the BBC reported 8 November 2001 that "The woman seen as Prime Minister Tony Blair's closest and most trusted aide is to leave the government for a job at oil giant BP.... [Anji Hunter] has been a permanent fixture at the prime minister's side since he first became Labour leader in 1994 ...[and] is widely seen as the prime minister's door keeper...". Hunter, along with Alastair Campbell and Sir David Manning, had accompanied Blair on his trips to set up the coalition for the invasion of Afghanistan after 911. The Foreign Secretary was left at home. The links between oil, Downing St, the intelligence services, and war could hardly be more intimate.

Meanwhile the Joint Intelligence Committee, on which the SIS is represented, has liaison officers from intelligence services in the US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. From the unimaginative perspective of the early 21st century Anglo-Saxon mind set ('intelligence' in this respect is, of course, something of a misnomer) there can hardly be any greater national economic imperative than maintaining access to overseas oil and gas at a time when future domestic supplies are fast becoming grossly inadequate - no more so than is the case with the US and the UK.

Along with other media on 2 October CNN reported that "The world's oil reserves are up to 80 percent less than predicted, a team from Sweden's University of Uppsala says. Production levels will peak in about 10 years' time, they say.... Oil production levels will hit their maximum soon after 2010 with gas supplies peaking not long afterwards, the Swedish geologists say..... Alekett said that his team had examined data on oil and gas reserves from all over the world and we were 'facing a very critical situation globally.' The conclusions of the Uppsala team were revealed in the magazine New Scientist Thursday".

BBC Newsnight journalist and investigative reporter Greg Palast was interviewed in the London newspaper 'Metro' 18 June 2003. Palast is an American and was responsible for Newsnight's exposure of the wrongful removal of thousands of black, mainly Democrat, voters from the electoral roll by Jeb Bush's administration in Florida during the US presidential election of 2000. In effect this handed the White House to brother George.

Palast was asked by Metro for his views on accusations that the British Government has lied about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Palast produces an interesting response to this and related questions stating "Your average reporter cannot spend the time or energy on [the kind of] complex internal documents [that I manage to get hold of]. Anyone who does that on a regular basis will find that it is dull, except for me and a couple of other guys like John Pilger. And you'd be out of a job because you can't produce that much..... You know what? There may be something even more frightening here. What if Blair believes this stuff - if you have a leader who can be led around by the nose by a few bureaucrats with a right-wing agenda? That's what scares me... I've got all these inside documents, showing what's really going on behind the closed doors of these huge empires of finance. But instead, we get pictures of green-haired kids throwing chairs through the windows of McDonald's. That is what the press considers a discussion of globalisation".

A commentary by Robin Cook which accompanies excerpts of his diary published in the Sunday Times 5 October states that "Sometimes old friends in the Democratic party ask me why Tony gets on so well with George Bush....The real mortar in the relationship is power. It would never occur to Tony Blair that there might be more respect for a prime minister who had the courage to say no to someone as powerful as the president of the US. He is programmed to respect power, not to rebel against it. I do not doubt that Tony Blair genuinely believed the world would be better without Saddam. I am certain that the real reason he went to war was that he found it easier to resist the public opinion of Britain than the request of the US president".

As perhaps a combination of these different observations might suggest, a Prime Minister who seeks power and personal prominence on the international stage, combined with elements within the intelligence services prepared to exploit such ambition by providing deliberately skewed information in order to precipitate British military intervention abroad for essentially economic purposes, would be a dangerous formula.

And what more specifically might be at the top of their 'national interest' economic shopping list? According to the Guardian 7 January "The foreign secretary, Jack Straw, yesterday pinpointed for the first time security of energy sources as a key priority of British foreign policy. Mr Straw listed energy as one of seven foreign policy priorities when he addressed a meeting of 150 British ambassadors in London. The US and British governments officially deny that oil is a factor in the looming war with Iraq, but some ministers and officials in Whitehall say privately that oil is more important in the calculation than weapons of mass destruction.... Mr Straw told ambassadors that, following a review he ordered last year, the Foreign Office drew up a list of seven medium to long-term strategic priorities, including 'to bolster the security of British and global energy supplies'".

The economic motivators behind the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq are well known, even if polite company still finds it difficult to discuss them. Such discussion does, after all, require an acknowledgement that we may not be quite as 'civilised' as we are led to believe.

Few commodities are as central to the continuation of the current process of globalisation and the 'liberalisation' of international trade as access to oil, and Iraq holds the world's second largest reserves at a time when global oil production is on the edge of major decline and international demand is soaring.

As a result of a lack of forward planning for the provision of alternative energy sources the political and bureaucratic incentive to be 'economical with the truth' when making the case for the invasion of Iraq, as part of an effort to access what hydrocarbons are left in the world left, is immense.

So whatever the actual outcome of the Iraqi WMD controversy let us not forget the real geo-political context for all of this. First it is worth remembering some of the words of the September 2001 PNAC document which states ".... the United States has for decades sought to play a more permanent role in Gulf regional security. While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein".

This wording confirms that although 'regime change' in Iraq is an interim goal, it is a means to an end not an end in itself.

So what is the real and ultimate objective of regime change in Iraq? A clue is provided by the same PNAC report which refers to the Gulf as "a region of vital importance". Now why would that be? Is it the sand?

The BBC's Alistair Cooke, when analysing the reasons for the first Gulf War thinks not. In a broadcast in June 2002 Cooke stated that "To have and to hold [Kuwait] would put [Saddam] on the way to achieving something that the Soviets had yearned for right after the Second War and been denied by the intervention of the United Nations, which was to be sovereign of the Gulf - and so, as Churchill foresaw and warned about, soon to be able to conquer Europe without a war by possessing 60% of the oil Western Europe lived by and so be able to dictate to countries like Britain, France, Germany, that they should abandon their precious democratic ways and get themselves governments friendly to Iraq".

Cooke, a veteran radio correspondent who has broadcast to Britain from America since 1937, confirms in his report that it was Margaret Thatcher who persuaded the current President's father to respond militarily to Saddam in 1991, rather than rely on UN sanctions which was his initial plan. According to Cooke "What so swiftly transformed the views and policy of the United States and the onlooking allies-to-be was the recognition, first pressed on President Bush by Mrs Thatcher and then rather late in the day realised by the King of Saudi Arabia, that once he held Kuwait there was nothing to stop Saddam from seizing the Saudi oil fields". Cooke is not a conspiracy therorist, but a fully paid up member of the Anglo-American transatlantic 'special relationship' club.

If Cooke believes this about Western motives for the first Gulf war (a view also held by former Reform Party Presidential candidate Ross Perot), at a time when Saddam was militarily much stronger, then what is the doubt in the case of the second? The main factor that has changed in the meantime is that the West's need for Gulf oil has gone from important to critical.

According to the US Energy Information Administration February 2003 "Iraq holds more than 112 billion barrels of oil - the world's second largest proven reserves. Iraq also contains 110 trillion cubic feet of natural gas..."

We are now at a stage where the UK and US are on the verge of large oil and gas supply difficulties in the short to medium term beginning most imminently with problems over gas supply - hence, for example, the intense efforts to form a partnership on gas supplies with Russian President Vladimir Putin during his state visit to Britain in June.

Likewise are Britain's current gas negotiations with Algeria, a non-democratic Islamic country with an unpleasant history of gross human rights abuses. If human rights were a major concern driving British and American foreign policy they would not being doing oil and gas related deals with despotic regimes such as those that exist in Azerbaijan, Libya and Kazahkstan either (a major investigation into an alleged corruption scandal in Kazahkstan known as 'Kazakhgate' involving US oil companies and Kazakh officials is currently under way according to Asia Times 3 October).

The situation in Azerbaijan is particularly instructive. On 13 October the London Times reported that "One of the former Soviet Union’s most tenacious leaders will surrender his throne this week, passing it to his son in what is widely seen as an attempt to keep the scale of corruption under wraps. The presidential election in Azerbaijan on Wednesday is causing concern, not just because it is rigged, but also because the West has invested billions in the oil-rich republic... Billions of pounds in investment from BP and from American oil companies mean that stability is critical. The biggest project is the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, which will cost almost £2 billion. The first oil is scheduled to flow in 2005, carrying one million barrels a day from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean.... Elections in Azerbaijan have a bad track record for fairness. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe is sending 620 observers and there will be 1,500 observers in all, but it is widely expected that the election commission will fiddle the figures. A poll by Adam, the independent inquiry centre, found that only 21 per cent of the population will vote for Mr Aliyev". 

But how many votes are cast for each candidate is not nearly as important as who counts them. As riot police patrolled the streets in the country's capital the BBC reported 17 October that "Official election results have not yet been released, but the central election commission says Ilham Aliyev won almost 80% of the vote. His nearest rival, Isa Gambar, trailed with just over 12%. The head of an international observer mission gave a damning assessment of the election process, which he said fell well short of international standards".

Years earlier the Daily Mail had been more forthright about the situation in the country. On 20 July 1998 it wrote that "It wasn’t supposed to be like this. Tomorrow New Labour’s ethical policy will drown symbolically in a poisonous cocktail of blood and oil when the Queen shakes hands with Azerbaijan’s President Aliev. Her Majesty may be forgiven for thinking this is one export-driven photo-opportunity too many. The Queen has dutifully entertained tyrants of all stripes but she has never had to shake hands with a SMERSH agent before.... Today, as President of Azerbaijan his secret police regularly arrest scores of critics allegedly plotting against him and thousands languish in his old haunts, the ex-KGB prisons. Others simply disappear. Yet Aliev’s Azerbaijan is respectable. There is one word to explain this bizarre fact: Oil.... Azeri democracy was uniquely Aliev-style.... oil decreed that Aliev had won 98.9% of the votes - a modest 1% fall from his last Soviet-era total... A gaggle of ex-Tory MPs and former Foreign Office diplomats know the value of keeping in with Aliev. So does a host of stars of George Bush’s Administration... [now] Tony Blair is wining and dining Aliev..."

Later, in an article entitled 'BP accused of backing 'arms for oil' coup', the London Sunday Times 26 March 2000 reported that "A secret intelligence report accuses BP, Britain's biggest company, of backing a military coup which installed a ruthless KGB hardman in the former Soviet state of Azerbaijan. An intelligence officer says BP... later consolidated its position with the new regime when the middlemen arranged to supply the incoming government with military equipment in an 'arms-for-oil' deal.... Aliyev's arrival was welcomed by Britain and America, which have a strategic interest in securing oil rights. BP has close links to British intelligence and employs several former MI6 officers... Lord Simon of Highbury, Tony Blair's former trade minister... was BP's group chief executive at the time of the coup... Blair gave [Aliyev] red-carpet treatment when he visited London in 1998 to sign a friendship treaty and $13 billion (£9.5 billion) in contracts with BP and other British firms...."

Returning to 2003 and an editorial accompanying the article in the London Times 13 October advises that "oil executives say they have no problem with the younger Aliyev taking power....The United States, despite declarations that it supports none of the candidates, has made only token protests about the violent intimidation of opposition candidates during the election campaign". Britain and the United States are the foremost foreign investors in the country led by the oil industry in the form of BP, Royal Dutch Shell, ExxonMobil, and Halliburton (the latter company having had Dick Cheney as its chief executive until he became US Vice President to George Bush).

A further case in point is Uzbekistan, a country where Enron had won substantial gas development rights prior to the exposure of its fraudulent activities and its financial collapse in late 2001.

On 1 October 2003 the London Times reported that "Britain's outspoken Ambassador to Uzbekistan has returned to London for 'medical reasons' after repeatedly denouncing the authoritarian regime in Tashkent. Craig Murray, 45, who has served little more than a year in the post, has come back to London quietly after angering colleagues at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Bush Administration and the Uzbek Government with his attacks... Human rights groups, who have praised Mr Murray for speaking out, expressed dismay at his return. By contrast, Washington has muted its criticism of President Karimov’s repression since it established a military base in the former Soviet republic before the Afghan war. It has invited Mr Karimov to the White House".

President Karimov had signed his deal with Enron in July 1996, but the project was hampered by difficulties in getting the gas to markets. One option was for the Enron gas to be piped across Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan to its multi-billion dollar power plant in India. The plant was in such financial difficulty by 2001, and such was Enron's influence within the Bush administration, that even a special working group within the US National Security Council had been set up to provide assistance in rescue discussions with the Indian government.

But difficulties in India were only one of the problems besetting the Enron project. Terms could not be agreed with the Taliban for the transit of the gas pipeline across their territory. As a result US representatives gave the Taliban an ultimatum on the pipeline before 911 stating "either you accept our offer of a carpet of gold, or we bury you under a carpet of bombs" according to an Inter Press Service report 15 November 2001. The BBC had previously reported 18 September 2001 that the US had indicated as early as July 2001 that it was planning an attack on Afghanistan by October 2001.

Following the subsequent Afghan war, publicly justified on the back of the 911 attacks none of whose suicide participants were from Afghanistan or Iraq, terms have now been agreed for the construction of the pipeline (although the return of instability to Afghanistan is jeopardising matters once again).

Continuing its report on Ambassador Murray's fortunes in Uzbekistan the London Times states "After only two months in the job, and with the apparent backing of the Foreign Office, he fired his first broadside, with an attack on the regime’s record. 'This country has made very disappointing progress in moving away from the dictatorship of the Soviet Union,' he told an audience in Tashkent. 'Uzbekistan is not a functioning democracy, nor does it appear to be moving in the direction of democracy. The major political parties are banned; parliament is not subject to democratic election; and checks and balances on the authority of the electorate are lacking. There is worse: we believe there to be between 7,000 to 10,000 people in detention who we would consider as political and/or religious prisoners.'....In May he lamented 'the intense repression here combined with the inequality of wealth and absence of reform'. In August he said that there was 'no freedom of speech, mass media, movement and so forth'. By now the British Embassy, in stark contrast to other Western missions, had become a magnet for dissent. On one occasion it received photographs of two Islamic prisoners who had been boiled to death after they refused to stop praying. While Uzbekistan’s human rights record was not in dispute, Mr Murray very public handling of the issue was causing alarm in London and Washington, where he was regarded as 'too undiplomatic'."

After all who cares about human rights and Saddam Hussein type brutality when there is oil and gas at stake? We certainly didn't care about them in Iraq until Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990, and he started to become a threat to western access to Gulf oil.

The Times further reports on Ambassador Murray's experience in Uzbekistan stating that "Matters finally came to a head in mid-September when the envoy returned to London for 'medical reasons' after coming under growing pressure to temper his public criticism..... 'He was a victim of his own ethical foreign policy,' one British source who regularly visits Uzbekistan said. 'I’m not surprised he has has been brought back. He was running amok. He was not reflecting British foreign policy.' ... James McGrory, a British businessman close to Mr Murray, co-signed a letter with 15 other expatriates to Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, defending the ambassador. The letter said that he had 'promoted British culture and political ideals to an extent not previously known here and increased British prestige'. 'The common belief is that Mr Murray is being sacrificed to the Americans,' Mr McGrory said. 'The rumours flying around are that the US Embassy objected to him disturbing their work in Uzbekistan. They certainly loathed him . . . The US Embassy makes no effort to conceal its dislike of the way he repeatedly and unequivocally slams (the country’s) human rights record.' Human rights organisations expressed dismay at Mr Murray’s return".

So there you have it. Promoting human rights was disturbing the work of the US in Uzbekistan.

Or in the words of one article entitled "Democracy on Hold" published in the Washington Post 6 October "Some of the world's most corrupt and ruthless dictators in Caspian and Central Asian nations such as Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan consolidate their autocracies while the Bush administration awkwardly clears its throat and begs for basing rights or oil deals".

Meanwhile as the Saddam WMD rationale continues to run into difficulties in the Persian Gulf many people are still trying to convince themselves that the motivation behind the war in Iraq was really about bringing freedom and democracy to its beleaguered people - a mere 500,000 of whose children had previously been killed as a result of US and UK backed international sanctions following the first Gulf war.

This is, of course, to say nothing of the West's courtship of Saudi Arabia, the dictatorship so fond of public executions, floggings, amputations, false imprisonment and torture. We are willing to keep dealing with them even when they do such things to innocent Britons residing in their country. It is, after all, the world's largest oil producer.

No, the real foreign policy priority is access to hydrocarbons.

All this coincides with a report in the Independent 13 July that "Tony Blair is appealing to the heads of Western governments to agree a new world order that would justify the war in Iraq even if Saddam Hussein's elusive weapons of mass destruction are never found. It would also give Western powers the authority to attack any other sovereign country whose ruler is judged to be inflicting unnecessary suffering on his own people".

On 21 February the London Times reported that during a visit to Algeria "Brian Wilson, the [UK] Energy Minister, said that Britain will become heavily dependent on imported natural gas .... the Energy Minister predicted that 70 per cent of Britain’s electricity would be generated from gas by 2020 and 90 per cent of the fuel would need to be imported..." On 26 June last year the same paper reported that "Dwindling domestic supplies and surging demand could lead to a severe gas shortage within three years, the Department of Trade and Industry warned British consumers yesterday."

More recently the Guardian confirmed 1 July 2003 that "the UK is self-sufficient in gas but generators will need to start importing gas within three years. By 2020, 80% of all electricity will be generated from foreign gas supplies". The Director General of the Institute of Civil Engineers told the paper that "This country has been largely self-sufficient in electricity generation for the past 100 years. We have been able to ride through a succession of energy crises, such as oil in 1973, coal in the early 1980s and the self-inflicted petrol crisis of 2000. All of these had the potential to inflict serious economic damage, but this was largely avoided by the fuel mix and diversity available at the time. This is about to change dramatically".

Oil problems are to follow as the government's own policy documents and the BBC's 'Money Programme' have already confirmed. According to a Money Programme's documentary on Iraq entitled 'Oil War' broadcast just before the start of the invasion of Iraq in March "Geologist Dr Colin Campbell predicted a decline in the North Sea several years ago and claims by 2015 Britain may have to import over half its oil needs.... Campbell thinks the decline [of global oil production] will start by 2010. 'It starts with a price shock due to control of the market by a few countries, and it is followed by the onset of physical shortage, which just gets worse and worse and worse,' he says."

Although this situation will come as a disturbing surprise to many people, it should not have done. The issue of 'peak oil' has been quietly discussed by academics for decades, although less so by the popular press. Nonetheless in the year following the election of Tony Blair the Observer 26 October 1998 produced a report entitled "Energy apocalypse looms as the world runs out of oil". Press headline don't get much clearer than that. It was one that even a tabloid paper would have been proud of.

A quotation from Franco Bernabe, chief executive of the 30% government owned Italian oil company Eni SpA, perhaps provides the most succinct summary of the article and places the current situation in Iraq in a crystal clear economic context. He states "My forecast is that between 2000 and 2005 the world will be reaching peak production from our known fields."

Since then most politicians have either remained uninformed on the subject or have decided to pretend it is not happening.

Moreover the British Prime Minister himself has already misled parliament on this subject in a largely unnoticed statement made in the House of Commons 14 April 2003 which he provided in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq. In a dismissive response to a rebel MP's assertion that the real reason Britain went to war was for the oil, he tritely stated that "The UK is a net exporter of oil, so we have no need of the Iraqi oil."

This was technically true at the moment Blair uttered his response, but the Prime Minister also knew very well that this situation is about to change. His own energy White Paper published in February says so. In the signed forward Blair himself states ".... our energy system faces new challenges.... Our energy supplies will increasingly depend on imported gas and oil..... we need access to a wide range of energy sources."

With this kind of weasel-word chicanery going on it would seem the Prime Minister has spent too much time in the presence of Alastair Campbell learning the black art of spin, and too little time developing the alternative energy programmes that the country and the world now urgently needs. The imperative is much more than simply protecting the environment. It is also about preventing war and economic breakdown on an unprecedented scale.

Unfortunately and extraordinarily, simply ignoring such alternative options does not seem to be the limit of a bizarre on-going refusal to confront an issue which represents perhaps the greatest challenge of our time - satisfying the future energy requirements of the globe in a genuinely sustainable fashion.

As recently as last year the British government actively blocked the introduction of  'fuel cell' programmes based on hydrogen technology which the motor industry wishes to bring forward. Although there are others approaches which have enjoyed less vigorous public promotion (as for example other developments reported from last year's Paris motor show), the use of hydrogen based fuel systems is one means of storing energy derived from alternative sources such as solar, wind, wave, geothermal, and hydroelectric. The ability to store the energy they create is a crucial requirement for the maximum uptake of these alternative technologies.

Yet despite the impending global oil and gas crisis the London Times reported 22 April 2002 that "The [British] Government is facing a battle with leading car manufacturers over the car of the future after deciding that fossil fuels will not be phased out for at least another 50 years. Ministers have rejected a proposal to convert Britain’s cars to hydrogen by 2025, and called on manufacturers to develop more efficient models powered by petrol or diesel.... Prototypes of BMW’s hydrogen powered 7-series have driven 100,000 miles during development without problems. The engine can run on both hydrogen and petrol, meaning that cars could be driven before a network of hydrogen filling stations was established. "

Failure to develop such programmes means we are now faced with the real prospect of constant global conflict in the pursuit of ever diminishing supplies of hydrocarbons as confirmed by the BBC's Money Programme in March. The web site summary of the programme's broadcast on the oil factor accompanying the invasion of Iraq concludes with the following sobering words: "But even if [post war] Iraq does boost its oil production ironically the effect could be short lived. Its vast reserves represent just four years of world consumption and by the time Iraqi oil is flowing freely, global oil production may already be in terminal decline. .... So if alternatives to oil are not found soon the changes could be radical. Unlimited use of cars and cheap flights around the world may well be a thing of the past. While international trade - the very basis of the global economy - will suffer."

And that would be putting it mildly.

Some people are beginning to recognise the size of the task that lies ahead. On 9 July the House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee published its eighth report. The report scrutinises the government's energy white paper published only in February.

The committee states that "The need for urgent action is highlighted by the scale of the challenges facing the UK.... Our fears about implementation have proved largely justified. The Energy White Paper is weak on specific measures and contains little that is new... Renewables are likely to assume an ever increasing importance in the context of the UK's growing dependency on imported energy. The Government needs to be fully committed, and we would like to see this commitment reflected in an implementation plan which would provide leadership, direction and confidence that the strategic objectives can be achieved.... we find it incomprehensible that the Government was unable to publish an implementation plan as a supporting document to the White Paper.... the Energy White Paper does not set an explicit target for renewables for 2020, stating only that 'our aspiration is by 2020 to double renewables' share of electricity'... While the Government has put in place a number of policy instruments to promote renewables, we remain unconvinced that this amounts to a coherent and robust strategy for achieving its objectives. The Government's approach still appears to rely too much on wind energy alone....The Government does not have a strategy for other renewables, including biomass and solar photo-voltaic, which adequately reflects the massive challenge posed by the objectives set out in the White Paper.... We highlighted last year our conviction that a transition to an environmentally benign energy system could not be achieved on the basis of unsustainably 'cheap' energy, as the Prime Minister's foreword to the PIU report indicated was a priority."

Regrettably the exceptional closeness of Downing St to the country's largest corporation British Petroleum - dubbed in the press as 'Blair's Petroleum' - is no secret. As a result of such influences the current hydrocarbon predominant national energy strategies of the US and UK will in effect continue to promote on-going global conflict, whether knowingly or otherwise. In these circumstances any major change in direction looks a forlorn hope this side of regime change, or more importantly mind set-change, in No 10 Downing St and 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.

Fortunately, however, some politicians - even within the British government - are beginning to realise that the course that has been chosen is not sustainable and that the need for change is urgent.

Although still very much something of a lone voice some thoughts of Peter Hain, as reported by the BBC back in October 2002 when he was British Minister for Europe, are worth concluding with.

Highlighting the fact that the cost of protecting the West's Middle East oil supplies is currently about a dollar a gallon, and that this cost should be reflected in transport and other domestic policies Mr Hain said that "there may be no amount of money we can spend that will guarantee the security of our oil supplies, especially their vulnerability to short- and medium-term disruption over the next few decades.... We can shift the bounds of the possible if we can combine the political urgency we associate with our national security with the wide range of low-carbon transport fuel technologies.  We must not be prisoners of our own time. The horrific terrorist attack in Bali, the attack on the French tanker off Yemen the other week - these threats are coming at the world from all directions.... And you can't continue.... to just keep erecting security and defence barriers all around you..... We have a way of life, a set of [energy] consumption patterns, that are going to have to change - all of us. We have to recognise that without a major shift in the whole way we organise ourselves, our pattern of life is simply not sustainable."

Although these comments are highly telling, too few have yet to fully grasp the intimate link between a hydrocarbon-based global economy, war and terrorism.

But with enough will and imagination all of these life damaging influences can be eliminated. Without the need to circulate lies. Not even for 45 minutes.

NATURAL LAW PARTY WESSEX
nlpwessex@btinternet.com
www.btinternet.com/~nlpwessex

"No one knows exactly which occurrences will prove to be significant, how they mature, and what they turn into. No one knows which inconspicuous snowball has the capacity to set off an avalanche, which, to the surprise of all observers, will radically change the political situation... [In November 1989] the desire for change reached such a level that one event was enough to become a snowball that brought down an avalanche with it."
Vaclav Havel, Former President of Czechoslovakia and The Czech Republic
Time Magazine, 18 August 2003

"You realize, finally, that this can't be all there is, that it can't all be convicted criminals and mass murderers and corrupt CEOs leading the American government into a giant dank cave of ignorance and bile and rogue-nation status, not really, and you look around for the alternative voices. You look for the leaders of the counterforces, the voices of reason, the peacekeepers and powerful objectors and proponents of the new revolution. And you look, and you keep looking ... and looking ... and looking ..."
Henry Kissinger In Hell
Because what we really need now is more murderous criminal masterminds in power
San Francisco Chronicle, 6 Dec 2002

A Vision For Transforming America

"George W. Bush effectively ignored peace protesters, but how will he fend off a movement to start a new US government? John Hagelin, a particle physicist and 2000 presidential candidate, has begun to advocate the establishment of a US peace government.... Hagelin, who holds a doctorate in physics from Harvard, is an expert in transcendental meditation. Once a professor at Stanford, he moved in 1983 to Iowa's Maharishi University of Management.... In addition to encouraging large groups to meditate, Hagelin says his government will also push for developing sustainable agriculture and preventive medicine. He says he is seeking scientists and educators in every state to occupy 'cabinet-level positions' in the peace government. Hagelin, who was the Natural Law Party's presidential candidate, acknowledges he may be too late to stop military action in Iraq, but he says his government has long-term objectives.... He says he is seeking scientists and educators in every state to occupy 'cabinet-level positions' in the peace government."
THE OTHER US GOVERNMENT
Financial Times (London), 19 March 2003

“John Hagelin is one of the most important leaders for positive change in the world today.”
U.S. Rep. Dennis J. Kucinich (D-Ohio)

John Hagelin's Peace Plan For Iraq - Des Moines Register - Iowa's Largest  Newspaper - Click Here
Hollywood Stars Join Dr. John Hagelin to Promote Peace -  Click here
Dr. John Hagelin Launches New U.S. Peace Government - Click here
John Hagelin and The Institute For Science, Technology and Public Policy - 'Solutions For America's Future' - Click Here

"Governments so far have not been ruled by the competent.  They have been ruled by the politicians who are skilled in raising money for special interests to conduct aggressive re-election campaigns.  But the ability to raise special interest contributions from the corporations is not the skill-set required to govern a nation free from problems....This US Peace Government will be formally launched 4 July week-end in a very historic ceremony in Maharishi Vedic City and will be introduced previously to the press in Washington D.C. on the 2nd of July in a national news conference there. We invite all members of the press, national and global, who are present in this broadcast to cover this and that will be Wednesday, July 2 from the historic Kay Adams Hotel in Washington D.C., to cover the historic launch of America's Second Government, a complimentary government in the nation, not competing with present government but bringing fulfilment to the aspirations of every government by quietly introducing prevention-oriented, problem-free administrations of Natural Law. So it is a very exciting time for the world."
Dr John Hagelin, Global Country of World Peace, Press Conference, 11 June 2003
Real Video Presentation - Begins 4 minutes into broadcast

What is the US Peace Government? - Click here

"Dr. John Hagelin, renowned quantum physicist and Natural Law Party presidential candidate in 2000, will launch a new 'U.S. Peace Government' in Washington, D.C., on Wednesday, July 2, 10 a.m., at the Hay-Adams Hotel. The historic launch comes on the 227th anniversary of the Continental Congress’s resolution for independence. Dr. Hagelin will be joined at the news conference by Cabinet-level representatives of this second, 'complementary' government, which will include 400 of America’s top medical doctors, business leaders, policy makers, and university professors.... Dr. Hagelin will also announce that over $100 million has been raised for U.S. Peace Government peace projects, including funds to establish a flagship campus for a new University of Peace.... Dr. Hagelin said that the U.S. Peace Government will not usurp the responsibilities of the existing government, which is primarily concerned with crisis management. Instead, the second government will promote scientifically proven programs to effectively prevent problems—in health care, education, defense, economy, energy, agriculture, and the environment."
John Hagelin to Launch New U.S. Peace Government
Natural Law Party USA Newsflash, 26 June 2003

"On September 29, 2003 a grant was awarded to the Institute for Natural Medicine and Prevention at Maharishi University of Management by the National Institutes of Health National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute. Over $2 million was awarded for four years as the second competitive renewal of the original 1992 grant. This grant will fund the continued study of the effects of stress reduction with the Transcendental Meditation program on cardiovascular disease morbidity and mortality in African Americans. The study locations are the Institute for Natural Medicine and Prevention in Maharishi Vedic City, Iowa and the Medical College of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, Wisconsin."
NIH awards $2 million to the College of Maharishi Vedic Medicine
College of Maharishi Vedic Medicine, October 2003

"Every single time these numbers have been achieved, extraordinary peace and prosperity has resulted,' Collins said. 'It’s never failed. The research is out there, and the results have been published in leading scientific journals. I would hope Defense Secretary Rumsfeld would look at this research and say, ‘What have we got to lose?’ It’s like an insurance policy. We have to do things now to protect our way of life. I see all this evidence that this approach works, and I just think we need to get the word out."
Seventh Heaven's (Warner Bros), Stephen Collins, on Invincible Defense Technology, on NBC and ABC television, Dec 2001

"We have an important message for the people of the Middle East,' said Dr. John Hagelin, a quantum physicist and author, and recipient of the prestigious Kilby Award for scientific research.... 'This practical approach, known as Invincible Defense Technology, applies cutting-edge discoveries in quantum mechanics, neuroscience, and human consciousness to diffuse stress, effectively disarming aggressors,' he said. 'It targets the root cause of violence acute stress resulting from religious and ethnic tensions. Just as anger can spread through a population, so can calm. Humanity is connected at the deepest level of human interaction an abstract, quiet communication so that collective consciousness can be influenced in a tangible and measurable way. There is a proven correlation between meditation and reduced social stress,' he claimed, pointing to 19 published research studies."
Transcendental Meditation: The solution to terrorism?
Jerusalem Post, 1 July 2002

"Maharishi University of Management in Fairfield is receiving some national recognition thanks to some Hollywood celebrities touting the college¹s meditation programs. M.U.M. staff say that the University is featured in a cover story in the August 4th issue of Time magazine, which is on newsstands now. On the cover in a meditating pose is actress Heather Graham, who has starred in films like 'Boogie Nights' and 'Austin Powers: The Spy Who Shagged Me'. The article also quotes well-known movie and television director David Lynch, who has been meditating for 30 years. The article mentions TM's use in education, and shows photos of kids at the Maharishi School in Fairfield. Reports claim that one in eight Americans practice some form of meditation. Other notable people familiar with the TM movement include Clint Eastwood, Richard Gere, Goldie Hawn, and former Vice President Al Gore."
'Time' Article Highlights M.U.M. and M.S.A.E
KMCD NEWS, August 2003

"With an open enrollment policy and a student body from a broad socioeconomic background, grades 9-12 consistently score in the 99th percentile on standardized tests year after year... Maharishi School of the Age of Enlightenment was founded to bring Consciousness-Based^SM education to children from preschool to 12th grade."
Introduction to Maharishi School, Fairfield, Iowa

"The National Center for Small Communities announced earlier this month that its Grass Roots Entrepreneurship Award, and accompanying $5,000 grant, would be presented to the city of Fairfield, Iowa and its mayor, Edward Malloy.... Perhaps the greatest good fortune this community enjoys, accordingto Malloy, is the existence of a 'unique educational institution' in the Maharishi International University of Management. This intriguing institution of higher learning combines a reputation for academic excellence with the principles and practices of Transcendental Meditation® and the TM-Sidhi program®.... Since about the mid-1980's, that entrepreneurial talent pool started sprouting fish. Mayor Malloy tells me that over the last fifteen years, there have been hundreds of new business startups in the community, some of which were bought by Fortune 500 companies while others remain locally owned... What is perhaps most intriguing about all this is the lack of input into this success story on the part of any federal programs targeting small businesses. There is no Small Business Development Center or Women's Business Center nearby. The mayor says their entrepreneurial
success has been largely 'self generated.'..."
How Small Town USA Becomes An Entrepreneurial Magnet
The MicroEnterprise Journal August 18, 2003

"Construction will begin this fall on a 100-acre greenhouse project that aims to create world peace by growing organic vegetables year round. When it is completed in two years, the project will be the largest of its kind in Iowa, said Bob Wynne, mayor of Vedic City, a community located two miles north of Fairfield. Wynne said organizers want to create 215 jobs with the project and, in the process, help attract residents to the new city, which was founded in 2001 as Iowa's first new city since 1982. Vegetables produced in the greenhouses will be marketed locally and in a 300-mile radius of Vedic City. 'We looked into the dynamics of the greenhouses as economic development for the city,' Wynne said. But the project is for more than economic development, Wynne said. It also is seen as a way to promote world peace. Vedic City is the first city in the world to be constructed entirely according to design principles espoused by Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, who popularized transcendental meditation... The sale of $3.3 million in municipal revenue bonds backed by the city is being used to finance the project. A $23,215 grant from the U.S. Department of Agriculture will pay a fourth of the cost of installing two wind turbines to generate electrical power at the greenhouse site. Photovoltaic panels also will be used to generate electricity from the sun, said Kent Boyum, director of the Vedic City Rebuild Program. 'We like solar energy,' Wynne said. 'The City Council has set a goal for the city to go completely to renewable energy sources.'"
Seeds of peace and carrots
Des Moines Register, 28 September 2003

"That the [north American electricity distribution] grid will crash again and again and yet again is absolutely certain. The only question is who are the real terrorists: errant crazies who blow things up, or entrenched interests that refuse to change? The technology now exists to transcend this mess. In the mid 1990s California's green energy advocates proposed a 600-megawatt mosaic of solar, wind and other renewable generators that would have entirely prevented the fake deregulatory crisis of 2000-1. It was approved by the California Public Utilities Commission, but then killed by Southern California Edison and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Today, the Bush Administration wants to further subsidize its fossil/utility friends with a bad energy bill, and by pouring billions into 'upgrading' the electric grid. The only thing certain is that every cent of that money will be wasted. In 1952 a Blue Ribbon report to Harry Truman predicted that the future of America's energy rested with the sun. It predicted 13 million solar-powered homes here by 1975, and the promise of decentralized, off-grid self-sufficiency. Instead, Dwight Eisenhower took us into the pit of the 'Peaceful Atom'. A trillion dollars later, we have a half-century of crashing grids and dangerous nukes that are vulnerable to terrorism and must shut down precisely when they're most needed, as they did during this latest blackout... Bush's 'upgrading the grid' means a new money pit for the same old unsafe nukes, polluting coal burners and gas turbines whose prices are set to skyrocket - all looped together by dangerous, wasteful wires that are bound to crash again and again."
The Latest Bogus Blackout
Counterpunch, 16 August 2003

"It is a rare politician who thinks not only beyond the next election, but beyond his own probable lifetime. Tony Blair is right to take seriously the threat of global warming and to echo scientists’ calls for 60 per cent cuts in carbon dioxide emissions over 50 years. So it is disappointing that while the energy White Paper sets out an agenda for climbing the foothills in the next seven years, it ducks some of the issues that need to be addressed if Britain is to have any chance of achieving the grand vision in the longer term....The refusal to set targets beyond 2010 does not quite fit with Mr Blair’s 50-year ambitions."
Hot air
London Times, 25 February 2003

"The need for urgent action is highlighted by the scale of the challenges facing the UK.... Our fears about implementation have proved largely justified. The Energy White Paper is weak on specific measures and contains little that is new... Renewables are likely to assume an ever increasing importance in the context of the UK's growing dependency on imported energy. The Government needs to be fully committed, and we would like to see this commitment reflected in an implementation plan which would provide leadership, direction and confidence that the strategic objectives can be achieved.... we find it incomprehensible that the Government was unable to publish an implementation plan as a supporting document to the White Paper.... the Energy White Paper does not set an explicit target for renewables for 2020, stating only that 'our aspiration is by 2020 to double renewables' share of electricity'... While the Government has put in place a number of policy instruments to promote renewables, we remain unconvinced that this amounts to a coherent and robust strategy for achieving its objectives. The Government's approach still appears to rely too much on wind energy alone....The Government does not have a strategy for other renewables, including biomass and solar photo-voltaic, which adequately reflects the massive challenge posed by the objectives set out in the White Paper.... We highlighted last year our conviction that a transition to an environmentally benign energy system could not be achieved on the basis of unsustainably 'cheap' energy, as the Prime Minister's foreword to the PIU report indicated was a priority."
House of Commons, Environmental Audit, Eighth Report, 9 July 2003

"Trends in energy markets have been comparatively benign over the past 10–15 years: the UK has been self-sufficient in energy; commercial decisions have resulted in changes in the fuel mix that have reduced UK emissions of greenhouse gases; and trends in world markets and domestic liberalisation have reduced most fuel prices. The future context for energy policy will be different. The UK will be increasingly dependent on imported oil and gas... Increasingly policy towards energy security ...... will be pursued in a global arena, as part of an international effort.... energy security should be addressed by a variety of means, including enhanced international activity and continued monitoring.... The UK is currently one of just two G7 countries which is self-sufficient in energy..... The future for energy policy seems likely to be much less benign.... issues of energy security are likely to become more important. The UK will become increasingly dependent on imported oil and gas.... most other G7 countries already rely substantially on imported energy. ... [One way to maintain security is] to use international action to address global threats to energy security. On just about any scenario the UK will become more dependent on imports both for both its gas and its oil...."
The Energy Review
A Performance and Innovation Unit Report - UK Cabinet Office, February 2002

"Mr.Greenspan told the House Energy and Commerce Committee on June 10 that the country could not expect Canada to make up for falling production in the United States, and that new facilities were needed to import liquefied natural gas from Asia, the Middle East and the former Soviet Union."
Canada Is Losing Ability to Fill U.S. Natural Gas Needs
The Ledger, Florida, 26 June 2003

'Natural Gas Crisis' by Dale Allen Pfeiffer

"The official reason for military action [against Iraq], if it becomes necessary, is to get rid of weapons of mass destruction. But Washington's approach to Iraq illuminates something much broader - the global strategy of the Bush administration...An energy report by Vice-President Dick Cheney 18 months ago forecast that American oil imports would have to rise by more than half by 2020 - partly, of course, because the administration is not much interested in reducing consumption... the most obvious tool [for this] is the military one...To take one example, American military bases set up to fight al-Qaeda in central Asia may also serve to safeguard oil supplies, to back up the commercial exploitation of the Caspian basin."
Iraq crisis reflects global US strategy
BBC Online, 1 January 2003

"I'm an American tired of lies. And with our government, it's mostly lies."
Woody Harrelson - London Guardian, 17 October 2002

How many lies in 'Pax Americana'? - 'Fight Smart' - 28 Feb 2003
The thirty-six lies that launched a war
10 Appalling Lies We Were Told About Iraq
20 Lies About the War - Independent 13 July 2003 - click here
Lies which Paved the Road to Invasion: 'Western' Disinformation about Iraq

Including
A Vision For Transforming America - 24 March 2003
This Is Our Prime Minister - 23 Feb 2003
What Is Happening To Britain And America? - 9 Feb 2003
The 911 Omar Sheikh Files - 2 Jan 2003
'October Surprise 2002' - Life After The US Constitutional Coup - 31 Oct 2002
What Did Britain Know About 911? - 28 Aug 2002
Why Did Bush Not Act On Sept 11? - 9 May 2002
World Peace Offered From Hiroshima - 22 April 2002
Did Sept 11 victims die for Enron? - 8 March 2002
CIA provided funds to financiers of Sept 11 bomber - 18 Nov 2001

World Events - Additional Press Reports of Interest - March To August 2003 - click here

  NATURAL LAW PARTY WESSEX
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