Who Did What On 9/11?
And Who Did Nothing?
www.btinternet.com/~nlpwessex/Documents/911WhoDidWhat.htm
"Even if the 9/11 Commission has studiously avoided drawing any explicit conclusions about the real reasons for the failure of America's defences during the hijacking attacks the relevant events of the day as diffusely recorded in its own report speak for themselves."
'Protocolgate'
'Fight Smart', 19 September 2004
The Excerpts Below Are Taken From
'Fight
Smart', 19 September 2004 |
"..... The NMCC learned of United
93’s hijacking at about 10:03. At this time the FAA had no contact with the military
at the level of national command. The NMCC learned about United 93 from the White House.
It, in turn, was informed by the Secret
Service’s contacts with the FAA. NORAD had no
information either. At 10:07, its representative on the air threat conference call stated
that NORAD had 'no indication of a hijack heading to DC at this time.'"
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, JULY 2004 (p 42)
"The defense of U.S.
airspace on 9/11 was not
conducted in accord with preexisting training and protocols.... As it turned out, the NEADS air defenders had
nine minutes’ notice [from a source outside protocol]
on the first hijacked plane, no advance notice on the second, no advance notice on the
third, and no advance notice on the fourth."
THE
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, JULY 2004 (p 31)
"Air National Guard units with different rules of engagement were scrambled without the knowledge of the President, NORAD, or the
National Military Command Center."
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, JULY 2004,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
| Contents |
| The President |
| The Vice President And The Secret Service |
| Federal Aviation Administration |
| Secretary Of Defence And Pentagon |
"The President was
seated in a classroom when,at 9:05, Andrew Card whispered to him: 'A second plane hit the
second tower.America is under attack'”
THE
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, JULY 2004 (p38)
"Why would the Presidential
communications systems fail when the President was still within US territory? Who was in
charge of the President's communications systems on 911? This communications systems
'failure' is in addition to the one between the FAA and NMCC during the 'air threat'
conference call. What are the explanations for these failures? This is one of the more remarkable aspects of the report -
remarkable because so little is said on this subject. However, one of the 9/11 Commissioners, Jamie Gorelick, let slip the
following astonishing information in an interview with PBS, 17 June 2004 'On Air Force One, the president was unable to reach most of the people or
at least many of the people whom he tried to reach. He could not functionally lead the
government from Air Force One at a time of great national stress and national emergency.' From this description it would appear it was not only the White
House that the President was allegedly unable to contact.And there it would seem the
matter has been left to rest. Yet either the President has lied on this matter to
cover-up his own inaction on the day or some serious questions need to be asked of those
in control of Presidential communications systems on 9/11. In the PBS interview Gorelick
goes on to say that the problem has since been fixed, but she doesn't confirm that she
knows what the problem was. What was that problem? If it's been 'fixed' then someone
knows."
'Protocolgate'
'Fight Smart', 19 September 2004
"The President's Daily Brief of 6
August referred to both potential preparations within the US for hijackings and
surveillance of Federal buildings in New York, and also confirmed that Bin Laden was 'determined to strike' in the US. The 911 Commission Report confirms (p. 260/262) that no further discussion of this brief by the President and his
senior advisers ensued prior to the attacks. Myer's
reference to 'traditional hijackings' is a diversion. The required initial military response to both
traditional hijackings and 911 type hijackings - the scrambling of fighter aircraft - is
the same. At the time that a hijacking alert arises it will generally not be known whether
it is a 'traditional' or a 911 type hijacking. The NMCC did not receive any requests for
fighter scramblings on 911 as required by the relevant protocols."
'Protocolgate'
'Fight Smart', 19 September 2004
"In addition to the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, the relevant protocol allocates specific
responsibilities to the President regarding 'The employment of U.S. military forces in
response to acts or threats of domestic terrorism'. When a
President of the United States ('The Commander In Chief') is told the country is 'under
attack' why would he not contact his Secretary of Defense and his most senior adviser in
the military - the Chairman or acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs? There is no evidence
of any such contact on 911 before 10:00 and even then discussion with Rumsfeld was 'brief'
and of such seemingly insignificant nature that neither the President nor the Secretary of
Defense can apparently remember the content. "
'Protocolgate'
'Fight Smart', 19 September 2004
"The Commission has been unable to
verify the President's claim that he authorised a shoot-down order, although he claims to
have done so."
'Protocolgate'
'Fight Smart', 19 September 2004
| Page | 911 Commission Report Excerpt | Comment |
| 40/41 | "The President told us he was frustrated with the poor communications that morning. He could not reach key officials, including Secretary Rumsfeld, for a period of time. The line to the White House shelter conference room—and the Vice President — kept cutting off..." | Why
would the Presidential communications systems fail when the President was still within
US territory? Who was in charge of the President's communications systems on 911? This communications systems 'failure' is in addition to the one between the FAA and NMCC during the 'air threat' conference call. What are the explanations for these failures? This is one of the more remarkable aspects of the report - remarkable because so little is said on this subject. However, one of the 9/11 Commissioners, Jamie Gorelick, let slip the following astonishing information in an interview with PBS, 17 June 2004 "On Air Force One, the president was unable to reach most of the people or at least many of the people whom he tried to reach. He could not functionally lead the government from Air Force One at a time of great national stress and national emergency." From this description it would appear it was not only the White House that the President was allegedly unable to contact.And there it would seem the matter has been left to rest. Yet either the President has lied on this matter to cover-up his own inaction on the day or some serious questions need to be asked of those in control of Presidential communications systems on 9/11. In the PBS interview Gorelick goes on to say that the problem has since been fixed, but she doesn't confirm that she knows what the problem was. What was that problem? If it's been 'fixed' then someone knows. |
| 40/41 | "The President emphasized to us that he had authorized the shootdown of hijacked aircraft. The Vice President’s military aide told us he believed the Vice President spoke to the President just after entering the conference room, but he did not hear what they said. Rice, who entered the room shortly after the Vice President and sat next to him, remembered hearing him inform the President,'Sir, the CAPs are up. Sir, they’re going to want to know what to do.' Then she recalled hearing him say,'Yes sir.' She believed this conversation occurred a few minutes, perhaps five, after they entered the conference room. We believe this call would have taken place sometime before 10:10 to 10:15. Among the sources that reflect other important events of that morning, there is no documentary evidence for this call, but the relevant sources are incomplete... At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called 'a quiet moment,' suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. He said he had not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President. The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a two minute conversation that obtained the confirmation. On Air Force One, the President’s press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary." | The
Commission has been unable to verify the President's claim that he authorised a
shoot-down order, although he claims to have done so. The Vice President is presented as being directly engaged with the President concerning the authorisation (and by implication the relaying) of the alleged shoot-down order. However, nowhere in the relevant protocols is the Vice President referred to in the chain of command. The use of 'lethal force' is a matter for the President and Secretary for Defense - who was apparently not available to the NMCC until after the last of the hijackings was over. Moreover as reported by Newsweek magazine 28 June 2004 the staff of the 911 commission (although this is not recorded in the final report authorised by the Commissioners themselves) have expressed doubt that the Vice President obtained consent for a shoot down order from the President. The staff's effort to have this reflected in the final 9/11 Commission report was successfully blocked by the White House. |
| General Richard Myers (Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 911) Twelfth
Public Hearing |
"There was a significant increase in terrorist threat reporting during the late spring and summer of 2001, clearly indicating a major Al Qaida terrorist operation was pending, but the location and timing were unknown. To the extent that the warnings pointed to specific areas, they pointed to the Arabian Peninsula.... The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) also issued a number of warnings in the months prior to 9/11. Those warnings were also non-specific, and focused primarily on threats against US citizens abroad and traditional hijackings." | The
President's Daily Brief of 6 August referred to both potential preparations within the
US for hijackings and surveillance of Federal buildings in New York, and also confirmed
that Bin Laden was "determined
to strike" in the US. The 911 Commission Report
confirms (p. 260/262) that no further discussion of this brief by the President and his
senior advisers ensued prior to the attacks. Myer's reference to "traditional hijackings" is a diversion. The required initial military response to both traditional hijackings and 911 type hijackings - the scrambling of fighter aircraft - is the same. At the time that a hijacking alert arises it will generally not be known whether it is a 'traditional' or a 911 type hijacking. The NMCC did not receive any requests for fighter scramblings on 911 as required by the relevant protocols. |
"Even if the 9/11 Commission has
studiously avoided drawing any explicit conclusions about the real reasons for the failure
of America's defences during the hijacking attacks the relevant events of the day as
diffusely recorded in its own report speak for themselves."
'Protocolgate'
'Fight Smart', 19 September 2004
| "The defense of U.S. airspace on 9/11 was not conducted
in accord with preexisting training and protocols....." THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, JULY 2004 (p 31) |
SUMMARY |
What
The 9/11 Commission Report Said "Air National Guard units with different rules of engagement were scrambled without the knowledge
of the President, NORAD, or the National Military Command Center." "Shortly after the
second attack in New York, a senior Secret Service agent
charged with coordinating the President’s movements established an open line with his
counterpart at the FAA, who soon told him that there were more planes unaccounted
for—possibly hijacked—in addition to the two that had already crashed. Though
the senior agent told someone to convey this information to the Secret Service’s operations center, it either was not passed on or was passed on but
not disseminated..." "By 10:45 there was, however, another
set of fighters circling Washington that had entirely different rules of engagement. These
fighters, part of the 113th Wing of the District of Columbia Air National Guard, launched
out of Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland in response to information passed to them by the
Secret Service.... A
Secret Service agent
had a phone in each ear, one connected to Wherley and the other to a fellow agent at the
White House, relaying instructions that the White House agent said he was getting from the
Vice President......" What Cheney Nearly
Said |
| CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION 3610.01A AND DOD DIRECTIVE
3025.15 REFER TO THE FAA, THE NMCC, THE PRESIDENT, THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENCE, NORAD, AND MILITARY UNITS NOWHERE DO THEY REFER TO THE VICE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRET SERVICE |
| "....it is apparent that the FAA's involvement with the Secret
Service on 911 was far greater than its involvement with the NMCC which appears to
have been minimal during the course of the hijackings." 'Protocolgate' - Who Hijacked the Emergency Response Procedures on 911? 'Fight Smart', 19 September 2004 "The
footnote says 'A senior Secret Service agent charged
with coordinating the President’s movements established an open line with his
counterpart at the FAA'. Although the location is
not stated it seems likely that this 'counterpart' was at FAA headquarters, the
organisation which failed to make any requests for military assistance on 911 as required
by established protocols. Was FAA HQ (if that's who was involved here) lead to
believe by the Secret Service that informing them of the situation was sufficient for
NORAD to be informed or was the Secret Service only communicating with the FAA concerning,
for example, the security of Air Force One? Who in the Secret Service's operation centre
was responsible for not passing on or disseminating the information about hijacked planes
provided in this way by the FAA? Who are Nelson Garabito and Terry Van Steenbergen?" "FAA headquarters were in contact with
the Secret Service headquarters but not the NMCC. Is it possible that the Secret Service
took charge of the FAA HQ's response to the attacks on 911 thereby by-passing the
established chain of command to and through the military and ultimately causing a failed
response to the attacks? Who is the 'Chuck Green' mentioned here? He is not referred to in
the report other than in the footnotes. According to the New York Observer 21 August 2003 'The F.A.A. and the Secret Service, which had an open phone connection,
both knew at 8:20 a.m. that two planes had been hijacked in the New York area and had
their transponders turned off.' Although
this press report may or may not be accurate as to precise timing, if otherwise correct it
would appear that the Secret Service had a direct communication link with the FAA from the
early stages of the first hijacking." It Appears The Secret Service Were Taking Orders From Dick Cheney "Why was the Secret Service issuing
commands to the air force from Cheney and why was Cheney by-passing the NMCC? After the
hijackings were over the fighters at Andrews were launched completely outside the military
chain of command. The Vice President's claim that he was unaware of this does not sit
easily with the statement that 'A Secret Service
agent had a phone in each ear, one connected to Wherley and the other to a fellow agent at
the White House, relaying instructions that the White House agent said he was getting from
the Vice President.' So it remains undetermined
whether the Secret Service were acting unilaterally or in conjunction with the Vice
President. In either case questions of legality are raised." Did Cheney Lie To The 911 Commission? "Dick Cheney, huddled in the
Presidential Emergency Operations Center under the White House, had just urged the
traveling George W. Bush not to return to Washington. The president had left Florida
aboard Air Force One at 9:55 a.m. on 9/11 'with no destination at take-off,' as last
week's 9-11 Commission report noted. Nor had Bush given any known instructions on how to
respond to the attacks.... Nor did the real-time notes taken by two others in the room...
reflect that such a phone call between Bush and Cheney occurred or that such a
major decision as shooting down a U.S. airliner was discussed.... by the time Cheney
issued his shoot-down order ...... the last plane-turned-missile on 9/11, had already
crashed in Pennsylvania...the question of Cheney's
behavior that day is one of many new issues raised
in the remarkably detailed, chilling account laid out in dramatic presentations by the
9-11 Commission. NEWSWEEK has learned that some on
the commission staff were, in fact, highly skeptical of the vice president's account and made their views clearer in an earlier draft of their staff report.
According to one knowledgeable source, some staffers 'flat out didn't believe the call
ever took place.'... the White House vigorously lobbied the commission to change the
language in its report.... The report 'was watered down,' groused one
staffer." |
FAA PROTOCOLS FOR HIJACKINGS APPLICABLE ON 911 - Click Here |
AIRCRAFT PIRACY (HIJACKING) AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES |
"These footnotes identify the relevant FAA and Department of
Defense protocols for emergency response to hijackings as: i) FAA Order 7110.65M ii) FAA Order 7610.4J iii) DOD
memo, CJCS instruction, 'Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne
Objects,' June 1, 2001. The latter in fact has a reference number (CJCSI 3610.01A) although this is not quoted." |
Vice President And Secret Service
"....it is apparent that the FAA's
involvement with the Secret Service on 911 was far greater than its involvement with the
NMCC which appears to have been minimal during the course of the hijackings."
'Protocolgate'
'Fight Smart', 19 September 2004
"The Commission has been unable to
verify the President's claim that he authorised a shoot-down order, although he claims to
have done so. The Vice President is presented as being directly engaged with the President
concerning the authorisation (and by implication the relaying) of the alleged shoot-down
order. However, nowhere in the relevant protocols is
the Vice President referred to in the chain of command. The use of 'lethal force' is a matter for the President and
Secretary for Defense - who was apparently not available to the NMCC until after the last
of the hijackings was over."
'Protocolgate'
'Fight Smart', 19 September 2004
"Why was Rumsfeld taking these
instructions from Cheney and not the President? There is no provision for this in the
protocols."
'Protocolgate'
'Fight Smart', 19 September 2004
"Why was the Secret Service issuing
commands to the air force from Cheney and why was Cheney by-passing the NMCC? After the
hijackings were over the fighters at Andrews were launched completely outside the military
chain of command. The Vice President's claim that he was unaware of this does not sit
easily with the statement that 'A Secret Service
agent had a phone in each ear, one connected to Wherley and the other to a fellow agent at
the White House, relaying instructions that the White House agent said he was getting from
the Vice President.' So it remains undetermined
whether the Secret Service were acting unilaterally or in conjunction with the Vice
President. In either case questions of legality are raised."
'Protocolgate'
'Fight Smart', 19 September 2004
"The footnote
says 'A senior Secret Service agent charged with
coordinating the President’s movements established an open line with his counterpart
at the FAA'. Although the location is not stated it
seems likely that this 'counterpart' was at FAA headquarters, the organisation which
failed to make any requests for military assistance on 911 as required by established
protocols. Was FAA HQ (if that's who was involved here) lead to believe by the
Secret Service that informing them of the situation was sufficient for NORAD to be
informed or was the Secret Service only communicating with the FAA concerning, for
example, the security of Air Force One? Who in the Secret Service's operation centre was
responsible for not passing on or disseminating the information about hijacked planes
provided in this way by the FAA? Who are Nelson Garabito and Terry Van Steenbergen?"
'Protocolgate'
'Fight Smart', 19 September 2004
"FAA headquarters were in contact with
the Secret Service headquarters but not the NMCC. Is it possible that the Secret Service
took charge of the FAA HQ's response to the attacks on 911 thereby by-passing the
established chain of command to and through the military and ultimately causing a failed
response to the attacks? Who is the 'Chuck Green' mentioned here? He is not referred to in
the report other than in the footnotes. According to the New York Observer 21 August 2003 'The F.A.A. and the Secret Service, which had an open phone connection,
both knew at 8:20 a.m. that two planes had been hijacked in the New York area and had
their transponders turned off.' Although
this press report may or may not be accurate as to precise timing, if otherwise correct it
would appear that the Secret Service had a direct communication link with the FAA from the
early stages of the first hijacking."
'Protocolgate'
'Fight Smart', 19 September 2004
| Page | 911 Commission Report Excerpt | Comment |
| 9 | "At 9:34, Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport advised the Secret Service of an unknown aircraft heading in the direction of the White House." | More details of the role of Secret Service in the US government response to the attacks on 911 feature elsewhere in report (see below). |
25 |
" The Command Center kept looking for American 77. At 9:21, it advised the Dulles terminal control facility, and Dulles urged its controllers to look for primary targets. At 9:32, they found one. Several of the Dulles controllers 'observed a primary radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed' and notified Reagan National Airport. FAA personnel at both Reagan National and Dulles airports notified the Secret Service." |
No primary radar tracking for Flight 77 is found until 36 minutes after its transponder is switched off. Communication lines were open with the Secret Service at airport level. |
| 39 | "At 9:33, the tower supervisor at Reagan National Airport picked up a hotline to the Secret Service and told the Service’s operations center that 'an aircraft [is] coming at you and not talking with us.' This was the first specific report to the Secret Service of a direct threat to the White House. No move was made to evacuate the Vice President at this time." | FAA Secret Service communication also continued at airport level. |
| 40/41 | "The President emphasized to us that he had authorized the shootdown of hijacked aircraft. The Vice President’s military aide told us he believed the Vice President spoke to the President just after entering the conference room, but he did not hear what they said. Rice, who entered the room shortly after the Vice President and sat next to him, remembered hearing him inform the President,'Sir, the CAPs are up. Sir, they’re going to want to know what to do.' Then she recalled hearing him say,'Yes sir.' She believed this conversation occurred a few minutes, perhaps five, after they entered the conference room. We believe this call would have taken place sometime before 10:10 to 10:15. Among the sources that reflect other important events of that morning, there is no documentary evidence for this call, but the relevant sources are incomplete... At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called 'a quiet moment,' suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. He said he had not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President. The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a two minute conversation that obtained the confirmation. On Air Force One, the President’s press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary." | The
Commission has been unable to verify the President's claim that he authorised a
shoot-down order, although he claims to have done so. The Vice President is presented as being directly engaged with the President concerning the authorisation (and by implication the relaying) of the alleged shoot-down order. However, nowhere in the relevant protocols is the Vice President referred to in the chain of command. The use of 'lethal force' is a matter for the President and Secretary for Defense - who was apparently not available to the NMCC until after the last of the hijackings was over. Moreover as reported by Newsweek magazine 28 June 2004 the staff of the 911 commission (although this is not recorded in the final report authorised by the Commissioners themselves) have expressed doubt that the Vice President obtained consent for a shoot down order from the President. The staff's effort to have this reflected in the final 9/11 Commission report was successfully blocked by the White House. |
| 41 | "At 10:02, the communicators in the shelter began receiving reports from the Secret Service of an inbound aircraft—presumably hijacked—heading toward Washington. That aircraft was United 93. The Secret Service was getting this information directly from the FAA." | Why was the FAA liasing with the Secret Service but not with the NMCC as required by protocol? |
| 42 | "..... The NMCC learned of United 93’s hijacking at about 10:03. At this time the FAA had no contact with the military at the level of national command. The NMCC learned about United 93 from the White House. It, in turn, was informed by the Secret Service’s contacts with the FAA. NORAD had no information either. At 10:07, its representative on the air threat conference call stated that NORAD had 'no indication of a hijack heading to DC at this time.'" | In the 911 Commission Staff Statement No 6 (p25) the wording is broader: "The FAA had not yet been connected to the Air Threat Conference and in general had practically no contact with the military at the level of national command." The implication is that prior to 10:03 the FAA had no significant contact with the military national command. |
| 43/44 | "At 10:39, the Vice President updated the Secretary on the air threat conference.... As this exchange shows, Secretary Rumsfeld was not in the NMCC when the shootdown order was first conveyed. He moved to the NMCC shortly before 10:30, in order to join Vice Chairman Myers. Secretary Rumsfeld told us he was just gaining situational awareness when he spoke with the Vice President at 10:39." | Why was
Rumsfeld taking these instructions from Cheney and not the President? There is no
provision for this in the protocols. Why was Rumsfeld not in the NMCC? In the 911 Commission Staff Statement No 6 (p27) some of the wording is broader: "As this exchange shows, Secretary Rumsfeld was not involved when the shoot down order was first passed on the Air Threat Conference". |
| 44 | "By 10:45 there was, however, another set of fighters circling Washington that had entirely different rules of engagement.These fighters, part of the 113th Wing of the District of Columbia Air National Guard, launched out of Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland in response to information passed to them by the Secret Service. The first of the Andrews fighters was airborne at 10:38. General David Wherley—the commander of the 113th Wing—reached out to the Secret Service after hearing secondhand reports that it wanted fighters airborne. A Secret Service agent had a phone in each ear, one connected to Wherley and the other to a fellow agent at the White House, relaying instructions that the White House agent said he was getting from the Vice President..... Thus, while the fighter pilots under NORAD direction who had scrambled out of Langley never received any type of engagement order, the Andrews pilots were operating weapons free—a permissive rule of engagement. The President and the Vice President indicated to us they had not been aware that fighters had been scrambled out of Andrews, at the request of the Secret Service and outside the military chain of command. There is no evidence that NORAD headquarters or military officials in the NMCC knew—during the morning of September 11—that the Andrews planes were airborne and operating under different rules of engagement." | Why was the
Secret Service issuing commands to the air force from Cheney and why was Cheney
by-passing the NMCC? After the hijackings were over the fighters at Andrews were launched completely outside the military chain of command. The Vice President's claim that he was unaware of this does not sit easily with the statement that "A Secret Service agent had a phone in each ear, one connected to Wherley and the other to a fellow agent at the White House, relaying instructions that the White House agent said he was getting from the Vice President." So it remains undetermined whether the Secret Service were acting unilaterally or in conjunction with the Vice President. In either case questions of legality are raised. |
| 464 | [Footnote] 208. "USSS [United States Secret Service] memo, interview of Gregory LaDow, Oct. 1, 2001,p. 1. Shortly after the second attack in New York, a senior Secret Service agent charged with coordinating the President’s movements established an open line with his counterpart at the FAA, who soon told him that there were more planes unaccounted for—possibly hijacked—in addition to the two that had already crashed. Though the senior agent told someone to convey this information to the Secret Service’s operations center, it either was not passed on or was passed on but not disseminated; it failed to reach agents assigned to the Vice President, and the Vice President was not evacuated at that time. See Nelson Garabito interview (Mar. 11, 2004); USSS memo, interview of Nelson Garabito, Oct. 1, 2001; see also Terry Van Steenbergen interview (Mar. 30, 2004). |
The footnote says "A senior Secret Service agent charged with
coordinating the President’s movements established an open line with his counterpart
at the FAA". Although the location is not stated it seems likely that this
'counterpart' was at FAA headquarters, the organisation which failed to make any requests
for military assistance on 911 as required by established protocols. Who are Nelson Garabito and Terry Van Steenbergen? |
| 464 | "[Footnote] 217. .. At Secret Service headquarters, personnel from the intelligence division were also on a phone conference with FAA headquarters. Chuck Green interview (Mar. 10, 2004)." | FAA
headquarters were in contact with the Secret Service headquarters but not the NMCC. Is
it possible that the Secret Service took charge of the FAA HQ's response to the attacks on
911 thereby by-passing the established chain of command to and through the military and
ultimately causing a failed response to the attacks? Who is the "Chuck Green" mentioned here? He is not referred to in the report other than in the footnotes. According to the New York Observer 21 August 2003 "The F.A.A. and the Secret Service, which had an open phone connection, both knew at 8:20 a.m. that two planes had been hijacked in the New York area and had their transponders turned off." Although this press report may or may not be accurate as to precise timing, if otherwise correct it would appear that the Secret Service had a direct communication link with the FAA from the early stages of the first hijacking. Investigative journalist Tom Flocco had been a regular attendee at the Commission's public hearings. In an online article 17 June 2004 he reported that: "President Bush is attended by a round-the-clock Secret Service detail which would of necessity been connected to the secure phone bridge conference lines. Most Americans think that President Bush first became aware of the attacks when his Chief of Staff Andrew Card whispered in his ear at 9:06 am at the elementary school while he was meeting with the first graders. Facts indicate otherwise. Laura Brown, Public Affairs Director at the FAA, initially told this writer at the first 9-11 hearing in Washington that the phone bridges started around 8:20 or 8:25 am, which would be reasonable since American 11 was determined to be hijacked at 8:13, 8:20 or 8:24 am. This, depending upon which news report, official, or air traffic controller is referenced--and to what extent one permits the government to shorten the official time-line of the actual attacks, thus reducing potential culpability should a grand jury ever be impaneled. After returning to her office and conferring with superiors, Brown sent an email to this writer later that same evening after 7:00 pm, revising her initial assertions for the commencement of Leidig’s phone bridges to around 8:45 am, thus shortening the official attack time-line to the government's advantage." Bush was attending a school in Sarasota, Florida, on 911. According to the November 2001 edition of Sarasota Magazine which was covering the Presidential visit for the local community: "[On the morning of 911] After a four-and-a-half mile run, the President returned to the Colony and showered. He left promptly at 8:35 but not before thanking the Klaubers and the Colony staff, each member personally when possible. The motorcade set out and soon disappeared southward on Gulf of Mexico Drive. The President was on Highway 301, just north of Main Street, heading toward Booker Elementary when, on the phone that Katie Moulton had been admiring just hours before, he received the news that a plane had crashed in New York City. A ride on Air Force One is usually one of the more pleasant perks that members of Congress enjoy. Bradenton’s Congressman Dan Miller had experienced the pleasure three times before. As a Presidential courtesy, it transcends party. Miller, a Republican, had last flown aboard the fabled jet, probably the most famous plane in the world, as the guest of President Clinton. Miller and his wife Glenda had been in Washington for the weekend, but he flew back to his Bradenton home on Monday night. At 8:55 Tuesday morning he was standing in front of Emma E. Booker Elementary School as part of the official greeting party, along with Congressman Adam Putnam. An aide had just whispered to Miller the news of the first plane crash in New York, but if the President yet knew, his greeting as he got out of the limo did not give it away. He did, however, make an unscheduled stop in a communications room, where he talked with Condoleeza Rice in Washington. He then proceeded into a classroom where 16 second graders, led by their teacher, Sandra K. Daniels, were going to demonstrate their reading skills." |
| 465 | "[Footnote] 225. On the NMCC, see DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001. On the Secret Service’s contacts with the FAA, see notes 208, 217. On the Secret Service conveying information to the White House, see DOD transcript, Air Threat Conference Call, Sept. 11, 2001; Nelson Garabito interview (Mar. 11, 2004)." | Who is Nelson Garabito?
Referred to in several footnotes, but not in the main text, he appears to be a member of
the Secret Service.
|
| 465 | "[Footnote] 236 The 113th Wing first learned from the FAA tower at Andrews that the Secret Service wanted fighters airborne. The FAA tower had been contacted by personnel at FAA headquarters, who were on an open line with senior agents from the President’s detail. See Nelson Garabito interview (Mar. 11, 2004); Terry Van Steenbergen interview (Mar. 30, 2004). On the Secret Service agent relaying instructions, see USSS memo, Beauchamp to AD Inspection, September 11 experience, Feb. 23, 2004. On the order to fly weapons free, see David Wherley interview (Feb. 27, 2004); DOD memo, interview of David Wherley, Oct. 3, 2001, p. 12." | This instruction from the
Secret Service only came after all the hijackings had terminated. The report in various places refers to documents which are not available to the public. However, it is apparent that the FAA's involvement with the Secret Service on 911 was far greater than its involvement with the NMCC which appears to have been minimal during the course of the hijackings. |
"Even if the 9/11 Commission has
studiously avoided drawing any explicit conclusions about the real reasons for the failure
of America's defences during the hijacking attacks the relevant events of the day as
diffusely recorded in its own report speak for themselves."
'Protocolgate'
'Fight Smart', 19 September 2004
| "The defense of U.S. airspace on 9/11 was not conducted
in accord with preexisting training and protocols....." THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, JULY 2004 (p 31) |
SUMMARY |
What
The 9/11 Commission Report Said "Air National Guard units with different rules of engagement were scrambled without the knowledge
of the President, NORAD, or the National Military Command Center." "Shortly after the
second attack in New York, a senior Secret Service agent
charged with coordinating the President’s movements established an open line with his
counterpart at the FAA, who soon told him that there were more planes unaccounted
for—possibly hijacked—in addition to the two that had already crashed. Though
the senior agent told someone to convey this information to the Secret Service’s operations center, it either was not passed on or was passed on but
not disseminated..." "By 10:45 there was, however, another
set of fighters circling Washington that had entirely different rules of engagement. These
fighters, part of the 113th Wing of the District of Columbia Air National Guard, launched
out of Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland in response to information passed to them by the
Secret Service.... A
Secret Service agent
had a phone in each ear, one connected to Wherley and the other to a fellow agent at the
White House, relaying instructions that the White House agent said he was getting from the
Vice President......" What Cheney Nearly
Said |
| CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION 3610.01A AND DOD DIRECTIVE
3025.15 REFER TO THE FAA, THE NMCC, THE PRESIDENT, THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENCE, NORAD, AND MILITARY UNITS NOWHERE DO THEY REFER TO THE VICE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRET SERVICE |
| "....it is apparent that the FAA's involvement with the Secret
Service on 911 was far greater than its involvement with the NMCC which appears to
have been minimal during the course of the hijackings." 'Protocolgate' - Who Hijacked the Emergency Response Procedures on 911? 'Fight Smart', 19 September 2004 "The
footnote says 'A senior Secret Service agent charged
with coordinating the President’s movements established an open line with his
counterpart at the FAA'. Although the location is
not stated it seems likely that this 'counterpart' was at FAA headquarters, the
organisation which failed to make any requests for military assistance on 911 as required
by established protocols. Was FAA HQ (if that's who was involved here) lead to
believe by the Secret Service that informing them of the situation was sufficient for
NORAD to be informed or was the Secret Service only communicating with the FAA concerning,
for example, the security of Air Force One? Who in the Secret Service's operation centre
was responsible for not passing on or disseminating the information about hijacked planes
provided in this way by the FAA? Who are Nelson Garabito and Terry Van Steenbergen?" "FAA headquarters were in contact with
the Secret Service headquarters but not the NMCC. Is it possible that the Secret Service
took charge of the FAA HQ's response to the attacks on 911 thereby by-passing the
established chain of command to and through the military and ultimately causing a failed
response to the attacks? Who is the 'Chuck Green' mentioned here? He is not referred to in
the report other than in the footnotes. According to the New York Observer 21 August 2003 'The F.A.A. and the Secret Service, which had an open phone connection,
both knew at 8:20 a.m. that two planes had been hijacked in the New York area and had
their transponders turned off.' Although
this press report may or may not be accurate as to precise timing, if otherwise correct it
would appear that the Secret Service had a direct communication link with the FAA from the
early stages of the first hijacking." It Appears The Secret Service Were Taking Orders From Dick Cheney "Why was the Secret Service issuing
commands to the air force from Cheney and why was Cheney by-passing the NMCC? After the
hijackings were over the fighters at Andrews were launched completely outside the military
chain of command. The Vice President's claim that he was unaware of this does not sit
easily with the statement that 'A Secret Service
agent had a phone in each ear, one connected to Wherley and the other to a fellow agent at
the White House, relaying instructions that the White House agent said he was getting from
the Vice President.' So it remains undetermined
whether the Secret Service were acting unilaterally or in conjunction with the Vice
President. In either case questions of legality are raised." Did Cheney Lie To The 911 Commission? "Dick Cheney, huddled in the
Presidential Emergency Operations Center under the White House, had just urged the
traveling George W. Bush not to return to Washington. The president had left Florida
aboard Air Force One at 9:55 a.m. on 9/11 'with no destination at take-off,' as last
week's 9-11 Commission report noted. Nor had Bush given any known instructions on how to
respond to the attacks.... Nor did the real-time notes taken by two others in the room...
reflect that such a phone call between Bush and Cheney occurred or that such a
major decision as shooting down a U.S. airliner was discussed.... by the time Cheney
issued his shoot-down order ...... the last plane-turned-missile on 9/11, had already
crashed in Pennsylvania...the question of Cheney's
behavior that day is one of many new issues raised
in the remarkably detailed, chilling account laid out in dramatic presentations by the
9-11 Commission. NEWSWEEK has learned that some on
the commission staff were, in fact, highly skeptical of the vice president's account and made their views clearer in an earlier draft of their staff report.
According to one knowledgeable source, some staffers 'flat out didn't believe the call
ever took place.'... the White House vigorously lobbied the commission to change the
language in its report.... The report 'was watered down,' groused one
staffer." |
FAA PROTOCOLS FOR HIJACKINGS APPLICABLE ON 911 - Click Here |
AIRCRAFT PIRACY (HIJACKING) AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES |
"These footnotes identify the relevant FAA and Department of
Defense protocols for emergency response to hijackings as: i) FAA Order 7110.65M ii) FAA Order 7610.4J iii) DOD
memo, CJCS instruction, 'Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne
Objects,' June 1, 2001. The latter in fact has a reference number (CJCSI 3610.01A) although this is not quoted." |
Federal Aviation Administration
"Under
the established protocol (CJCSI 3610.01A)
the FAA is required to communicate with the NMCC whose responsibility is then to set up
the necessary communication link between NORAD and the FAA - a process which clearly
worked satisfactorily before 9/11 according to Mr Berger's own testimony. No
mention is made in [FAAActing Deputy Administrator] Mr Belger's statement of the FAA's
failure to request airforce intercepts via the NMCC in this way at any point during the
hijackings. However, the statement does confirm that 'The FAA security organization was participating in classified
conversations with the intelligence agencies.' No further information is provided about those
conversations. The role of the FAA security organisation is important because Mr Belger
confirms that it 'was
responsible for managing the situation and the communication network with other government
and industry agencies.' No
explanation is give as to why the FAA headquarters was able to communicate with 'intelligence
agencies' on 9/11, but not with the NMCC with whom it had communicated
satisfactorily and 'frequently' in the past during hijack alerts. Mr Belger's statement confirming
satisfactory pre-911 communications with the NMCC is not included in the 9/11
Commission's final report."
'Protocolgate'
'Fight Smart', 19 September 2004
"[During the 9/11 Commission's Twelfth
Public hearing] Mr Belger confirms to the Commission that pre-911 the standard channel for
obtaining a fighter escort for a hijacking was a request submitted to the NMCC and that
the 'FAA would
frequently ask the military, through the NMCC, for airborne surveillance of the hijacked
aircraft to monitor its movements.' Why isn't
Belger quoted on this in the final 9/11 Commission report? No one disputes the fact that the events of 911
were extraordinary but Belger does not explain why no fighter escort requests for any
of the stricken aircraft were put through to the NMCC by FAA headquarters during the
course of the hijackings on 911. Why would the events of 911 justify breaching protocol
and providing a lesser response than for previous 'normal' and less serious hijacking
alerts? Belger says 'On 9/11
FAA did not have formal dedicated communication channels directly to NORAD'. But the relevant protocol specifies that NORAD
is required to set up such communications once a request for military assistance has been
made by the FAA via the NMCC. No such requests were issued on 911. However, Belger does
confirm that 'The FAA
security organization was participating in classified conversations with the intelligence
agencies'. Belger also
states 'After 9/11 the most
significant improvement needed was establishing a direct communications link between FAA
facilities, DOD, and NORAD. We could no longer rely on communication to NORAD through our
Headquarters or through the NMCC.' Belger doesn't explain why that link failed but he does identify it as
the most significant factor in the failed response on 911. Clearly a further investigation
is needed to provide an explanation. However, in his oral evidence Belger
did elaborate as follows: 'Prior to 9/11, the
procedures for managing a traditional hijacked aircraft, as I said, were in place and
pretty well tested.... The most frustrating after-the-fact scenario for me
to understand is to explain is the communication link on that morning between the FAA
operations center and the NMCC.... It is clear I think in the record that at 9:20 the FAA
operations center did call the National Military Command Center and add them into the
hijacking net. I can tell you I've lived through dozens of hijackings in my 30-year FAA
career, as a very low entry-level inspector up through to the headquarters, and they were
always there. They were always on the net, and were always listening in with everybody
else.... this is very, very important, in response to your question.... at 9:20, the NMCC
was called. They were added to this open communication net. In my 30 years of history,
there was always somebody listening to that net.... Real-time
information.... I truly do not mean this to be defensive, but it is a fact -- [I
repeat] there were military people on duty at the FAA Command Center, as Mr. Sliney [FAA
Command Center’s national operations manager] said. They were
participating in what was going on. There were military people in the FAA's Air Traffic
Organization in a situation room. They were participating in what was going on. ' Mr Belger's observations
here are not relayed in the Commission's final report. Apart from the near
total inaction of Rumsfeld and Myers during the attacks this conclusion appears to go
right to the heart of the failed response on 9/11. Why did the communication between FAA
HQ and the NMCC fail on 911, on the very day it was most needed, when Mr Belger confirms
the system had worked satisfactorily in the past with 'frequent' requests for such assistance? Why were communications by FAA HQ
on 911working easily with the 'intelligence agencies' but not with the NMCC? From this
description it is apparent that the 'intelligence
agencies' had a direct line into the FAA security
organisation, the body managing the Washington Operations Centre and responsible for
linking HQ with other FAA facilities during the emergency. It would also appear that FAA
conversations with the 'intelligence agencies' on 911 remain classified."
'Protocolgate'
'Fight Smart', 19 September 2004
"According
to oral evidence given in the same session as Mr Griffith by the FAA's Command
Center’s national operations manager Mr Ben Sliney [during
the 9/11 Commission's Twelfth Public hearing]: '... at the Command Center of course is the military cell, which was our
liaison with the military services. They were present at all of the events that occurred
on 9/11.... If you tell the military you've told the military. They have their own
communication web that I think defeated some of the notification processes, as I've been
listening to today. But in my mind everyone who needed to be notified about the events
transpiring was notified, including the military.' The apparent implication of these remarks is that it was the
military cell at the FAA Command Centre that was responsible for failing to notify the
hijack assistance requests to the NMCC and not the FAA. Despite
their potential importance Mr Sliney's observations here are not relayed in the
Commission's final report."
'Protocolgate'
'Fight Smart', 19 September 2004
| Page | 911 Commission Report Excerpt | Comment |
| 26 | "NORAD heard nothing about the search for American 77." | This is a reference to NORAD centrally. Meanwhile NEADS only found out that Flight 77 was missing when it placed its own call to the FAA's Washington Centre at 9.34 to ask about American 11 (p.27). In the process it was purely by chance that it found out about Flight 77. There was no notification to NORAD from FAA HQ as required by protocol. |
| 27 | "No one at FAA headquarters ever asked for military assistance with American 77." | As was the case with all the other hijackings on 911. |
| 28 | "By 9:34, word of the
hijacking [of Flight 93 which later crashed in Pennsylvania] had reached FAA
headquarters." |
This plane did not crash until 10.03. No FAA request for military assistance was ever issued during this hijacking despite the fact that by 9.38 three high profile targets had been hit by other hijacked aircraft and Flight 93 was also by then known to be a hijacking. |
| 28/29 | "At approximately 9:36, Cleveland advised the Command Center that it was still tracking United 93 and specifically inquired whether someone had requested the military to launch fighter aircraft to intercept the aircraft. Cleveland even told the Command Center it was prepared to contact a nearby military base to make the request. The Command Center told Cleveland that FAA personnel well above them in the chain of command had to make the decision to seek military assistance and were working on the issue." | What on earth does "working on the issue" mean? What decision was there left to make other than to request military assistance - three airliners had already crashed by now. |
| 29 | "From 9:34 to 10:08, a Command Center facility manager provided frequent updates to Acting Deputy Administrator Monte Belger and other executives at FAA headquarters as United 93 headed toward Washington, D.C. At 9:41, Cleveland Center lost United 93’s transponder signal. The controller located it on primary radar, matched its position with visual sightings from other aircraft, and tracked the flight as it turned east, then south. At 9:42, the [FAA] Command Center learned from news reports that a plane had struck the Pentagon. The Command Center’s national operations manager, Ben Sliney, ordered all FAA facilities to instruct all aircraft to land at the nearest airport." | Flight 93 was captured by primary radar despite its transponder being turned off |
| 29/30 | "... At 9:53, FAA headquarters informed the Command Center that the deputy director for air traffic services was talking to Monte Belger about scrambling aircraft...." | Why was no such request
issued to the NMCC? Mr Belger gave evidence at the twelfth and final public hearing held by the the 911 Commission. Only one paragraph of his statement deals with the FAA's failure to communicate with the NMCC on 911 in accordance with protocols (although the protocols themselves are not mentioned). That paragraph states: "Prior to 9/11, FAA’s traditional communication channel with the military during a crisis had been through the National Military Command Center (NMCC). They were always included in the communication net that was used to manage a hijack incident. When a hijacking was reported, FAA security personnel activated a command center in the Washington Operation Center and a senior executive from the FAA’s security organization was responsible for managing the situation and the communication network with other government and industry agencies. FAA would frequently ask the military, through the NMCC, for airborne surveillance of the hijacked aircraft to monitor its movements. On 9/11 FAA did not have formal dedicated communication channels directly to NORAD. Although the FAA had letters of agreement with DOD and the FBI which defined procedures to follow and roles and responsibilities, it became clear that the events of 9/11 went far beyond the scope of those existing agreements. In the Headquarters and in FAA field facilities we were reacting to a real scenario that had not been practiced or modeled. Decision makers were reacting quickly, and in my opinion professionally in an untested environment." Whilst the latter is an assertion which may be true in relation to FAA field facilities it is not self-evident in relation to FAA HQ. An explanation is required as to why standard hijack procedures worked satisfactorily before 9/11 but not on 9/11 itself. Once the first strike on the World Trade Centre had occurred, then never in the history of hijackings can the need to request military air support for the ensuing stricken aircraft from the NMCC have been more urgent or obvious. No such requests were ever made and no substantive explanation for this is offered in the 9/11 Commission's report. Moreover the statement that "On 9/11 FAA did not have formal dedicated communication channels directly to NORAD", may well be true but does not constitute an explanation as to why not. Under the established protocol (CJCSI 3610.01A) the FAA is required to communicate with the NMCC whose responsibility is then to set up the necessary communication link between NORAD and the FAA - a process which clearly worked satisfactorily before 9/11 according to Mr Berger's own testimony. No mention is made in Mr Belger's statement of the FAA's failure to request airforce intercepts via the NMCC in this way at any point during the hijackings. However, the statement does confirm that "The FAA security organization was participating in classified conversations with the intelligence agencies." No further information is provided about those conversations. The role of the FAA security organisation is important because Mr Belger confirms that it "was responsible for managing the situation and the communication network with other government and industry agencies." No explanation is give as to why the FAA headquarters was able to communicate with "intelligence agencies" on 9/11, but not with the NMCC with whom it had communicated satisfactorily and "frequently" in the past during hijack alerts. Mr Belger's statement confirming satisfactory pre-911 communications with the NMCC is not included in the 9/11 Commission's final report. |
| 36 | "The FAA, the White House, and the Defense Department each initiated a multiagency teleconference before 9:30. Because none of these teleconferences—at least before 10:00— included the right officials from both the FAA and Defense Department, none succeeded in meaningfully coordinating the military and FAA response to the hijackings. At about 9:20, security personnel at FAA headquarters set up a hijacking teleconference with several agencies, including the Defense Department. The NMCC officer who participated told us that the call was monitored only periodically because the information was sporadic, it was of little value, and there were other important tasks.The FAA manager of the teleconference also remembered that the military participated only briefly before the Pentagon was hit. Both individuals agreed that the teleconference played no role in coordinating a response to the attacks of 9/11. Acting Deputy Administrator Belger was frustrated to learn later in the morning that the military had not been on the call. At the White House, the video teleconference was conducted from the Situation Room by Richard Clarke, a special assistant to the president long involved in counterterrorism. Logs indicate that it began at 9:25 and included the CIA; the FBI; the departments of State, Justice, and Defense; the FAA; and the White House shelter. The FAA and CIA joined at 9:40....We found no evidence that video teleconference participants had any prior information that American 77 had been hijacked and was heading directly toward Washington. Indeed, it is not clear to us that the video teleconference was fully under way before 9:37, when the Pentagon was struck. Garvey, Belger, and other senior officials from FAA headquarters participated in this video teleconference at various times. We do not know who from Defense participated, but we know that in the first hour none of the personnel involved in managing the crisis did. And none of the information conveyed in the White House video teleconference, at least in the first hour, was being passed to the NMCC." | What were the more important
tasks the NMCC claims it needed to attend to during the hijackings given that it wasn't
involved in the launching of any fighter aircraft as required by the protocols? Although 'security personnel' at FAA HQ had set up a hijacking teleconference with several agencies the one organisation it needed to communicate with most, the NMCC, was not materially participating. Who set up this line of communication that turned out to be a blind alley for the frustrated Mr Belger? How is it that after a multi-million dollar inquiry the Commission is unable to establish who from the Department of Defense participated in the White House video teleconference? |
| 458 | "[Footnote] "102. See FAA regulations, Hijacked Aircraft, Order 7110.65M, para.10-2-6 (2001); David Bottiglia interview (Oct. 1, 2003); FAA report,"Crisis Management Handbook for Significant Events," Feb. 15, 2000. From interviews of controllers at various FAA centers,we learned that an air traffic controller’s first response to an aircraft incident is to notify a supervisor, who then notifies the traffic management unit and the operations manager in charge.The FAA center next notifies the appropriate regional operations center (ROC), which in turn contacts FAA headquarters. Biggio stated that for American 11, the combination of three factors—loss of radio contact, loss of transponder signal, and course deviation—was serious enough for him to contact the ROC in Burlington, Mass. However, without hearing the threatening communication from the cockpit, he doubts Boston Center would have recognized or labeled American 11 'a hijack.' Terry Biggio interview (Sept. 22, 2003); see also Shirley Miller interview (Mar. 30, 2004); Monte Belger interview (Apr. 20, 2004)." "[Footnote] 103. FAA regulations, Special Military Operations, Requests for Service, Order 7610.4J, paras. 7-1-1, 7-1-2 (2001); DOD memo, CJCS instruction, "Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects," June 1, 2001. |
These footnotes identify the
relevant FAA and Department of Defense protocols for emergency response to hijackings as: i) FAA Order 7110.65M ii) FAA Order 7610.4J iii) DOD memo, CJCS instruction, "Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects," June 1, 2001 The latter in fact has a reference number (CJCSI 3610.01A) although this is not quoted.
|
| Michael Canavan (Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security at the Federal Aviation Administration on 911) Second Public Hearing |
"During my tenure at FAA, my staff and I interacted routinely with the intelligence and law enforcement communities. We were advised of current and possible future threats against civil aviation and worked actively to implement measures to protect the flying public against those threats. Throughout 2001, as the intelligence reporting volume increased, the overwhelming majority was focused on likely targets overseas, particularly in the Middle East. Throughout this period, my office issued at least 15 Information Circulars to authorized aviation industry security professionals- corporate security directors, senior management personnel, ground security coordinators, supervisory personnel at overseas locations and as appropriate, to local airline managers and law enforcement personnel on a need-to-know basis. Often times, these were issued in concert with Department of State public announcements and FBI National Law Enforcement Transmittals. Information Circulars contained data derived from law enforcement and intelligence information focusing on domestic and international terrorism threats directed against aviation. The Information Circulars updated U.S. carriers against continuing violence against American citizens and interests around the world, with a particular emphasis on the Middle East, and encouraged airlines to practice a high degree of awareness. For example, one Information Circular described the plot to target a public area in the Los Angeles Airport terminal by Ahmed Ressam- who was arrested in December 1999 while attempting to enter the United States from Canada.... As I recall, the threat reporting during early to mid-2001 centered on U.S. targets abroad. In June and July 2001, the FAA was included in many interagency Counterterrorism Security Group meetings, held at the White House by the National Security Council (NSC) staff, regarding possible attacks in the Arabian Peninsula, Israel, and Europe. In early July, the NSC chaired a meeting at which the interagency was briefed about additional intelligence indicating that terrorist attacks seemed imminent; the Intelligence Community briefers emphasized attacks would likely take place overseas. While we all agreed that attacks within the U.S. would not be ruled out, there was no indication from the Intelligence Community that attacks focused specifically against airlines. Nonetheless, the entire CT [counter terrorism] community, including law enforcement and intelligence agencies, were placed on highest alert and we all sent out notifications for heightened security measures to be put in place immediately. The FAA sent out SD's and IC's to all interested parties." |
Although General Cavanan reports that most threat warnings issued by the FAA related to the Middle East during the summer of 2001, one circular specifically referred to a previous plot to target a public area in the Los Angeles Airport terminal. Canavan also confirms that intelligence reporting volume was increasing throughout 2001. Threat circulars were issued to local airline managers as well as overseas personnel. The circulars focused on both domestic as well as international "terrorism threats directed against aviation". Canavan lays particular emphasis on threat reporting relating to overseas targets made at the White House meetings during June and July. However, a report of one of those meetings attended by the FAA in July 2001 published in the Washington Post 17 May 2002 describes how White House counter-terrorism chief Richard Clarke was of the view that attacks were going to take place in the US. Clarke said "Something spectacular is going to happen, and its going to happen here soon". Nonetheless Canavan confirms that the FAA was placed on highest alert during June and July. If so it is not clear why its lines of communication with the NMCC were not properly established by the time of 911, particularly as General Myers confirmed in his own evidence to the Commission's public hearings that the NMCC "serves as our worldwide monitoring crisis response center". |
| Jane Garvey (Head of Federal Aviation Administration on 911) Seventh Public Hearing |
"During my May 22 testimony before the Commission, I was questioned about the FAA’s knowledge, prior to September 11, of intelligence reports regarding the use of commercial aircraft as weapons of mass destruction. The Commission cited several such reports. The staff of the former FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security Intelligence, which as been subsumed into the Transportation Security Administration, previously prepared a detailed, classified statement regarding those reports for the Joint Inquiry of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Hopefully, that statement answers most of the Commission’s questions regarding those reported episodes. I do not specifically address the incidents here. Instead, I wish to provide brief, general comments to the Commission regarding the FAA’s intelligence capabilities on September 11.... Prior to September 11, the intelligence provided to the FAA did not support a conclusion that there was any specific, credible threat of terrorists using aircraft as suicide weapons for attacks against the United States. This conclusion should not be construed as a failure to maintain a high level of vigilance. The FAA was aware of numerous, more traditional terrorist threats prior to September 11, and constantly warned airlines and airports about those threats, as well as adjusting countermeasures when warranted. The FAA and the intelligence community itself, believed that these more traditional terrorist threats – the bombing of aircraft, and hijacking and hostage taking – posed the more likely threats to aviation." |
Ms Garvey's testimony of 22 May 2003 states that "following the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 it became obvious that the general terrorist threat in the United States had increased. It was not immediately clear what the threat might be with respect to domestic civil aviation but evaluation of the intelligence that continued to come in drove the FAA Office of Intelligence to the conclusion that some terrorist groups were preoccupied with the idea of attacking civil aviation and that, in fact the domestic threat to civil aviation had, in fact, increased.... We wish we had received the FBI/Phoenix memo on flight school students - and it would have worried us a lot - but we did not." It appears that some or all of the FAA's statement on pre-911 intelligence reporting provided to previous congressional Joint Inquiry investigations may remain 'classified'. The initial response to a hijacking of any kind is to launch fighter escort aircraft. This is the same for both conventional hijackings and those of the suicide type executed on 911. Ms Garvey does not explain why FAA headquarters did not request fighter escorts on 911. This anomaly is particularly difficult to understand given Ms Garvey's acknowledgement of the FAA's pre-911 recognition of the risk of "more traditional" hijackings and the resulting "constant" warnings to airlines and adjustment of "counter measures". |
| Cathal Flynn (FAA Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security 1993 - 2000) Seventh Public Hearing |
"The statement of Ms. Jane Garvey, former Administrator of the FAA, to the Commission on May 22, 2003, summarized the development of the national aviation security program from its beginning..... I will try to avoid repeating these excellent summaries..... From 1993 to 2000, aviation security was implemented in an environment shaped by several developments and events: memory of the Pan Am 103 catastrophe and national determination that nothing like it should happen again; the World Trade Center bombing of February 1993 and the discovery, in the post-bombing investigations, of previously un-noticed groups within the United States that at least seemed to be connected with Middle Eastern terrorist organizations; the 'Manila Conspiracy', also called the 'Bojinka Plot', that aimed in early 1995 to destroy as many as twelve U.S. airliners nearly simultaneously as they flew from airports in East Asia; growing awareness of the al Qaeda terrorist organization; and the crash of TWA flight 800 on July 17, 1996, which initially appeared to have been caused by an on-board bomb and thus raised national awareness of a possible terrorist threat to aviation within the United States. The investigations stemming from the World Trade Center attack revealed terrorist interest in civil aviation within the United States. Because of that, and because Middle East-connected terrorists had a propensity to attack aviation, additional security measures were imposed by security directives and program amendments, at first only for a time around salient events such as the sentencing of World Trade Center terrorists. Later in 1995, the measures were re-implemented with some changes, and kept in effect.... By 1995, the FAA had become convinced that the baseline of aviation security, the aggregate of the permanent carrier and airport programs, had to be raised.....With the support of the Secretary of Transportation and the National Security Council staff, the FAA determined that its Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) was the forum in which to achieve the consensus for a new baseline. The ASAC met and formed the Baseline Working Group on July 17, 1996. Deputy Secretary of Transportation Mortimer Downey and Congressman James Oberstar addressed the ASAC and strongly endorsed raising aviation security in this manner. The destruction of TWA flight 800, which followed the Baseline Working Group’s creation by only a few hours, accelerated a process already underway. President Clinton formed the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security on July 25. Its members included the Directors of Central Intelligence and the FBI...... If, as has been reported, some of the terrorists used the names by which intelligence agencies knew them, the attacks could have been disrupted, perhaps completely defeated, simply by requiring all airlines to deny them boarding and report their reservations to law enforcement agencies. " |
Nonetheless Admiral Flynn confirms FAA pre-911 awareness that "The investigations stemming from the [1993] World Trade Center attack revealed terrorist interest in civil aviation within the United States." Because of that "additional security measures were imposed by security directives and program amendments"although these are not elucidated here. He confirms FAA pre-911 awareness of "previously un-noticed groups within the United States that at least seemed to be connected with Middle Eastern terrorist organizations" and of "of a possible terrorist threat to aviation within the United States." It is clear from these remarks that the potential for attacks on aviation launched from within the United States was recognised by the FAA pre-911. The last major airline security event within the US was in 1996 (TWA flight 800) which accelerated a review of aviation security. Admiral Flynn bluntly states that "If, as has been reported, some of the terrorists used the names by which intelligence agencies knew them, the attacks could have been disrupted, perhaps completely defeated, simply by requiring all airlines to deny them boarding and report their reservations to law enforcement agencies." In this respect a report in the New York Times 25 March 2004 is relevant. It states "Reprising the scene in the White House on 9/11, [head of counter terrorism Richard] Clarke says he took a call from Dale Watson, the FBI's counterterrorism chief. 'We got the passenger manifests from the airlines,' Watson said. 'We recognize some names, Dick. They're al-Qaida.' Clarke recalled: 'I was stunned, not that the attack was al-Qaida but that there were al-Qaida operatives on board aircraft using names that FBI knew were al-Qaida.' Watson told Clarke that 'CIA forgot to tell us about them.'" |
| Claudio Manno (FAA Director of the Office of Intelligence on 911) Seventh Public Hearing |
"On September 11, 2001, I was the Director of the Office of Intelligence, which was part of the Office of Civil Aviation Security of the FAA. My responsibilities were to oversee and manage the receipt, identification, analysis and dissemination of intelligence information focusing on terrorism and other threats to U.S. civil aviation. In this role, I provided intelligence support to the Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security, other principal officials of the FAA, and the Office of Security and Intelligence at the Department of Transportation. Although the magnitude of the events of September 11, 2001, had not previously been seen, FAA’s Intelligence Watch had managed multiple aviation crises prior to the tragic suicide hijackings..... Prior to September 11, 2001, the FAA Office of Intelligence received, on a daily basis, a steady stream of raw reporting and finished intelligence from DOS, CIA, NSA, and DIA. The reporting included items that were sent electronically, hard-copy products received via courier, and cables and finished intelligence retrieved using a variety of Intelligence Community databases. From this intelligence flow, FAA analysts working on a 24-hour Intelligence Watch identified, on average, between one and two hundred classified cables, reports, hard-copy products, faxes and e-mails each day that merited closer review. To further ensure the receipt of relevant information needed for the accurate assessment of threats to civil aviation, FAA assigned intelligence liaison officers to the CIA, FBI and DOS. Their primary duties were to identify and pursue information regarding actual or potential threats to civil aviation. By integrating FAA analysts into these agencies, additional access to intelligence was obtained. The access included the ability to read and review information that is disseminated externally to other agencies, as well as internal, operational, 'in-house' e-mails and message traffic that is not shared with outside agencies. As a result, FAA liaison officers often gained insight and information about a terrorist threat or incident that was not officially passed to other agencies; in these cases, they requested release of the information and would educate the agencies as to why such information was of importance to the FAA. In some cases, they were successful in getting access for FAA; in other situations, due to sensitivity of sources and methods, the information was not approved for release. FAA understood that this was the trade-off for those agencies granting the liaison officers access to their information. FAA fully appreciated restriction of access based on the 'need-to know' principle and the requirement to protect sensitive intelligence sources and methods." |
This statement sets out the degree to which the FAA was reliant on external US intelligence agencies (CIA, FBI etc) for anticipating potential terrorist threats to US civil aviation. |
| Monte
Belger (FAA Acting Deputy Administrator on 911) Twelfth Public Hearing |
"On the morning of September 11th, the first indication to the FAA Headquarters of a potential problem was sometime after 8:30am when our Air Traffic office in HQ received a report that an American airlines aircraft had a communication problem. The Boston Center was aware that AA-11 was in distress and had started the process for a possible hijacked aircraft. Our air traffic personnel in the HQ immediately began to gather information from the field facilities. My first knowledge of a problem that morning was upon my return to my office from a meeting in the FAA HQ building. I was advised that an aircraft had hit the World Trade Center. I immediately went into the FAA Operations center and began to gather information. The initial reports to me were unclear—we did not immediately know that AA-11 had crashed into the World Trade Center. We launched into an information gathering response in HQ. Our Air Traffic HQ group established communications with the field facilities to get as much information as quickly as possible. And the tactical communications net, managed by FAA Security, was established in the Washington Operations Center to link HQ with other FAA facilities. I contacted the FAA Administrator who was in a meeting at the Department of Transportation and she immediately returned to the FAA building. During this time period I had several phone conversations with Sec. Mineta and his Chief of Staff. I was on the phone with his Chief of Staff when the second aircraft hit the Trade When UAL 175 crashed into the second tower it was clear that we were dealing with deliberate actions..... Prior to 9/11, FAA’s traditional communication channel with the military during a crisis had been through the National Military Command Center (NMCC). They were always included in the communication net that was used to manage a hijack incident. When a hijacking was reported, FAA security personnel activated a command center in the Washington Operation Center and a senior executive from the FAA’s security organization was responsible for managing the situation and the communication network with other government and industry agencies. FAA would frequently ask the military, through the NMCC, for airborne surveillance of the hijacked aircraft to monitor its movements. On 9/11 FAA did not have formal dedicated communication channels directly to NORAD. Although the FAA had letters of agreement with DOD [Department of Defense] and the FBI which defined procedures to follow and roles and responsibilities, it became clear that |