Bio-terrorism and the Gill rDNA trajectory
"It's time for
biologists to begin asking what means we have to keep the
technology from being used in subverted ways,"
Professor Matthew Meselson, molecular
biologist, Harvard University,
Nature 411,
232 - 235 (2001)
(the address of this page is www.btinternet.com/~nlpwessex/Documents/Bio-terrorism.htm )
19 May 2001
Ben Gill, President of the National Farmers Union of England and Wales, upset a lot of people around the world earlier this week by suggesting that eco-terrorists might have been responsible for the recent outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in the UK.
Ben Gill enjoys a particularly poor relationship with many environmentalists on account of what is seen to be his misplaced enthusiasm for genetic engineering (hence the moniker 'Biotec Ben'). His controversial remarks on foot-and-mouth were made during a trip to Australia.
It is ironic, therefore, that by the end of the week it should be the Sydney Morning Herald [1] which featured an article on how genetic engineering is running the distinct risk of placing enormous power in the hands of international terrorists with the eventual prospect of powerful - yet relatively cheap to build - bioweapons proliferating across the planet.
One thing that should have been learnt from the foot-and-mouth epidemic in the UK is that the consequences of losing control of our agricultural biology can be immense. Can it be hoped, then, that Ben Gill will begin to reflect a little more deeply on where the recombinant DNA (rDNA) genetic engineering paradigm in general is leading humanity; and on what the downside of pursuing that trajectory is?
Foot-and-mouth (a non-fatal disease from which most animals make a full recovery) is but a minor irritant compared to the biological catastrophe that is capable of emerging out of the genetic engineering tool shed before too long. The more this technology is developed, the more diverse the applications; the more it becomes impossible to regulate; and the more diverse the hands into which its methods legally or illegally fall.
Whilst some may hope for more productive sustainable agriculture from genetic engineering (even though there is scant scientific evidence for this [2] ) the scope for creating new plant and animal diseases both intentionally and unintentionally is real and immense. No Star Wars missile defence system - however expensive - has any relevance in this context.
Alarmist nonsense? Well, even the UK's normally conservative Farmers Weekly has run hair-curling copy on the subject of genetic engineering and biological warfare in both human and agricultural contexts. The creation of new biotech generated diseases targeted at a nation's agricultural production is no longer simply a matter of speculation as its report on 12 November 1999 indicated:
"A panel of experts in plant diseases and terrorism revealed how vulnerable agriculture is to bio-terrorism - the use of pathogens to cause a food crop epidemic or contaminate the food supply.
The risks are very real, according to plant pathologists, the FBI and the international intelligence community gathered at the American and Canadian Phytopathological Society symposium in Montreal's Palais de Congres....
The .... Cold War and advances in the biological sciences led to the creation of weapons engineered to infect people.... The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention was supposed to end the race to develop even nastier bio-weapons.
But in 1992, a senior Soviet Union biomedical research scientist Kanatjian Alibekov, now known as Ken Alibek, defected. He told a stunning tale about his career in the Biopreparat, his former nation's massive biological weapons programme.
Now documented in his book 'Biohazard', it makes clear the USSR's military production of large quantities of advanced bio-weapons, including anti-crop bioweapons, right into this decade.
Although now disbanded, the question remains as to where have the thousands of Biopreparat scientists and technicians gone and what are they doing, Christopher Davis, a former British intelligence officer wrote in the May 29 issue of 'New Scientist'..."
A good, if somewhat disturbing, question. Is there, for
example, a connection between these developments - or indeed the
release of GM crops - and the arrival of new mysterious corn
viruses in the US ? [3] Well, nobody knows (or is saying) - but to use
the phrase deployed by an NFU spokesman to defend Ben Gill's
foot-and-mouth bio-terrorism suggestion: "It is
one of many possibilities that cannot be ruled out".
Meanwhile the scientific journal Nature reports
this week that "government agencies are already
working on methods of detecting disease outbreaks caused by
genetically engineered organisms." [4]
In this context those who encourage the proliferation of the development of recombinant DNA technology, and the inevitable abuse of the so-called 'knowledge' that goes with that development, are likely to have considerably more to worry about in the future than the management of a relatively harmless farm animal disease and the protection of the British tourist industry.
If you fly too close to the sun eventually your wax wings will melt. 'Apocalypse now' or 'apocalypse soon'?
rDNA is no respecter of natural law, and terrorism is no
respecter of man-made law. No regulatory system, however
well-intentioned and complex, can possibly deal with this
combination. Only an entirely new paradigm for the biosciences
and global security can guarantee 'apocalypse never' [5, 6].
We should pursue it.
NATURAL LAW PARTY WESSEX
nlpwessex@bigfoot.com
www.btinternet.com/~nlpwessex
Footnotes:
1. 'Mutant bacteria biowars
threaten apocalypse now' www.smh.com.au/news/0105/17/world/world3.html
2. 'Will GM crops deliver
benefits to farmers?' www.btinternet.com/~nlpwessex/Documents/gmagric.htm
3.
'Georgia Unknown' www.btinternet.com/~nlpwessex/Documents/NewUScornviruses.htm
4. 'The
bugs of war'
www.nature.com/cgi-taf/DynaPage.taf?file=/nature/journal/v411/n6835/full/411232a0_fs.html
5. 'Lifesciences Breakthrough for Sustainable Health and
Agriculture'
www.btinternet.com/~nlpwessex/Documents/biosciencefrontier.htm
6. SAPRA - 'Security and
political risk analysis'
http://www.subcontinent.com/sapra/military/m_1999_05_01.html
Losing Control of Global Biosecurity - Sept 2001 Update
Sydney Morning Herald
Thursday, May 17, 2001
http://www.smh.com.au/news/0105/17/world/world3.html
Mutant bacteria biowars threaten apocalypse now
Genetic engineers already have it within their grasp to devise a lethal bio-weapon for terrorists and rogue states, the British science publication Nature warns this week.
Small changes in the DNA of well-known bacteria and viruses could turn these agents into mass killers, the journal says.
The publication echoes warnings by a pair of Australian scientists, Dr Ron Jackson and Dr Ian Ramshaw, who accidentally created an astonishingly virulent strain of mousepox, a cousin of smallpox, among laboratory mice.
They realised that if similar genetic manipulation was carried out on smallpox, an unstoppable killer could be unleashed. They decided to publish their findings in January to draw attention to the potential misuse of biotechnology.
Nature warns: "Making subtle genetic alterations to existing pathogens to increase their virulence or durability in the environment, or to make them harder to detect or to treat with drugs, is within the limits of today's technology.
"With the decoding of a pathogen's entire genome now commonplace, and transgenic techniques advancing all the time, some researchers believe that the sinister potential of biology can no longer be ignored."
Biowarfare - use of germs or viruses such as anthrax or smallpox - has long been considered by military strategists. However, the risk has increased thanks to advances in knowledge about how genes work, new techniques for moving pieces of DNA around, and the relative ease with which a rogue organisation could build or hire a lab to build such a weapon.
Scientists interviewed by Nature ruled out, for the time being, the ability to build new, artificial agents from a set of component parts.
A far simpler way would be to tweak the performance of an existing bacteria to make it more resistant to antibiotics, they said.
The genetic sequences of bacteria such as tuberculosis, cholera, leprosy and the plague are already in the public domain - as is that of a food poisoning bug, Staphylococcus aureus, that is already becoming resistant to antibiotics.
By identifying the genes from Staphylococcus aureus that make the bug resistant, and inserting them into the other bacteria, a scientist could make a killer for which there would be scant defence.
Dr Willem Stemmer, chief scientist with Maxygen, a California pharmaceutical research firm, used one of these techniques to explore how resistance genes work, Nature reports. He created a strain of the common intestinal bug Escherichia coli that was 32,000 times more resistant to the antibiotic cefotaxime than conventional strains. He destroyed the superbug in response to the American Society for Microbiology's concerns about potential misuse.
"It's time for biologists to begin asking what means we have to keep the technology from being used in subverted ways," said Harvard University molecular biologist Professor Matthew Meselson, who has often spoken of the dangers of biowarfare.
Agence France-Presse
Biological Weapons and the New Genetics - Avoiding the Threat
Friday 18th May, 2001
(10.00am to 4.30pm)
School of Oriental and African Studies
Russell Square, London
Genetic engineering could make biological weapons more attractive to aggressors by making them more rapid and effective at causing death or disease or by enabling weapons to be targeted at certain ethnic groups. 2001 is crucial for biological arms control - proposals for new, more stringent international laws due for agreement in December now hang in the balance.
This conference will provide up-to-date information on genetic technologies and biological weapons, how to prevent their production and use, and the international negotiations taking place. It will also look at the special role scientists will have to play in ensuring their knowledge is not abused. The conference will be of interest to scientists, the biotechnology industry, the media, and all those interested in genetics, peace and arms control.
Speakers include:
Professor Malcolm Dando - Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford
Dr Jeff Kipling - Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry
Jan van Aken, Sunshine Project, Germany
Oliver Meier, VERTIC
Dr Brian Balmer, University College London
Dr Alistair Hay, University of Leeds
Cost:
£10 (£5 unwaged), including lunch.
Please make cheques payable to GeneWatch UK.
NB: This is a ticketed conference and application in advance is
essential. Places are limited so it is advisable to book as early
as possible.
For more information and reservations please contact GeneWatch UK.
GeneWatch UK, The Mill House, Manchester Road,
Tideswell, Buxton, Derbyshire, SK17 8LN, UK
Phone: + 44 (0)1298 871898 Fax: + 44 (0)1298 872531
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New Scientist - Bioterrorism Special Report
