'Fight Smart' Update - 19 September 2004

Don't Take the Bait - Fight Smart
ANIMATED 911 SUMMARY - CLICK HERE

'Protocolgate'
911 Commission Report
The US Air Defence Failure On 911
Who Hijacked The Emergency Response Procedures On 911?
www.btinternet.com/~nlpwessex/Documents/WAT911airresponse.htm
Why Were Cheney And The Secret Service In The Loop
And Rumsfeld, Myers And The President Out On 911?

"Civilizations fall not because of external attack, but because of internal rot."
Coleen Rowley FBI agent who blew the whistle on her superiors' pre-911blocking
of an application for a warrant to search the computer of  Zacarias Moussaoui, the suspected 20th hijacker
Rowley to leave FBI at year's end
Star Tribune, 9 September 2004

"If it weren't for Coleen Rowley, there would be no 9/11 commission . . . The whole thing would have been covered up."
Ray McGovern, former CIA analyst and Presidential intelligence briefer
Rowley to leave FBI at year's end
Star Tribune, 9 September 2004

"Most of the intelligence community recognized in the summer of 2001 that the number and severity of threat reports were unprecedented. Many officials told us that they knew something terrible was planned...."
THE 9/11COMMISSION REPORT (p.262)

"FBI information since that time [1998] indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York.... "
'Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US'
Presidential Daily Brief received by President George W. Bush on August 6, 2001
THE 9/11COMMISSION REPORT (p.262)

"In most cases, the chain of command authorizing the use of force runs from the president to the secretary of defense and from the secretary to the combatant commander. The President apparently spoke to Secretary Rumsfeld for the first time that morning [of 9/11] shortly after 10:00. No one can recall the content of this conversation, but it was a brief call in which the subject of shoot down authority was not discussed.... Secretary Rumsfeld told us he was just gaining situational awareness when he spoke with the Vice President at 10:39."
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, JULY 2004 (p 43/44)

"Not only was Mr Rumsfeld bypassed in the normal chain of command for such a shoot-down order, but the command from Vice President Dick Cheney that the airliners be 'taken out' did not reach the fighter planes until after the last ill-fated airliner had crashed in Pennsylvania, the special commission said."
Rumsfeld 'bypassed', says probe body
Dawn (Pakistan), 18 June 2004

"[During the twelfth and last public hearing FAA Acting Deputy Administrator on 911 Monte] Belger confirms to the Commission that pre-911 the standard channel for obtaining a fighter escort for a hijacking was a request submitted to the NMCC and that the 'FAA would frequently ask the military, through the NMCC, for airborne surveillance of the hijacked aircraft to monitor its movements.' Why isn't Belger quoted on this in the final 9/11 Commission report? No one disputes the fact that the events of 911 were extraordinary but Belger does not explain why no fighter escort requests for any of the stricken aircraft were put through to the NMCC by FAA headquarters during the course of the hijackings on 911. Why would the events of 911 justify breaching protocol and providing a lesser response than for previous 'normal' and less serious hijacking alerts?"
The US Air Defence Response On 911
'Fight Smart', 19 September 2004

"According to a statement from NORAD, 'Before September 11th, 01, NORAD regularly conducted a variety of exercises that included hijack scenarios. These exercises tested track detection and identification; scramble and interception; hijack procedures; internal and external agency coordination and operational security and communications security procedures..... At the NORAD headquarters' level we normally conducted four major exercises a year, most of which included a hijack scenario.'"
NORAD exercise had jet crashing into building
CNN, 19 April 2004

"In the two years before the Sept. 11 attacks, the North American Aerospace Defense Command conducted exercises simulating what the White House says was unimaginable at the time: hijacked airliners used as weapons to crash into targets and cause mass casualties. One of the imagined targets was the World Trade Center.... [there were] early drills, including one operation, planned in July 2001 and conducted later, that involved planes from airports in Utah and Washington state that were 'hijacked.' Those planes were escorted by U.S. and Canadian aircraft to airfields in British Columbia and Alaska. NORAD officials have acknowledged that 'scriptwriters' for the drills included the idea of hijacked aircraft being used as weapons.... Until Sept. 11, 2001, NORAD conducted four major exercises a year. Most included a hijack scenario.'"
NORAD had drills of jets as weapons
USA Today, 18 April 2004

"The commission had to subpoena the F.A.A. for documents, had to subpoena NORAD for documents and they will never get the full story. That is one of the tragedies. One of these days we will have to get the full story because the 9-11 issue is so important to America. But this White House wants to cover it up."
Former Senator Max Cleland who stepped down from the 9/11 Commission December 2003
Interview with 'Democracy Now', 23 March 2004

"The defense of U.S. airspace on 9/11 was not conducted in accord with preexisting training and protocols....." THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, JULY 2004 (p 31)

'Mission Accomplished' US Commander-In-Chief, President George Bush On The Aircraft Carrier The USS Abraham Lincoln In 2003 Celebrating The Invasion Of Iraq That Stemmed From The US's Failure To Defend Itself On 911 A Failure Which Also Resulted In The Invasion Of Afghanistan In 2001

Who Hijacked The Protocols On 911? "Air Force jet fighters could have intercepted hijacked airliners roaring toward the World Trade Center and Pentagon on 9/11.... The never-heard-before declaration by Gen. Ralph Eberhart [Commander of NORAD on 911] stunned the hearings on the terror attacks..... 'If the FAA told us as soon as they knew, then, yes, we could have shot down the planes,' said Eberhart......'We would have been able to shoot down all three . . . all four of them,' said Eberhart, who was named commander of NORAD after Sept. 11..... During the hearing, a furious commissioner Bob Kerrey raised his voice and asked the FAA what the 'hell' had been going on." 13 Minutes: Fed's Stunning Hijack Blunder New York Post, 18 June 2004 "Prior to 9/11, FAA's traditional communication channel with the military during a crisis had been through the National Military Command Center (NMCC). They were always included in the communication net that was used to manage a hijack incident. When a hijacking was reported, FAA security personnel activated a command center in the Washington Operation Center and a senior executive from the FAA's security organization was responsible for managing the situation and the communication network with other government and industry agencies. FAA would frequently ask the military, through the NMCC, for airborne surveillance of the hijacked aircraft to monitor its movements." Monte Belger, FAA Acting Deputy Administrator on 911 9/11 Commission, Twelfth Public Hearing, Written Statement "FAA headquarters began to follow the hijack protocol [for the first hijacking on 911] but did not contact the NMCC [National Military Command Centre] to request a fighter escort....." THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, JULY 2004 (p 19) "The first indication that the NORAD air defenders had of the second hijacked aircraft, United 175, came in a phone call from [FAA] New York Center to NEADS at 9:03. [the very minute that it hit the WTC - FAA headquarters had not requested fighter aircraft support from the NMCC as required by protocol]" THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, JULY 2004 (p 23) "No one at FAA headquarters ever asked for military assistance with [the third hijacking] American 77." THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, JULY 2004 (p 27) "Despite the discussions about military assistance, no one from FAA headquarters requested military assistance regarding United 93 [the fourth hijacking]. Nor did any manager at FAA headquarters pass any of the information it had about United 93 to the military." THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, JULY 2004 (p 30) "In [FAA] Headquarters, Air Traffic Services set up an additional situation room in the front office that was occupied by DOD [Department of Defense] liaison officers who worked on the Air Traffic Services Headquarters staff.... At the FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Center, the military officers assigned to the Air Traffic Services Cell became immediately involved in coordinating FAA Air Traffic Control System Command Center actions with military elements." Jeff Griffith, FAA Deputy Director of Air Traffic on 911 9/11 Commission, Twelfth Public Hearing, Written Statement "... at the Command Center of course is the military cell, which was our liaison with the military services. They were present at all of the events that occurred on 9/11....  They have their own communication web that I think defeated some of the notification processes, as I've been listening to today. But in my mind everyone who needed to be notified about the events transpiring was notified, including the military." Ben Sliney, FAA Command Center’s National Operations Manager 9/11 Commission, Twelfth Public Hearing, Oral Evidence "Prior to 9/11, the procedures for managing a traditional hijacked aircraft, as I said, were in place and pretty well tested.... The most frustrating after-the-fact scenario for me to understand is to explain is the communication link on that morning between the FAA operations center and the NMCC....  The hijacking net is an open communication net run by the FAA hijack coordinator, who is a senior person from the FAA security organization, for the purpose of getting the affected federal agencies together to hear information at the same time.... It was my assumption that morning, as it had been for my 30 years of experience with the FAA, that the NMCC was on that net and hearing everything real-time..... I can tell you I've lived through dozens of hijackings in my 30-year FAA career, as a very low entry-level inspector up through to the headquarters, and they were always there. They were always on the net, and were always listening in with everybody else.....  from my perspective there is no doubt in my mind that the FAA security organization knew what to do. There is no doubt in my mind that the air traffic organization knew what to do. They are the two key players in that type of scenario.... this is very, very important, in response to your question.... the NMCC was called. They were added to this open communication net. In my 30 years of history, there was always somebody listening to that net..... I truly do not mean this to be defensive, but it is a fact -- there were military people on duty at the FAA Command Center, as Mr. Sliney said. They were participating in what was going on. There were military people in the FAA's Air Traffic Organization in a situation room. They were participating in what was going on." Monte Belger, FAA Acting Deputy Administrator on 911 9/11 Commission, Twelfth Public Hearing, Oral Evidence "....As Mr. Belger stated, from my point of view I'm absolutely sure that our field managers know -- knew on 9/11 what to do in the event of a hijacking. The procedures are very cleared. The procedures are trained as a matter of refresher training in our operational facilities every year..... There are protocols, there are check lists, there are folders that are kept in operational positions where people have responsibility for reporting. And through the years -- not only for hijackings, but aircraft accidents and other incidents -- reporting is a very high priority. So it surprises me that people would think our managers didn't know how to report." Jeff Griffith, FAA Deputy Director of Air Traffic on 911 9/11 Commission, Twelfth Public Hearing, Oral Evidence "Shortly after the second attack in New York, a senior Secret Service agent charged with coordinating the President’s movements established an open line with his counterpart at the FAA, who soon told him that there were more planes unaccounted for—possibly hijacked—in addition to the two that had already crashed. Though the senior agent told someone to convey this information to the Secret Service’s operations center, it either was not passed on or was passed on but not disseminated..." THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, JULY 2004 (p 464) "The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 were a call to arms." General Ralph Eberhart, Commander of NORAD on 911 9/11 Commission, Twelfth Public Hearing, Oral Evidence "Both civilian and military officials of the Defense Department state flatly that neither Congress nor the American public would have supported large-scale military operations in Afghanistan before the shock of 9/11." The Military 9/11 Commission Staff Statement No 6, 2004 "On the afternoon of 9/11, according to contemporaneous notes, Secretary Rumsfeld instructed General Myers to obtain quickly as much information as possible..... He thought the U.S. response should consider a wide range of options and possibilities. The secretary said his instinct was to hit Saddam Hussein at the same time......" THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, JULY 2004 (p 334/335)

AWOL
'MISSING IN NON-ACTION ACCOMPLISHED'
"[On 911] The Secretary of Defense did not enter the chain of command until the morning's key events were over."
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, JULY 2004,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

".... The employment of U.S. military forces in response to acts or threats of domestic terrorism may be requested only by the President (or in accordance with Presidential Decision Directives) and must be authorized by the President. All requests for assistance in responding to acts or threats of domestic terrorism must also be approved by the Secretary of Defense...... The Secretary of Defense shall manage the DoD’s response to any acts or threats of terrorism..... The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall assist the Secretary of Defense when he or she is implementing the DoD operational response to acts or threats of terrorism. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall at all times maintain contingency plans for use in counterterrorism situations....."
Military Assistance to Civil Authorities
Department of Defense Directive No 3025.15, February 18, 1997

"What the 9-11 Commission Report does not explain is why, on the morning of September 11, 2001, President Bush, Donald Rumsfeld, and other top officials were essentially missing in action..... even though the commission’s report paints a stark portrait of opportunities lost in defending against terrorism, many observers—especially the families of some 9/11 victims, who pushed hard for the commission’s creation—were disappointed in its failure to provide a timeline of the actions of the nation’s top leaders that morning. Such an analysis, they believe, would have shown conclusively that blame for failing to defend against the attacks goes all the way to the top.... 'We still don’t have a full accounting of Rumsfeld’s whereabouts and knowledge on the morning of 9-11,' [9/11 Commissioner Jamie] Gorelick acknowledged after the commission’s final public hearing. 'We don’t have answers to the questions that you’re asking. But I’m going to make sure it’s nailed down,' she promised. Yet the final published report offers no further details on Rumsfeld’s inactions or the reason he was 'out of the loop' (as the secretary himself put it) that morning. The National Military Command Center (NMCC) inside the Pentagon was the nerve center of the military’s response to the attacks on 9-11. But the lead military officer that day, Brigadier General Montague Winfield, told the commission that the center had been leaderless. 'For 30 minutes we couldn’t find [Secretary Rumsfeld].' Where was Rumsfeld on 9-11? I put the question to the commission's vice chair, Lee Hamilton, following the release of the report the commissioners call 'the definitive account of 9-11.'.... Was the commission comfortable with the fact that the country’s Secretary of Defense was not in the chain of command or present in the Pentagon’s command center until all four suicide hijacked planes were down? 'I’m not going to answer that question,' said Hamilton, and turned away."
Who's in Charge Here?
Mother Jones, 22 July 2004

"Donald Rumsfeld, one of the chief opponents of investing real power over purse and personnel in a new national intelligence chief, told the 9/11 commission that an intelligence czar would do the nation 'a great disservice.'  It is fair to ask what kind of service Rumsfeld provided on the day the nation was under catastrophic attack. 'Two planes hitting the twin towers did not rise to the level of Rumsfeld's leaving his office and going to the War Room? How can that be?' asked Mindy Kleinberg, one of the widows known as the Jersey Girls, whose efforts helped create and guide the 9/11 commission. The fact that the final report failed to offer an explanation is one of the infuriating holes in an otherwise praiseworthy accounting. Rumsfeld was missing in action that morning, 'out of the loop' by his own admission. The lead military officer that day, Brig. Gen. Montague Winfield, told the commission that the Pentagon's command center had been essentially leaderless: 'For 30 minutes we couldn't find' Rumsfeld. For more than two hours after the Federal Aviation Administration became aware that the first plane had been violently overtaken by Middle Eastern men, the man whose job it was to order air cover over Washington did not show up in the Pentagon's command center. It took him almost two hours to 'gain situational awareness,' he told the commission. He didn't speak to the vice president until 10:39 a.m., according to the report. Since that was more than 30 minutes after the last hijacked plane crashed, it would seem to be an admission of dereliction of duty.... Rumsfeld is in charge of NORAD, which has the specific mission of protecting the United States and Canada by responding to any form of air attack. The official chain of command in the event of a hijacking calls for the president to empower the secretary of Defense to send up a military escort and, if necessary, give shoot-down orders. Yet President Bush told the panel he spoke to Rumsfeld for the first time that morning shortly after 10 a.m.? 23 minutes after the Pentagon was hit and moments before the last plane went down. It was, says the report, 'a brief call in which the subject of shoot-down authority was not discussed.' As a result, NORAD's commanders were left in the dark about what their mission was..... Why wasn't Rumsfeld able to see on TV what millions of civilians already knew?...  How is it that civilians in a hijacked plane were able to communicate with their loved ones, grasp a totally new kind of enemy and weaponry and act to defend the nation's Capitol, yet the president had 'communication problems' on Air Force One and the nation's defense chief didn't know what was going on until the horror was all over? "
Rumsfeld and Bush Failed Us on Sept. 11
The Los Angeles Times, 13 August 2004

"A Zogby poll released Monday said that 49 percent of New York City residents believed that national leaders 'knew in advance that attacks were planned . . . and that they consciously failed to act.'"
9/11 Referenced as a Defining Moment
Washington Post, 1 September 2004

"On Sept. 10.... a group of top Pentagon officials suddenly canceled travel plans for the next morning, apparently because of security concerns."
Bush: ‘We’re At War’
Newsweek, 24 September 2001

"On the eve of a Republican National Convention invoking 9/11 symbols, sound bytes and imagery, half (49.3%) of New York City residents and 41% of New York citizens overall say that some of our leaders 'knew in advance that attacks were planned on or around September 11, 2001, and that they consciously failed to act,' according to the poll conducted by Zogby International. The poll of New York residents was conducted from Tuesday August 24 through Thursday August 26, 2004.... The poll is the first of its kind conducted in America that surveys attitudes regarding U.S. government complicity in the 9/11 tragedy. Despite the acute legal and political implications of this accusation, nearly 30% of registered Republicans and over 38% of those who described themselves as 'very conservative' supported the claim...... Less than two in five (36%) believe that the 9/11 Commission had 'answered all the important questions about what actually happened on September 11th,' and two in three (66%) New Yorkers (and 56.2% overall) called for another full investigation of the 'still unanswered questions' by Congress or Elliot Spitzer, New York's Attorney General."
Zogby Poll: Half of New Yorkers Believe U.S. Had 9/11 Foreknowledge
NewsMax, 31 August 2004

"In the early 1960s, America's top military leaders reportedly drafted plans to kill innocent people and commit acts of terrorism in U.S. cities to create public support for a war against Cuba. Code named Operation Northwoods, the plans reportedly included the possible assassination of Cuban émigrés, sinking boats of Cuban refugees on the high seas, hijacking planes, blowing up a U.S. ship, and even orchestrating violent terrorism in U.S. cities. The plans were developed as ways to trick the American public and the international community into supporting a war to oust Cuba's then new leader, communist Fidel Castro... The plans [now available online at the National Security Archive at George Washington University] had the written approval of all of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and were presented to President Kennedy's defense secretary, Robert McNamara, in March 1962. But they apparently were rejected by the civilian leadership and have gone undisclosed for nearly 40 years.... "
Friendly Fire - U.S. Military Drafted Plans to Terrorize U.S. Cities to Provoke War With Cuba
ABCNews, 1 May 2001

"CBS News has learned that barely five hours after American Airlines Flight 77 plowed into the Pentagon, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld was telling his aides to come up with plans for striking Iraq — even though there was no evidence linking Saddam Hussein to the attacks.... Now, nearly one year later, there is still very little evidence Iraq was involved in the Sept. 11 attacks. But if these notes are accurate, that didn't matter to Rumsfeld."
Plans For Iraq Attack Began On 9/11
CBSNews, 4 Sept 2002

"Whilst the 9/11 Commission reports (p 44) the astonishing claim by Rumsfeld that he didn't have 'situational awareness' on 9/11 until 10:39, the ability to draw fast conclusions which had apparently completely abandoned the Secretary of Defense in the morning suddenly made a miraculous return in the afternoon.  According to the report  (p 334/335): 'On the afternoon of 9/11, according to contemporaneous notes, Secretary Rumsfeld instructed General Myers to obtain quickly as much information as possible. The notes indicate that he also told Myers that he was not simply interested in striking empty training sites. He thought the U.S. response should consider a wide range of options and possibilities. The secretary said his instinct was to hit Saddam Hussein at the same time......' For those prepared to read the detail of the official 9/11 report the situation is transparent. In the morning Rumsfeld failed to act against the hijackers when the evidence was massive, and in the afternoon he was looking to act against Saddam Hussein when the evidence was non-existent. Even if the 9/11 Commission has studiously avoided drawing any explicit conclusions about the real reasons for the failure of America's defences during the hijacking attacks the relevant events of the day as diffusely recorded  in its own report speak for themselves."
The US Air Defence Failure On 911
'Fight Smart', 19 September 2004

"Years before George W. Bush entered the White House, and years before the Sept. 11 attacks set the direction of his presidency, a group of influential neo-conservatives hatched a plan to get Saddam Hussein out of power... The group was never secret about its aims. In its 1998 open letter to Clinton, the group openly advocated unilateral U.S. action against Iraq.... Of the 18 people who signed the letter, 10 are now in the Bush administration. As well as Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz, they include Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage  ... "
Were Neo-Conservatives’ 1998 Memos a Blueprint for Iraq War?
ABC News, 10 March 2003

"The evidence again is quite clear that plans for military action against Afghanistan and Iraq were in hand well before 9/11. A report prepared for the US government from the Baker Institute of Public Policy stated in April 2001 that 'the US remains a prisoner of its energy dilemma. Iraq remains a destabilising influence to... the flow of oil to international markets from the Middle East'. Submitted to Vice-President Cheney's energy task group, the report recommended that because this was an unacceptable risk to the US, 'military intervention' was necessary. Similar evidence exists in regard to Afghanistan. The BBC reported that Niaz Niak, a former Pakistan foreign secretary, was told by senior American officials at a meeting in Berlin in mid-July 2001 that 'military action against Afghanistan would go ahead by the middle of October'. Until July 2001 the US government saw the Taliban regime as a source of stability in Central Asia that would enable the construction of hydrocarbon pipelines from the oil and gas fields in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, through Afghanistan and Pakistan, to the Indian Ocean. But, confronted with the Taliban's refusal to accept US conditions, the US representatives told them 'either you accept our offer of a carpet of gold, or we bury you under a carpet of bombs' .... The 9/11 attacks allowed the US to press the 'go' button for a strategy in accordance with the PNAC agenda which it would otherwise have been politically impossible to implement. The overriding motivation for this political smokescreen is that the US and the UK are beginning to run out of secure hydrocarbon energy supplies...."
This war on terrorism is bogus
The Guardian, 6 September 2003

"Both civilian and military officials of the Defense Department state flatly that neither Congress nor the American public would have supported large-scale military operations in Afghanistan before the shock of 9/11."
The Military
9/11 Commission Staff Statement No 6, 2004

"[Senator Bob] Graham, who was chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee from June 2001 through the buildup to the Iraq war, voted against the war resolution in October 2002 because he saw Iraq as a diversion that would hinder the fight against al Qaeda terrorism. On Iraq, Graham said the administration and CIA consistently overplayed its estimates of Saddam Hussein's threat in its public statements and declassified reports, while its secret reports contained warnings that the intelligence on weapons of mass destruction was not conclusive. In October 2002, Tenet told Graham that 'there were 550 sites where weapons of mass destruction were either produced or stored' in Iraq.  'It was, in short, a vivid and terrifying case for war. The problem was it did not accurately represent the classified estimate we had received just days earlier,' Graham wrote. 'It was two different messages, directed at two different audiences. I was outraged.' In his book, Graham is especially critical of the FBI for its inability to track al Qaeda operatives in the United States and blasts the CIA for 'politicizing intelligence.'  He reserves his harshest criticism for Bush. Graham found the president had 'an unforgivable level of intellectual - and even common sense - indifference' toward analyzing the comparative threats posed by Iraq and al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. When the weapons were not found, one year after the invasion of Iraq, Bush attended a black-tie dinner in Washington, Graham recalled. Bush gave a humorous speech with slides, showing him looking under White House furniture and joking, 'Nope, no WMDs there.'  Graham wrote: 'It was one of the most offensive things I have witnessed. Having recently attended the funeral of an American soldier killed in Iraq, who left behind a young wife and two preschool-age children, I found nothing funny about a deceitful justification for war.'"
Graham Book: Inquiry into 9/11, Saudi Ties Blocked
Miami Herald, 5 September 2004

"The president had left Florida aboard Air Force One at 9:55 a.m. on 9/11 'with no destination at take-off,' as last week's 9-11 Commission report noted. Nor had Bush given any known instructions on how to respond to the attacks."
Who Was Really In Charge?
Newsweek, 28 June 2004

"You're at a photo op, reading a book with schoolchildren and an aide suddenly whispers that a second plane has hit the World Trade Center. 'America is under attack.' You're the president of the United States. What do you do?.... From two different angles, Americans have new glimpses of that historic moment. One comes from rabble-rousing Michael Moore, whose Bush-eviscerating film 'Fahrenheit 9/11' premieres next week, and includes an uninterrupted seven-minute segment showing Bush's reaction after hearing the news of the attack. He doesn't move. Instead he continues to sit in the classroom, listening to children read aloud. Moore lets the tape roll as the minutes pass painfully by.... .... Douglas Brinkley, a presidential historian at the University of New Orleans, concurs [with Presidential historian Robert Dallek of Boston University] : 'I don't understand how one sits there. I just don't. Minutes are an eternity in that sort of situation. . . . A quick presidential decision may save lives.' Eventually, at the suggestion of an aide, Bush got up and went to a holding room. He spoke briefly to the vice president, his national security adviser, the governor of New York and the head of the FBI, according to the commission report. Then, the report states, Bush spent roughly 15 minutes working on what he'd say to the cameras at the elementary school. He was acting as Communicator in Chief, in a sense. With his senior aides, he worked on his lines. 'As far as we know, no one was in contact with the Pentagon. The focus was on the President's statement to the nation. No decisions were made at this time, other than the decision to return to Washington,' the report states. The president was persuaded to fly to Louisiana and then Nebraska before finally returning to the capital."
On 9/11, a Telling Seven-Minute Silence
Washington Post, 19 June 2004

"It's been painfully obvious the administration not only fought the creation of the [9/11] commission but that their objective was the war in Iraq, and one of the notions that was built on was there was a direct connection between al Qaida and 9/11 and Saddam Hussein. There was not. So therefore they didn't want the 9/11 commission to get going.... I can't say, as a commissioner, to the Congress and the American people, that I had full access to all the documents pertaining to 9/11 and here's the conclusion. I can't say that.... This is the most serious independent investigation since the Warren Commission. And after watching History Channel shows on the Warren Commission last night, the Warren Commission blew it. I'm not going to be part of that. I'm not going to be part of looking at information only partially. I'm not going to be part of just coming to quick conclusions. I'm not going to be part of political pressure to do this or not do that. I'm not going to be part of that. This is serious."
Former Senator Max Cleland who stepped down from the 9/11 Commission December 2003
Interview with Salon.com,'Democracy Now', 21 November 2003

911 'PROTOCOLGATE'
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION 3610.01A AND DOD DIRECTIVE 3025.15 REFER TO THE FAA, THE NMCC, THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENCE, NORAD, AND MILITARY UNITS
NOWHERE DO THEY REFER TO THE VICE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRET SERVICE

US Defence Failure On 911
Incompetence Beyond Belief or 'Consciously Failed To Act'?

"[The] National Military Command Center operations director asked [a] newly-qualified substitute on Sept. 10 to stand his watch at 8:30 am on Sept.11. According to the personal written statement of Navy Captain Charles J. Leidig, Jr., entered into the record during today’s hearings before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, it was revealed that on September 10 Leidig was asked by Brigadier General Montague Winfield to stand a portion of his duty as Deputy Director for Operations for the National Military Command Center (NMCC). This would require supervision and operation of all necessary communications as watch commander. Leidig said 'On 10 September 2001, Brigadier General Winfield, U.S. Army, asked that I stand a portion of his duty as Deputy Director for Operations, NMCC, on the following day. [September 11]  I agreed and relieved Brigadier General Winfield at 0830 AM on 11 September 2001.' Winfield had requested Leidig to assume his watch at what turned out to be the very outset of the September 11 attacks--but even after American Flight 11 had already been determined to be hijacked just minutes before Winfield handed over his watch to Leidig. Captain Leidig’s Commission statement was 1.25 typewritten pages, large font, and double-spaced--the shortest written statement provided by any 9-11 Commission deponent as observed by this writer since the commencement of the probe. News reports today and into the evening commented upon the abysmal handling of communications, confusion and chaos during the attacks, which calls into question why Winfield handed over control of communications and supervision of the NMCC to Leidig during the attacks when he knew the Captain had just met the supervision qualifications to stand watch some 30 days earlier.... [At the 9-11 Commission hearing] Commissioner John Lehman offered that while Air Force Generals Richard Meyers, Ralph Eberhart and Larry Arnold (Ret.) had been questioned, no one had asked any questions of the 'only sailor in the group,' Captain Leidig. Lehman asked Leidig about the controlled phone bridges or conferences held during the attacks, which the Captain confirmed were classified and secure phone lines while also indicating that 'the President can be included' in such teleconferences. After some discussion about certain difficulties reaching the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and compatibility issues in connections, Leidig confirmed that Vice President Cheney and the White House were connected to the phone bridges. At that point Chairman Kean quickly cut off Lehman’s line of questioning and proceeded to Commissioner Timothy Roemer who smartly decided to pick up on Lehman's phone bridge issue. Whereupon Leidig again confirmed that 'I was connected to the White House.' [during the Significant Event Conference, which became an Air Threat Conference.] In response to a pointed question, Leidig also confirmed that the NMCC had the capability to connect to Air Force One, but that it did not do so, at least not during Leidig's watch which was during most of the time period of the actual attacks when the President was still at the elementary school. Leidig was asked, in effect, why the NMCC did not connect directly to Air Force One, to which he answered 'I don't recall,' and he repeated his 'I don't recall' assertion.  Interestingly, Leidig had also told Lehman and Roemer that Winfield relieved him and reassumed his duties as Deputy Director for Operations for the NMCC just before United Flight 93 crashed in Pennsylvania and the attacks were over, which would have been around 10:00 am, during what had become an Air Threat phone conference. All of which raises questions regarding why the experienced Winfield left his watch after the attacks had begun, what prompted Winfield to request Leidig to assume his watch the next morning, why Winfield chose 8:30 am to have Leidig relieve him, [and] why the Commission never addressed these issues.... Observant individuals conversant with key issues regarding what many have termed an overt military stand-down on 9-11-- seemingly masked by feigned confusion, chaos, and screwed up communications--were treated to new ground having been broken as questions of shifted responsibility bubbled to the surface...."
Rookie in the 9-11 Hot Seat?
TomFlocco.com, 17 June 2004

"On Sept. 10.... a group of top Pentagon officials suddenly canceled travel plans for the next morning, apparently because of security concerns."
Bush: ‘We’re At War’
Newsweek, 24 September 2001

"On 10 September 2001, Brigadier General Winfield, U. S. Army, asked that I stand a portion of his duty as Deputy Director for Operations, NMCC, on the following day. I agreed and relieved Brigadier General Winfield at 0830 on 11 September 2001.....  Shortly after assuming duty, I received the first report of a plane’s striking the World Trade Center [impact time 08:46:40].  Some time after, I learned of the second plane’s collision with the World Trade Center [impact time 09:03:11] . In response to these events, I convened a Significant Event Conference [which began at 9:29], which was subsequently upgraded to an Air Threat Conference. During the Air Threat Conference [which began at 9:37] Brigadier General Winfield relieved me and reassumed duties as Deputy Director for Operations for the National Military Command Center."
Admiral (select) Charles Joseph Leidig, USN
9/11 Commission, Twelfth Public Hearing, Written Statement

"MR. BEN-VENISTE: And do you recall at some point -- we have it at 10:37 -- that the vice president of the United States reported on that call that there was an anonymous threat against Air Force One, using the then-code name Angel, that it was to be the next target? Do you recall that, sir?
ADM. LEIDIG: Sir, I think that occurred right after I was relieved on the watch by General Winfield. Right after we resolved what was going on with United 93, around that time General Winfield took over."
9/11 Commission, Twelfth Public Hearing

"Brigadier General Montague Winfield was in command of the military's worldwide nerve center that morning, the center's logbook a record of the opening moments of the war: 8:48, first plane hits the World Trade Center; 9:02, second explosion at the World Trade Center; at 9:38, American Airlines Flight 77 slams into the Pentagon. The Command Center is on the other side of the massive building.... 10:30, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld enters the National Military Command Center."
Inside the Pentagon on 9-11
CNN, 7 September 2004

"Brigadier General Winfield served as the Deputy Director for Operations, J3, in the National Military Command Center.  He was present as the General Officer in Charge during the terrorist attacks of 9/11.....Brigadier General Winfield was nominated, competed for and earned a position as Senior Military Fellow at the prestigious Council on Foreign Relations, a national membership organization and 'think tank' headquartered in New York City"
Brigadier General (P) W. Montague 'Que' Winfield, Commander, JPAC
The Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC) Web Site