One of Many

Operation “Avalanche” Salerno, Italy

Detailed Account

Commandos

The Commandos were having a difficult time at Vietri, as the Germans bombarded the village from the surrounding high ground. Number 2 and 5 troops were assigned guard to the right flank, and looked over Highway 18 as it climbed out of Salerno. However, it was not the expected British 46 Division which had met them, but Tiger Mk IV Specials, armed with 75mm guns.

Heavy losses resulted as the two Tiger’s opened fire, but Lt. Pat Hendeson with some of his men used the new PIAT anti-tank weapon, which was effective if less than 100 yards from the target. After 4 attempts, and badly damaging one tank the Germans retreated, and Hendeson was awarded the Military Cross.

The Marine commandos in the hills had a relatively quiet day, and during the afternoon a couple of reccon vehicles from 46 Division moved out of Salerno, and a while later a US Ranger patrol came into their position.

46 Division. The Battle for Salerno

From the first landing,  there had been no let up in the operations on the beaches below Salerno, and as daylight increased , more and more troops came ashore to the already busy beaches.

B Company of 1/4^th Hampshire’s,  were off loaded into deep water swamping their radio sets, by an American LCI. They were charged with reaching Highway 18 and preventing the bridges from being blown by the German forces. The loss of the radio equipment  meant that no report could be made as to the success of their mission, to the command HQ.

As further troops and vehicles came off the LCT’s one 3 ton Bedford full of explosives was hit, killing the driver and the surrounding Sappers in the blast. The light increased, and with it the German observers in the hills had more light to enable greater accuracy to the guns bombarding the beach.

The 5^th Hampshire’s who were dropped onto the wrong beach, attempted a crossing of the Asa River and move to their designated assembly point inland. In common with many units their radio had not survived the salt sea water. However, C Company  5^th Hampshire’s met a German counter attack in a narrow lane, with high walls both sides(Hampshire Lane).

The encounter cost many casualties, as the Panzer Grenadiers were in armoured  half track vehicles. By the end of the first day, the 5^th Hampshire’s had  suffered 40 killed and 300 wounded or captured.

In Uncle sector the first of the LST’s were beaching when the forward beach head was only about 200 yards inland from the beach. At Green beach two LST’s attempted to land but the German guns had control of the area, so they landed on Red beach at 13:30, about 4 hours late. Trucks and Bedford lorries were unloaded on to the beach still under shell fire. The road off the beach was a non metalled track, with deep ditches each side and was clogged with traffic. Traffic control was lacking for most of the day either by local units or MP’s , adding further to the problem. The Lincoln’s and the 2/4^th KOYLI joined with the remnants of the Hampshire’s to help clear the Germans who were controlling the Green beach exits.

56 Division.

The light was now full, and the day hot and sunny, however, visibility was obscured by a mixture of sea mist and smoke in the still air. LCG 8 moved in towards the shore to attack a German battery, which was causing problems at the beaches above the Sele Estuary. They were attempting to destroy the German battery by bringing both guns to bear, when a shell exploded just below the bridge, killing many men. Lieutenant Pitt received the DSC for keeping the ship in action while badly wounded, and helping to destroy the German position until relieved by H.M.S. Cadmus.

On the beach head, 8 Battalion Royal Fusiliers completed the destruction of the German Strongpoint in this area which had caused many problems to the incoming troops. The Germans quickly moved up tanks, resulting in the 7^th Battalion Ox and Bucks Light Infantry being confined. This meant that the chances of 56 Division being able to meet up with the Americans on their right across the Sele River  were small.

Eight Sherman tanks of “A“ Squadron Royal Scots Greys, had to be dug out of the mud in a field exit from the beach, but once free moved in support the 8^th  Battalion Royal Fusiliers and managed to destroy one Mk IV Tiger and two Mk III flame-throwers.

The Germans had limited divisions to maintain a 30 mile front, therefore the resistance was patchy, while the 8^th Royal Fusiliers had a hard time, the 9^th Battalion had a clear run into Battipaglia. On each side the 8^th reached Santa Lucia and the Ox and Bucks passing through came to a halt as the resistance increased.

At Battipaglia the 9^th Royal Fusiliers were exposed on their left flank because of the failure of 169^th  Queen’s Brigade to secure Montecorvino airfield and the higher surrounding ground. The 2/6^th Queen’s had been given the Airfield objective, and had taken it with the aid of two Sherman tanks and 25 pounder guns. Part of the Route 18 formed an embankment which represented a perimeter to one side of the airfield, from this the Germans countered, and held their area until the evening.

More infantry came ashore throughout the day, the 201^st Guards and 6^th Battalion Grenadier Guards were to be used the next day in order to push out from the beach head. By the end of the first day, British X Corps were ashore with 23,000 troops, 80 tanks, 325 guns, and more than 2000 thousand vehicles over a 7 mile landing front. They had been given the objectives of securing the town of Salerno, the Airfield of Montecorvino, the Passes leading to the Naples Plain, and the towns of Battipaglia, and Eboli. The Corp had failed in most of these objectives and the Germans were still in control of some of the most vital ground positions.

General Mc.Creery had sent his Divisional Tactical Head Quarters ashore on the 9^th, while X Corps Tactical HQ remained aboard H.M.S. Hilary until the 12^th September. The casualties for the first day were reasonably light with 56 Division having 156 losses and 46 Division having 350,  mainly from the Hampshire’s. A major problem was that no contact had been made with the Americans across the Sele River, which underlines that from the beginning of the landings the Allies fought two separate fronts in Salerno Bay.

US 36 Division at Paestrum

The only beach in this sector for the US VI Corps that was free of German small arm and close range fire was Red beach, but this was bombarded by the larger batteries further inland. The Paestrum watch tower made life very difficult on Green beach. Yellow and Blue beaches were to remain the heaviest protected for several hours, by both German Artillery and small arms fire.

141 Regiment Combat Team was in a very difficult situation with the 1^st Battalion split, with the bulk of the rifle companies pinned and isolated on the right. The 2^nd and 3^rd Battalions had moved a little inland of the beach, but could make little progress. The contact with the warships was lost, and so the firepower from the warships could not be summoned.

The heavy artillery was causing chaos in the sea lane approaches to the beaches, with many craft milling around without purpose unable to unload their cargo. This caused the timetables and unloading of urgent reinforcements and supplies to be confused.

With the increase of daylight, the Germans began using tanks, and at this time no American tanks had been landed to oppose them. Scheduled for 06:30 on Blue Beach, enemy artillery held up the landing until 13:30, which was moved to Red Beach, using destroyer support.

Red and Green beaches began to become more organised and men and materials were coming ashore under the control of Beach Masters using loudspeakers.

German positions at Monte Soltane held 1^st Battalion 141^st RCT, with the help of tanks until dusk, when with naval support they advanced forward. At dusk a large amount of Allied artillery was ashore and this became a force to turn the situation in favour of the beleaguered American infantry.

The Americans now firmly ashore, had experienced the heaviest of German counterattacks, but were now making progress inland. Communications between ship and shore were virtually non-existent so few details of events reached Clarke or Dawley. The first detailed report reached Clark at 17:00 hrs. During the evening the German resistance declined and the Americans were able to push forward to secure some of their objective positions.

Aided by 645 Tank Destroyer Battalion and 601^st Tank Battalion both part of the US 45 Division, the 3^rd Battalion 143^rd Infantry secured the village of Capriccio south east of Monte Soprano. To their right the pinned down 141^st was able to join their flank. The 142^nd RCT were entrenched at Albanella, but a long way from where the left hand battalion was meant to be. They were still 7 miles from the Sele River, and the nearest right hand British battalion of 56 Division were a further 3 miles beyond that.

By the evening the Americans had a beach head of some 12 miles and at its deepest it was 4 miles. The Germans had blown the bridge on Highway 18 over the Sele River so separating the British and American Corps of Clark’s 5^th Army. The casualties for the US Divisions was 100 dead and over 500 casualties.

The night saw further Luftwaffe air raids and the command ship with Clark on board constantly changed position in the fleet in order to put more A.A fire power around it.

Temporary Halt

The end of the day on the 9^th September, both Wehrmarcht and Luftwaffe Divisions were on the move. Kesselring’s first reaction to the Salerno landings was to order the 10^th Army under Vientinghoff, to retreat North towards Rome. However, at the end of the first day he had decided to make a counter attack and push the allies back to the sea. He needed to dissuade the use of amphibious landing, further up the coast of Italy where they could trap his troops by outflanking them on a second front.

Kesselring was aware that the two British Divisions were not the 8^th Army, but that they had seen some active service and were not raw units. He was also delighted that the American units had no battle experience,  and that the invasion  commander, a General, also had no invasion experience in the field.

The Germans, with their experience, quickly noticed  errors on the Allies beaches and planned to make the most of them. These included the Allied failure to land immediately with sufficient forces to give them the required impetus to gain the high ground. The major flaw was that the beach heads had gaps between the Corps, and  that the confusion of the landing of the two British Divisions, separated units and support. The beach heads lacked depth, so reserve troops once landed had nowhere to go in such a shallow area.

By the end of the first day, the depleted 16 Panzer Division had the beach head pinned down in the basin of Salerno Bay, by control of the encircling mountains. Now Kesselring was to gather his forces to push back the Allied assault.

Due to previous battle damage at Sicily, Montgomery’s invasion requirements, and other theatres of war, the landing craft numbers were not as Clark had been promised.

Clark wanted two Divisions of US 6 Corps but only had enough craft to land one and a third. Complications with supplying the troops past the immediate beach head were compounded by the lack of available port facilities, with the stores and reserves having to be off loaded directly onto the beach subject to weather and tidal conditions.

The Germans had the advantage of road access for their supply, plus elements from four Divisions to choose. The plan Von Vietinghoff decided upon was to harass the beach, but build up the forces behind, then with the aid of the high ground, attack the Allies downhill and with the impetus so gained, force the Allies on the run. For this tactic, 2 Panzer Corp Headquarters would be used, one for the North Sector (British X Corps and Special Forces) using XIV Panzer Corps. For the Americans LXXVI Panzer Corps would deal with the South beach head.

German Battle condition was not fully ready, mainly because the Sicily and North Africa  defeats had caused some disarray. 15 Panzer Grenadiers in the Gulf of Gaeta north of Naples was an example, having 12,000 men but only 7 tanks and 18 assault guns for support. The XIV Panzer Corps had Herman Goering Panzer troops included with 15,000 men but just 30 tanks and 21 Assault guns, but they did have artillery support.

Fuel was the main problem for the Germans and this held up 29^th Panzer Grenadiers for the 9^th and 10^th  September with no petrol. A further problem for the Germans was the Italians once allied to Germany, now had partisans harassing their convoys.