One of Many

Operation “Avalanche” Salerno, Italy

Detailed Account

The Battle Continues

Rangers

On the first three days of landing, the Luftwaffe launched more than 450 missions by fighters, fighter bombers, while Dorniers and Heinkels had flown 100 night raids. These and the new German guided bomb caused heavy damage on the fleet, including what appeared two deliberate attacks on hospital ships, which were both well marked and illuminated. These were the Newfoundland and the Leinster which eventually had to be scuttled.

The land actions were initially a series of skirmishes using infantry in the main, but as seen both sides lacked the resources to provide the extra impetus for a breakthrough. On the Allied side engineers, drivers and clerks all took up arms in an infantry role in the beleaguered front lines.

The German 1^st Panzer Grenadier Regiment commanded by Colonel Haas created smaller battle groups each built around a battalion of Panzer Grenadiers and included supporting arms. It was these troops that first confronted the Commandos and Rangers, who were now guarding the left flank and preventing the Germans infiltrating across the Sorrento Peninsula.

Chiunzi Pass was locally known as “88 Pass” or “Hellfire Pass” to the troops, due to the German 88mm Artillery fire, and for 18 days a duel was fought between the US 75 mm guns on half-tracks and the German 88mm guns. On the 13^th September, the Rangers greeted the long awaited 1^st Battalion 143^rd RCT Infantry reinforcements. However, as the 143^rd were moving in to support the Rangers, Mc.Creery ordered them to support the Commandos at Vietri where the Germans were nearly breaking through, but before  they arrived, the emergency had passed, and the attack repulsed. On the 14^th , 143 RCT 1^st Battalion took up position above and to the left of the Chiunzi Pass, where they spent the next 12 days in contact with the Germans.

Commandos

The Commandos had achieved their objectives by seizing Vietri and the Cava Defile high ground. However, their field of operations and 3 days supplies, along with their small numbers made it improbable that they could withstand a concerted enemy onslaught. On the 10^th they were informed that there would be no relief, as the North Midlands Infantry Division (46^th) was securing the beach head and pushing the German forces back into the hills behind Salerno.

On the 10^th the Germans approached Vietri and using Spandaus and heavy machine guns began intensive fire on the Commandos in the town. Further up into the hills above Dragonea, the Germans began probing the defences and using mortars as support. The Germans assembled in Cava and moved into the terraced farmland and hills. Allied naval guns were used to help the Commandos positions, which required far more men, as there were not enough troops to cover the thickly wooded valley floor, and terraced slopes from the enemies advance. After a mortar hit upon a troop of Commandos they fell back to regroup, here the Germans broke through into the village of Draonea, however, Q troop held in reserve, quickly regained the position , but at a high cost in casualties. The Germans withdrew behind a curtain of mortar shells, after Marine Commandos troops 1 and 3 reinforced the line and expanded it slightly to within view of Marini. This again showed  the effectiveness of this German probing  tactic to deny any attack impetus, and use up the Allied man power in a struggle for survival.

The Germans continued to infiltrate the Commandos positions, probing to find areas where the men were spread to thinly to defend in adequate numbers. Vietri was constantly bombarded on Saturday 11^th  with many casualties to the already depleted Commandos.

Towards the evening of the 11^th the 6^th Lincoln’s and KOYLI moved into the hills and relieved the Commandos. However, the rest was short lived as on the 12^th at 08:30 they were again on their way to the hills above Vietri  to reinforce the again weakening line.

After a long barrage through the afternoon and night the Germans mounted an offensive in the early hours of Monday 13^th September. They succeeded in infiltrating the forward positions, and the Commandos were forced to retire from Dragonea. After a very accurate artillery barrage by the 71^st Field Artillery unit just in front of the Allied positions, a counter attack was made on the German positions at 12:30, and by 13:30 the line was restored, and Dragonea regained. At dusk on the 13^th  the Yorks. and Lancs. moved into the hills and relieved the Commandos back into Vietri.

An extract taken from a message sent by General Alexander to the Imperial General Staff in London on the evening of the 12^th September reads 

“ I am not satisfied with the situation at Avalanche. The build up is slow and they are pinned down to a beach head which has not enough depth”.

The message highlighted the situation at Salerno at this time.

For nearly a week  these German probing strikes, and Allied countering continued, but finally the bitter fighting began to swing the situation in the Allied favour. It was never a neat military battle, rather a messy mix of small unit engagements spread across a changing ill defined front. It was typical of what has become modern conventional warfare.

British 46 Division

The 16^th Panzers reinforced by the battle groups from the H.G Panzer Division,  continued to push into the Cava defile, as the 46 Division held on to the narrowest bridge head in difficult wooded hill country behind Salerno. During the afternoon of the 11^th, the Germans launched a major attack down the Borenissi road in the centre of the British positions. They hit the forward companies of the Sherwood Foresters at Ponte Fratte, forcing the loss of about one mile.

Two Liecs companies assisted in the counter, where they advanced in the heavily wooded slopes, but failed to make contact with the Sherwood Foresters in this dense vegetation. They did however, manage to take and hold on to an advanced position deep in enemy territory where for three days they fought their own private war with the German forces. On the 3^rd night, now running out of food and ammunition they found their way back to the British line.

The Durham’s were taking up positions on Hospital Hill on the northern outskirts of Salerno, with the 1/4^th Battalion Hampshire’s dug in on the high ground further south called White Cross Hill after the survey marker on the summit. All of these battalions were in the front line and subjected to heavy bombardment by mortar and artillery fire, and constant incursions by German combat patrols seeking out any weak areas in the front.

On the 13^th all surplus personel, Sappers, mortar, clerks etc. were used as infantry to replace the depleted companies. The Hampshire’s, bombarded frequently, but holding their positions were about to relieve their troops on the summit of White Cross Hill at midnight when a terrific mortar barrage and a battle group of 15^th Panzer Grenadiers attacked. Being caught out in the open, the Hampshire’s were over run, and White Cross Hill lost.

This hill offered  splendid views of the whole battlefield,  and was soon to become one of the most bitter fought battles of the beach head. All three battalions launched successive and increasingly more costly attacks to no avail, although capturing the crest, only to find it impossible to hold against a German counter. The Lincoln’s with the Commandos at Vietri were holding the line in this sector.

British 56 Division

The 56 Division front, ran from the outskirts of Salerno on the left, to the ground between Battipaglia and Eboli on the right. During the days following the landing, the Germans constantly probed for weaknesses in the very thinly manned line. They struck hard on the Queens Regiment at Hill 210 across the railroad and above Montecorvino Airport. Between the Queens and Fusiliers at Battipaglia the line was very thinly held by 3 battalions of 201^st Guards Brigade, and in the centre of the line a vicious battle was fought for the “Tobacco Factory” area just west of Battipaglia. The “Tobacco Factory” was in fact a tomato processing plant occupying a commanding view. The Scots Guards failed to obtain it.

The German pressure on the Allies in this sector began on Friday 10^th against the 9^th Battalion Royal Fusiliers in Battipaglia, two rifle companies deployed along Castel Lucia heights to the north-east of the town were forced to retire to Battipaglia , leaving half their men dead on the hill. They were caught in the advance by three battalions of the 64^th Panzer Grenadiers, with supporting armour. The Panzers in a classic Blitzkrieg movement, stormed and surrounded the town with the Fusiliers sealed inside. By late afternoon the Fusiliers had lost their last anti tank 6 pounder, and the Germans received their first reinforcements of the 1^st Battalion 3^rd Parachute Regiment formerly of the 29^th Panzer in Calabria.

Later the Guards with support from Sherman tanks from the Scots Greys prepared to counter attack. Number 2 Company of the Guards forced a way close to the town and Reconn groups linked up with the few remaining Fusiliers in the southern end of the town. The Shermans fired a salvo at the bridge, as the Germans armour advanced, but due to the close nature of the conflict, some of the Guards were hit as well. When the Fusiliers were regrouped in the evening, there was now less than half a battalion. Here they were joined by the 2^nd Battalion Cheshire Regiment and dug in around the Crossroads at St. Lucia, with the canal on their right.

A second attempt to capture the “Tobacco Factory” was made by the Scots Guards whose first assault in daylight, without artillery support was severely curtailed. This second assault was again repulsed owing to the lack of armoured support, and the fact of having to attack a strongly held building across 300 yards of open floodlit field. In this assault only 2 officers and 12 men escaped.

After the failures of Battipaglia and the “Tobacco Factory” it was decided to withdraw and so shorten the front line, and so on Sunday 12^th September as darkness fell the Guards, Grenadiers and artillery withdrew.

The US Sector

Altavilla and Sele  Calore Corridor

During the period Saturday 11^th to Tuesday 14^th the Germans made full use of their advantage of both position and mobility. Tank and Assault guns closely supported by infantry in half-tracks, could move and concentrate quickly and discover weak parts of the Allied line. In the US sector on the 11^th  the Germans struck with their full might, on advancing US troops with no prepared defensive positions.

Three US columns were moving forward. The 157^th RCT on the left over the Sele River were moving into the British sector preparing to attack Eboli about 8 miles from the Sele River. If gained it was to threaten the German position at Battipaglia, and allow the British to threaten Montecorvino. To the right the Texans had control of Altavilla and were poised to move onto Hill 424 and dominate the high ground. In the centre 179^th RCT was to continue the advance up the Sele-Calore Corridor to Ponte Sele where they could cut Route 19 and the German supply lines.

The vital ground in the US sector was this plain between Sele and Calore Rivers. It formed a low ground plain beginning at Serre 12 miles inland at the foot of the hills, and descended gently to the junction of the two rivers, 5 miles from the coast. It was the obvious point for a German counter attack on the beach head.

However, this valuable area for both sides appeared to be missed by General Clark, until his troops landed, and also the importance of Persano in the defensive role against a German armoured counter attack through the low plain corridor. The village of Persano was on the top of a low hill that had a commanding view of the plain below, particularly the crossing point over the Sele River. Instead the emphasis was on Ponte Sele beyond, as a point where the British and US could link up completing the beach head perimeter.

During the night of the 11/12^th , 179^th RCT and the British 56 Corps made contact. As daylight began the German 29^th Panzer began an attack, and from positions held in Persano, machine guns and mortars managed to separate the 179^th supply column from the main unit. Shortly after the German artillery and anti-tank units in Persano opened fire on the US tanks and Tank Destroyers that were south of the crossing at the bridge over the Sele. The main column fought with a German outpost about a mile from Ponte Sele.

Shermans from the 753^rd Tank Battalion crossed the Calore at 06:45 under fire with Tank Destroyers and guns of the 160^th Field Artillery but were repulsed with heavy losses when they attempted to take Persano.

The 179^th  now very low on ammunition, were surrounded when the Kruger Battle Group launched an attack south from Ponte Sele. However, they managed to dig in and defend as best they could. As darkness fell the fighting subsided, and 179^th regrouped into a tight perimeter to the East of Persano, hoarding what little ammunition they had until the next daylight attack. The 3^rd Battalion which had split away to advance on Hill 424 and Altavilla had crossed the Calore, but was then stopped by the German defences, and fell back to La Cesa Creek after dark. The left flank advance of 157^th Combat Team with Sherman Tanks of the 191^st Tank Battalion had proceeded well, until coming across a German battalion dug in at the “Tobacco Factory”. The combat team moved along a gravel road leading north-east from Highway 18 to Eboli. This road was of vital importance to both sides for the following: From Highway 18 it went across open fields until 700 yards north of the Factory it drops sharply into the Grataglia Plain. Here the Eboli road meets two tracks, one which comes from Bivio Cioffi east on Highway 18, and secondly one which cuts through the Grataglia to a crossing point over the Sele and on to Persano. The gravel road turns north  east from these junctions around a hill and rises onto Eboli.

The battle for this rise and the factory was to prove of great tactical significance, for whoever controlled the hill also commanded the whole of the Grataglia Plain and river crossing. They also controlled access to the Sele-Calore corridor on the right, and main highway beyond. Route 19 joined Battipaglia and Eboli, it passed through Altavilla and was the main supply route for the Germans attacking the US 6^th Corps.

In the attack on the factory, seven Sherman tanks were lost in the first advance. The battle continued for the rest of the day, but both sides reach stalemate and the attacks lost their momentum. Engineers in the 36 Division sector finished the airstrip  near Paestrum.

General Clark now ashore, became concerned with the 45^th Infantry under heavy pressure in the Sele - Calore corridor, and had also received a request from Mc. Creery for more troops to close the gaps in the Corps boundary beyond the Sele river. The 36 Engineers Regiment was sent and moved to the left of 157^th RCT and took up a defensive position below Bivio Cioffi.

142 RCT 1^st Battalion was quiet around Altavilla, but due to the scrub covered terraced slopes, intersected by ravines it was difficult to defend especially when lacking the sufficient numbers. Hill 424 was a weak position, especially as another hill to the south remained unoccupied, but they had insufficient manpower to hold both. During the Saturday night 11^th, 2^nd Battalion 15^th Panzer Grenadiers began to infiltrate and gained Hill 424. At dawn they opened fire in all directions. The Americans were unable to call for artillery support as the Germans were within the American perimeter and too many Allied losses would be incurred. The 142^nd called for assistance, but none were immediately available. Altavilla was captured and the Americans had to fall back.  3^rd Battalion 143 RCT was sent to recapture Altavilla, which due to communications confusion took the whole afternoon and evening to arrange, and march to their positions. The Germans in this time were able to dominate the  corridor and to threaten 179 RCT, however, by Sunday morning the 179^th was reinforced and the Germans withdrew out of Persano to Eboli. They continued to hold Altavilla, thus preventing the US advance through the corridor. 179^th RCT had by this time suffered fifteen percent casualties.

Across the Sele river 157^th RCT made a second attempt to capture the factory, and following a heavy artillery barrage, rifle companies stormed into the attack, and after about an hour the factory was taken, when the Germans withdrew. However, after regrouping, the Germans with a full battalion of Panzer Grenadiers and Mk IV Panzers in front  forced the Americans out again. This resulted in repeated struggles for this vital area throughout the day, but the Germans conceded the position during the night.

Clark visited Dawley in the command post at Paestrum, to review the situation. Clark was very concerned about the gap between the US  left at Bivo Cioffi and the British right at St. Lucia. After Clark toured the front he was sure the Germans would concentrate on this obvious weakness. Clark was also extremely concerned about the tactical methods of Dawley.

At this point Clark made what appears in retrospect to be a tactical error, by not countermanding the attack on Altavilla. Instead he ordered Dawley to send all units of 45^th Infantry to cross the Sele river and deploy in a line from Bivio Cioffi to St. Lucia to cover the British-US gap. Secondly he ordered Dawley to ensure Persano and the corridor was adequately covered and reinforced. Dawley was equally determined to continue the battle at Altavilla, and since this was not officially countermanded , he did so.

The American Corps which had barely sufficient troops to hold the ground already occupied, were now to assume responsibility of more terrain, and march in 3 different directions to obey all of the orders.

The ability of Dawley was becoming a real concern to Clark, and should with hindsight have been replaced before this point. The British were requiring little attention, and were handling the situation well enough.

Dawley’s decision to continue with his own plans for Altavilla, and Clark’s orders now meant that Walker and the US 36 Division were responsible for  22miles of front. This stretched from the foothills around Ogliastro and Agropoli in the south to the Sele and Calore rivers. In addition Walker had to mount an offensive into a mountainous position of Altavilla.. The division was now becoming ill equipped for the infantry campaigns, that this landing was proving to be. 36 Division had landed on the beaches with nine battalions of infantry, one including artillery and support had gone to reinforce the Rangers at Serrento. The eight remaining were now under strength and one was badly beaten and no longer combat effective. This meant that seven depleted battalions of the US 36 Division were to confront the already proven professionally superior German forces.

Walker protested to Dawley that he could not expand this sector with the available troops, but Dawley insisted that one battalion was enough to meet the requirements at Persano. Dawley explained that once the high ground of Altavilla was taken, the Germans would not dare to advance into the corridor, with the Americans on the high ground on both sides. Dawley indicated a position about one and half miles from Persano that the division was to hold. However, it appears again with hindsight, that Dawley did not fully appreciate that the high ground was at Persano itself. It also transpires that he did not inform Walker that 45 Division had failed with two battalions and a combat team, including supporting elements, and had narrowly missed complete disaster. After this incident Dawley maintained that the 45^th Divisional commander Middleton never informed Dawley of the massive battle fought by the 179^th RCT. Further confusing the issue however, was that Walker never asked about the previous troops who held the ground, numbers, or outcome.

Pressures of war under combat conditions, “fog of war”, or just inexperience of combat, all contributed to the errors of this time.

2^nd Battalion 143^rd Infantry, the divisional reserve were ordered to move from Mount Chirico to the Persano zone, but Walker failed to impress on them the importance or anticipated problems awaiting. On Sunday 12^th in the evening, the battalion set out to cover the 12 miles to Persano. At the same time the Thunderbirds were moving to link up with the British across the Sele river. Also Colonel Martin had his battalions on the move to launch a two pronged attack to gain Altavilla and the surrounding high ground.

Monday 13^th September

The 26^th Panzer reinforcements had arrived at the beach head, and a push to the sea was planned and if successful would hopefully delay any proposed allied landing in Europe. Therefor Von Vietinghoff ordered Corp commanders to launch immediate and heavy offensives against any Allied pockets of resistance.

Clark re-visited the beach head again on Monday 13^th and was acutely aware of the situation. One of the problems was that the High Command joint nationalities politics, had forced a landing on a too tight budget. Where the quality of the troops was not in question but that their numbers were insufficient. There was the initial problem of insufficient landing craft to build up Allied forces, as the Germans increased theirs. Some of the craft left the scene as soon as the initial Salerno landing was completed, they were recalled for preparations in the France landings. The German’s were thus able to reinforce and re-supply far easier by land than the Allies were by sea.

The command post was in the US sector along Highway 18 near Paestrum and here Clark began to assess the situation. One mystery remains and is supported by documentary evidence on both sides of the Atlantic. This is that Clark was informed that 82 Airborne Division would be available for Salerno after originally being recalled. He was informed of this by General Alexander on the evening of the 8^th September prior to the landing. However, in his book “Calculated Risk” Harrap 1951. He claims that he was first told of the 82^nd Airborne only on the 12^th September.

On the 11^th Clark sent a message to Ridgway in Sicily, that he required two airborne operations. First, a battalion drop on Avellino an important German communications Centre in land from Salerno. Second a three battalion combat team to be dropped north of Naples. However, he countermanded these requests to delay until Monday evening 13^th September, when he thought the British would break out of the Cava Defile.

With Battipaglia and  Altavilla, already held by German forces, and heavy enemy pressure growing at Vietri and Salerno, Clark finally decided to use the 82^nd Airborne simply to reinforce the beach head. Again this tactic has been questioned since the event, as a badly wasted use of a highly specialised force.

The drop zone chosen by Clark was 5 miles north of Agropoli in an area of flat land between sea and the coastal highway, measuring 1200 yards long by 800 yards wide, and was to receive the 2^nd Battalion 504^th Parachute Infantry.

Crisis in the US sector

During the day the 3^rd Battalion 142 Infantry attempted to re-capture Altavilla, but were unable to make progress along the ridge from Albanella due to fierce German resistance. An attack by the 143^rd 3^rd Battalion at the base of the hill met some success, but at the cost of heavy casualties after entering the town following a powerful artillery barrage. Their next objective was Hill 424, but after a heavy counter attack by the German defenders only K Company 142 Infantry remained in Altavilla, however, they were completely surrounded and cut off.

Walker, without contacting Dawley, ordered the break off of the attack and for his men to fall back behind La Cosa Creek, which ran roughly parallel to the coast, and had now become the US front line. At around 20:00 that evening, a meeting of Clark, Dawley and Walker was held along with other staff officers. At 21:00 Walker left the meeting, and went to the front line. Here he divided the US front line into 3 sectors and placed a Brigadier General in command of each sector, each was an experienced officer. He then bypassed the divisions senior commanders and placed three colonels Martin, Forsythe, and Werner as second in command, these were the RCT commanders.

During the afternoon on the 13^th, in the Sele corridor zone the situation had become critical, as the Germans thinking an evacuation was imminent due to the mass mobilisation of the American units, ordered the XIV Panzer Corps to use all available forces for an attack south of Eboli, in order to disrupt and destroy the perceived evacuation. A battalion of the 71^st Panzer Grenadiers Regiment with twelve Mk IV Panzers plus a new formation of Kleine Limberg Battle Group ( 16^th Engineers Battalion, 2^nd Battery 16^th Artillery Regiment, and a company of the 26 Reconn Battalion) attacked the US 1^st Battalion 157 Infantry at the factory. The Americans had no time to recover from the previous days struggle and were forced to withdraw, due to the overwhelming odds, despite some determined resistance. The Germans moved close to the Sele River and threatened deep into the Sele corridor.

At around 16:00 on the 13^th the reinforced Kleine Limberg Group encountered the 2^nd Battalion 143^rd Infantry, which had been Walker’s divisional reserve at Mount Chirico, but had moved to the Persano sector to meet Dawley’s request for a battalion to fill the gaps left by the 179^th RCT of the 45^th Division.

Without strengthening their position since its arrival the 2^nd Battalion 143^rd Infantry found itself on its own, with the nearest Allied force some two and a half miles away, itself locked in a struggle for Altavilla.

Again given the privilege of hindsight, Colonel Jones should have pulled back immediately to the high ground around Persano, or to the river’s crossing, rather than to the lower ground currently held. At around 16:00 the German shells began a barrage, and German tanks supported by infantry began approaching. The Americans were soon overwhelmed and as the batteries of the 132^nd Field Artillery were  targeted on Altavilla, and no contingency planning was made for them to support both actions, this resulted in the loss of the 2^nd Battalion 143^rd Infantry. Only nine officers and 325 enlisted men escaped, either capture or death, and the German advance continued towards the sea.

Dawley contacted Clark and advised him that the Germans had broken through the Persano Line. This astounded Clark, as he had not been advised of the developments as they had progressed through the afternoon. When Clark asked Dawley “What are you going to do about it? What can you do?” Dawley replied “ Nothing, I’ve got no reserves, All I’ve got is a prayer”. Which according to the account by Clark “Horrified” him, to hear such defeatism in his Corp Commander.

By 18:30 the German thrust had crashed through the Sele - Calore junction, where German tanks fanned out along the northern banks of the Calore, and continued firing on the rear units of the US sector. The only US troops between the Germans and the sea were the supporting artillery of 45 Infantry Division.

It was their action, bravery under extreme conditions and their guns which saved the battle in the US sector. The Panzer’s did not manage to break through the massed guns of 189^th Field Artillery, supported by the 158^th Field Regiment, and later supported by the 27^th Armoured Field Artillery Battery. Here both battalions had batteries deployed at 1000 yards back from the Sele  Calore junction and at about 10 yards between each 5 man crewed gun. All available men, some even from administration roles at command HQ were ordered to the front line just in front of these guns. The guns managed a round every 20 seconds, and as darkness fell, the Panzers withdrew back to Persano. During the time the artillery had fired 3,650 rounds and the armoured artillery had fired 300 rounds.

Clark called an emergency meeting of the US commanders, and he advised them of his concern that Salerno was to become another Dunkirk evacuation. He advised them of the two contingency plans (Sealion) and (Seatrain) each based on the premise of one Corp acting as host for the other to withdraw too, and evacuate the beachhead.

U.S. plans were made for the evacuation if required from the US sector beaches, Naval forces responded by moving troop ships into the bay ready, and all supplies and reserve landings were halted, with a heavy bombardment planned for the evacuation if required.

On the morning of Monday 13^th, Mc.Creery had asked General Alexander for immediate reinforcements to X Corp. This was acted upon, and they were to be shipped from reinforcements already in North Africa.

General Alexander also sent a message to General Montgomery who was locked in the mountains of Clabria, and had as his next objective Castrovillari, 70 miles up the coast. However, Alexander ordered him to directly intervene in the Salerno battle regardless of logistical risks.

Air Marshall Tedder offered Alexander full air support, for a maximum effort in support of the beach head troops. Alexander also sent a message to Patton, to send additional units from his 7^th Army in Sicily, to increase Clarks build up for a push out of the narrow beach head. He selected the 3^rd Infantry Division under General Truscott.

During the night of the 13/14^th the 82^nd Airborne arrived, at midnight they reached the drop zone. The U.S. 36^th Division had fallen back two miles towards the sea, and had set up a final defensive position along the La Cosa line. This position was not naturally strong, but was all that existed between there and the sea, the small stream was no barrier, and the hills behind from Cappa Santa to Mount Chirico, and on to the Tempone di San Paulo were not very high or rugged. However, this was the best that could be made, and the Germans would have to advance across a small flat plain to reach them, and expose themselves to US fire. The Navy continued a barrage of the German positions and the USS Philadelphia fired in excess of 1000 6 inch shells during the night. The air support of heavy and medium bombers, concentrated on the areas of Eboli and Battipaglia. Two battalions of paratroopers took positions in Defesa Montica to the south, and remained ready as reserves if required.

At dawn on Tuesday 14^th the 26^th Panzers arrived in the area despite the Allied bombing. While leaving a large rear guard, whom Von Vietinghoff planned to use instead of the 16^th Panzers to drive south-west from Eboli and onto Salerno cutting through the British defences, and finally link up with the Herman Goring Division. XIV Panzer Corps reported that against the British in the Salerno area, the German troops found a stiffening resistance, and not the expected retreating army. Other commanders confirmed this, but also that the Americans had retreated to a new defensive position at La Cosa. However, Von Vientinghoff insisted on one last push, before Montgomery should intervene from the south.

The first German assault was launched at 08:00 on the Americans, and proved a disaster for the Germans. Ten tanks led the assault from the factory area southwards, and advanced across and in front of the 179^th Combat Team, and the combined armour, artillery and infantry overwhelmed the assault. At 09:30 the Germans withdrew the attack, but after about one hour it was pressed again. This attack was more pressing and probing for weak spots in the line, rather than a full attack. They came from the Grataglia down the west bank of the Sele river, but failed to move the 157^th Infantry. An assault was made on the 3rd Battalion 179^th Infantry protecting the Coastal Highway but the Army fire power, and 6inch naval shells from the Boise Cruiser proved too much for them. The Germans again pulled back and began a long range artillery barrage of the US positions.

Along the Cosa Line the Germans main attack also began at 09:30 when a company of infantry and Panzer Mk IV Specials attacked across the Calore towards Mount Chirico. And the Shermans and Panzers met in a classic tank encounter, which this time swung in favour of the US.

The British Line.

The British X Corps commander General Mc.Creery had made no contingency plans for withdrawal. A headquarters element of 23^rd Armoured Brigade had arrived and Mc.Creery gave them command over reserve force of ad-hoc units consisting of ( 44^th Reccon, Scot’s Greys, 50^th Battery Royal Artillery, 2 companies of 2/4^th Hampshire’s, and a company of Cheshire’s) this force consisted of some 3000 men to watch over the extreme right flank of the X Corps line. They took up positions at dusk on the 14^th September.

Throughout the morning,  46 Division with all units in the line came under heavy pressure. There were now no more units in reserve, regardless of whether the Germans broke through.

While the battle against 46 Division continued, the Germans extended the attack further south, with a Battle Group of 26 Panzers headed west out of Eboli, skirting Battipaglia, and came upon the 56 Division deployed in the open ground . The British managed to repulse the attack with the aid of 17 pounder anti-tank guns and heavy Vickers machine guns.

During the evening, 8^th Battalion Royal Fusiliers took over part of the line from the Hampshire’s, due to pressure by the Herman Goring Panzer Division increasing in the Salerno area. Two battalions of 167^th Infantry Brigade from 56 Division ( 7^th OX and Bucks plus the 8^th Battalion Royal Fusiliers) moved in to support the Hampshire’s, and become part of 46 Division control. The gap in the line left by these two battalions was  filled by the reserves under the 23^rd Armoured Brigade command.