One of Many

The Story Of 46 Division during WW2

Detailed Account (Tunisia) North Africa

After a wide sweep to avoid submarines and escorted by the "Derbyshire" the contingent arrived on 3^rd January 1943, into Algiers Bay. A march to Maison Carree, of 15 miles with full kit greeted the troops. The depleted transport was fully occupied in the supply lines to the front.

Within a week the brigade moved up to Ghardimaou as the first stage towards the front 500 miles away. Beyond Ghardimaou was "Messerschmitt Alley" a 10 mile level straight road which was strafed daily.

Sedjenane was reached on the 17^th January where existing units were relieved. The brigade was in a large basin area surrounded by hills with enemy observers on Green Hill and Baldy Hill, plus the advantage of air superiority. The road was dangerous in the daytime, and the commanding enemy positions imposed caution on any forward troop movements.

The front was lightly held, with 11 brigade of 78 Division holding Hunts Gap and the Beja road. 138 Brigade arrived on the 17^th January and took position at Beja-Oued Zarga road while 128 went to Hunts Gap.

The Leicester's encountered the first battle, when on 10^th January a company attack was mounted on the Italian positions north of Green Hill. Plans for the capture of Green Hill, Baldy Hill and Sugar Loaf were now made, in order to open the road to Bizerta. However before this could be implemented the enemy launched a general offensive which all but shattered the weakly held Tunisian front.

Rommel's armour came up the Sbiba Pass and broke through the American defences at Kasserine Pass. The Leicesters,450 Field Battery, and 229 AT Battery were rushed 150 miles from Sedjenane to Thala. The German tanks broke through the line, with heavy losses to both American and British forces, but the attack was not pursued. Rommel had been ordered South by his High Command, after the Italians had suffered in the attack by the British 8^th Army. In this offensive the Leicester's lost 400 men and 229 AT Battery had 50 casualties, with 450 Battery having considerable casualties after keeping their guns firing throughout the battle.

Sidi Nsir

In the Beja Sector, 5 Hampshire's were holding an outpost position at Sidi Nsir, about 12 miles in front of Hunts Gap. This road was regularly mined by German patrols, causing problems for troop and supply movements. The battalion was positioned around the rail station, when on the 22^nd February a platoon patrol at Djebel M'dalla ran into three companies of Barenthin Regiment who were ready to attack Sidi Nsir. The patrol was lost, but the attack never came to fruition, with the enemy settling for a heavy barrage of mortar and machine gun fire at dusk.

On the 26^th a line of enemy tanks moved down the Tunis road, with mines and machine gun fire disabling three, but by 10:00am hill 609 had fallen. At Sidi Bana the platoon fought a gallant and prolonged battle, but just after midday large enemy forces including half tracks meant they were overwhelmed. The commanders last message was that he was down to 3 men and was destroying the radio set. The German tanks continued against heavy resistance, and by mid afternoon were through the minefield. Hill 374 fell at dusk, and at midnight the battalion withdrew to Hunts Gap. About 200 men returned to Sidi Nsir, but their gallant delay of 24 hours was to prove invaluable in the defences of Hunts Gap.

Hunts Gap

Hunts Gap was similar to Sidi Nsir, as there was only one way for the tanks to approach, down the road with hills on each side. The heavy rain during the night had made the valley floor into thick mud, in which the tanks quickly got bogged down when moving off the road.

February 27^th was the crucial day of the battle, with as many enemy tanks as we had guns. However they were unable to use the tanks effectively with only the narrow road for the tanks to advance along. Two Hampshire battalions and the battle weary Leicester's held the hills each side of the road, with reinforcements rapidly being gathered from all along the front. The enemy was relying on the tanks for the first assault, rather than infantry, although these were beginning to move up into the hills. The advance failed to make any penetration on the 27^th , losing eleven tanks which were picked off as they moved single file along the road or when they got bogged down in the muddy fields each side.

The morning of the 28^th saw a determined attack by the tanks and infantry. 282 Battery was forced to withdraw from in front of Ksar Mezouar Station. A company of 2/4 Hampshire's were overrun at Guessa Farm, but Montaigne Farm was held by the Leicester's. It was the 2/4 Hampshire's who felt the brunt of the fighting each side of Hunts Gap. Churchill tanks moved into the valley, after a two hundred mile force march. They were outgunned , and despite enemy effort to entice them out of their belly down positions, they succeeded in destroying 10 enemy tanks in a day.

March 1^st saw attacks on the Hunts Gap to Ksar Mesouar road, but these infantry attacks were held after 2 Hampshire's joined the 3 depleted existing Hampshire battalions. German aircraft carried out heavy bombing at Beja to prevent supplies and reinforcements from reaching the front at Hunts Gap.

A stalemate in the battle developed, as a fresh attack in the north on the Sedjenane road began. On the 2^nd March a battalion of reinforcements arrived, and had limited success in attacks on the German positions. The main threat to Beja was now over. Hunts Gap was a confused battle, costing the division a high price in casualties and prisoners, as several lonely outposts on hills were overrun before aid could be sent.

The First Battle of Sedjenane

139 Brigade was placed into reserve in the Sedjenane valley. On the 27^th February with the enemy coming from the north, they established themselves in the hills 2 miles north of Sedjenane station. Durham's and 2 troops of commandos were rushed to stem the advance, which threatened to cut off Green Hill. After an unexpected lull in the enemy advance the troops on Green Hill were able to withdraw.

Sedjenane taken from Story of 46 Division 1939-45

The Foresters took up position astride the road, where it passed through a narrow gap 3 miles east of Sedjenane station. Enemy attacks were heavy and by the 3^rd despite gallant defence by the Lincoln's and Durham's, the enemy forced a way into Sedjenane. At 04:30 am on the 4^th the battalions were ordered to withdraw.

Five miles to the rear 2 Coldstream Guards and 10 Churchill tanks spared from Hunts Gap were covering the road. Behind the guards the brigade reformed, after a series of costly withdrawals, and outflanked positions.

The positions around Tamera were also in danger of becoming outflanked. On the 6^th March 139 brigade assumed responsibility of the road from Djebel Abiod to Chemical Corner when they linked up with the defending units of Hunts Gap.

A German attack was repulsed on the 8^th, but 2 days later further attacks had some success. The Foresters attacked with a parachute battalion to the east of Tamera but produced little gain against heavy scrub and machine gun fire.

Enemy aircraft played a major role in the battle for Tamera, as supplies were dropped to the German troops by Junker 52's. While Stukkas, Focke-Wulfs, continued to attack ground positions. Our supplies came by road from Beja, past Chemical Corner and the mine, in a convoy proceeded by an armoured car with a searchlight, as enemy patrols constantly mined the road.

On the 17^th of March an enemy attack forced the French from Frenchman's Hill, and forced the Leicester's and Foresters to reform 3 miles back from Tamera, which was held throughout the 18^th. During the night they were able to withdraw back towards Djebel Abiod. This important road junction, where the coast La Calle to Bizerta branched south to Beja had to be held at all costs. The enemy attack had so far driven the allies back 20 miles from Green Hill by skilful use of ground and infiltration techniques rather than by sheer weight of numbers.

138 took over the Djebel- Abiod front on the 20^th March where 139 brigade had suffered considerable losses in the 20 days withdrawal.

End of the Defensive Period

138 up to this point had not been so heavily involved as the two other brigades, they had been in Medez-el-Bab sector along the next valley to the south of Hunts Gap, through which the road from Beja ran east to Teboura and Tunis.

Medez-el-Bab was a market town, on the Medjerda river, and east of the town was Longstop Hill a ridge which had seen fighting on Christmas day 1942. South was Banana ridge covering the Goubellat Road.

Considerable enemy movement was observed on the 26^th February, and the outpost on Banana ridge was withdrawn. The enemy gains in front of Beja meant that Medez-el-Bab sector was now an outpost and supplies had to take a 70 mile circuit through Teboursouk and past Peters Corner. During the first 3 days of March enemy activity forced the French to evacuate Chaouch . An unsuccessful attack by the KOYLI was made on Banana Ridge, and the York's and Lancs. managed to fend off an attack in the woodland around Medjez station. The situation stabilized, with regular shelling and occasional dive bombing, plus the German mine laying patrols becoming the normal.

Each brigade had now experienced life in battle. These first battles being mainly in a defensive role, with considerable periods in loose contact, without relief and supplies from the main brigade body. A company was usually charged with defending a hill resulting in heavy losses, as they were often isolated and then overrun due to the lack of manpower to fill in the gaps.

Second Battle of Sedjenane

The March offensive of the enemy had gained them some very useful ground and had dealt a blow to the British 1^st Army. By the 20^th March however they were held all along the front.

The north saw their greatest gains with a 20 mile withdrawal from Green Hill to Djebel Abiod. On the Beja front, he was held at Hunts Gap. They had gained many useful heights and also prevented the use of two important roads La Calle to Beja and also Beja to Medez-el-Bab.

Allied forces were now mounting, and reinforcements were arriving to relieve the defensive positions. The Americans were attacking at El Gueltar. The British 8^th Army was south and had broken through the Mareth Line.

46 Division was now ordered to Recapture Sedjenane. In the North the three brigades 138^th, 38^th, and 1 Para with Artillery were to form the main thrust. Midnight on the 27/28^th March , with 1 Para and heavy artillery attacking on the left, 36^th would move one hour later in silence to strengthen the assault and 138 would outflank to the right and come in behind Tamera so completing the pincer movement. Medium artillery would be ready to support these latter stages of the advance if required.

The early moves went to plan, but midday on the 28^th an enemy counter attack was launched, and only held with the greatest difficulty. 138 had to use mules for supplies and carrying heavy mortars. Dense scrub and enemy machine gun post made the going difficult and slow on the single track. The attack progressed methodically forcing the enemy positions, and after a bridge had been built in front of Green Hill a squadron of tanks was sent down the road to Sedjenane on the 30^th using transporters. Mines held them up 2 miles from the village, where an enemy rear guard was encountered. Air attacks now caused casualties to this convoy and the supporting Sappers clearing the mines.

The south west approach to Sedjenane saw the Yorks. and Lancs. involved in hard fighting above the mine. On the 30^th March in appalling weather, and gruelling terrain they made 8 bayonet charges to clear the enemy from the hills. That night the mine was taken along with some supplies, and at Sleepy Valley, guns and large quantities of stores were also captured.

On the 31^st with the ford completed by the Sappers, Sedjenane was re-taken and on the following day 36 brigade attacked the hills around Sappers Corner. During the 5 days fighting the enemy had nearly 1000 prisoners taken, suffered high casualty rates, and lost large quantities of valuable stores.

138 brigade had a constant struggle in rough tangled countryside, made worse by the heavy rain and mud. The only route of supply was by a single track suitable only for mules. Heavy fighting came spasmodically in dense impenetrable scrub, where a man could remain unseen 5 yards away. Feeding depended on the success of the supply route, so was irregular, and the casualties had to be carried long distances in the mud on this same single track.

Pichon & Bou Arada

The 128 brigade was moved south 100 miles to El Ala, in order to take part in the attack on Pichon across the Marguellil river. The attack began on 8^th March, with the 1/4 and 2/4 Hampshire's crossing the stream before dawn, overrunning several enemy outposts. At daylight 5 Hampshire's arrived in transport and continued the attack up into the hills to Pichon, under heavy mortar fire. This advance continued to Djebel Cherichera.

To the south 6^th armoured division passed through the Fondouk minefield and onto Kairouan. A long march north, constantly harassed by air attacks 128 brigade was requested to attempt cutting off the enemy escape route north from Kairouan.

However, on the 14^th they were ordered to rejoin the division at El Aroussa, in order to prepare for the major attack north of Bou Arada.

The enemy now found themselves in a state of siege, having been forced into withdrawal to the mountain area that held Tunis and Bizerta.

From the south the 8^th Army was pressing forward. The 1^st Army had now been built up and comprised of two Corps, while the French and Americans comprised of one Corps each. On first arrival there had been 78 Division stretched out along the hills, but now there were whole divisions preparing for the final assault. The enemy were now very closely packed with excess of a quarter of a million troops within their reduced defensive positions.

46 Division moved south under the command of 9 Corps , in order to gain the hills north east of Bou Arada and Lake Sekret El Kourzia , to launch the armoured divisions into the Goubellat Plain and on to Tunis.

The enemy facing them was the Herman Goering Division ( later met again in Italy) and these were in carefully prepared positions expecting an attack.

A large scale artillery barrage supporting the infantry up the rocky hillside was planned, with 120 twenty five pounder, a battery of mediums, and 231 A/T battery supporting 128 brigades advance. A further 72 twenty five pounder, 24 self propelling guns plus a battery of mediums, and 229 A/T battery were to support 138 brigade.

A simultaneous attack by 128 on Seba Argout, and 138 on Argoub Sellah 3 miles to the north was launched at 0200 on 22^nd April. During the attack 128 with the Durham's directed to Sidi Barka suffered heavy casualties from mortar fire. 1/4 Hampshire's made for Melhalla, and also met with heavy resistance from artillery shelling and counter attacks. These prevented 128 from gaining their final objective, having been held in their advance by strong enemy resistance.

138 division had better success after an earlier counter attack before the assault began. They succeeded in the capture of Argoub Hamra, and further north the Yorks. and Lancs. joined up with their tanks and between them gained Sidi Bel Krier. Just after midday Aroub Sellah was captured completing the final part of the brigades objectives.

The successes of 138 brigade formed a menace to the rear of the enemy which was holding the advance of 128 brigade, and during the night the enemy managed to slip away. The Hampshire's moved forward in the morning of the 23^rd to take their final hill objectives.

The battle of Bou Arada was now complete and the armour passed through into the Goubellat Plain. However, the armour failed to make any vital gains. During the clear up of the area some skirmishes were encountered especially around Djebel Bessioud, with the hill taken on Easter Sunday.

Two days later 138 brigade was moved north to Djebel Kourninr where the enemy was holding up our armour, a small battle ensued by the Yorks. and Lancs. and Lincoln's on the 27^th April which was to prove the last fighting to be done in this campaign.

9 Corps was moved to Medjez - El - Bab sector. The division was not present in the final triumphant descent on Tunis and Bizerta, but 128 brigade moved to Cap Bon to witness the German surrender.

On May 20^th the division was represented in the great Victory Parade in Tunis.