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post-autistic economics review
Issue no. 16; October 17, 2002                                      back issues at www.paecon.net
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            In this issue:

                     - Bernard Guerrien
                                 Once Again on Microeconomics
                    - James G. Devine
                                 Psychological Autism, Institutional Autism and Economics
                    - Richard Wolff
                                 “Efficiency”: Whose Efficiency?
                    - Jamie Morgan
                                 Social being as a problem for an ethical economics
                    - Robert Heilbroner and William Milberg
                                 Revisiting The Crisis of Vision in Modern Economic Thought
                    - Comment:
                                 Frankfurter on Mouchot and Harry Truman



 

Once Again on Microeconomics

Bernard Guerrien   (Université Paris I, Panthéon-Sorbonne, France)


I am happy to see that my paper on microeconomics1 has provoked so many reactions. That was one of its main purposes. I can not answer everyone - it would take too long.

 

It is clear that several contributors to this discussion clearly disagree with me: Deirdre McCloskey2, Bruce Caldwell3 and Julie Nelson4, for example.  As for Jacques Sapir5, I confess that I did not understand most of what he wrote - perhaps because I never read Spinoza. All of the participants I just mentioned believe that there is something worth keeping in microeconomics, something they more or less identify with “economic reasoning”.


Two obvious remarks before answering on the substance of the matter
  

First of all, I am not against theory“ or “abstraction” as Jacques Sapir suggests (“. . . part of Guerrien’s argument reveals an unhelpful bias against abstraction itself”).  On the contrary, I am in favour of teaching a lot more theory. When French students who are revolting against their curriculum say “no more micro 1, micro 2, micro 3 . . . ”, they mean that they want to be taught more theories, in the plural (including neoclassical theory), more history of economic thought, more moral philosophy (even Spinoza ...), more sociology, etc..

 

You can explain neoclassical “abstract” theory in a very simple way, because it consists of a set of “stories” or “parables”, and with a lot of mathematics, but if you think that these stories are not relevant, then insisting on proofs of existence, on comparative static results and other refinements, will not make them relevant; all this has no interest (except, perhaps, for mathematicians).

Second remark: I am not against "economic reasoning". When I say that neoclassical theory is not "relevant", I am not at all pointing to the obvious fact that "economic men" do not resemble "actual men" but mainly to the fact that "the relations" these economic men entertain among themselves (in neoclassical theory) do not resemble the relations that exist in any known economy, past or present.

I am not against reasoning about abstract men (whose self-interest is grossly exaggerated, becoming almost their only motive) as long as the relations they enter into (firm-wage labourer, landowner-tenant, banker-industrialist-merchant, etc.) resemble relations that exist in the real world. I may not entirely agree with him, but I find John Stuart Mill's economic reasoning "relevant", though, as he says himself, it is based on “an arbitrary definition of man, as a being who invariably does that by which he may obtain the greatest amount of necessaries, conveniences, and luxuries, with the smallest quantity of labour and physical self-denial with which they can be obtained in the existing state of knowledge” (System of Logic, p. 326, his italics). Probably, neoclassical economists agree with this, too. Then, the difference between us is not that I reject "economic reasoning".

 

The logical flaw in micro theory

 

Now, after these two remarks, I remind you that the principal bug in microeconomics - as you find it in all textbooks (including McCloskey’s - see appendix) - is not in the use of mathematics, or in the “unrealistic” preference relations, and so on, but in the very simple fact that, if you suppose, as micro theory does (at least, “at the beginning”), that everyone is a price-taker, then you logically need an auctioneer-type institution to set prices. Then, and only then, can you legitimately speak of supply and demand curves (or functions) and so on. Without an auctioneer, you need at least some price-making agents, and if you introduce such agents you find yourself in a completely different theory. You can, for instance, imagine people wandering around, bargaining, etc ..., as David Kreps suggests in his Microeconomic Theory, pp. 196-197, saying that these kinds of models are in their “relative infancy” (how is this so, when there are so many people all around the world producing all kinds of models?).

I think that I don’t need to remind you that the founders of neoclassical theory were perfectly aware of the logical problem concerning the origin of prices in a model in which everyone is supposed to be a price-taker. Jevons tried to avoid it with his “trading bodies” metaphor, Walras by assuming that prices are "barked" or "barked out" (“les prix sont criés ”) and that there are no exchanges (nor production) outside of equilibrium. Edgeworth, perhaps the most clever of them, clearly criticized these illegitimate assumptions and saw the logical flaw or circular reasoning implied in them - a flaw that you find in all microeconomic (or “price theory”, or “economics”) textbooks, Stiglitz included - which consists in deducing supply and demand curves (functions) from the behaviour of price-taking agents and then explaining that the prices they take are determined by these supply and demand curves (see appendix for two examples).

 

So, if you insist on keeping a neoclassical or individual-based theory about the world around us, you should at least be consistent and not skip necessary steps: you have to suppose that there are (at least, some) price-making agents, and that they bargain. You cannot escape the problem, as is so often done by saying that "the market does this" or "the market does that" and by speaking of  “market forces”, “the law of supply and demand”, “equilibrium point“, which are just words or metaphors that suggest some mysterious “mechanism” that  is  constantly engendering prices. Worse still: these prices are supposed to be efficient if they are not hampered by rent controls, agricultural subsidies and trade barriers, as in Caldwell’s examples.

 

You may give the impression of rigor by drawing supply and demand schedules on the blackboard (they give this impression to people who have been brought up on them); but you don't escape the logical flaw. If you want to draw something, then draw Edgeworth’s box; it at least allows you to introduce some of the more elemental problems of bargaining.

Deirdre McCloskey gives an example of “applied microeconomics” (sorry, “price theory”): the rise of oil prices in 1973. This is exactly the kind of important historical event that it is silly to explain by using nice supply and demand curves. This is a very, very complex case of multilateral bargaining (with price-makers involved)! There are OPEC and non OPEC countries, quotas decided by some of them, and not by others, strategic and political problems between countries, expectations of traders about what will happen in the future (see what is happening now, with the US-Iraq affair). Even Cournot's model (where there is an auctioneer) is of no use here.

 

I am sure that a certain type of student is very happy when we use “applied price theory” to explain the oil crisis (and the French Revolution and the decline of Spain, as is so often done) - it's so nice to understand without studying. But I doubt if we are able to do it, even though there are a lot of people publishing papers on the oil question.

Caldwell and Nelson give the Ricardo comparative advantage example of microeconomic reasoning. OK, but where are supply and demand curves in this case? Do they think that Ricardo is a “micro-economist”? I have never seen his name in micro-economics textbooks.

There is also the (inevitable) question of elasticities and of the impact of taxes - a normative question, for sure. It is obvious that if you take general equilibrium prices (with an auctioneer, etc.) as a benchmark, then every change in prices is sub-optimal (in the sense of Pareto) - because Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium is a Pareto optimum. As Samuelson remarked a long time ago, you don’t need the “surplus” concept, and the demand and supply schedule, to explain that. That’s for the abstract theory. If you want to study the problem in practice, you start from the fact that agents are more or less sensitive to the price movements of different goods; if you want to know just how sensitive, you can ask them, make polls or use different kind of econometric methods to (approximately)  evaluate this sensibility; then you have an approximate idea of the effects of varying taxes (elasticity, in the mathematical sense, is a local notion that only gives information about small “movements” around a given - observed - point).

 

I also don’t agree with Ann Mayhew6 when she says that “explaining the behavior of small firms that operate in markets consisting of other such firms” is a “simple problem” for which “there is certainly something worth keeping in standard microeconomics”. Because it is “a simple problem” only if you suppose that there is an auctioneer with price-taking firms (and consumers). But does anyone consider that these are “simple”, or relevant, assumptions?

 

En résumé, and again: if you want to be a consistent neoclassical theorist (starting from individuals, tastes, technology and endowments), you have to start from the beginning: generalized bargaining between individuals. Unhappily, you cannot go very far in this direction; you can perhaps say something about Nash (normative) solutions, about Salop-Rubinstein models with complete and perfect information, about the core of the economy (without production), and about its “shrinking” when the numbers of agents of each type increase. But nothing more. I suppose that’s why microeconomic textbooks don’t start with bargaining, and prefer the (invisible) walrasian auctioneer.

Now, in practice, what do we observe around us? With the exception of the stock market and commodities prices, most (relative) prices are quite stable: why? That is a very interesting question. We are constantly teaching that prices adjust with supply and demand; but, in fact, it is quantities (stocks) that adjust, and most relative prices don’t move, or move slowly. And this is a very important and happy fact: if prices were moving constantly and everywhere, as in the Stock Exchange (the famous “volatility”), then no middle or long term calculation could be made, and there would be no investment - and, finally, no production. People would spend most of their time bargaining, searching “the lowest price”, and so on. A long time ago, John Stuart Mill - who didn’t use “supply and demand” curves (and not because he was intimidated by (elementary) mathematics) - explained that competition could not be separated from custom. He tells us of competition (supply and demand) that "it rather acts, when it acts at all, as an occasional disturbing influence; the habitual regulator is custom modified from time to time by notions of equity or justice . . . , when competition does exist, it often, instead of lowering prices, merely divides the gains among a greater number of dealers"

 

I think that you cannot study economic relations if you don’t pay attention to institutional arrangements, customs and traditions, mass psychology, class conflicts, and so on. Obviously, this is very difficult, and you have to be very modest when you teach these things (it is much easier to tell our students that “theory - mathematical models - show this or that; if you do this, then you will have that, etc.” than to say “well, I don’t really know, but in my opinion . . . . ”

 

Now we come to the last, and eternal problem of the “alternative theory”. Well, first we have to be cured of our inferiority-complex with neoclassical theory. If we think that it is a bad, empty theory, then, there is no problem: any theory can be at least as good as it is. Classical economists (Smith, Ricardo, Mill) say a lot of interesting things; Marx and Keynes, too; there are some good ideas in “old macroeconomy”, in the IS-LM fashion. Leontieff and Sraffa models allow us to think about inter-depencies in the economy. Economic history is quite fascinating - especially the evolution of capitalism (in the way done, for example, by the French “regulationniste” school).

 

Neoclassical models - with  utility and production functions, and maximizing agents - have nothing to say about all this. And we have to explain why, again and again.

I don’t think that we will some day “produce” a new “great theory”, whether in the axiomatic way or not. But do we need it ? Even without it, we can say a lot of interesting things about the world and how to change it. Economists always have something to propose.



Appendix: On McCloskey's and Friedman's "price theory"

 

Deirdre McCloskey gives her Applied Price Theory (www.uic.edu/~deirdre2) and David Friedman's Price Theory as examples of good economics. Sorry, I don't see the difference between these two books and other standard micro-economics textbooks (almost all the "examples" in these two books are imaginary and made up) and I find in them the same logical fault that I pointed out in my main critique of microeconomics. Here is the proof.

Both McCloskey and Friedman start with traditional consumer-choice theory and suppose price-taking agents - without this assumption it would be illegitimate to draw a "budget line", as they do. This seems to be the obvious thing to do: when a consumer goes to a shop, he takes prices as given.

Then, they both deduce the demand (and supply) curves of a household: this is standard microeconomics  (Friedman, chapters 2-4; McCloskey,  chapters 1-4).

They differ a little in the next step: Friedman treats the firm in the same way he did with the consumer. He always supposes price-taking agents (without saying it clearly); but this is a less obvious assumption: bosses or managers don't buy their inputs in shops as consumers do, and, when they sell, they propose a price. But, after more than 40 figures (about consumer choice), students probably don't react anymore: instead they are likely to be tired and ready to accept anything.

Both (McCloskey and Friedman) have a special chapter on exchange – Friedman, Chapter 6 “simple trade”, McCloskey, Chapter 5, “trade” – where, among other things, both present the Edgeworth box.

HERE is the problem: we all agree (even Marx) that there are mutual gains to be had from a trade, but that this is not enough to determine prices. Friedman uses the usual deus ex machina: "the market". The title of his Chapter 7 tells us how he sees things: Markets - Putting it all Together. Friedman says: "in Chapter 3, we saw how the behavior of an individual consumer led to a demand curve, a relation between the price at which he could buy a good and the quantity he choose to buy" (p. 156) Then he explains "the market demand curve is the horizontal sum of the individual demand curves" (p. 156, his italics). But who carried this "sum" out ? The same happens with the supply curve: "in chapter 5, I showed how individual supply curves could be derived . . . the market curve is the horizontal sum of the individual supply curves" (p. 157). Then comes the (apparently) obvious: "we are now ready to put supply curves and demand curves together“. Obviously, too, these curves cross at only one point, equilibrium, E.  Friedman asks: "What will the market price be and what quantity will be produced and consumed at that price?" (I suppose that "the market" is "we", as it is we who "put supply and demand curves together "). He then answers: "As any experienced guesser could predict (sic!), the answer is point E, where the supply and demand curves cross". He explains then that it is because "if price is too high, producers find themselves with products that they cannot sell. In order to get rid of them, the producers are willing to cut the price. Price falls" (p. 157). Elementary, my dear Watson, if you forget that demand and supply curves give the choices of price-taking agents! Then: WHO cuts prices? Friedman doesn't answer this question (indeed, I am quite sure that he isn't even aware of it, and he is perfectly satisfied with appealing to the metaphor of "the forces moving the system back to equilibrium", as he does on page 159.

Deirdre McCloskey is a little more subtle. She prefers to use the "many agents" Edgeworth's approach (and, implicitly, the Debreu-Scarf result). At the beginning, she accepts the indetermination of bargaining, but only when there are few people, and then she uses an "every day life" argument: "Fortunately for someone trying to understand and predict it, most economic behavior is not bargaining between two people" (p. 96). And she explains that it is because the situation is different when there are many people on both sides: "competition takes place among many buyers and sellers of the same item. In such circumstances each seller or buyer takes the price obtainable as given, for with many sellers and buyers no one of them can alter the market price by threatening to refuse to bargain" (p. 97). I ask: if "each seller or buyer takes the price as given", from where did this "market price" that they cannot "alter" come from? Next, in a section very significantly entitled: "How the Market Achieves Equilibrium" ("the market" does this or does that . . .), she says: "a radical simplification in the theory of exchange is permitted by price-taking. It eliminates bargaining" (p. 97). Who "permits" this simplification? After explaining that "one can still, however, look at the behavior of the market (sic!) in an Edgeworth box", she considers exchanges of "thousands of (farmers and consumers called) Howsons and Webbs", that form "the whole market". And she explains that "Each Webb is unable to influence the money price of wheat he faces in the market and therefore takes the price as given". The same for each Howson. OK. But just after that, she writes: "When the price varies, . . ." (p. 8). Do you see the bug?

No? Try again: "The market price is determined, the self interest of thousands of price-taking suppliers and demanders has led to the glorious end of the story, Equilibrium" (p. 99). Agents "determine" prices that they take as given.

References
1. Bernard Guerrien,  “Is There Anything Worth Keeping in Standard Microeconomics ”, post-autistic economics review, issue no. 12, March 15, 2002, article 1.  http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue12.htm

2. Deirdre McCloskey, “Yes, There is Something Worth Keeping in Microeconomics”, post-autistic economics review, issue no. 15, September 4, 2002, article 1. http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue15.htm
3.
Bruce J. Caldwell, “In Defense of Basic Economic Reasoning”, post-autistic economics review,
issue no. 13, May 2, 2002, article 4.
  http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue13.htm

4. Julie A. Nelson, “What should be retained from standard microeconomics”, post-autistic economics review, issue no. 14, June 21, 2002, article 8. http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue14.htm

5. Jacques Sapir, “Response to Guerrien’s Essay”, post-autistic economics review,
issue no. 13, May 2, 2002, article 5.
  http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue13.htm

6. Anne Mayhew, “Superior Analysis Requires Recognition of Complexity”, post-autistic economics review, issue no. 14, June 21, 2002, article 7.  http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue14.htm

_________________________

SUGGESTED CITATION:
Bernarnd Guerrien, “Once Again on Microeconomics”, post-autistic economics review, issue no. 16, September  16, 2002, article 1. http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue16.htm

 

 

 

 

Psychological Autism, Institutional Autism and Economics*

James Devine   (Loyola Marymount University, USA)

 

 

As an economist with a son having heavy autistic leanings, the discussion of the “Autistic Economics” quickly caught my attention. I had never thought of the economics profession or its neoclassical orthodoxy as “autistic.” I think that this way of thinking can be useful, at least as a preliminary step, allowing the economics profession to eventually transcend autism. But as with all analogies, we must  examine not only the similarities between autism and orthodox economics, but the differences.

 

The Autism Spectrum

 

As a layperson interested in psychology, I have reached a preliminary understanding of autism, based on others’ research and on discussions with other parents of autistic or semi-autistic children. “Autistic disorder” is a social communication disorder and a developmental delay, involving “restricted, repetitive, and stereotyped patterns of behavior, interests, and activities.”1 I interpret this constellation of symptoms as being the result of an organically-based (neurobiological) sensory-processing problem which is much like the opposite of being deaf. Instead of hearing too little, a person with autism may hear too much, and be unable to filter out the noise or to prioritize the information received to make it intelligible. The external stimuli that most treat as normal seem to be a constant barrage of blackboard chalk scraping the wrong way. Not surprisingly, an autistic person slams hands over his or her ears, trying to shut out the meaningless cacophony. Alas, for that person, information overload occurs not simply with sound, but with the other commonly-known senses (sight, taste, smell, touch), along with proprioception (the sense of movement through space) and the vestibular sense (understanding one’s own body’s internal signals). So folks with autism tend to not only shut out external stimuli, but to be extremely anxious, communicate poorly with others, and be physically uncoordinated.

 

Just as with “neurotypical” individuals (i.e., many or most of those reading this essay),2 each person with autism or autistic tendencies is unique. Different individuals with autistic problems have different combinations of these sensory-processing difficulties, so that one may be better at screening sounds than at prioritizing and understanding visual information – and so forth. Some, but far from all, compensate for processing problems in one sphere with genius in another, as with cinema’s “Rainman.” There are also degrees to which the whole neurobiological package hits an individual – and the amount of emotional or intellectual resources she or he has to resist impairment. Thus, professionals write of the “autistic spectrum,” the continuum from hard-core autism to high-functioning autism, to Asperger’s syndrome or borderline autism (AS), to the loner mentality so common among professors, accountants, and computer specialists.3

 

In terms of behavior, folks on the autism spectrum tend to be isolated from the world; have troubles with communication with others; engage in repetitive body movements; insist on sameness, repetition, and routine; and seem to treat others as objects.4 Those with AS have been described as follows:

“Persons with AS show marked deficiencies in social skills, have difficulties with transitions or changes and prefer sameness. They often have obsessive routines and may be preoccupied with a particular subject of interest. They have a great deal of difficulty reading nonverbal cues (body language) and very often the individual with AS has difficulty determining proper body space. Often overly sensitive to sounds, tastes, smells, and sights, the person with AS may prefer soft clothing, certain foods, and be bothered by sounds or lights no one else seems to hear or see.”5

This is just a partial list of symptoms, but the general idea is clear: people with autism have a hard time doing anything but to live inside their heads, no matter how friendly the social environment is.

 

It is not surprising, therefore, that one autistic mother that I know had to explain to her two autistic children that there was something “out there” called “society” which had norms and mores which they had to learn and obey. Those on the spectrum instinctively see Baroness Thatcher’s dictum that there is no society, only individuals6 as self-evident.

 

Autism and Economics

 

The orthodox economist’s a priori agreement with Thatcher’s assertion – i.e., its commitment to methodological individualism – suggests that the textbook homo economicus (HE) might be autistic. For example, as with HE, autistic individuals often have preferences that are little shaped by their social environments (or at least seem that way to frustrated parents or partners).7 But there are major differences. First, unlike for neurotypicals or HE, information-processing problems are extremely important to autism, as with Herbert Simon’s “bounded rationality.” Second, just as with neurotypicals but unlike HE, people with autism have consciences, are torn by inner mental and emotional conflicts, and often want to connect socially with other human beings, if they can.8

 

Instead of being autistic, HE is more robotic or cybernetic in nature. The use of this kind of one-dimensional “man” in theoretical work is appropriate to a profession suffering from “institutional autism” (see below). Someone with autism is likely to treat other human beings as if they were furniture or automatons. Put another way, like those with autism, the economics profession’s dominant vision lacks a “theory of mind.” This means that, like autistic individuals, those who employ HE as a theoretical concept “do not understand that other people have their own plans, thoughts, and points of view… [and] have difficulty understanding other people's beliefs, attitudes, and emotions.”9

 

Turn now, before any analysis of their etiology, to other specific “autistic” symptoms of the profession. The original statements by the rebellious French economics students10 define autistic economics in terms of its one-sided and exclusionary interest in “imaginary worlds” (as opposed to empirical study), “uncontrolled use of mathematics” (as an end in itself rather than merely as a tool), and the absence of pluralism of approaches in economics (the monopoly of the neoclassical approach).

 

The first two of these characteristics seem at first to fit with the idea of autism. Indeed, they merge into one symptom in many cases, since mathematics almost always portrays an idealized and thus imaginary world.11 However, there is a major difference from autism here: many folks with autism have difficulty with abstract thought, since they are overwhelmed by the concrete details of life. While the focus on an imaginary internal world is an obvious result of autism, the use of abstraction should be seen instead as a defense mechanism against the confusion arising from the blooming, buzzing, confusing concreteness of the empirical world.

 

The third characteristic – a tendency for a single paradigm to dominate – seems to fit well with the an autistic person’s rigidity and desire for sameness, expressed as a preference for clear simple answers rather than intellectual debate or critical thinking. However, it does not explain why neoclassical economics – which includes methodological individualism and the focus on HE – is the prevalent orthodoxy. Nor does this list of “symptoms” say anything about treatment. So the profession must be described.

 

An Autistic Profession?

 

It would be a mistake to apply the psychological description of autism to economics in an unvarnished way. Even though high-functioning autistic people are often attracted to academia, where they can lecture others without listening, engage in research alone, and develop beautiful mind pictures, it is hard to say that a majority – or even a large minority – of economists have autistic tendencies. Individuals on the autistic spectrum do not have to specialize in economics to succeed in academia since there are other outlets for expression of their proclivities besides economic theory.12 Being able to “work well with others” helps one achieve success in academia, as in most spheres, so that those with autistic tendencies would need to be very smart or to work very hard to compensate for social-skills deficits. In sum, self-selection can only be one part of the basis for autistic economics.

 

More profoundly, it would be a mistake to apply an autistic person’s own highly individualistic perspective, i.e., seeing “economics” as a simple aggregation of isolated economists. Instead, the economics profession is an institution, spawning a collective product and should thus be analyzed in a sociological or social-psychological (institutionalist) way. The profession trains people to accept autistic assumptions (and attracts those who do so already) and rewards them for doing so. Thus, the autistic aspect of the field involves more than the sum of its parts.

 

Again delaying a full discussion of the basis for this institutional autism, it must be stressed that the French students’ summary does not apply exactly to the empirical world. As with psychological autism, there is a spectrum. The hard-core autistic walling-off from the societal environment can be seen most strongly in the specific, highly abstract, axiomatic, or “Bourbakist,” school that the students protested against.13 Further down the spectrum toward “normal,” the approach of only dealing with the world by lecturing or dictating to it (as with Asperger’s syndrome) can be seen with the International Monetary Fund, which applies the same preconceived vision of the ideal market system (and the same neo-Liberal set of policy imperatives) to every country it encounters. At the other end of the spectrum, there are all sorts of economists who work for government, business, foundations, and even labor unions; the fact that these real-world institutions are willing to pay for their contributions indicates that these economists’ degree of social connectedness is adequate to the task. They may use abstract math or econometrics, but it would be libelous to apply the autistic tag to these economists.

 

The existence of a spectrum does not mean that the profession itself lacks institutional autism. The autistic economics of the Bourbakists and their Anglophone counterparts or the I.M.F. and similar organizations define the most prestigious segment of the economics profession, the one that “smart young economists on the rise” wish to emulate. Thus, autistic economics tends to dominate the “Big Name” departments, along with most professional journals, departments, professional associations, and textbooks.

 

Since much of the socio-institutional basis for the prevalence of autistic economics is shared with other academic fields, the nature of the subject matter must be considered. As a “soft science” dealing with the complexity of human social interaction as participant-observers, economists cannot approach the objectivity – and the ability to attain consensus – of the physical sciences. But we deal with a much simpler subject-matter than does, say, the sociology profession, so that some hope of consensus arising exists, at least on key issues. That is, economics is in the middle of a spectrum between obvious consensus on many issues and the extreme inability to form one. In this context, economists seem to have an autistic drive for sameness – a “physics envy” wish to imitate the natural sciences’ ability to attain consensus. Unlike sociology, for example, they can do so partly by restricting the subject-matter to easy topics such as markets and market-like processes and thus by restricting the acceptable ways of thinking.

 

To finally explain physics envy and other autistic symptoms, the profession must be understood as an artificial societal institution, created by people, that has taken on a life of its own partly independent of individual preferences while feeding back to shape those preferences and perspectives. Having roots in medieval guilds, academic institutions such as the economics profession center on a hierarchy topped by Big Name professors, universities, professional associations, and journals. Lacking a basis for true scientific objectivity, the identity of these Big Names cannot be decided as in physics. Thus, which professors, universities, professional associations, and journals are most influential are selected by the already-existing Big Names, i.e., by “the insiders” or the “superstars.”14 Thus, the dominant ideology of the past is perpetuated over time.

 

Despite the top-down organization of the profession, it would be a mistake to assume that either a monopoly or a conspiracy exists. Competition also plays a role, in which “success” is defined by rising in that hierarchy. By the pyramidal nature of such hierarchies, the rise of one individual toward the top excludes others from such success, so that competition encourages individuals to over-invest time and effort in order to succeed.15 Departments, associations, journals, and textbooks also compete to attain the pinnacle of prestige and power defined by the current in-group.

 

This system implies a dynamic that perpetuates autistic pathology over time: people at the bottom of the hierarchy are not only trained to think and practice the dominant ideology, but find it in their professional interest to do so whole-heartedly and sincerely. Otherwise, they do not get the desired publications, jobs, promotion, tenure, attention, and fame. Those who accept the dominant world-view most profoundly are most able to be creative in developing new applications and are seen as wunderkinder who can rise to the top. This result is reinforced by self-selection, as the deviants leave the profession or sink into professional backwaters. Of course, those who rise feel they must teach it to those further down the hierarchy (students), since they believe in it and want the students to succeed at the higher levels of a profession they value. Those textbooks produced by Big-Name economists (or their conceptions) tend to dominate, while the “winner-take-all” nature of the textbook market limits the number of textbooks available.16 Finally, the neoclassical approach of excluding critical thinking and intellectual debate makes the task of teaching easier. 

 

The self-referential nature of this system encourages the focus on imaginary worlds, including that of mathematics. The latter also plays a major role because of its use in grading subordinates’ success, a crucial part of any hierarchy. It has always been very difficult to judge how hard or well an academic actually works, while such decisions often threaten to become unpleasant political processes. Student course evaluations are almost always inadequate, as is the number or size of a professor’s publications (along with the number of times they are cited). But most feel that the quality of her or his mathematical technique can readily be judged. Simultaneously, the ambitious scholar can bemuse the older professors whose mathematical techniques are rusty or out-dated by applying the newest and fanciest methods. Just as we see the prevalence of jargon or obscurantism in other fields, in economics the one-upmanship of academic competition encourages the over-use of mathematics and the embracing of physics envy.

 

However, the institutional autism of the profession exists in a societal context. The economics profession cannot be understood without stressing its separation from the other social sciences. During the last century or so, the economics profession has defined itself in comparison to other fields. This, along with their self-satisfied sense of mathematical virtue, has encouraged economists to sneer at other specializations (especially sociology), the way the hatters’ guild mocked the laborers – or to try to conquer them, as Gary Becker and his school does. Either way, the main flow of information is from economics to other fields, rather than vice-versa. This Asperger-style elitism means that the profession eliminates whole sets of questions and parts of society from analysis, restricting the empirical and theoretical information that economists have to process, adding order to a complex and confusing reality. It allows the economists to maintain their beloved assumptions, however unrealistic.

 

Of course, the economists’ guild exists in a modern capitalist environment, not a medieval one. It must sometimes prove its usefulness to business, government, and other societal institutions, which can threaten to de-fund academic programs that are totally “irrelevant.”17 This, of course, explains why the dominant form of economics is neoclassical (studying idealized markets), just as a different style of economics (one emphasizing planning) prevailed in the old Soviet Union. This role for the societal environment implies that the profession cannot be entirely autistic, just as no individual can be so.

 

This point is reinforced if we define neoclassical economics. This approach can be seen as involving adherence to (1) mathematical method, with an emphasis on (2) utilitarianism and methodological individualism, (3) equilibrium, (4) naturalism, and (5) positivism.18 Last but hardly least, in the neoclassical ideal, (6) all human activity is seen as exchange or as organized by markets, in reality or as an ideal.

 

In terms of the discussion above, all but one of these may be seen as reflecting the profession’s autistic attitudes, at least in part. I have discussed the first two of these above. Moving down the list, the centrality of equilibrium seems a symptom of totally autistic thinking in a society such as capitalism in which endogenously-driven change – sometimes drastic, as with financial crises – is the norm.19 Related is item (4), i.e., the view that human-made institutions such as markets can be reduced to “natural” forces such as individual preferences and technology, in which the complexity and artificiality of human institutions is abstracted from or forgotten. The profession’s positivism – i.e., its view that value-free research is an achievable ideal, that the observer is unaffected by being a participant in the system, and that serious philosophical reflection is unnecessary – also fits with a generally autistic attitudes.

 

However, the emphasis on markets and exchange – as opposed to other kinds of human institutions such as tradition, democratic cooperation, and hierarchy – clearly reflects the society in which economists live and learn. Though the neoclassical’s vision of exchange and markets may be unduly restricted, idealized, formalized, static, and individualized – symptoms of autistic attitudes – the fact that he or she is actually engaged with a real-world problem gives us a glimmer of hope.

 

Cures?

 

Returning to the case of neurobiological autism, there is no cure at this point. That is, there is no known method (such as a pill) to definitively prevent or end this disorder. But autism represents a developmental delay – which opens the door for a long-term struggle to speed up that development, to improve an individual’s functioning in society. Various methods (from behavior modification to active effort to engage a person socially in his activities20 to occupational therapy) can speed up an individual’s ability to learn to cope with the shower of stimuli. Pills can help handle symptoms (such as anxiety), making it easier for therapists to apply other methods. All of these involve trying to break down the walls between the autistic individual and the empirical world.

 

What about “curing” the economics profession of its institutional autism? It should not surprise anyone that there is no quick fix. The persistence of autistic symptoms (as described by the French students) is based in the hierarchy and the competition to rise in those ranks. This autism encourages, and is in turn shored up by, a refusal to engage with other social scientists in a serious way, as peers. In addition to  efforts to get rid of unnecessary hierarchy and competition, outsiders and deviants may be able to push the profession up the developmental ladder to minimize solipsism. These efforts might be helped by the course of events, as when the shock treatment of the Great Depression pushed the profession away from classical economics and toward Keynes. In any event, the effort to force the profession to actively engage with reality must be central.

 

But such empirio-criticism is never enough. Just as autistic individuals need help making sense of reality, it takes a theory to trump a theory. In many cases, that means that we need to do better than the neoclassicals, presenting improved theories to understand empirical reality. These would be conscious of the limits of mathematical method, embrace the heterogeneity of empirical reality, take a deeper understanding of individual social psychology into account, treat economies as undergoing hard-to-reverse processes, involve institutionalist insights, eschew excessive pretensions of unjustified scientific objectivity, and avoid reducing all activity to exchange, partly by learning from the other social sciences.21 If enough people are willing to make the effort, perhaps the profession will move toward pluralism.

 

In terms of research, it would be a major mistake to reject the profession or even neoclassical economics totally. In my experience, many interesting insights can be drawn from the more sophisticated work of neoclassicals, especially if treated skeptically with an eye to finding the valid aspects of their work rather than simply rejecting them. Despite their problems, it is better to know the state of the orthodoxy’s knowledge than to be ignorant of it. Finally, there are reasons for hope. Magazines such as The Journal of Economic Perspectives, which center on presenting ideas without unnecessary formalism, along with such fields as experimental economics, which are by necessity empirical, show the possibility for improvement.

 

Notes

* Thanks to Edward Fullbrook, Barkley Rosser, and Lynn Kilroy for their input. Of course, the full weight of any blame for misleading, inaccurate, or ambiguous content is on my shoulders.

1. See the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, 1994 4th ed, category 299.00.

2. See http://isnt.autistics.org/ for an analysis of “neurotypical disorder,” which affects 9625 out of 10,000 individuals.

3. See, for example, Attwood, Tony. 1998. Asperger's Syndrome: A Guide for Parents and Professionals (London ; Philadelphia : Jessica Kingsley Publishers).

4. A more complete list can be found in many places. Mine is based on a web-page of by the Los Angeles-based United Autism Alliance (http://www.unitedautismalliance.org/knowledge/).

5. See “What is AS?” at http://www.udel.edu/bkirby/asperger/.

6. In reality, she said that “there is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and there are families.” (See http://www.cooperativeindividualism.org/thatcher_society_and_responsibility.html)

7. Contrary to this assertion, autistic children, like neurotypical children, can be very suggestible, absorbing all sorts of attitudes and preferences from the popular culture.

8. Despite its lack of conscience, HE is also not sociopathic or psychopathic since a person with antisocial personality disorder (to use the up-to-date term) often exploits society’s mores for his or her selfish aims. This shows a clear understanding of society that both HE and the autistic individual lack.

9. From Stephen M. Edelson of the Center for the Study of Autism, “Theory of Mind,” at http://www.autism.org/mind.html. The concept – also used in animal ethology – was first applied to autism by Uta Frith.

10. See the “Open Letter From Economic Students to Professors and Others Responsible for the Teaching of this Discipline” and “Petition for a Debate on the Teaching of Economics” (from June and July of 2000, both found at http://www.paecon.net/).

11. Of course, it is quite possible to describe an ideal world without math, as in utopian novels.

12. However, I doubt that very many autistic individuals study sociology or social psychology, which (as their names suggest) are inherently societal in their nature.

13. See, for example, Philip Mirowski and Roy Weintraub. “The Pure and the Applied: Boubakism Comes to Mathematical Economics,” Science in Context, Summer 1994, 7:245-272. A classic case of Boubakism is Gerard Debreu’s Theory of Value (New York, Wiley: 1959).

14. On the former, see for example, Olivier J. Blanchard and Lawrence H. Summers, “Hysteresis and the European Unemployment Problem,” NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 1986, pp. 15-78. On the latter, see Sumner Rosen, “The Economics of Superstars,” American Economic Review 71(December 1981): 845-58.

15. For this vision of competition, see Frank, Robert H. and Philip J. Cook. 1995. The Winner-Take-All Society: Why So Few at the Top Get So Much More Than the Rest Of Us. New York: Penguin.

16. Again, see Frank and Cook, 1995.

17. Critics of autistic economics should recognize the possibility of the rise of an economics which is totally subservient to these interest groups.

18. See, for example, Philip Mirowski, 1988. Against Mechanism: Protecting Economics from Science. Towota, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 24-5.

19. This point should remembered by those who confuse the opposition to autistic economics with left-wing economics, since the generally conservative Austrian and Schumpeterian schools reject the static conceptions of the orthodox school.

20. By coincidence, Dr. Stanley I. Greenspan, the advocate of active social intervention (“floor time”) is the brother of economist Alan Greenspan.

21. For one of my efforts on this front, see “The Positive Political Economy of Individualism and Collectivism: Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau,” Politics & Society, volume 28 number 2, June 2000, 265-304. A draft is available at http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~jdevine/HLR.html.

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SUGGESTED CITATION:
James G. Devine, “Psychological Autism, Institutional Autism and Economics”, post-autistic economics review, issue no. 16, September  16, 2002, article 2. http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue16.htm

 

 

 

 

”Efficiency”: Whose Efficiency?

Richard Wolff   (University of Massachusetts, Amherst, USA)

 

I.  The concept of “efficiency” common to most contemporary economic theories holds that analysis can and should determine the net balance between positive and negative effects of any economic act, event, or institution. Sometimes, in practical economic applications, this same notion of efficiency refers to “cost-benefit” analysis. A quantitative measure of all the positive and negative effects of an economic act, event, or institution is undertaken to determine whether, on balance, the positives (benefits added up) outweigh the negatives (costs added up). If so, it is judged to be “efficient” and should be undertaken; if not, the reverse holds.

 

Such a definition and use of the term “efficiency” prevails at both the micro and macro levels of social and economic analysis. The building of a factory extension may or may not be micro-efficient. An interest rate increase may or may not be macro-efficient. At the level of society as a whole, the institution of a “free market” may or may not be efficient. This same efficiency concept serves in comparative economics. Two or more alternative acts, events or institutions are compared as to their efficiencies. Then, the one that has the greatest quantitative net balance of positive over negative aspects is designated the “more/most efficient.”

 

II.  Such a concept of efficiency requires and presupposes, in all its usages, a rigidly and simplistically determinist view of the world. That is, it presumes that analysis can and does regularly (1) identify all the effects of an economic act, event, or institution, and (2) measure the positivity/negativity of each effect.1  In sharp contrast, an overdeterminist view of the world renders that concept of efficiency absurd.2 In this view, any one act, event, or institution has an infinity of effects now and into the future. There is no way to identify, let alone to measure, all these consequences. No efficiency measure – in any comprehensive, total, or absolute sense – is possible. Thus, none of the efficiency “results” ever announced, however fervently believed and relied upon for policy decisions, possessed any comprehensive, total, or absolute validity.

 

Overdeterminism undermines the efficiency calculus and the absolutist claims made in its name in yet another way. When considering the “effects” of any particular economic act, event, or institution,” an overdeterminist standpoint presumes that each of such effects actually had an infinity of causative influences. The “effects” can thus never be conceived as resulting from only the one act, event, or institution chosen for the efficiency analysis. What efficiency analyses deem to be “effects” of a particular act, event, or institution are never reducible to being solely its  effects. Hence, such “effects” can not and do not measure the “efficiency” of any particular act, event, or institution. This too renders the usual efficiency calculus and the efficiency concept null and void.3

 

III.  It follows logically that all efficiency analyses and results are relative, not absolute. They are relative to (dependent upon) a determinist view of the world, a determinist ontology that presumes unique causes and “their” effects. Efficiency as a comprehensive, total, and absolute concept-cum- policy standard has no validity in and for analysis that presumes an overdeterminist rather than a determinist ontology.

 

IV.  To say that all efficiency analyses are relative to a determinist ontology opens the way to a further critique of them. Given their notion of cause and effects, they all necessarily select a few among the many effects they attach to any particular act, event, or institution whose efficiency they choose to determine. No efficiency calculus could ever identify and measure all such effects. What distinguishes one efficiency analysis from another are the different principles of selectivity informing each.4 Usually, one principle of selectivity reigns hegemonic: one set of selected effects is deemed “important” and worth counting while others are marginalized or ignored altogether. These days, economics textbooks teach their readers which effects are to be considered in “applied economic analysis.” 

 

This has often provoked criticism. Feminist economists have shown how the hegemonic efficiency calculus has usually ignored the effects that pertain to women, households, reproduction, children, and so on. Likewise, environmentalist economists have shown how the hegemonic efficiency calculus has ignored ecological effects, and so on. All too rarely have such critical economists gone beyond the demand that formerly ignored effects be henceforth added to those selected for inclusion in the hegemonic efficiency calculus. That is, their critique of the hegemonic principle of selectivity has focused chiefly on getting their preferred effects included within the hegemonic set. The same applies to much Marxist work. It seeks to challenge the hegemonic efficiency calculus by showing especially how it ignores all sorts of class effects of economic acts, events, and institutions.

 

Yet all such critics could deepen and strengthen their arguments if they took the next step to challenge the hegemonic efficiency calculus per se on conceptual grounds. The relativism of all efficiency arguments and claims creates vulnerability for them and critical opportunity for those who challenge them. From an overdeterminist perspective, the economy is an object of struggle among historically conditioned social groups. As such groups emerge within the circumstances of their time and place, they develop particular understandings of their problems and devise different programs for their solution. In so doing, they inevitably concentrate on some problems rather than others (and the causes associated with them), conceive and decide among some solutions rather than others, attribute some (rather than others) effects to such solutions, and so on.

When formalized into “efficiency calculi,” the different social groups perform them differently: they operate different principles of selectivity in identifying their problems and solutions, their causes and their effects.

 

These groups often clash. Struggles emerge that usually include conflicts over which principles of selectivity will govern the analysis of problems and solutions, which principles of selectivity will be hegemonic in their society and hence in their efficiency calculi. Each group tries to impose its particular principles of selectivity, its particular efficiency calculus, by transforming it into the absolute set of principles of selectivity for all efficiency calculi for all members of the society. In place of contending efficiency calculi there is to be one calculus to which all social conflict is to be subordinated: social conflict is to be resolved by determining what is the efficient policy or program to follow. Advancing their own particular efficiency calculus as if it were the absolute notion of efficiency is thus one form taken by the social struggle for hegemony among contending groups. In today’s world, the hegemony of social groups favoring capitalism is expressed and sustained by their heavily promoted presumption of an absolutist concept of efficiency and by policy decisions legitimated thereby. Not surprisingly, that absolute concept turns out to be their particular principle of selectivity.

 

V.  An overdeterminist critique of efficiency focuses on deconstructing the claim that any one efficiency calculus – one subset of the countless effects attributed to any act, event, or institution – has some absolute or socially neutral validity. There is no single standard of efficiency. Society always displays different, alternative understandings of and solutions for society’s problems. Different social groups struggle for their alternative social programs utilizing an arsenal of weapons that includes, for many, their respective efficiency calculi. When and where an absolute efficiency calculus is believed to exist, there one particular efficiency calculus and one particular group (or set of groups) has established its hegemony over others. Success in the struggle by those others to undo that hegemony requires undermining its absolutism as a key component of that struggle. An absolutized efficiency calculus will be used by the social groups that support it as a weapon to suppress contending social groups, their social analyses, and their programs for social change.

Notes
1.  The discursive ploy of retreating to the notion that efficiency analysis identifies and counts only the “most important” or “relevant” effects does not escape the problem. This ploy presumes, once again, that an analyst can know which of the effects are “the most important” or “relevant.” To know that requires knowing all the effects, i.e. knowing that all the other effects are unimportant or irrelevant.
2.  For a definition and discussion of overdetermination as used here, see S. Resnick and R. Wolff, Knowledge and Class: A Marxian Critique of Political Economy. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1987.
3. This applies to Pareto “optimality” as well. One can never know all the consequences of an economic situation so as to determine whether one person is better off and no-one is worse off. Likewise, one cannot know, let alone measure, all the utility losses to determine whether they might even hypothetically be compensated by all the gains.
4. Thus, efficiency calculi are relative also in a second way: they are relative to the particular subset of attributed effects that they select to consider.
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SUGGESTED CITATION:
Richard Wolff, “’Efficiency’: Whose Efficiency”, post-autistic economics review, issue no. 16, September  16, 2002, article 3. http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue16.htm




Social Being as a Problem for an Ethical Economics
Jamie Morgan   (The Open University, UK)

Introduction

Orthodox economics conspicuously lacks a satisfying account of social being and is thus unable to provide a practical starting point in addressing many of the problems of being that humanity now confronts. It is theoretically impoverished and practically bereft. As PAE and previous forums have shown, the current orthodoxy of economics is neither explanatorily powerful nor is it genuinely scientific. One way of showing this is to explore how its science, its method and its power are founded on a series, a cascade, of inversions of dimensions of realisms that corrupt science and method in the name of that power. Those inversions include issues of:

  • The relation between economy and being
  • Synchronous behaviour
  • The ill of being
  • The alienated economist
  • Alienated method


My starting point or primary organising principle is that economics as an explanatorily powerful (and thus scientific) discipline should account for what we live for, but that it is not economics for which we live.

What are we living for?

Orthodoxy colludes in the commodification and fetishism of capitalism. Its primary inversion is that for the orthodox economist, we live for the economy - its motors (as they are represented by the orthodox economist) are our motors, a stochastic ordering process that reflects our most basic “natural” behaviours and motivations. This homo economicus ergo sum extracts its account of the economy from the social whole and subjugates human being to it. The economy we are told we live for is the economy of the orthodox economist, a best of all possible worlds, in so far as we are told that it is the only world there is and we’d better get used to it.  It is a world we apparently make but one that escapes us.  For orthodoxy, the knowledge that has previously eluded us is not a path to emancipation but rather the tracing of our prison walls.  Its invisible hand offers a seductive material utopia that arrives as a clenched fist, demanding that we conform and be disciplined by its own inevitability.

The Paradox of Synchronicity

For the orthodox economist, our behaviour, founded though it might be in a deep-seated “nature” of accumulation, desire and competition, will never quite be our own. Our behaviour is externalised, becoming behavioural, an imperative. Our choice in this arid world of orthodoxy is no choice at all lest it be non-being, an ultimate sanction of capitalism or death. One synchronises with the system in order to survive. Indeed, synchronicity is the system (just as it is the non-beating heart of homeostatic equilibrating method). It is the system in so far as it denies the existence of any significant and causally efficacious rules, institutions or interventions other than this primeval behavioural imperative. Being is thus no more or less than persistence. One persists in a system that somehow claims to subordinate the self to its self. As a consequence, the utopia at the heart of that orthodoxy is simultaneously pragmatic and deterministic, avaricious and pessimistic, human yet all too holohedral. It is a charitable cruelty that affords us, each and every one, participation, a cruelty that whispers of merit, hard work, returns, and opportunity in the name of the ever-present possibility that we may succeed and that others may fail. Failure is the collateral damage of utopia – the poor, the disenfranchised, the oppressed, and marginalized. Their failure defines success. Their failure is an illustration that some forms of the subjugated being of orthodoxy are more abject than others. The morality of  this most “hard-headed” of disciplines is, therefore, Nietszchean. In it, “blood and cruelty lie at the bottom of all “good things”.” Of it, morality is transvaluated in a becoming that is amoral in its methodological indifference to morality, and immoral in terms of the consequences of such amorality.

Frozen Being

One cannot understand an advanced capitalist economy without understanding the constitution and consequences of the transitive values that the organisation of its production produces.    The absence of moral investigation within orthodoxy is thus symptomatic of the economy’s contributions to the ill of social being. Orthodox economics is part of the (il)liberating problem of technologies whose social relationality it blithely ignores. It is in this sense that if we do not (should not, cannot, will not) live for economics, the economist should at least be asking what it is we are living for (and what consequences this has for how others live and die across the world, now and in the future). This is a moral as well as a practical question. As a practical question it is, all too easily, debilitated by the deterministic undercurrents of orthodox pragmatism. Such pragmatism lends itself to a utilitarian pleasure principle that is at once too narrow and too broad, providing limited descriptions without explanations; rendering the historical eternal. This is yet another dimension of orthodox synchronicity and also another element in the inversions of orthodoxy. The dynamism of the lived life of social being is frozen. Homo economicus is statuesque, ignorant and selfish.

Nowhere is this lack of engagement with the dynamics of social relations of economy clearer than in the home economy of the alienated and commodified self. At the same time as technology has divorced many of the centres of advanced capitalism from hard physical labour, it has produced new forms of oppressive social relations where humans have, ironically, become once more subject to subsistence agriculture’s long hours of labour (for technology is now pervasive and its relations invasive); concomitantly, reduced non-working time has increasingly become an arena of instrumental activity within the emergent leisure economy, one dominated by consumption on three fronts: food, home refurbishment, and shopping.

The relations of economy of all three subject the human at the centres of advanced capitalism to accelerated rhythms and his/her marginalized counterparts in the majority world to greater burdens. Food has become an oral fixation, a primary sensory pleasure, a lifestyle choice, and a source of fear. Affluent over-consumption, knowledge of the mortality implications of the foods of choice, and obesity, channel us to the clinic, the diet book and the gym where hours of over-consumption of the world’s resources are converted into joules of isolated exertion on yet more machines that are in turn the conversion point of food into further profit. Similarly, home refurbishment has become a micro-economy of perpetual investment in the reconstruction of living space whose demands rob us of what little living time we have within it. Shopping meanwhile, is the master category of the home economy, a centre of gravity, a principle source of leisure, status and self-esteem. It is a preoccupation, a form of activity that has attuned the human to a numbing receptivity to acquisition divorced from attainment; the introduction of lifestyle obsolescence has quickened its pace at the same time as new forms of credit have softened its short-term pressures whilst all but guaranteeing a hard landing. Shopping has become the bull market of the soul. Here, orthodoxy is denied even the defence that scarcity is a purely allocative problem.

The Alienated Economist

Yet one cannot simply define a problem like human social being out of existence. The very claim is a category mistake. One is defining it out of theory. Such an act of power within orthodoxy simply commits the error of burying one’s head in the sand. Ringfencing narrow and problematic fundamental assumptions about humanity with forbidding formulae that produce neat and tidy mathematical outputs (that in another inversion, that of theoretical linearity, all but select their inputs) impoverishes the theoretician as it bastardises the theoretical process. There is something deeply atavistic and yet all too modern in the way that the orthodox economist has become a tool of his tools. The orthodox economist is both the high priest of capitalism and another instance of its victim. A source of cant and superstition, of such linguistic abuses as  “the needs of the market,” and “human capital downsizing.” A master who is by his own dialectic truly a technician-slave; his thought counts the cost of production but not the value of being. Yet he knows the value of differential calculus, of indices, simultaneous equations, and regression. One must ask why it is that, alone amongst the social sciences, orthodox economics has so assiduously pursued the Chicago School dictum of 1926, “When you cannot measure your knowledge becomes meagre and unsatisfactory.”

The orthodox economist’s disdain for reality is captured by the (only half joking) injunction, “But does it work in theory?” In lauding unreality orthodoxy commits itself to a trajectory that parodies itself. A profession whose hierarchy places the mathematical economist at its airless summit, far removed from practical considerations, may provide an economist with a clear path to maximising his own exchange value but does so by crushing his use-value. Ironically, competence is divested from its etymological relation to the socially productive. Rather it is diverted into computation; competence becomes a technical facility rather than a contribution to society. Orthodox economics thereby becomes one of the few social realms where rational expectations genuinely apply; orthodox economics becomes a profession of calculating calculators.

The ideological value of “facts”

Orthodoxy abstracts from fantasy to construct knowledge. Unreal assumptions conducive to the simplification of complex mathematical problems dictate what is and what is not economically significant. Thus abstraction is conjoined to abacus and absolved from its relation to appropriation from the world in order to return with knowledge of the world. Here one shifts to a further double returning, both to “But does it work in theory?” and to that realm where one is a tool of tools. Perfect knowledge and instantaneously equilibrating and spontaneously clearing markets make neat mathematics but require a neat world, not the untidy one that we actually inhabit.

Here wider inversions of “to be scientific” become clear. The rejection of use-value in the maximisation of the exchange value of the orthodox economist, that is inherent in the debasing of competence, is itself a sub-set of the behavioural imperative from which its theoretical core derives. In affirming a deep-seated “nature” where we accumulate, desire and compete, orthodoxy overwrites the needs inhering in species being – food, sleep, shelter, warmth, dignity, security etc. A set of descriptive nouns become ascriptive verbs whose claim to represent the same territory, a baseline from which the cultural, the social and the human begins, takes the form of disguise.

Such ascriptive verbs are values of means from species-being beginnings, and thus one trajectory delimiting one possible (impoverished) end. Disguising then, takes the form of overwriting species being with values claimed as basic facts. Once the behavioural imperative is installed as fact, the possibility that things could be otherwise, as species being is pursued within the social whole (and in the constitution of social being), is sublimated. The construction of orthodox “fact” begins from disguised value. That construction is, therefore, ideological, a necessary myth.  It is ideological both in its function within the secret logic of orthodoxy and within orthodoxy’s relationship to the unrelenting inevitability of capitalism. The interface between the two secretes the statement that we are (this) nature all the way up – an insight as meaningless as that we are (that) nurture all the way down. As a consequence, unreality takes yet another guise in terms of orthodoxy’s claim to authority. As a theory it inverts any commitment to the overcoming of ideology in the pursuit of truth. Its truths are ideological and its science is ideological.

Likewise, its concept of  “To do science” is also ideological. Installing the behavioural imperative as fact is not only the first step in tracing the prison walls of systemic synchronicity, it is also an act within the philosophy of method. The many dynamics by which things cannot be otherwise within orthodoxy speak to a knowledge that is ultimately waiting to be found. Since things cannot be otherwise, that “found” is not simply a beginning in both the fallible process of knowledge of the world and the work of transforming that world, it is simply what the world is – a true reflection, founded in a debased form of materialism that knows that what it observes is, has been, and will always be. Orthodoxy is, therefore, a special kind of Empiricism; a form of Humeanism without the latter’s scepticism towards the possibilities inherent in the act of knowledge. Its “To do science” makes a God of the scientist and an idiot of man. Science finds a society that is a machine of perpetual motion, a set of wheels and gears executing the same operations in an undeviating endless closed cycle, without history, without consequences, and for all intents and purposes, without meaning. In their absence it is a science without the human, and this is surely the nadir of ideology in a social science.

Conclusion

Such then are the inversions of dimensions of realisms that corrupt science and method in the name of the power that is orthodox economics. They are inversions of realisms because they raise the standard of unrealism. Their paradox is that they raise that standard precisely in the name of realism – of science and of method. In doing so a claim is made on common sense action within the world that ephemeralises heterodoxy, as “softer” social theory that may be disparaged as (once more playing out the nadir of ideology in a social science) “sociological”.

Ironically, it requires the terminology of another form of unrealism, the post-modern, to appreciate this. Orthodoxy wears its exclusions, its constructed “Other” by which it defines itself, upon its sleeve.  Its philosophical defence of its own lack of realism shows precisely this. Its instrumentalism, the claim that heuristically convenient simplifications (that are actually methodological fictions rather than abstractions) are explanatorily powerful, its contraction of method to mathematical technique, and its reduction of evidence to quantifiable data (when pressed for such), all bear this out. That orthodox economics has managed such a sleight of hand – claiming to be the disciplinary proponent of all that is practical and useful in economics, offering itself as a first port of call for policy advice and justification, claiming to represent “how things really are”, whilst also being a site of fundamental and often celebrated forms of unrealism – is itself a sociological conundrum. An exploration of that conundrum may say much about how more prosaic, yet more valid, heterodox approaches have been excluded from a ready audience for their own realist claims.

Yet beyond an organising principle that economics should account for what we live for but that it is not economics for which we live, the explorat