D (Sound-ranging) troop scarcely had time to draw breath before it was whisked off to the area of Caumont in the Bocage country to set out a base in support of 7^th Armoured Division hinged around the tiny village of La Vitardiere. Its arrival during the   night of the 28^th June could not have been more inglorious. The rain fell; the ground was mud soaked and slippery; the lanes lay in deep gullies that, when daylight came, made cable laying difficult, a strafing. The troops dug out foxholes in the steep banks as best they could and in the surrounding fields, and awaited the dawn before putting the finishing touches. So this was war!

The HQ surveyors set up in a gully and got on with the job of plotting hostile batteries. Both advanced posts had a rough time, the occupants of A.P. Victor in particular being much troubled with mortar-shells ( the explosive sound of which was described by one incumbent as the loud crashing of skulls). But they were rewarded. The CRA, 7^th Armoured Div. phoned one morning to say that first priority was to be given to locating enemy heavy AA Batteries. A few Thunderbolts were put up to encourage them to fire, and the troop had a field day, obtaining 19 AA locations. Later in the day the ‘fixes’ received the full treatment from Divisional artillery while 250 Lancaster’s bombed Villers Bocage, trapping a German Division in its narrow streets. The scarcity of flack during the raid attested the accuracy of our work, and the knowledge within the Troop that it was limiting RAF losses gave it confidence. This overall success (the Troop recorded 68 HBs all together on this base) was a great boost to morale. Somehow, all the UK training. The exercise assessments, the damp mornings on Salisbury Plain, had fulfilled their purpose, and, what was most important of all, the Regiment had done its job well in real warfare.

Before the end of its short tenure of the base the Troop had new masters – the Americans. The opening clash of cultures was soon got over and good relations quickly established. But on 3^rd July D Troop was relieved by C Troop, the former having a new task to undertake.

But the story of Caumont would not be complete without mentioning the chilling experience of two troop officers – still naïve as to war – walking through the town (assume means Caumont which at this time was in No Mans Land) on the morning after arrival. Save for the odd scavenging dog the town was empty and, apart from a periodic fall of shell, completely silent. Every footstep sounded like a rifle shot (Hob Nailed Boots) as it echoed against the walls of the narrow streets. Apprehensive eyes turned towards upper windows, searching for snipers against whom a warning had been issued. Not a curtain move, no voice spoke. This eeriness was to be experienced many times later in the campaign as we crossed the German border, but on this, the first occasion, it turned over those two greenhorn stomachs. Of course, in retrospect, the members of A.P.s will regard this as kids stuff, and incomparable with the nervous chill of retiring from the observation trench to the sleeping quarters through an orchard at the dead of night, when the crackle of every twig could be the signature of a marauding enemy patrol.

At this juncture it is worth recording an event that occurred immediately after the Regiment had landed, since it has a bearing on all that we did in the bridgehead. It is best told in the words of the CO, Col. Hilary Clegg.

" On landing. Monty had summoned all 12 Corps officers down to CO’s. He arrived stripped off a parachute jacket – unwound and then re-wound his scarf and proceeded to tell us the whole story to date, concluding by saying that the Bridgehead was now impregnable. He then said ‘I am going to tell you what your task in the future is to be, and why’. He turned to a large map on the wall showing the whole bridgehead. He said ‘Look at those four or five German armoured divisions around Caen. They are good, intact divisions. Your job will be to keep them where they are. We are attacking Caen now (VIII Corps). We may get it – we may not – I don’t care. Now look right at the American front. You see those three divisions opposite them. They are not divisions. Vital bits of them are locked up in Cherbourg – even half a platoon there, the other half with the division. You can appreciate the value of those three divisions.

The Americans will take Cherbourg today or tomorrow. They will need time to sort themselves out. Then, provided those Caen armoured divisions stay put, you can see how easy it will be to break out towards Brittany". Asked what we should tell the troops, he said, after a pause, "Tell them the enemy set-up – the enemy know it well enough. Don’t of course mention my Brittany intention. Above all keep those armoured divisions opposite you".

The CO goes on to record what our "leaning" on the enemy involved: "attack (vigorously) from Caen along the east bank of the River Orne: subsequent pressure along the west bank. But no attack was really pressed home or followed up and, deliberately, little ground gained except east of the river Orne."

While the sound-rangers were deployed at Caumont the surveyors of Y Troop were preparing pickets down the Odon valley. This was to treat the invasion as an extension of a UK exercise, and many lessons were quickly learned. The Troop commander tells the story in these words:

"Soon after my troop landed we deployed to prepare bearing pickets down the Odon valley. We were very green! I remember Ray Smith getting into trouble climbing Grainville church tower carrying a map board. I took a sergeant out in a jeep to prepare a bearing picket at Baron just behind hill 112 which was at a that stage the high ground in contention. We raised a lot dust on the lanes going down which stimulated some fire from the enemy’s large mortars (nebelwerfers – colloquially referred to as ‘moaning minnies’ from their dismal sound)

which precipitated us into a ditch. Then it rained, laid the dust and we completed the readings and got the hell out of it.

Sadly, the Troop’s choice of venue for the first computing centre was a disaster. It was in a field just behind a copse at La Bijude. For some reason it was heavily shelled and mortared, and Lance Bombardier Edwards and Gunner Bloy were killed in the attacks. Lieut. Smith was sent to find a less exposed site- not an easy task in those days with the bridgehead packed tightly with units – but he found a field surrounded by tall trees near the village of Le Mesnil Patry that looked as though it would give vehicle cover. He led the Troop into this new hide, but things were no better. They were shelled again that night, the shells splintering on the trees and peppering the slit trenches below. A despatch rider, Gunner Boyd, was wounded in these attacks and subsequently died in hospital.

In these early days the Troops job was to put the divisional artillery on a common grid since the lack of room for manoeuvre made the battle a static one, but different measures became necessary later after the break-out when the battle became more fluid.

We have digress from Caumont (La Vitardiere) base which was taken over by C troop from D troop on 3^rd July. The men of C troop took over not only the base but also the Americans, and the combination worked well, since they obtained 138 HBs, of which 3/4 were of guns and ¼ mortars. The enemy was making considerable use of mortar fire which was destructive, especially to the infantry, although the gun areas had their fair share of the nuisance. During their tenure the Troop undertook two successful comparator shoots in collaboration with the American 105mm artillery. There was always a warm feeling of satisfaction at the end of a comparator shoot learning that the enemy gun emplacement getting ‘the treatment’ had disappeared from the HB list. C Troop remained on the base until 10^th July.

During this period two weighty armoured attacks had been made towards Caen. Both proceeded by a heavy bomber attack, the second – Operation Charnwood – being especially overwhelming with 450 RAF aircraft of Bomber Command. These were in accordance with Monty’s edict to ‘lean on the enemy and keep his armour opposite us’. Canadian troops took over Carpiquet airfield on 9^th July.

Before 12 Corps took over the Caen – Carpiquet sector from VIII Corps the latter asked 7^th Survey for the loan of a sound-ranging base to deal with mortars that were plaguing hills 112 and 113. Our Corps commander agreed. The then more experienced D Troop was given the job. A 6-microphone 7500 yards base was deployed.

Several things have to be said about the Cheux base. It will be for ever remembered for "Happy Valley" where Field Section heroically kept our lines intact against ceaseless harassment from light and heavy mortars, and where L/Bdr Davies won the MM for his courage at keeping the lines in action while under fire. The improvised skills of Captain Sam Small and Bdr. Jack Went attached agricultural ploughs to vehicles to bury the cable and protect it from being cut by shell and mortar fire as well as the tracks of tanks and other vehicles. With all this effort the lines were somehow kept open. The A.P.s here were troubled, not for the first time, with equipment that was damaged by shell-splinters a problem not encountered or envisaged during exercises in the UK!

But what separated the Cheux base from all the others, before or after was the smell of death. Scores of cattle, caught in the crossfire of war, lay in the fields around, feet in the air, their bodies bloated with the gases of decomposition. The stench was almost unbearable; in fact it was tolerated only because it had to be. D Troop HQ was colloquially referred to as "Dead Cow Field". But war presents some strange antithesis, and in those days of midsummer, men could look eastwards at dawn on good mornings and see the ruins of Caen silhouetted against a blinding crimson sunrise. Was it a bloody backcloth to Man’s wantonness, or a reminder of the Psalmist’s pondering – "Wither shall I go from Thy spirit? Or wither shall I flee from Thy presence?"

Yet always there were the mortars that it was our job to find and for the artillery to destroy. It was comforting, about two weeks after the Troop’s deployment, to have a visit from Major Thomas the Counter-Mortar Officer and to be told that the light mortars had been withdrawn, and that the heavies were being deployed at extreme range. He congratulated the Troop on the important part it had played in this tactical victory. This was good news, but it was not the victory the Troop would most readily recall: that was what became known as the BS plot. This needs explaining "D" Troop of the 59^th Medium Regiment RA situated in the field immediately in front of our HQ, was being heavily shelled at about 6am one morning, one gun receiving a direct hit. Fortunately our Troop recorded the offending enemy gun, and by means of the ‘comparator’ which automatically recorded the fall of our own shot in relation to a target that already has been plotted. We were able to help our neighbours range on to the offending HB. After the final ranging round the enemy fired twelve more rounds, but our gunners fired to rounds gunfire from eleven guns and the HB was never heard from again. This seemed to mould a friendship between our units, and whenever we were near 59 Medium during the rest of the fighting, we always called in on Capt. Bingham their adjutant. In all, 124 HBs were recorded on the Cheux base, 2/3 coming from guns and 1/3 from mortars. One final word. It was noticed that a number of shells failed to explode, a feature that was thought to reflect the work of labourers forcibly expelled from the occupied countries.

On the 22 July the base was taken over by C Troop, who, in the course of two days obtained 20 HBs. Only a handful of these were from mortars, a result that underlined Major Thomas’ judgement. D Troop meanwhile moved to Putot-en-Bassin for a few days well-earned rest - especially the field section

B Troop had moved into Grainville-sur-Odon, overlooking the river, first occupying houses until the REs built them steel towers, and observing until 5 August. Their base here was subject to heavy and persistent shelling and mortaring from the effective nebelwerfer, whose trajectory-sound was described by the sergeant in command as ‘like a ship leaving harbour’. Consequently there was continual interruption to the lines, and the occupants of each of the posts got very little sleep. Incidentally. The complement of each post was 6 surveyors, 2 signallers, 3 drivers and 2 linesmen, a total of 12. Every effort was made an 8-hour shift system, but anything as cut-and dried as this soon turned out to be stuff of Salisbury Plain, and one did the best one could.

The experience on the Eastern side of the bridgehead of heavy casualties from mortars led to, or at least brought forward, a new development in the sound ranging field. One of the problems with the mortars was that they were very much mobile, and the standard sound-ranging set-up was often too inflexible to cope with them when they moved. What seemed to be needed was some new type of sound-ranging equipment.

As it happened the boffins at the School of Survey had been working for some time on the design and development of something which seemed to fit the bill, a new sound-ranging instrument which they called a 4-Pen Recorder. This was a compact, light-weight machine which derived its name from the fact that the signals from the microphones were recorded, seismograph fashion, by four electric pens. As with conventional sound ranging, the microphone had to be "surveyed in" and connected to the machine by cable. But only four microphones were used instead of the conventional six and the base was considerably shorter. Only one AP was employed.

One of the first machines to be produced was rushed out to 7^th Survey in mid-July, and a special section was formed to operate it. This section was formed to operate it. This section was placed under the command of Lt. David Duncan from Y Troop. It had a complement of twenty men, including himself and two sergeants. One of these sergeants was the experienced Sgt. Podobranski, a great character, who had taught at the School of Survey and acquired some fame there by his invention of the "Podobranski Plotter. For transport the section was given two half-tracks and two jeeps.

After some initial teething troubles the 4-Pen was soon proving its worth. Testimony to this is provided not only by reports of Counter Mortar Officers (CBOs) but also by the fact that two more 4-Pen sections were formed within the Regiment before the campaign ended. Sometimes, however, the mortars proved too elusive even for the 4 Pen. In the light of experience and in the difficult conditions prevailing later that year in Holland, the 4-Pens came to be used as much for locating guns as mortars. Apart from their greater mobility, the shorter bases employed often made it possible for them to be sited closer to the front than the main sound-ranging units. But this is anticipating events.

Col. Clegg expressed the view that "this period (in the bridgehead before the break-out) was the most nerve-racking of the whole campaign. True, we did not have mines to contend with, but shells and mortars were taking their toll of one or two of us every day – a surveyor here, an OP somewhere else, a linesman, someone on recce, even two enjoying a cup of tea".

It was also a period in which great demands were made on ingenuity, especially that of the artificers and mechanics. Bdr Went recalls having to repair the petrol tank of a half-track that had been hit by shrapnel. The tank was fitted with a self-sealing material, but had to be permanently repaired. This had to be done in the field by flattening out a 25-pounder brass cartridge case and "tinning" it on to the task with a blowlamp. Jack Went writes to say that he did not feel at all safe as he directed the lamp on to the cleaned-out petrol tank! But it worked.

At this time (18 July to 25 July) the onslaught for the breakout had begun. Operation Goodwood was launched 18 July and Operation Cobra on 25 July. The Regiment was involved in following up the limited progress of Goodwood, and eventually, the encircling of the German forces that Cobra produced. C Troop deployed a very successful 6-microphone base at Mouen just east of the main Caen-Vire road that locate, in the period 25 July to 6 August, 121 HBs, 85% of which were from field guns. Over the same period D troop were settled at Fontenay-le-Pesnil where they captured 90 HBs, nearly all of which were field guns. This artillery activity on the part of the enemy indicates that even as late as 5 August its main effort was directed at the British end of the bridgehead.  

at Le Mont, where, up until 14 August it had registered 44 HBs - all guns, and C Troop forward of D Troop at Le-Mesnil, where it registered 21 gun locations. The ground over which the Le Mont base was laid was heavily mined, and much time was employed with the mine detectors making certain that the line laying vehicles could move safely.