Dagenhardt     Col. H Clegg          Cyril Beard
August 1977

Before starting on my memories of D tp's work in the 1944/45 N.W. Europe campaign, it might interest members of the troop to recall certain very important matters affecting Artillery as a whole and the Survey Regiments in particular.

Three Factors made the gun a winner in world war ll.

• First - Wireless, a forward observer by means of wireless could call instantly the fire of every gun to hit that point that his infantry wanted him to strike.
• Second - Survey. The rapidity of Survey enabled these guns to hit that point almost as soon as their trails were down.
• Third, the idea of hitting every located H.B (hostile battery) in turn with every gun available, as late as possible before H hour virtually inhibited the enemy's previously devastating counter preparation fire.

Air photos, Sound Ranging and Flash spotters (until the Germans used Flashless propellant) found these H.Bs.

Sound Rangers
As the war went northwards into more covered country and often poor visibility, they became the No.1 gun finders, with air photos distinctly second. Again with the short rapid 5000yds or so penetration of the usual break? In attack, mobility became vital and one found if the new base could be planned in the evening, recce started at first light next day, then the new base would be in action the same evening on at least four microphones and one A.P.

In locating H.Bs prior to an operation, given 5 days or more, reasonable enemy activity and "average" met conditions, sound rangers would locate about 80% of H.Bs. Also their less accurate locations often disclosed the secret in the air photo.

Finally the only immediate reply to a H.B doing damage was in the hands of the sound rangers. Hence it was vitally important to maintain continuous sound ranging cover during the numerous break in operations.

CAUMONT
The day after we landed in Normandy, 4^th Survey Regt. Asked for an extra S.R. base to cover the Caumont front – a comparatively quiet sector. 12 Corps agreed and thought it would be good practise. The only snag was that the base surveyed by 4^th Survey Regt., though safe enough itself, would have necessitated A.P.s in the enemy lines. So D troop had to start afresh the next day. Even then the left A.P. seemed to attract a lot of mortaring.

Two important lessons were learned here. First the vital importance of the shelling connection i.e. sound of gun to fall of shot. Failure to do so led to the odd location of an H.B. of one of our own gun bursts. Second was the fact that even a full sized S.R. base could be useful in finding mortars.

Cheux "Dead Cow Field"
Before 12 Corps took over the front from 8 Corps, D tp relieved at Caumont by C tp. Was asked to see what it could do about mortars which wee plaguing the infantry assembling to attack hills 112 and 113.

A shortish base was set up with H.Q. in a dugout and sunken lane, gassed the whole time by the bloated bullocks in dead cow field.

Shells and mortars continuously ripped to pieces the D8 cables to the left hand microphones. Capt. Sam Small, I think, had the brilliant idea of commandeering a French horse plough, hitching it to a carrier, and ploughing in the lines to a depth of a few inches an amelioration which kept the base in action.

One incident I recall which you may remember. The attack on pt 112 had gone in and beyond. I visited a Div. H.Q. en route to D tp. On the wireless came a call for a Victor target (All Corps Artillery) scale 10 against 200 enemy tanks. I plotted the map ref. On the Brigade Major’s map. It was on the line of the leading infantry. The Bde. Major checked back with the F.O.O (Forward Observation Officer) and was told to fire it. Within 5 minutes some 600 guns had loosed off some 5000 rounds. Ten minutes later the F.O.O called for the same target but a bit to the left. Another 5000 rounds. Twenty minutes later a repeat with tanks still further left. After that the F.O.O reported "tanks gone". You must had heard that racket – time about mid morning.

When 12 Corps took over the front, C tp occupied a base left of D tp layed out by 10^th Survey Regt. R.A. In over a week this base never functioned owing to continuous line cutting. It was intended to withdraw C tp to Carpiquet but this did not occur, and C tp got a few days rest.

Good, however, came out of evil. R.H.Q discovered that there were limitless supplies of D8 at base and thereafter we kept 200 miles of it with us. That finished cable recovery for the war. It also gave sound rangers the time saving which enabled them to give continuous cover to attacking formations.

With the American break-out at St Lo we could hardly believe that the menacing hills 112 and 113 were empty of enemy. 12 Corps main thrust was on the left - the Orne crossing – and in conjunction with the Canadians, Falaise. I therefore saw little of D tp in this phase. 54 Bty. Was operating under command of 53 Div. I think. My visits were mainly to Bty. H.Q. for exchange of information and administration matters. On the other hand one learned again the efficiency of German observed fire. In expanding our bridgehead over the Orne the Germans maintained for several days observation of the bridge from the right flank. It was not until 53 Div secured the high ground there that peaceful daylight movement over the bridge became possible. Later with the Falaise pocket enclosed and 12 Corps tightening the ring, the enemy, who should be then have been badly disorganised, dropped a salvo on X troop having tea in a field which one would have considered perfectly safe from observation. The same thing happened to Y tp after S’Hertogenbosch. Both resulted in tragic casualties.

54 Bty. with many others was grounded to supply the transport to support the drive through Northern France, Belgium, Holland and optimistically, Germany. D tp rejoined the regiment at Antwerp about a fortnight later (having gone forward with Adv Tac HQ).

D Tp. reconnoitred but did not occupy a base to the East of Antwerp (actually occupied Die Pieting base for one day), when the decision was taken to forget the Scheldt and set up the airborne drop to capture all river crossings up to Arnhem. As a result 54 Bty. Moved to behind the Wilhelmina Canal to cover a small bridge head which we established East of Hasselt.

In this operation 12 Corps was to be left flank guard and 8 Corps (including 53 Bty. Right flank to 30 Corps whose task was to drive through the airborne" carpet" to Arnhem. The unpleasant little bridgehead which 54 Bty had to cover was designed to get 12 Corps off the mark. Similar bridgeheads had been seized by the two other Corps.

There was a marked change in outlook on this front. After hundreds of miles through France & Belgium with only light rear guards to compete with, and the main danger being driving by accident into them, one again saw flattened villages, and again became careful of German observation and resultant shells and mortars. The Germans had regrouped strongly behind the canal and did not lack guns ammunition.

In deploying D tp base I remember a smart exchange with your B.C. Murray Graham. I happened to meet your recce. party at a railway crossing - the line of the railway I had marked out on my map as a suitable sort of base for the job. A few bumps along the sleepers proved the railway line navigable so I ordered the base to be set along it. Maj. Murray Graham was hopping mad when latter he discovered the ploy, saying it was not the C.O.s job to site microphones. Quite correct. Still I was unrepentant. Easy survey and the railway effectively stopped line cutting by our own vehicles. Here gun finding was ideal. Conditions just right for sound ranging and for the first time the Germans used non stop flash propellant so B tp really had a ball. Alas all to no avail. We literally had no ammunition to answer with, and our little bridgehead had absolute hell as a result.

Every round we could get from the beachhead had to be saved for the main operation. When that took place in fact we failed to break out from our established bridgehead and had to force another farther East.

D tps. next task was to support 53-49? Div who had secured an airfield West of Eindhoven near Bree. It was vitally important for supporting 30 Corps and providing air cover for the Arnhem supply drops. It was under fire and liable to counter attack. B tp. had moved up 30 Corps axis to around St Oedenrode.

The corridor was then cut and even the road leading up to it was under continuous fire from the West. I had a long argument with your CRA. I wanted a sound ranging troop to deal with this menace (C tp. was away with 8 Corps). He was still unhappy about his airfield, loss of which would have had unthinkable consequences. I still think the risk was minimal but I had to give way, so D tp was spared a hurried deployment at the cut of the corridor.

The sense of anticlimax after the Arnhem failure was strong. It began to look like Caen again. Another unpleasantness was the daily crossing of the single of the single track Nijmegan bridge under enemy observation.

One sunny afternoon I visited B tp. left O.P. far to the West in a church on the South bank of the Waal. In addition to B tps. O.P. in the church I found one gunner F.O.O. sitting on a wide balcony under an umbrella and a dozen spectators and hangers on. I left some sharp orders re self preservation which was reinforced on my way back. I often stopped in a quiet place to listen to enemy guns to try and get an impression of change. After an hour I was pretty sure that a Division had moved in on our left flank. That evening I offered the dog leg switch of D tp to cover U.S. 101 airborne division Just arrived and deploying thank goodness along our left open flank. Not the first of several heavy tasks which D tp. was asked to do. We all probably remember the repeated night attacks repulsed by 101 Div. who were most grateful for the support you enabled our counter battery chaps to give them.

With Den Bosch captured D Tp deployed Northwards and the advance continued with the 7^th Armd Div. AGRA and 53 Bty. There were some sticky passages but 12 Corps objectives were gained..

Information given to me about the American front was about Two miles out – the wrong way. Looking for a site indicated to me as suitable for a Div Artillery (and also for a part of D tp.) I found a patrol of Americans crawling along a ditch who put me wise. The whole flat area was in full view of the raised canal bank reported to be ours but firmly in German hands. However other reasonable areas were available and redeployment then commenced. I almost became P.E. no. 1 with D Tp. Visiting just as they had wired in I found them in full view of that damned canal bank. It was too dangerous. I ordered them to move that night ½ mile to another farm house. I am not sorry . How the mistake occurred I do not know because my experiences on that recce., must have included in orders the dangers of observation from the canal.

The operation itself was rather worrying. We know that there were five German armoured divisions assembled North of Arnhem - luckily they were preparing for the Ardennes and did not interfere. Again we knew that the whole advance would be plagued by guns of the extended Siegfried line from across the Maas. In effect the initial thrust went well. 51 Highland Div after breaking in actually formed marching order, vanguard, advanced guard the lot. It did not last long. But enough to allow them to jump the canal in the night South of Panningen. D tp. deployed along the Maas towards and beyond Roermond to do what they could about the Siegfried line guns. But the battle by then was beyond their left flank and our thrust along the Maas bank was being heavily shelled. I remember visiting CRA 51 Div. late one evening who was very worried about this. I then gave orders to D tp. to re-deploy next day at right angles to their existing base to deal with the menace – but knowing full well almost at once that they would have to form another base for the final attack on Venlo. Success resulted and our right started to move more freely so that within a day or two D tp could deploy to cover the Venlo assault.

About this time tragedy hit D tp. One night the Germans launched an extensive air assault using light anti-personnel bombs against the whole of the assault area. One of several landed near D tp. H.Q. (C tp HQ) killing two of the Met Section who were launching their Met balloons. I remember prowling around my tac HQ wondering if I should get all the men out of their accommodation and get them into cellars.

The only other incident I remember is that Capt. Sam Small blew himself up on a mine some time after the operation ended on a route travelled by a great number of people. Luckily only his ears were affected but badly enough for him to be sent home. Jack Tasker took over . German jets appeared for the first time during and just after the operation.

In the event all went well. Some front and ice bound roads were troublesome, but the Ardennes battle giving out (partly thanks to our old friends 101 at Bastonge) and it was not until the new year that we suffered a smart attack which was stopped precisely at the 4 pens AP.

The attack on the Roer was launched late in January. Here for once in a way my main problem was Survey, and so we thought mines (we were attacking the Siegfried line ). The initial assault involved a midday thrust North from Gangelt With Corps artillery following up to support a further assault next morning. The puzzle was with almost non stop 500 yard visibility how to get the bearing forward for 2 or 3 miles before dark. The Survey tp commander worked out sun azimuth for every 5 minutes of day light on the day of the attack. In fact on the day there was bright sunshine all afternoon. In this operation there was less reason to advance D tp. as any premature advance would uncover our left which the 4 pen was trying to deal with it.

The menace of mines proved unfounded. They were all Frozen solid and would not go off. Towards the end of the operation it thawed. I remember I had four routes up to various parts of the front. The day of the thaw every one was blocked by blown up vehicles one Medium Regiment due to join us for our ten days rest in Louvain (Holsbeek) took two days to clear itself.

Gun location was a problem. We needed a third troop to cover Wesel and South of Wesel, my pleas were eventually successful with 3 days to go. In fact our borrowed troop located a number of batteries to the South of D tp’s zone – so much that the C.B. plan had to be re-arranged and reprinted at the last minute. 54 Bty was once again grounded after Tp HQ (this was actually Y tp) offered Mr. Churchill a cup of tea while he watched the Rhine crossing.

I am afraid this is rather a scrappy account but it is now 1/3^rd of a century since these stirring events happened. If I have got things wrong or failed to remember important ones I plead senility and ask forgiveness.

I should like to remember exactly how many bases D tp employed. I believe between C & D over fifty. I know that bases faced every quarter of the compass in the course of the campaign. In commanding a regiment at Larkhill after the war, at all _?_ conferences the life saving and battle winning assistance of the Sound Rangers was always stressed.

H.Clegg Lt.Col R.A.