Brief for the Local Government Association on "Devolved Management for Allotments"
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Brief for the Local Government Association on "Devolved Management for Allotments" |
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1. Devolved Management: What's in it for Local Authorities? The practice of devolving a share of the responsibility for managing allotment sites to local allotment societies, known variously (and inconsistently) as "devolved management", "self-management" or "delegated management", has drawn strong if qualified support both from parliament and from central government. According to the Report of the Inquiry into The Future For Allotments: "There is little doubt that, when successfully implemented, self-management schemes ensure greater control of a site by allotment holders and tend to work to the benefit of the site". The Report went on to recommend "that all local authorities examine the potential for self-management of their allotment sites"(1), and noted the comment made by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Environment in her oral evidence, that "self-management at that very local level is almost always a good idea"(2). The Report also recommended "that the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions should draw up an appropriate model agreement that can be used by local authorities formally to devolve responsibilities to allotment societies"(3). This may have been a recommendation too far for the Government, which came to the view in its Response that "arrangements for devolution to allotment societies is best determined at a local level according to local circumstances"(4). In practice, devolved management requires attention both to general issues, for which several models will be described in a later section, and to very local circumstances, as the Government suggests, and best practice in devolved management for a specific local authority will involve a reasoned and negotiated choice of model (or models) and careful adaptation of that model to shifting realities on the ground. The advantages of devolved management to local authorities are largely, but by no means exclusively, economic ones. In evidence from the local authority sector which drew particular praise from the Inquiry, Alan Kirby summarised the main economic arguments in succinct terms, and in the context of a successful scheme for the devolved management of allotments in Stroud developed in cooperation with the NSALG and local allotment gardeners. The terms of reference from which the Stroud scheme evolved were "to examine (a) what makes good allotment provision? and (b) how can good provision be achieved at minimum cost to the Council tax payer?"(5). Kirby based his argument on the question of the appropriate charge that should be levied for allotment use. In his view, "Allotment rents should be calculated in relation to the marginal cost arising from usage, i.e. as is the case with most leisure provision. However, even if rents are calculated in this way, the resultant rents levels would be unacceptably high - because good day to day site management is expensive". And he continues: "It is believed that high quality day to day direct management by Local Authorities is an unacceptably high and unnecessary marginal cost that can be avoided by effective management agreements with Allotment Associations"(6). Implicit in the argument is an acceptance that allotment provision should be "good", which is defined in the Stroud case to include good security, good water supply and secure tenure. It is difficult to imagine a "best practice" regime for allotment management that argued for "bad" allotments, but it is worth suggesting that the definition of "good" allotments should itself be negotiated at the local level in the light of specific local opportunities and priorities. The relevant point to be made here, however, is that the higher the standard established, the more expensive it will be to maintain, and hence the stronger the argument becomes, other things equal, for effective self-management agreements. Explicit in the argument is the view that rent levels for "good" allotments would be "unacceptably high". Again, the definition of an "acceptable rent" is something for local negotiation, but the implication is that the lower the willingness of plotholders to pay in cash, then the greater the requirement that they contribute in kind - unless of course rents are subsidised from some other source, such as local taxation, trading profits or charitable donation, in the light of other priorities such as health, social welfare and environmental conservation. The costs attributable to allotments are not confined to those derived from day to day management, of course, but include also capital costs such as the replacement of fencing and upkeep of roads, water supplies, equipment and any buildings. Conceivably these could be factored into rent as depreciation charges, though as Kirby points out, "local authorities must inevitably remain the main provider of allotments", and "as with all recreational facilities, they will remain responsible for the capital expenditure provision"(7), so the appropriateness of compounding rents with capital charges is questionable. At this point, however, the argument takes a different turn, for allotments differ in a key respect from most other recreational facilities, in that "once provided, they are not universally available", and the implication deserves quoting at length: "In the case of allotments, exclusive occupancy is granted to an individual (effectively for an indefinite period and frequently for 20 years or more). In these circumstances, there is justification for saying that the tenants have an obligation to reduce the burden on the public purse. The obvious mechanism is through rents. The practical effect of raising rents to a 'realistic level' would be a lack of take up. It is for this reason that the Council is strongly of the view that future allotment provision has to include a high degree of self management by the tenants. It is believed this can only be achieved through the formation of associations acting as agents for the providing authority"(8). There is one other set of costs arising from allotments - the opportunity costs of allowing allotment land to lie unused and derelict, the recognition of which drives the desire of many local authorities to rationalise their portfolios of statutory allotment land. This is surely the most sensitive issue in allotment politics, and no "best practice regime" for allotments could sensibly ignore it. There is one obvious way to avoid these costs: rent all the land available to legitimate tenants. The Inquiry heard evidence that not every local authority has subscribed to this solution in the past, and that some may actively have sought to discourage demand, a charge taken sufficiently seriously by the Government to prompt it to introduce a new requirement covering active promotion as part of the Section 8 procedure (9). With notable exceptions (to which we return later) however, full use of statutory land by contented tenants is a goal to which most allotment societies and individual gardeners would subscribe. 2. Devolved Management: What's in it for Allotment Gardeners? Which brings us to the complementary rationale for devolved management - the best interests of present and future tenants. For reasons already explored, devolved management represents one means of achieving "good" allotments, and sometimes the only means. But devolved management can also be highly beneficial in other ways, which are explored in detail in submissions to the Inquiry by Professor David Crouch and others. Who better to promote allotments, for example, than people who are actively engaged in managing the plots, who can provide a friendly welcome and practical advice on site as and when required? What better way to foster morale and a genuine sense of community on allotments (and genuine service to surrounding communities) than to give local allotment gardeners some measure of direct responsibility for and control over the management of their sites? (10) What better way to ensure effective participation in Local Agenda 21 initiatives - and thus to achieve common cause with local authorities - than through partnerships based on allotment societies which are democratically accountable to their members and have independent experience of community-based resource management? (11) What better way, in short, to maximise the opportunity to put the dereliction and abandonment cycle into reverse, and tackle the problem of allotment vacancies where it matters: at the point of demand. So much for carrots. The stick is eloquently summarised in the submission made to the Inquiry by one of the most successful associations in the country, and one which took the lessons of the Thorpe Report to heart a quarter of a century ago: "Those sites of low occupancy, where the users are not prepared to look outwards, to help in recruitment and to share their enthusiasm for gardening, must be prepared for the site's demise"(12). 3. Drawbacks of Devolved Management Devolved management has advantages then for both local authorities and plotholders. But it is no universal or unqualified panacea. The drawbacks of devolved management may be summarised in terms of commitment, capacity and accountability. In this section we review the problems: solutions will be discussed in Section 5. No scheme for devolved management will work unless there is sustained commitment to it on the part of the local authority, the allotment society, and individual plotholders. Local authorities require some assurance that the societies or plotholder groups to which responsibilities are devolved will remain committed, reliable and responsible partners, despite occasional changes of membership (13), and there is a reciprocal requirement for a consistent commitment from the local authority despite changes in personnel, policies and political complexion. An arrangement which is opposed by a significant minority of individual plotholders is unlikely to work either, since volunteer managers are easy targets for persistent abuse from dissatisfied plotholders, not least for being on "the council's side", a charge which carries particular venom when the past relationship between a local authority and its tenants has been acrimonious. The capacity of an allotment society to make a success of devolved management will depend in part on the extent of the duties to be devolved (for which see the next section), but also on a wide range of other variables which may or may not be within its control - the size of the site, the tenancy rate, the quality of the infrastructure, the level of rental income, the leadership abilities of present and future tenants, the character of the local community, and so on. This capacity may vary over time, which is problematic, because once a local authority has devolved some of its management responsibilities it may lose the capacity to reassume them. The quality of service provided under devolved management is determined by the professionalism with which new responsibilities are discharged. Plotholders are likely to demand a service at least as good as that previously obtained from the local authority, in matters such as responsiveness to complaints, handling of funds and equal opportunities. Again, the ability of allotment societies to develop and sustain this capacity will vary, and may not be easy to judge in advance, because higher professional standards on site alter the perceptions that plotholders have of each other. More professional can be interpreted as aloof, distant and overbearing by plotholders left outside the charmed circle. Accountability is central to the task of maintaining support for devolved management amongst plotholders - and local authorities. Without transparent procedures and audit mechanisms, there is always the risk that failures in the performance of devolved duties will go undetected (or unreported), and conversely, that societies will become a little too zealous in implementing their powers. The Minister addressed this issue in her oral evidence to the enquiry: "If there is self-management, it has to be done in a structure that is fair to all, not in an elitist way: we do not want somebody on the allotments who we do not want to talk to or who is from the wrong side of the tracks. I would assume that any local authority that wanted to allow self-management to happen would ensure, within the structures that were set up to do that, that degree of fairness because there is still a statutory right for people to have access to allotment land" (14). The need to ensure accountability increases along with the share of management responsibilities which are devolved, and local authorities must recognise that there are limits beyond which devolution should not go if accountability is to be ensured (15) and cannot go given their statutory duty to provide (16). At the same time, it is important that any system of accountability should not be open to abuse by malicious and persistent complainers. A more subtle problem of accountability is highlighted by the dilemma which faces allotment societies over the sensitive issue of rationalisation and disposal. One method of upgrading the quality of the allotment portfolio is to sell off "surplus" allotment land (with Section 8 approval) and apply a share of the proceeds to the upgrading of the remaining facilities (17). Where there is genuinely insufficient demand for vacant land there is no problem, and obvious benefit for the plotholders, the local authority and chargepayers; the difficulty is that societies (and their constituent plotholders) may also stand to gain where latent demand is left unexpressed, and indeed have an incentive to co-operate with the local authority in a manner contrary to the best interests of those plotholders who may be required to relocate and "plotholders yet to be" who, as the result of the loss of the land, may "never become". Safeguards are clearly required - and will be considered in Section 5. 4. Models of Devolved Management We noted earlier that the capacity of an allotment society or plotholders' group to make a success of devolved management will depend in part on the extent of the duties to be devolved. The list of duties to be considered is very long (Appendix I is by no means exhaustive), and the appropriate division of responsibilities is unlikely to be identical for any two sites. Nevertheless, it is useful to impose some order, if only to give a general indication of the degree of devolution, and to bring some consistency to the use of terminology. For present purposes, it may be helpful to adopt (with some modification and elaboration) the categorisation used by Ashford Borough Council in consultations with its Allotments Forum, which identifies five different models for devolved management (18), as follows: € Dependence: Neither plotholders nor societies play any practical role in site management, beyond exchanges of information, perhaps through the medium of a "site representative". Dependence can be a comfortable state for plotholders, and one not willingly abandoned, if the level of service provided by the local authority is considered adequate, or if plotholders are resigned to a poor service. A deterioration in the quality of service (linked to the rising cost of direct provision) may stimulate interest in an alternative model, but only if dissatisfaction overcomes resignation. More positively, inertia may be overcome through the demonstration of the positive benefits to be derived from a degree of active involvement in site management. € Participation: Plotholders informally accept responsibility for minor maintenance works, and some mechanism may exist (such as an allotments forum) for the views of plotholders or site representatives to be consulted on capital expenditure and repairs. € Delegation: A properly constituted allotment society accepts formal responsibility for a range of duties under license from the local authority, under financial arrangements which release a proportion of rental income for this purpose. For example, the society may arrange tenancies and carry our regular maintenance duties, but leave the local authority to carry out repairs, pay for overheads such as water, and undertake all legal formalities. € Semi-Autonomy: The allotment society leases the site from the council, arranges tenancy agreements and reinvests revenue (which it manages) on maintenance, repair and capital items. Depending upon the term of the lease plotholders may become the tenants of the society rather than of the local authority. The local authority retains defined oversight and strategic functions. € Autonomy: The allotment society purchases the land and operates independently. This option is a possibility for an individual site: complete privatisation of a local authority's allotments portfolio would be problematic, however, given the statutory duty to provide. This categorisation can be used to identify three essentials for any regime of "best practice" in allotment management.
5. Processes and Safeguards The processes required to identify the appropriate model of devolved management for a particular site and to facilitate higher levels of participation in site management by plotholders and allotment societies are different but complementary. Negotiations on the appropriate model and content of any devolved management agreement should cover all aspects of site management, including (but by no mean confined to) the list given in Appendix I. It is important to recognise that during the negotiations leading to the introduction of devolved management - at any level of autonomy - allotment societies and plotholders are unlikely to have expertise and resources available "in-house" to match either those of the local authority or, more significantly, the requirements of the task in hand. This is an unsatisfactory situation for all parties, including the local authority, which needs some assurance that any agreements entered into can be sustained by the plotholders. "Best practice" should involve the insertion of professional expertise at that point, obtained either from within the authority on the basis of accumulated experience in this field, or from a third party. We have already noted, for example, the involvement of the NSALG in facilitating devolved management in Stroud, and the Inquiry heard similar stories from around the country (19). It is important for the spread of devolved management - and the achievement of the associated benefits - that the capacity of third parties such as the NSALG to offer a professional facilitation service be maintained and augmented (20). This is a matter for third parties to address, although it would be reasonable to expect local authorities to make a contribution to the cost of any services they receive, once a system based upon fees rather than membership is in place. We have also noted that every allotment site is different, and the appropriate model and its content should be considered with care. There would be merit to developing the list given in Appendix I into a full audit of the commitment and capacity of both the local authority and the allotment society and plotholders in respect of each site (21), not least as an objective basis for negotiations on establishing devolved management, but also as a benchmark for subsequent reviews, to see if a higher level of autonomy has become appropriate. Auditing and facilitation also imply an additional benefit: they are learning processes, and learning (about the present and about the possibilities) helps to build aspiration, commitment and capacity. It would be appropriate in this sense to append to each item some indication of the advantages - and disadvantages - to plotholders and societies of accepting a measure of devolved responsibility. Representative bodies for allotments have an important role to play in the design of documentation for these audits. The submission from the South East Regional Allotment Committee to the Inquiry noted: "Research and publication of case studies aimed at successful and best practice would substantially assist many Local Authorities develop allotment sites"(22). This is sound advice, but more should be possible. It would be helpful for exemplars of the Participation, Delegation, Semi-Autonomy and Autonomy models or the like not only to be documented, but also empowered to perform a proactive role in encouraging the spread of their models to local authorities and individual sites currently operating at a lower scale of autonomy. In this context, the efforts of both the London Borough of Bromley to establish a forum for allotment officers in the South East as a medium for disseminating best practice, and the supportive role played by the Bromley Allotments and Leisure Gardens Federation and its members (23), who together form an excellent model of management under the Semi-Autonomy model, should be commended, encouraged and extended both by the Local Government Association and by representative bodies for allotments, and similar exemplars should be encouraged to come forward (24). Finally, it is essential to integrate into "best practice" a number of safeguards against failures of commitment, capacity and accountability. The commitment of the volunteers who accept responsibilities on behalf of all plotholders can easily flag - when initial enthusiasm wears off, criticisms accumulate, and apathy (sometimes apathy induced by success) traps office holders in "irreplaceable" positions. A sensible safeguard is to build into the rules of the society an insistence on retirement from office after a set period - so that succession remains an issue (25). As for the commitment by individual plotholders, transparent and well publicised procedures to which societies can be held accountable undoubtedly help, including the publication of minutes and accounts (26). Once again, there is an important role for representative bodies such as the NSALG in advising on "best practice" in such matters. At the same time, volunteers deserve protection from arbitrary and malicious complaints, against which a threshold requirement, such as that commonly incorporated into allotment society rules whereby ten or more signatures to a petition are required before a Special General Meeting has to be called, can act as a buffer, although as a counterweight, perhaps, there should also be a requirement that valid votes of no confidence are reported to the local authority. Substantial reference to capacity building has already been made, and this should be augmented by general measures to build a community spirit (the subject of a separate brief). The development of a capacity to deliver a higher standard of service depends in part on training, and it would be highly desirable if any training courses on allotments management developed by ILAM or other bodies for the benefit of allotment officers could also be opened to the trustees or officer of allotment societies on self-managed sites. In addition, there should be a regular flow of information from local authorities to societies on council policies on equal opportunities, access and the like, so that the services provided on devolved management allotment sites can be kept in line with contemporary standards. As for the hazard of societies cooperating a little too closely with local authorities in the disposal of statutory allotment land, an appropriate safeguard would be to ensure that audits of potential for devolved management are open to the public gaze, not just to those of the local authority and current plotholders, whenever asset sales are contemplated, to protect both parties from charges of collusion. The aim of an open procedure should be to ensure that no latent demand for plots is being suppressed - although this should not be interpreted to include latent demand for a specific plot - and that the interests of those who may be displaced are fully taken into account, with compensation paid where appropriate. Where disposals are planned to finance improvements, this should trigger an audit anyway, to determine whether these improvements will also enable an increase in the level of autonomy within the devolved management system. Footnotes (1) The Future for Allotments: Fifth Report of the House of Commons Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Committee. Volume I. London: The Stationery Office, HC560-I, June 1998, p. xxxii (2) The Future for Allotments: Minutes of Evidence. London, The Stationery Office, HC560-iii, March 1998, p. 71 (3) The Future for Allotments: Fifth Report of the House of Commons Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Committee. Volume I. London: The Stationery Office, HC560-I, June 1998, p. xxxii (4) The Government's Response to the Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Committee's Report on The Future for Allotments. London: The Stationery Office, Cm 4052, September 1998, p. 4 (5) Memorandum by Alan Kirby (AL 16). The Future for Allotments: Fifth Report of the House of Commons Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Committee. Volume II. London: The Stationery Office, HC560-II, June 1998, p. 8 (6) ibid., p. 9 (7) ibid., p. 10 (8) ibid., p. 10 (9) The Future for Allotments: Minutes of Evidence. London, The Stationery Office, HC560-iii, March 1998, p. 69, para. 226. The comments of the Minister on the encouragement of self-management are relevant at this point: "I think that can be very positive and I think that actually gets over some of the suspicions about local authorities deliberately wanting to run down sites". (ibid., p. 71, para 247) (10) Memorandum by Professor David Crouch (AL 17). The Future for Allotments: Minutes of Evidence. London: The Stationery Office, HC560-i, February 1998, p. 2; Supplementary Memorandum by Professor David Crouch (AL 17 (a)). ibid., pp. 19-20; and ibid., p. 16, para. 45 (11) QED Allotments Group, Allotments in Local Agenda 21. Brief Prepared for the Local Government Association's Working Group on a Best Practice Regime for Allotments (First Draft), November 16, 1998 (available from the QED Website at http://www.btinternet.com/~richard.wiltshire/lga3.htm) (12) Memorandum by Kent House Leisure Gardens (AL 67). The Future for Allotments: Fifth Report of the House of Commons Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Committee. Volume II. London: The Stationery Office, HC560-II, June 1998, p. 39 (13) Memorandum by the Department of the Environment Transport and the Regions (AL 23). The Future for Allotments: Minutes of Evidence. London, The Stationery Office, HC560-iii, March 1998, p. 64 (14) The Future for Allotments: Minutes of Evidence. London, The Stationery Office, HC560-iii, March 1998, p. 72, para. 249 (15) The problems confronted in Cardiff following the formation of a plc to run allotments there, as described in the National Society's evidence to the Inquiry, would appear to be a case in point. Memorandum by the National Society of Allotment and Leisure Gardeners Ltd (AL 22). The Future for Allotments: Minutes of Evidence. London: The Stationery Office, HC560-i, February 1998, pp. 7 (16) "An Allotment Authority cannot divest itself of overall responsibility for the provision of allotments within its area. This means that no matter what form of devolution has occurred, the authority will still be responsible for meeting the allotment needs of its charge payers". Bristol City Council, Living Bristol Allotment Strategy (Draft Document), March 1998, p. 73 (17) This approach is advocated, for example, in evidence submitted to the Inquiry by the South East Regional Allotments Committee: "Within the South East it is the Committee's policy to encourage societies to listen to Council proposals for rationalisation and assess them in terms of both current and latent demand, taking into account fluctuations over time. Co-operation is advised where proposals incorporating upgrading existing provision with better facilities including any backlog on site maintenance". Memorandum by South East Regional Allotments Committee (AL 27). The Future for Allotments: Minutes of Evidence. London: The Stationery Office, HC560-ii, February 1998, p. 46 (18) While Ashford Borough Council has kindly supplied a copy of its presentational materials it is not responsible for the elaboration which has been added here. (19) See, for example, the five year record of problems and issues maintained for the South East, as referred to in: Memorandum by South East Regional Allotments Committee (AL 27) op.cit., p. 43 (20) See also the Memorandum by the Local Food Links Project (AL 32). The Future for Allotments: Fifth Report of the House of Commons Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Committee. Volume II. London: The Stationery Office, HC560-II, June 1998, pp. 20-21 (21) To quote from the admirable preface to the management agreement between Stroud Town Council and Uplands Allotments Association (the Stroud version, not the Handsworth one!), kindly supplied by Mr Alan Kirby: "The objective of this agreement is for shared responsibility for allotment management between the Council and the Association with each doing what they are best at in order to guarantee long term provision of high quality allotment facilities within the town." [emphasis added] The purpose of this audit procedure is to discover what each is best at. (22) Memorandum by South East Regional Allotments Committee (AL 27) op.cit., p. 48 (23) Memorandum by Kent House Leisure Gardens (AL 67) op.cit., pp.38-40, and Memorandum by Bromley Allotments and Leisure Gardens Federation (AL 81). The Future for Allotments: Fifth Report of the House of Commons Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Committee. Volume II. London: The Stationery Office, HC560-II, June 1998, pp. 44-45 (24) See, for example, another case commented on with approval in the Inquiry Report: Memorandum by Shepperton Allotment Association (AL 51). The Future for Allotments: Fifth Report of the House of Commons Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Committee. Volume II. London: The Stationery Office, HC560-II, June 1998, pp. 30-31 (25) Bromley Borough Council's annual allotments survey specifically inquires whether such arrangements are in place (26) For an example of open procedures used on a semi-autonomous site by the Dartford Road Allotments Association, visit http://www.btinternet.com/~richard.wiltshire/draa4.htm
Appendix I: Some issues to be determined in arrangements for devolved management
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