At the outbreak of the French Revolution the 35th regiment of Foot was stationed at edinburgh Castle and stayed in Scotland until 1792 when it was sent to Ireland. However 1793 saw British activities once again beginning to centre on the French held West Indies. By January 1794 the 35th Regiment of Foot once more back in Barbados preparing to attack Martinique. On 20th of February after much heavy fighting all Fortresses on the island were once more in British hands. (The 35th Regiment of Foot having been involved in the capture of the island in 1762.)

    Following the fall of Martinique the 35th Regiment of Foot was again to repeat history, this time with the capture of St Lucia. From this island they were transported for an attack on Guadeloupe where the northern portion of the island group and its Fortresses was at the point of the bayonet quickly secured. Two days later the southern island fell into British hands, the third time in successive wars.

    The flank companies then found themselves bound for St Domingo, however by their arrival fighting had ceased, but this did not prevent loss. During the passage disease had broken out and the Grenadier battalion which included the 35th Regiment's, practically ceased to exist. Meanwhile things began to go badly for the centre companies.

    The French having recovered from their initial island loss, set about recovering their former possessions and soon recaptured part of Guadeloupe. The forces gathered to repel the French, including the centre companies of the 35th Regiment, were soon in trouble. On the 2nd of July most of the 35th Regiment of Foot was involved in an abortive attack on the town of Point-a-Petre and had to retreat to Berville. By the 1st of September, thanks once again to disease the companies of 35th Regiment at Berville are reported to have only had 47 men fit for duty, these men were part of the forces forced to capitulate to the French on the 6th of October.

    The fall of the main body left a small garrison, including several companies of the 35th regiment of Foot, in possession of the only fortress on Guadeloupe in British hands, FORT MATILDA. Here the small garrison managed to hold out, enduring great hardships, until December 10th. The surviving members of the 35th Regiment of Foot were transported to Martinique from there, by early 1795, they were on their way to Gibraltar via England, where the Regiment stayed until late 1796.

    From 1797 until 1799 the 35th Regiment of Foot was back in mainland Britain stationing various parts of the United Kingdom. However, 1799 saw the Regiment take part in the Duke of York's army co-operating with Russian allies in an attack on the Dutch Republic (Batavian).

    Although this campaign needs further research the following can be stated on the 19th of August 1797 both battalions 35th Regiment were involved in heavy fighting through the village of Schorl, fighting shoulder to shoulder with two battalions of Russians and a brigade of British  Guards. However even this exhalted company had to retire due to lack of ammunition (in the case of the Russians) and as exhaustion (in the case of the British) set in. At the end of this days battle (some 14 hours) the 1st Battalion had over 350 men killed, wounded or missing. Probably because of the losses, for the rest of the campaign the centre companies of both battalions were given the duty of prisoner escort. The flank companies however were not so lucky and were involved in heavy fighting on the 2nd of October around Egmont and on the 6th of October around Baccum.

    By late October the Dutch campaign of the Duke of York was obviously not going to achieve either the repulsion of  French troops or Dutch defection and by November all British troops were on board transports, heading home.

    1800 saw the first battalion in action during the taking of Malta from the French (captured during Napoleon Bonaparte's progress to Egypt) again this needs further research but what can be said is that " the first British standard flown over Valetta was that of the Kings colour of the 35th Regiment of Foot" (from Historic Memoir's of the 35th Regiment of Foot by Richard Trimen). That year like most of the British army the 35th Regiment of Foot underwent radical changes in dress equipment and drill.

    Between 1800 and 1805 the Regiment saw no action, the first battalion being on the island of Malta while the second remain in the U.K. However during this period two notable things occurred, first the Regiment's Colonel, General Henry Fletcher died on the 17th March 1803.

This old soldier had spent no less than 48 years in the Regiment and had risen to command after the death of Colonel Monro. General Henry Fletcher's passing meant  that from is founding in 1700 to 1803 the Regiment had had just four commanders (It would be interesting to research how this compares with other Regiments, perhaps visitors to this site might be able to contribute something here). The second occurrence was that in 1805 having originally been titled "The Dorsetshire Regiment" the 35th Regiment of Foot, thanks to the efforts, (in both recruitment in Sussex and his lobbying the King) of the Colonel of the 35th Regiment of Foot-- Lieutenant-General Charles Lennox (later the fourth Duke of Richmond -----29th December 1806)  was renamed "The Sussex".

Recently a letter arrived from a visitor Steve Williams to this site containing the following information/request for help. Since it adds a different aspect to "the period" and might prove interesting to research further I enclose it----
    I am researching my family tree and have found that one ancestor was in the 2nd Battalion 35th Regiment of Foot. His name was John Williams who was born 1787 at Brenock, Wales. John Williams joined the 35th Regiment and deserted three times (This may have been because of the Welsh dislike of the English ? ) for which he was sentenced to 14 years servitude and sent to Australia.
    I have a copy of his army record which is about all I have and am trying to establish the location of the 2nd Battalion-35th regiment of Foot at the time of his desertion. Between 6th of March and 16th of March the 35th Regiment had been shipped from Sicily to Alexandria and it was on 10th of March John Williams deserted from Captain Slessors company but where ?. (At his trial he was accompanied by another deserter Samuel Webb .)

All entries under Captain Slessors Company (WO-12-5019 War Office-Reg't pay list)
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
NAME                            PERIOD OF PAY            NO OF DAYS    AMOUNT          REMARKS _____________________________________________________________________________________________
John Williams          25th Nov-2ND Dec               8                -/8/-            Deserted
John Williams          21st Dec- 24th Dec               4                -/4/-            Joined from desertion
John Williams          25th Dec-10th March           76             3/16/-            Deserted                                  -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
State of Balance of effects and credit debts of N.C.O's Drummers,Pipers and Privates of 2nd Battalion- 35th Regiment of Foot, who have died or deserted, from the 25th December 1805 to the 24th March 1806. Both days inclusive.

COMPANY                 NAME               DESERTED               CREDIT              DEBITS
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Capt. Slessors          John Williams            10th March                 &3/16/-                 Nil

Account of expenses incurred by Samuel Webb and John williams, deserted, bought back to the regiment, 31st March 1806.

                            Pay from 23rd March-30th March    8 days @ 6d each £-/8/-
                       Acts from 27th March-30th March   4 days @ 3d each  £-/2/-
                       One pair of handcuffs                                                 £-/2/-
                                                                                              Total  £-/12/6

THIS ALL ADDS A DIFFERENT  VIEW ON THIS PERIOD --STEVE WILLIAMS REQUESTS ASSISTANCE FOR MORE RESEARCH--SHOULD ANYONE COME ACROSS ANYTHING RELEVANT I'M SURE STEVE WOULD LIKE TO HEAR FROM YOU

    Early 1806 saw the Regiment involved in strengthening Sicily's defences however an expedition, under Major-General Sir John Stuart, against Calabria in Southern Italy had been instigated. For this Lieutenant Colonel Oswald from the Regiment would command the 3rd Brigade while the Grenadiers found themselves in a Grenadier battalion and the light company became part of a light battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel James Kempt. This light battalion also included another 150 picked men from "The Sussex" as three more "light companies" these latter men to quote Fortescue, "must have represented the cream of the Regiment" and to a man "hard biting old soldiers". In short though the expedition only numbered some five thousand men a large portion of it was of the very highest quality. The actual breakdown of Stuart's expedition was as follows---
    Light infantry brigade under Colonel Kempt -
light companies from 1/20th, 1/27th, 1/35th, 1/58, 1/61, 1/81 and Watteville's Regiment, the "flankers of the 35th, 2 companies of Corsican Rangers and 1 Company of sicilians plus 2  four pound guns.
    1st Brigade Colonel Cole
8 companies 1/27th, Grenadier companies of 20th, 1/27th, 1/35th, 1/58th, 1/81st, and Watteville's Regiment 3 four pound guns
    2nd Brigade under Colonel Acland
!0 companies from 2/27th, 8 companies from 1/81st plus 3 four pound guns.
    3rd Brigade under Lieutenant Colonel Oswald (from the 35th Regiment of Foot)
8 Companies from 1/58th 8 companies from Watteville's Regiment plus 3 four pound guns

    The expedition arrived at the Bay of St Euphemia on June the 30th and
following a short exchange on the beach by the 1st of July the invasion force was ashore. However, later in the day a heavy surf  rose up which prevented speedy landing of ammunition and supplies this in turn prevented Stuart from taking full advantage of surprise. The French commander General Reynier  used this delay to full effect and concentrated a much more numerous force (5690 infantry, 328 cavalry and 373 gunners) to oppose Stuart. This was composed of  a brigade of the 1st  Light Infantry (two battalions) and 42nd of the Line (two battalions)  under General Compere and a brigade of the 23rd Light Infantry (two battalions) plus two battalions of Poles and one of Swiss under General Digonet.

    On the 3rd Stuart heard contradictory reports that the French were concentrating across the River Lamato near the town of San Pietro di Maida and rode out with his staff to reconnoitre, (It so happens General Reynier at that time also decided to reconnoitre and the two only just missed each other by moments). That evening Stuart having mistakenly underestimated French numbers gave orders that 350 men were to hold the beach-head while the rest of his force would march for an early morning attack on the French position.

    The scorchingly hot morning of the 4th July found the British force advancing in two parallel columns across the plain between the beach and the River Lamato. Nearest the River marched Kempt's brigade (including the 35th's light and drafted companies) followed by Cole, nearest the sea marched  Acland's brigade with Oswald's in the rear. Each brigade was accompanied by light guns (on mules)  while three heavier guns followed Acland's column. The British force was flanked to seawards by the APOLLO accompanied by two smaller craft.

    The march itself was not without difficulties French cavalry patrols were very much in evidence while according to Fortescue the plain was littered with deep marshes and sand that "the field guns could only with difficulty be bought forward". So thanks to the heat and their exertions over the guns it was a much suffering infantry that passed through the streets of Lamato before wheeling inland and entering the Plain of Maida.

    Meanwhile General Reynier (who at this time though himself  inferior in numbers) had been far from inactive, while the British advance on Lamato had progressed his infantry had filed out of their campsite into the upper portion of Maida plain. By 0845 his cavalry had been recalled and he advanced confident that he could "drive six or seven thousand English into the sea" once again to quote Fortescue "Reyneir who had tested the quality of the red coats in Egypt ought to have known better than this".

    On entering the Plain of Maida the British force continued its advance with Kempt's light brigade on the right  next to it Acland's brigade followed by that of Cole. Slightly to rear of Centre as a reserve was Oswald. French cavalry and horse artillery was by now in action the guns exchanging shots with the British artillery. Although little damage was done the effect of much manoeuvring and cannon smoke was an obscuring of French infantry movements.

    On the right Kempt deployed his Corsican Rangers and light company of the 20th across the shallow Lamato River to clear some thickets only to have them driven back by infantry secreted there by Compere in an attempt to turn the British right. The 20th lost its Captain and was in great difficulty however it stood its ground "until the flankers of the 35th came to its help and drove the French back in disorder" this was followed by a charge from the rallied Corsicans and the detached British were able to rejoin their places on the right of Kempt's Brigade.

    The French cavalry now moved towards the British left allowing the dust to settle and display to the British the French force marching towards them, in echelon from the left---Compere's leading. On the French left was as stated Compere's brigade of 1st Light infantry (Legere) and 42nd Line infantry (2800) , to their right was Peyri's brigade of Swiss and Poles (1500) and on the far right was Digonet's 23rd light infantry (1250) now joined by the French cavalry and Guns.

    The armies closed upon each other in silence, punctuated by the boom of cannon, the French firing mostly high the British guns more effective. As has often been misreported (and so well pointed out in Dr David Chandlers book, On the Napoleonic Wars, Collected Essays) the French were NOT in column but in line, the British in their by now traditional two deep formation, the French in three.

    With Compere's and Kempt's brigades closing to about one hundred yards the two lines halted and fired and exchanged a number of volleys, during which the British seemed to have emerged the more successful, as they were quickly ordered forward.

    Now occurred one of the great mistaken actions of military history, to quote Fortescue again "Kempt observing that his men were encumbered by their greatcoats, which they wore bandolier wise actually halted them, when they must have been within no more than seventy yards of their opponents and bade them throw their coats down. The front rank turned about to help the rear rank obey the order and the French mistook the movement for the beginning of a retreat." Compere galloped in front of his men shouting "Cease fire, Cease fire, Charge! and his men moved forward.

    By now the British light infantry were now free of their greatcoats and actually moving forward themselves. With Kempt ordering "Steady, Light infantry! wait for the word. Let them come close." Waiting till no less than thirty yards separated the two lines Kempt ordered "Fire! Charge bayonets". The leading French infantry turned and fled at this sudden turn about, taking with them practically all of Compere's 1st Legere. Compere himself though struck twice, accompanied by one or two lone brave men, managed to close with the British line but were quickly overcome. Kempt's men pursued their French counterparts until being rallied at the village of Maida having killed or captured some 900 men for the loss of fifty.

    Meanwhile the French 42nd of the line of Compere's brigade  and Acland's brigade came in contact. Here the French were first to fire an ineffective volley but the counter fire of two volleys and following charge forced the French line infantry back in some confusion. They managed to rally covering Reynier's now exposed left and any possible retreat route while supporting the brigades to their right.

    Peyri's brigade of Poles and Swiss now advanced from the rear to halt Acland's advance, the Poles being driven off with little difficulty. Unfortunately the Red coats of the Swiss were mistaken by the Highlanders as Watteville's Regiment and were able to deliver a close range damaging volley into much surprised British infantry. Recovering the British red coats returned fire and managed to drive off the now unsupported gallant Swiss. This allowed Acland's bloodied brigade to continue its advance.

    Reynier now had only his 23rd Legere (1250) his cavalry, plus horse artillery, uncommitted, with these he intended to attack the by now Acland's left. This was thwarted by the advance of Cole's brigade, sometimes in square, advancing on the extreme British left. Reynier now went on the defensive and formed his 23rd Legere on rising ground supported by his cavalry. Sending forward detachments of his light companies with cavalry in support. This was so successful that Reynier even managed to force Cole back on the defensive indeed due to ammunition running low and exhaustion beginning to set in, all was not good for the British left.

    The situation was retrieved by  Oswald bringing up the reserve on Cole's right and the late arrival of the 20th foot under Colonel Ross (delayed at sea) doubling forward first into action against the French skirmishers on Cole's exposed left and then wheeling to the right and open devastating fire upon Digonet's now isolated  23rd Legere.

    The result of the battle was now a forgone conclusion Reynier concentrated his forces on his now steadfast 42nd Line infantry before covering his retreat using his cavalry and skirmishers according to Fortescue "had the British possessed but two or three squadrons of cavalry, hardly a man of Reynier army could have escaped".

1. Brigade under Compere approaches in column before attacking in Line, a---1st Light Infantry (Legere), b --42nd Line infantry
2. Brigade under Peyri, c---Poles, d---Swiss
3. 23rd Light Infantry plus concentrated Cavalry
4.  Brigade under Kempt, a--Detached Light company 20th Foot, Corsican Rangers
     plus "flankers of the 35th Regiment".
5.  Brigade under Acland.
6.  Brigade under Oswald.
7.  Brigade under Cole advancing through scrub.
8.  20th Foot "doubling" from landing beach

    So ended the battle of Maida, returning to the beach, Stuart remained inactive for 48 hours (although he did allow his troops by brigades to bathe) before pushing Oswald's brigade forward to take Monteleone. Here the garrison of three hundred and fifty seven surrendered along with other exposed detachments. On the 21st of July the Castle of Scylla capitulated this was swiftly garrisoned by fresh British troops while the rest of the army re-embarked for Sicily.
In all the cost of the Calabrian campaign of 1806 to the 35th Regiment of Foot, The Sussex, was 12 killed 70 wounded of all ranks.

    The events of this campaign are as so little known, in order to inform more space and time has been committed than other sections on this web site. The main source is J.W.Fortescue's great work on the British army with additional information from the National archives at Kew and the National army museum (some figures are to be verified and amended at a later date).The causes of Britain's short lived and the near disastrous campaign in Egypt 1807 and war with one of its few allies, Turkey, are of such complexity they require some lengthy explanation. As stated the causes are complex and as far as I can ascertain came about as stated below--if anyone discovers further material on this or even has another viewpoint I would only be to happy to see/hear it.

    Since the defeat of French forces in Egypt in 1801 British politicians had tried, with marked failure to establish a Government of the country that would satisfy both Turkish territorial claims on the area and the Mameluke Beys who were the de facto rulers. The Turks on one hand quite simply would only be satisfied with the practical extermination of their Mameluke opposition while the Mameluke Beys for their part were not going to be satisfied unless their power was restored to that prior to the arrival of Napoleon's army.

    High level mediation was attempted on several occasions by General John Stuart at Constantinople but to no avail, this was further complicated by the arrival of an emissary, Sebastini who it seems was suspected of re-establishing French influence in Egypt (and thereby raising once again the spectre of an overland route for a French army marching on India).

    As far as, the so far, Two antagonists (Turkey and the Mamelukes) were concerned the Mamelukes were not only fighting a physical war against the Turks but also one against time. This was because their traditional route of new recruits--- Christian slaves via  Turkey, was now closed, therefore it was the Mamelukes who more readily sought British (or if that failed, French) help.

    By 1803, Stuart the British finally managed to persuade the Mameluke Beys to take their forces from the Nile delta into southern or upper Egypt while awaiting efforts on their behalf in Constantinople. (and allowing the remaining British troops in Egypt to finally embark for Malta).

    The British representative General Stuart appointed in Cairo was his Military secretary Missett. This gentleman by all accounts was something of a Machiavellian schemer unfortunately as he was also physically handicapped (research yet to be done) his schemes were not based on first hand experiences/evidence, but on the reports of others.

    At this point Turkey suffered a number of mutinies amongst its provinces including its Albanian troops garrisoning Cairo and the delta. Naturally enough the Mameluke Beys took advantage of this unforeseen gift and rallied the Albanians to their cause, thereby leaving the Turk's sole foothold in Egypt shut up behind the defences of Alexandria. Both sides now looked around for foreign assistance.

    As if the situation could not have been more anarchic, more was follow. All the contending parties now developed pro English/pro French lobby's which the French representative was quick to take full advantage of. Meanwhile the whole situation had further descended into anarchy --the leader of the French party amongst the Mamelukes, attempted to assassinate the leader of the British party (just returning from a visit to Britain) which led to open war between the two groups. On top of this the Albanians mutinied against the Mamelukes as a whole, driving them from Cairo. (As if this was not enough, a Bedouin army also decided to have a major foray into the region).

    By 1804 the Albanians in Egypt had found themselves a strong leader, unfortunately one  favouring the French, Mohammed Ali. It appears that not only was Mohammed Ali blessed with leaderships skills but he was also something of a military leader of note as well. In 1805 The Turks sent a large enough force to egypt with the intention of putting down both groups Mamelukes and Albanians, however Mohammed Ali marched his men to Cairo, overcame the Turks and their Viceroy, and proclaimed Viceroy himself. With a situation on their hands, they could not suddenly change, the Turks actually consented to this title being "official" which considering the French leanings of Mohammed Ali, naturally enough put Missett into something of a panic and soon urgent calls for British military intervention were winging their way to the British leaders.

    It was at this point the Mamelukes actually began talking to the Turks "asking" for the expulsion of the Albanians and allowing Egypt to return to Mameluke control. Unbelievable as it may seem the Turks agreed to this double dealing and sent both fleet and army to enforce their will, but Mohammed Ali was far to strong "defying both". The death of the Mamelukes leaders ( from natural causes?) further strengthened Mohammed Ali's hand.

    Over the years despite numerous appeals from Missett, that a military
force should be sent to Egypt to secure British interests while anarchy reigned, nothing had been done, it was now the British Government decided to act, against the strong French influence, just when the dice were heavilly weighted against such action. As, already seen Mohammed Ali was not only an able leader, but one who was strongly entrenched.

    As the news that Major General Fraser's military mission, had set sail, reached him, Missett took the opportunity to inform the Mamelukes that the British forces were coming and would restore control of Egypt to them. (Even though he had himself, many times informed the British Government that the Mamelukes were not to be trusted).

    The small British force that finally left Sicily on 6th of March consisted of the 20th Light Dragoons, the 31st Regiment of Foot, first and second battalions of 35th Regiment of Foot, 2nd battalion 78th regiment of Foot, De Roll's Regiment (Swiss in British service), and The Chasseurs Britannique (French and others serving in British service). This was further augmented by attached Sicilian Volunteers---one company of 100 men per British regiment serving in the Mediterranean. The two light companies of the 35th going to the light battalion while the remaining soldiers of the 35th, together with some artillery, formed the 2nd brigade under their own commander --Lieutenant Colonel John Oswald.

    `From the start misfortune set in, during a gale on the night of sailing the fleet was practically scattered. By the 16th of March, Fraser (in the warship Tigre) arrived off of TURKISH HELD Alexandria with only a fraction of the intended numbers, amongst which were both battalions of the 35th. Missett it seems at this point persuaded Fraser that haste was needed (before Mohammed Ali's Albanians could arrive from Rosetta, and so he asserted "while the population would assist" the efforts of liberators).
 Fraser agreed and despite a heavy surf running a storming force was landed. This included the first battalion of the 35th  their attached Sicilians, De Rolls and a small artillery team. With 150 men from the 35th leading under their Colonel Oswald (one wonders if these 150 were the "Flankers" from Maida) these 1000 odd men overran a stoutly defended fortified position but found their entry point, Pompeys's gate, heavily barricaded against them.

    Fraser drew his men to the West of the city  and sent detachments (including some from the 35th---actual numbers/companies requires further research)  to capture Aboukir Castle (this cost the 35th Regiment
2 men killed and 6 wounded) and to cover routes that Mohammed Ali would have to take to for an attempt on Alexandria. This positioning by Fraser also "secured a safe embarkation point for the rest of the army, as and when it arrived. According to Fortescue  the position was the same as that of Abercromby's army during the battle of March 21st 1801.

    Early on the 20th of March the Frigate Apollo arrived. shepherding the missing transports, the sight of which finally caused Alexandria to open its gates. Unfortunately for Fraser the capitulation of the town left him with a whole set of new problems.

    Missett now informed Fraser that Alexandria was on the point of running out of food altogether leaving the people to starve and army onto salted rations (Fortescue asserts this to be untrue). He explained further that the town depended on the land around Rosetta for cereals and Rahmanieh for cattle. (It can easily be suspected this was in order to support the commitment he'd made to help the Mamelukes on Britain's behalf, despite the fact he had no remit to do so). Fraser was now in a particularly difficult position, he had been ordered by his masters in London to only capture Alexandria, but had been informed by Britain's man on the spot that it could not be held without the capture of Rosetta or Rahmsnieh. To strengthen his argument Missett informed Fraser that the defences of Rosetta were in a dilapidated state and Mohammed Ali's Albanians were mere rabble. There was no argument against the 40 miles to Rosetta or the even more distant Rahmanieh nor the fact the capture of either or both of these targets would almost strip Alexandria of the very troops meant to occupy it.

    In consequences of Missett's machinations Fraser dispatched the 31st Regiment, the Chasseurs Britanniques and two six pounders (1600+ all ranks) to capture Rosetta. The small column reached Rosetta and marched into the maze of narrow streets of a seemingly deserted town, before a withering fire opened up from every conceivable darkened window.

    General Meade took a serious wound to the head and command devolved onto Lieutenant Bruce who managed to extricate his command from the streets of Rosetta and order a retreat. (Missett's agent affirmed that the town was actually taken and the men relaxing when the retreat sounded, other accounts are equally as contradictory as they are baffling---Missett was to send these and other accounts of the action to Britain) Whatever the truth is the losses speak volumes, 185 killed, 282 wounded all ranks out of some 1400.

    On hearing of the near disaster at Rosetta Missett redoubled his case for Rosetta to be taken (presenting various officials to support his case on the food situation) while assuring Fraser the Mamelukes were already marching to assist the British. Fortescue quotes the letter that Fraser sent to Britain to quote this "My instructions tell me that the possession of Alexandria is my chief object. But we are at War with the Porte (since Britain had taken Alexandria from Turkey by force). "Which seems to have escaped both Government and Missett, so we have the whole force of the country, both Turks and Albanians, to contend with." He also asks for precise instructions which is not surprising considering the changing/complexity of the situation. Fortescue asserts that he is not surprised about this request for instructions "for it is impossible to divine for what purpose he was sent to Alexandria."

    Taking into consideration all the arguments Fraser finally chose to make another attempt on Rosetta. This time a much larger force of some 2500 men would be sent under the command of Brigadier William Stewart and Brigadier John Oswald. it consisted of the 20th Light Dragoons, 1/35th (the second battalion left as garrison of Alexandria) 2/78th, the light battalion (including the 35th's light companies) De Roll's Regiment, Eleven artillery pieces and 200 seamen.

    With the Light battalion leading and the first battalion 35th bringing up the rear the column marched off towards their first stopping point Aboukir, 15 or so miles away on the 3rd of April. The progress was much laboured due to baggage wagons deep sand and occasional lost directions and this watering hole was not reached until late in the day. The following morning was spent transporting the force across Aboukir Bay however during the evening the 78th and the light battalion pushed forward to Edko and by the following morning had secured the place. The rest of the column followed the 6 miles or so across open sand on the 5th of April and was soon experiencing difficulties thanks to a searing wind blowing straight out of the Sahara. Never-the-less the much suffering column reached Edko that day.

    Intelligence informed Stewart that the Albanians had placed a large body of troops four miles south of Rosetta at El Hamet to control a natural isthmus separating the River Nile (Rosetta branch) from Lake Edko. Stewart decided it prudent to occupy this site in order to guard his right, rear and communications with Edko. The advanced guard (78th and light battalion) were given the task which was achieved after a brief skirmish. The position, reasonably strong, a watercourse with high banks, having just two crossing points, between lake and river, was given to Major Vogelsang and three hundred men from De Roll's Regiment plus two guns, to hold. The only weak point was where the watercourse banking dissolved at the western end leaving exposed, a half mile wide plain ideal for cavalry. Apparently Stewart relied on timely Mameluke intervention to secure this area.

    Meanwhile the main body had advanced under fire into the sand hills surrounding Rosetta and took up investing positions. Unfortunately due to lack of numbers it was impossible to fully invest the town thus allowing both supplies and men in, while allowing numerous sorties out.

    During one such sortie on the 8th of April the 35th Regiment was involved in a running fight with a large body of cavalry that was falling back after an attack on the 78th. Four companies under Captain Andrew Pack were sent to cut the cavalry off from retreating into the town. However the enemy cavalry were far from beaten and attempted to charge the advancing 35th's four companies. Captain Pack pulled his men back a little and began delivering perfectly controlled volleys into the Albanians this was enough and the cavalry sped away. During this skirmish the 35th lost one officer killed and one officer and several men wounded.

    Brigadier Stewart by now realised Rosetta could only be taken by a regular siege (despite not fully surrounding the town) and siege lines were drawn up. By the 10th of April the first heavy guns opened fire but made little impression. Fire was returned by several enemy guns and a raid was planned to destroy one particular battery across the river. (I have seen two accounts of the action and these differ even down to the actual date--one gives the 15th another gives the 16th so here further research is needed). What is certain, is that the 35th's grenadier party accompanied the small attacking party of 200 men of the 78th Highlanders plus 40 seamen. This party succeeded in destroying the guns however as they began to pull back the alerted enemy counter attacked only to find the 35th's Grenadiers fully ready to cover the withdrawal to the waiting boats, this they accomplished with great success. Richard Trimen gives the last man to leave the east bank of the Nile as the 35th's Sergeant Wright.

    The 35th Regiment was again in action on the 19th of April this time in support of the 20th light dragoons and though the action was successful by the time it was over the 35th had lost another two officers killed and fourteen men wounded. The story of sortie following sortie was the same all along the British line. While the 35th and 20th Light Dragoons were involved with their encounter, De roll's Regiment at El-Hamet were heavily attacked by cavalry which they managed to drive off. However Stewart had become anxious about his worrying right flank and detached one of the 35th's light companies and De Roll's light company from the light battalion and sent then under Captain Tarleton (of the 35th) as reinforcements. Orders were also given that Tarleton was to use his men to drive the enemy cavalry back to the East bank of the river.

    The following day Tarleton attempted to carry out his orders but the enemy was far to numerous and he withdrew. Unfortunately in order to get his command to safety across the two access points he divided it (while still in the open). This was of course an invitation to the enemy cavalry and they took full advantage of. The unfortunate main target for their attack became the De Roll's men who were quickly surrounded and practically annihilated (Fortesque gives only 5 survivors).

    When news reached Stewart he sent Colonel Macleod of the 78th (to take command at El hamet) with two companies of his own Regiment and the 35th's Grenadier company off as further reinforcements. (Bunbury's account, which I believe, Richard Trimen uses gives two companies of the 35th and one of 78th. This is yet one more example of differing accounts that requires further and deeper investigation, for the time being I bow to Fortescue)

    By that evening Macloud had secured his position, his dispositions ran as follows, on the far right overlooking the plain that ran from water course to Lake Edko were the two companies of the 35th Regiment. (The Grenadier company, arriving that evening with Macloud and the Light Company, already at El Hamet, having been sent with Tarleton) With them were one company of the 78th and a three pound cannon, all under Tarleton. In the centre of the line stood two companies of De Roll's Regiment with a second three pound gun all commanded by Major Vogelsang (from De Roll's). On the far left with their flank resting on the River Nile stood two more companies of the 78th the remainder of De Roll's Regiment and a six pound cannon, this last section of his line Macloud determined to command in person. By now it seems Stewart had already decided upon lifting the siege of Rosetta and planned a withdrawal. Macloud was given orders that he should try to hold the position if at all possible. If not he was to begin his withdrawal from the left (the Nile), falling in turn upon the supporting troops to their right before linking up with his column (coming from Rosetta) on the shore of Lake Edko. This all sounds fine on paper and Macloud's command of six hundred plus, British, Swiss and even French Men, sounds strongly positioned enough, but they were actually staring disaster in the face.

    Stewart galloped off to Rosetta in the dark narrowly missing  large groups of enemy cavalry. Shortly after arriving back at Rosetta he was informed that a veritable fleet of large transport vessels were coming down the Nile (100 plus, accompanied by two square rigged warships) all intent on strengthening the forces acting against El Hamet.
Believing in his El Hamet commander, Stewart wasted no time and began his own withdrawal, sick and stores being first to depart under the protecting eyes of the remaining companies of the 78th and De Rolls Regiment (and under cover of all the artillery pieces blasting away). These troops fell back to Lake Edko where they formed square.

    The covering guns were then themselves destroyed under the levelled (and effective) bayonets of the 35th's centre companies. These centre companies plus three more companies from the light battalion were given over to Brigadier Oswald as rear guard. By now Rosetta's Albanian defenders were well aware the British were leaving and mounted several major attacks on the parting troops until the rear guard joined the square at Lake Edko (and formed the rear face). The 35th suffering more due to being closer to the Albanian sharp shooters but to quote Stewart---"Nothing could surpass the steadiness of the troops". A later dispatch mentions the 35th "firing by wings and platoons retiring" and "the 78th with its front rank kneeling, as during the movements of a field day". (For a full version of this and other actions see, an Historical Memoir of the 35th Royal Sussex regiment of Foot by Richard Trimen, obtainable from the Regimental Museum--Redoubt Fortress, Eastbourne).

    By 10.00 hrs this combined square with its whirling attackers had reached the point where Stewart expected to meet Macloud's force coming from El Hamet but of the missing red coats there was no sign. Stewart even tried to make foray in Macleod's direction, during which the 35th were involved in a bayonet charge. However as there was still no sign of Macloud and more attacks by enemy cavalry Stewart continued his retreat in square towards Edko. With the Albanians seeing the retreat under way in an orderly fashion plus the particularly unhealthy prospect of attacking a properly formed infantry square the enemy broke off the action.

    As to events concerning Macleod's detached command, they are to say the least confusing. It seems that Macleod on seeing the approaching fleet (100 transports supported by two square riggers) came to the rapid conclusion that left would be overwhelmed in firepower alone. (Each square rigger must have had at least 12 guns and assuming at the bare minimum 30 men/transport the force about to land and attack was at least 3000 men but my figures are just a guess and I suspect the transports were carrying far more that this).

    Whatever the truth is Macleod began to retire, sadly not as ordered. It seems he ordered Vogelsang (on the extreme left) to fall back with his gun and three companies, to a small sandhill in rear of centre (instead as Macleod had been ordered, to Mohr's command on his right). Macleod then rode along the originally intended retreat route, the raised dyke. Reaching Mohr he told him to withdraw his company occupying El Hamed.

    With no one to oppose their landing the approaching Albanian troops landed, rushed into the village, occupying both El Hamed and the dyke, and immediately began opening a withering fire upon the now exposed Mohr. Macleod continued along the dyke until he reached Tarleton's 35th and 78th companies whom he ordered into an open triangle pointing south with its open face resting on the dyke. By now however even this portion of the battlefield was coming under intense fire from El Hamet and soon 35th and 78th were taking heavy losses.

    Before being killed Macleod's last order was, for Mohr to join Vogelsang on his sandhill. Fortescue states that the depleted elements of both Mohr and Tarleton's commands now tried to reach this supposed haven but only a few managed to reach it. (It is unclear just where Captain Tarleton met his end). Richard Trimen quotes Captain Macalister's (of the 35th) account which says that during the fight with odds of fifteen to one, he consulted both officers and men (of the 35th and 78th) if they should retreat, and was told that "they would sooner fight it out than abandon their wounded comrades ".On hearing this the remnant of "De Roll's Regiment immediately cheered and expressed a determination to follow their example". (Captain Macalister also states "a small square to their right had already been sabred to a man"). Whatever the truth is, this small isolated square fought on amidst thousands of enemies until lack of ammunition forced Vogelsang to surrender his small band (Macalister having been shot in the eye).
    Even during the surrender/overrunning of the square it seems that many men of both the 35th and 78th simply refused to give in. Macalister even ordered one man-- John Dyke (It will be interesting to research the service history of this lone soldier) to surrender his musket.The reply is rather telling " you have been telling us all the morning to die with arms in our hands, and I'll be dammed if I don't" and followed this defiance by bayoneting his nearest enemy. He was soon cut down in turn, but not alone.

    Of Macleods 816 plus officers and men over 292 were killed the cost to the 35th Regiment was 61 all ranks killed. Fortescue blandly quotes that the prisoners received "noble treatment". However according to Macalister, first they were transported up the Nile to Cairo by boat (beneath their feet were preserved heads of their fallen comrades) here both heads and prisoners were paraded backwards and forwards across the city to the delight of the inhabitants.The prisoners were then incarcerated throughout the Egyptian summer in the citadel until September, when the survivors were exchanged.

    With Stewart entrenched behind the walls of Alexandria the campaign had, to say the least, now assumed the position of a military disaster (which may have been even greater had it not been for the steadiness of the centre companies of the 35th and 78th at Rosetta) and with it recriminations (which could well justify a book). By 19th September the British army had been evacuated and slightly more friendly terms achieved with Mohammed Ali.
 
    As for the Mamelukes who had failed to produce any help at all, they were embroiled in their own internal fighting during which several of their leaders were killed. In 1811 Mohammed Ali finally rid himself (and his Turkish friends) of these once formidable soldiers by ordering a great massacre at Cairo citadel.